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Abstract 
 
 
This project aims to analyse the build-up to the 2003 Iraq war from a doxastic perspective, 
taking the nuclear and terror belief propositions as the paradigm of the professed rationale for 
the war. The Bush administration expressed a belief in favour of the given rationale under 
conditions epistemically inadequate to warrant belief. I will explore the concept of belief in 
relation to acceptance and faith in a bid to highlight the distinctive character of belief. The 
research aims to examine a possible attribution of belief and acceptance in light of the 
evidential conditions at the time. In an attempt to establish the epistemic status of the given 
paradigm belief propositions, taking them at face value, the research explores a 
commonsensical, internalism, and a non-commonsensical, externalism, justification theory 
along with deontologism as a possible source of motivation behind the internalist constraint 
on justification. This research concludes, in light of the evidential conditions at the time, that 
the given supposed beliefs can be rightly characterised as neither paradigmatic nor non-
paradigmatic cases of belief. That is, it concludes that neither belief nor pragmatic belief can 
be rightly attributed to the given supposed believing subjects. Rather, it concludes - in light of 
the new security environment, the nature of the alleged threat in question, the certainty 
thresholds and evidential standards considered appropriate to accept a given threat in a post-
9/11 era, the inadequacy of the available supporting evidence along with the risk asymmetries 
associated with accepting or rejecting that p - that the given alleged cases of belief are more 
apt to be characterised as cases of mere propositional acceptance. That is, of course, if the 
given supposed beliefs were genuine propositional attitudes rather than pretended beliefs or 
mere public display. The originality of this thesis emanates from the epistemological 
approach I have taken to examine the Bush administration's case for the war. In light of what 
I have concluded in relation to the epistemic status of the given supposed beliefs, my 
contribution to knowledge is also the demonstration that the commonsensical view of 
justification - represented by the internalist account - is the theory that is most consistent with 
our intuitions of the rationality of belief. I argue that internalism receives its intuitive appeal 
from our commonsensical convictions of epistemic justification rather than from 
deontological considerations, as claimed by rival externalists.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. The Build-up to the 2003 Iraq War 
 
In an attempt to introduce the relevant propositions under inquiry and present an 
overall picture of the Bush administration's case for the war, this chapter explores the 
lead-up (2001-3) to Iraq war, taking into account the principal charges levelled 
against Iraq in a bid to justify the war. The nuclear and terror propositions are taken to 
be the paradigm of the case for war, and they comprise the focus of the inquiry in this 
research. In an attempt to address the conditions that need to be taken into account 
when establishing the attribution of pragmatic belief or mere propositional 
acceptance, this chapter touches on regime change as the Bush administration's 
principal pragmatic end in the Iraqi conflict along with the alleged Iraqi threat to the 
US homeland security and the region. That is, in order to establish the attribution of 
pragmatic belief, we need to take into account the pragmatic ends at play at the time 
of an apparent belief formation. In this case, regime change was the hub of all 
pragmatic ends at the time of the alleged belief that p. In addition, the practical desire 
to ward off the allegedly feared threat from Iraq also comprised a key part of the 
given pragmatic ends. There was, on the part of the Bush administration, an alleged 
fear that Iraq might, at some point, attack or pose a threat to the US homeland security 
or its interests in the region through transferring WMD stockpiles, knowledge or 
material to terrorists, dominating the Middle East and thereby rivalling America's pre-
eminence or endangering its naval forces in the region or through acquiring nuclear 
weapons and attempting to blackmail the United States. Though regime change as a 
pragmatic goal might have favoured a collective mere manifestation of belief in 
favour of the professed rationale behind the war, I rule out the nature and force of 
such a pragmatic goal to have promoted or caused pragmatic belief that p. That is, it is 
possible that the Bush administration perceived the expression of a belief in the given 
propositions as a convenient way of garnering the public support they needed to 
pursue their regime-change policy.  
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But it would be bizarre to argue that the Bush administration officials wanted to 
believe the professed rationale behind the war because their pragmatic goal of regime 
change depended on such a belief state. The realisation of such a pragmatic goal 
might have required or favoured a collective mere manifestation of belief in favour of 
the professed rationale in order to make such a goal politically acceptable by the 
general public, in which case the manifested belief would have been a matter of mere 
pretence or mere public display rather than genuine belief. But it would be 
unreasonable to argue that the realisation of such a goal required genuine belief in the 
professed rationale behind the war. Thus, we cannot take their acting or even 
reasoning as if p as evidence that they genuinely believed the given professed 
rationale. Mere acceptance, like belief, that p disposes us to reason and act 
appropriately to p too, as explained in chapter four. Further, there are situations where 
we pursue a practical goal under the guise of a false premise. That is, we sometimes 
pursue a practical end under a premise we neither believe nor accept. Consider the 
fraudulent applicants who apply for disability or unemployment allowance under a 
premise (p) they neither believe nor accept. Though these agents might act 
appropriately to p if suitable situations arise, they neither reason as if p nor do they 
feel it true that p. They pursue an end whose manifested rationale they neither believe 
nor accept. They just feign belief in p in a bid to realise their goal or make it 
acceptable. In the case at hand, the more likely candidate to have had the kind of 
pragmatic force to promote or cause pragmatic belief that p would be the alleged fear 
that Iraq was in possession of chemical or biological weapons, a reconstituted nuclear 
weapons program, in league with Al-Qaeda, or the alleged fear that Iraq, if left 
unchecked, would sometime attack or pose a threat to the US homeland security or its 
interests in the region.  
 
But this research argues that merely fearing that p in the absence of good evidence 
whether p, where p is of major concern, normally promotes mere propositional 
acceptance rather than belief. The pilot who dreads the feared eventualities of p, but 
who lacks good evidence whether or not that p, is more likely to accept p rather than 
not p if he had to act or proceed on some basis. Richard is a pilot who operates night-
time flights in a region marked by very high mountains. The plane he flies neither has 
a co-pilot nor is it fitted with an autopilot. He briefly falls asleep during a flight, 
waking up to a faulty electronic system on board. He can still descend or ascend the 
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plane should he choose to do so, but the device responsible for communicating the 
altitude of the plane is faulty, giving unrealistic figures. Due to such an electronic 
breakdown, he is unable to determine the altitude of the aircraft, and it is too dark or 
foggy to make any sound judgment about the aircraft's altitude on the basis of his own 
phenomenology. He takes the eventualities of flying at low altitude (p) to be too 
costly due to the high mountains that surround the area. Due to the high cost of error, 
he does not just take it for granted that not p. Driven by the risk asymmetries he 
associates with accepting or rejecting that p, Richard comes to accept that p. Just like 
the field commander (see p. 98), he is in a position where he has to act on some basis. 
Therefore, he, for practical reasons, takes it for granted that p, using it as a premise for 
practical reasoning. It is, however, not the case that he has good evidence to regard p 
as more likely than not p. But he takes the feared eventualities of p - crashing into a 
mountain - to be more costly than those of not p. It is, after all, safer to err on the side 
of prudence or caution, as noted on p. 105. Richard takes belief in p to be unwarranted 
from his own cognitive perspective on the issue for he takes p to be unsupported by 
evidence. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to characterise the propositional 
attitude that guides his action as one of belief. He merely accepts that p and acts 
accordingly.  
 
    The Bush administration’s case for war was constructed on the basis of two1 key 
stated rationales. First, the stated belief that Iraq was in possession of WMD2 at the 
time. The Bush administration officials manifested a belief in the allegation that Iraq 
had chemical and biological weapons stockpiles along with a reconstituted nuclear3 
weapons program before the war. Second, the stated belief that Iraq had a relationship 
with Al-Qaeda4. The invasion of Iraq has been covered from many different 
perspectives – primarily from political5, historical6, and military7 perspectives – 
examining the relevant aspects of the war. I aim to analyse the build-up to Iraq war 
from a doxastic perspective, examining whether the given beliefs were cases of belief 
or mere propositional acceptance. In inquiring into the given beliefs, I will also 
                                                 
1
 Human suffering in Iraq was mentioned on occasions by the Bush administration, but it was not 
adduced as the major rationale for the war.  
2
 Refer to appendix (pp. 2-7, 8-14, and 15-32).  
3
 Refer to appendix (pp. 15-32).  
4
 Refer to appendix (pp. 33-61).   
5
 See Record (2010). 
6
 See Keegan (2004), Malone (2006), and Duelfer (2009).  
7
 See Keegan (2004). 
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investigate whether or not such beliefs can be appropriately characterised as cases of 
pragmatic belief.  
 
Pragmatic beliefs are acquired on the basis of pragmatic considerations. That is, our 
cognition is pragmatically driven when we set out to bring about a pragmatic belief, 
whereas it is epistemically driven when our object in an inquiry is to get the truth 
rather than the pursuit of desire satisfaction. Further, under indifferent circumstances 
where our doxastic tendencies are epistemically motivated and our goals are 
accuracy-driven, we tend to test a hypothesis and come to believe or disbelieve the 
outcome on the basis of truth-conducivity. That is, our propositional attitudes are 
driven and shaped by truth or truth-conducivity in situations where we feel 
emotionally impartial towards the hypothesis in question. But this does not reflect 
how we always come to acquire doxastic attitudes. As we will learn later on, our 
cognition is not always sensitive or responsive to truth; we sometimes tend to arrive at 
the conclusions we want to arrive at. Further, we sometimes want to believe what we 
want to be the case or what satisfies our (non-epistemic) desires, interests and goals. 
Our cognition, as noted in chapter four, is directionally driven towards the embrace of 
a desired conclusion in situations where certain pragmatic desires, interests or goals 
are at play. Epistemologists recognize that we are sometimes emotionally biased in 
favour of the doxastic attitude we want to bring about (as explicated in chapter four). 
Barnes and Scott-Kakures rightly argue that our being emotionally biased in favour of 
a particular doxastic attitude serves certain pragmatic ends.  
 
The reason, they argue, we are biased in favour of belief in a particular conclusion 
is that the belief attitude we aim at is in the service of the realisation of our pragmatic 
goals, desires and interests. Moreover, epistemologists distinguish between desire and 
fear driven beliefs as cases of (non-epistemically) motivated believing with the former 
being the more common phenomenon. The way the Bush administration officials 
approached evidential considerations - resisting disconfirming evidence, ignoring 
living doubts that p, and focusing on confirming evidence - might give rise to the 
possibility of pragmatic belief as an appropriate doxastic attribution. But this research 
argues that given the nature of the given propositions, the new security environment 
along with the evidential conditions at the time, neither belief nor pragmatic belief can 
be rightly attributed to the Bush administration officials. In situations where a 
 5 
proposition is merely feared, due to the risk asymmetries we associate with accepting 
or rejecting that p, we normally tend to accept the feared proposition. In the case of 
the Bush administration's case for war, the given propositions were inadequately 
supported by the available evidence. They were unwelcome propositions. In situations 
where we fear that p but have no good evidence whether p, we do not normally come 
to believe that p. Fearing that p in the absence of good evidence whether p normally 
promotes propositional acceptance rather than belief. By contrast, wishful 
propositions normally promote or encourage belief. Accepting something you fear to 
be the case is prudentially justified by the practical reasons that promote such 
acceptance. But from a deontological perspective, one is epistemically obligated to 
withhold belief in situations where there is no good evidence whether p. 
 
The invasion of Iraq was a military operation waged by a US-led coalition on 19 
March 2003 and declared accomplished on 01 May 2003. It was launched with a 
stated mission to realise the objectives called for by the two rationales outlined 
earlier: ridding Iraq of the alleged WMD, thwarting a potential transfer of WMD to 
terrorists and preventing further training and assistance between the two. Resolving 
the issue of Iraqi WMD was vested with the UN. Following the invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, the UN founded UNSCOM as an inspection regime to uncover and destroy 
Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and dismantle the relevant programs and materials. Following 
the departure of the UN inspectors from Iraq in December 1998, the issue of Iraq’s 
WMD and their threat were on the wane. They took less centre stage on the global 
media coverage as well as the international political arena. After the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11, the issue of Iraq’s WMD was reignited and re-emerged with a more dramatic 
turn which led to new rising tensions between the USA and Iraq. In effect, the post-
9/11 rhetoric of American politics towards Iraq got increasingly tougher. This came 
after a relative calm and a relatively soft rhetoric between the two countries. There are 
dramatic rhetorical shifts from 2001 through 2003 in the discourse of the Bush 
administration as far as assessing the status of Iraqi WMD and its alleged threat are 
concerned.  
 
On 24 February 2001, seven months prior to 9/11, the US Secretary of State Powell 
meets with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa in Cairo, Egypt. In a press 
conference held by the two authorities in Cairo on the same day, Powell is asked 
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about America’s air strikes and continuing sanctions against Iraq for which he 
responds: “frankly they [the sanctions] have worked. He [Saddam Hussein] has not 
developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He 
is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors” (see appendix, p. 2). 
Moreover, on 29 July 2001 then US National Security Adviser Rice corroborates 
Powell’s position on the status of the Iraqi WMD and observes: “we are able to keep 
arms from him [Saddam Hussein]. His military forces have not been rebuilt” (see 
appendix, p. 2). The discourse of both statements signifies how soft and promising 
American rhetoric was towards the Iraqi WMD issue prior to 9/11. Powell makes it 
clear that the imposed sanctions on Iraq have achieved the intended objective and that 
Iraq has not developed a substantial capability with regard to WMD and is incapable 
of dominating its neighbourhood. Likewise, Rice asserts that the Bush administration 
is capable of disarming Iraq, pointing out that Iraq’s military is weak. Further, she 
stresses that his military has not regained the power it once had before the first Gulf 
War.     
 
    The US-Iraqi relations were complicated by Iraq’s regional ambitions and its 
continued interest in unconventional weapons. Experiencing over a decade of tense 
diplomatic relations, matters with Iraq were eventually brought to a head to prevent a 
potential shift in the balance of power and preserve America’s economic and 
geopolitical interests in the region. Sharing certain strategic regional interests such as 
combating Iran, the US and Iraqi governments enjoyed close diplomatic relations 
during the 1980s. But they finally fell out in 1990 over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
Iraq’s regional domination could have allowed Iraq to challenge America’s pre-
eminence in the region. The fall out was, thereby, primarily due to Iraq’s veering 
away from the strategy of the US foreign policy in the region. The possession or use 
of WMD did not appear to be much of an issue to the US government in the 1980s 
when Iraq was in line with the US policy objectives in the region.  
 
Three factors reinforced the notion of Iraq as a threat to both the US homeland 
security and its strategic interests in the Middle East. First, Iraq's alleged possession 
of unconventional weapons. Second, its manifested willingness to use such weapons 
against hostile regimes. Third, its alleged relationship with terrorist networks. Iraq 
posed a threat to the peace and security of the international community through its 
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flagrant aggression against Kuwait (1990-1) and Iran (1980-8). But despite Iraq's 
glaring aggressions, regime change as a public policy objective was not pursued by 
the consecutive American governments. It was pursued by the Bush administration 
only after Iraq was perceived to be a future threat to its national security at home, its 
strategic oil interests, the security of its naval forces and its supremacy in the region. 
In addition to that, Iraq was also considered a continued threat to America’s 
staunchest ally in the region, Israel. Eliminating the threat to Israel was regarded by 
some as a rationale behind the Bush administration’s determination to confront Iraq. 
Speaking of the alleged Iraqi threat, Philip Zeliko, then member of President Bush's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, states (10 September 2002):  
 
Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I'll tell 
you what I think the real threat is and actually has been since 1990 – it's the 
threat against Israel. And this is the threat that dare not speak its name, 
because the Europeans don't care deeply about that threat, I will tell you 
frankly. And the American government doesn't want to lean too hard on it 
rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell  
(http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=23083). 
 
 
 
    Though the UN inspection process continued to make tangible progress8 and 
produce good evidence that not p, the Bush administration officials persisted in their 
public assertions that Iraq was an immediate present threat to the US national security. 
Throughout the build-up to the war, Iraq was portrayed by the Bush administration 
officials as presenting an emerging threat (Cheney, 17 March 2002), a mortal threat 
(Cheney, 29 August 2002), a fundamental danger potentially to the US (Cheney, 8 
September 2002), a serious threat to the US, its friends and allies (Cheney, 31 January 
2003), a serious threat to the US and the world (Bush, 4 September 2002), a grave and 
gathering danger (Bush, 12 September 2002), a true threat to the US and a threat to 
Israel (Bush, 26 September 2002), a threat of unique urgency (Bush, 2 October 2002), 
the most serious dangers of our age (Bush, 7 October 2002), an urgent challenge to 
the US national security (Bush, 12 October 2002), a unique and urgent threat (Bush, 
20 November 2002), a serious and mounting threat to the US, its friends and allies 
(Bush, 28 January 2003), a direct and growing threat to the safety of the American 
people (Bush, 26 February 2003), a direct, true and real threat to the US (Bush, 6 
                                                 
8
 See appendix (pp. 89-101).  
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March 2003), a clear threat to the US (Rice, 8 September 2002), a nuclear, chemical 
or biological 9/11, a great and immediate threat to the security of the American people 
and the stability of the world, an immediate biological threat, a growing danger to the 
safety and security of the American people and the world, a vastly great present 
danger, a grave and gathering danger, a threat to its neighbors, a threat to the US 
(Rumsfeld, 18 September 2002), a great and immediate threat to the security of the 
American people, a grave and gathering danger (Rumsfeld, 19 September 2002), a 
clear and present danger to the security of the US and the region (Senator Hutchinson, 
19 September 2002), a present threat and an immediate challenge to the international 
community (Senator Warner, 19 September 2002), a unique and dangerous threat to 
the US national security (Congressman Gephardt, 2 October 2002), real and present 
dangers to the region and to the world (Powell, 5 February 2003), and an imminent 
threat (McClellan, 10 February 2003)9. 
 
The discourse of the Iraqi threat as mortal, imminent, immediate, unique, urgent, 
present, growing, mounting, grave, serious, and direct constitutes what is essentially 
considered an imminent threat – the kind of threat that warrants self-defense or 
preemptive war. But no adequate evidence was adduced to substantiate the claim that 
Iraq presented a present or imminent threat to the US national security. Before the 
Bush administration assumed office, Defense Secretary Cohen asserted that Saddam 
Hussein “cannot pose a threat to his neighbors”10 (10 January 2001). Cohen reiterated 
his position a day after his earlier statement and argued that “He [Saddam Hussein] 
does not pose a threat to his neighbors at this point, and I don't believe will be in a 
position to do so”11 (11 January 2001). Reinforcing the same position, Tenet also 
argued that “his [Saddam Hussein’s] ability to project power outside Iraq’s borders is 
severely limited”12 (7 February 2001). Furthermore, on 3 October 2002 Pelosi also 
rejected the allegation that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the US: “As the ranking 
Democrat on the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I have seen no evidence or 
intelligence that suggests that Iraq indeed poses an imminent threat to our nation. If 
the Administration has that information, they have not shared it with the Congress” 
(see appendix, p. 69). Moreover, the classified version of the National Intelligence 
                                                 
9
 For further details, refer to appendix (pp. 62-80).  
10
 See appendix (p. 62). 
11
 See appendix (p. 62). 
12
 See appendix (p. 63). 
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Estimate (1 October 2002) also recognized the lack of any specific information to 
substantiate the administration’s claims of Iraqi threat to the US homeland: “we have 
no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against 
US territory” (see appendix, p. 73).  
 
Following the military offensive against Iraq, these perceptions were corroborated 
by Robert Baer, a 21-year CIA veteran who spent ninety percent of his time as a 
career agent in the Middle East. He argues that “The only person Saddam was a threat 
to … was to Iraq. … he wasn’t scaring anybody. He certainly wasn’t scaring the 
Iranians, or the Turks or the Saudis or anybody else” (in Greenwald 2004). Moreover, 
on 10 July 2003, Gregory Thielmann, then director of intelligence bureau at the US 
State Department, also observes: “I believe the Bush administration did not provide 
an accurate picture to the American people of the military threat posed by Iraq. … 
Iraq posed no imminent threat to either its neighbours or to the United States” 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/10/iraq.julianborger1). But despite the 
lack of substantiating evidence, the Bush administration’s intimidatory rhetoric 
permeated through most of their statements about Iraq’s WMD and its alleged threat, 
provoking a sense of urgency to act. There was no adequate evidence to warrant belief 
in the proposition that Iraq was a present or imminent threat to the US homeland.  
 
1.2. Iraq and Al-Qaeda 
 
In his host meeting with the Republican governors at the White House on 20 
September 2002, President Bush introduced the Iraqi issue as an extension of the war 
on terror: “It is important to know that Iraq is an extension of the war on terror” (in 
McClellan 2008: 139). Throughout the campaign to rally political support and 
rationalise the case for war, the Bush administration officials persisted in their 
argument that there was a connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. But establishing 
such connection was complicated by the lack of adequate supporting evidence and a 
pervasive understanding that the two were ideologically different to make common 
cause. But the Bush administration was still persistent in its endeavour to portray Iraq 
as an ally of Al-Qaeda. Though this research finds it inappropriate to attribute belief 
or pragmatic belief to the Bush administration officials, Richard Clarke, then US chief 
counter-terrorism adviser on the US National Security Council, argues that they 
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wanted to believe that there was a connection between the two: “they [the Bush 
administration officials] wanted to believe that there was a connection, but the CIA 
was sitting there, the FBI was sitting there, I was sitting there saying ‘we have looked 
at this issue for years, there is just no connection’” (in Greenwald 2006). 
 
Lacking current adequate supporting evidence, the inquiry into the terror 
proposition focused on possible intentions, motivations and the alleged past contacts 
between the two. These considerations were the core of the premise behind the 
alleged relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. This was recognized, on 8 
September 2006, by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as what gave rise to 
the alleged relationship: “One key aspect of prewar analysis focused on the intentions 
and motivations for a potential Iraq-al-Qa’ida partnership” 
(http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf). The other consideration 
instrumental in drawing the conclusion that there was a relationship between the two 
was data mining which is defined by the CIA veteran Robert Baer as “going back 
over old information coming up with new conclusions” (in Greenwald 2004). In their 
2006 report, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence acknowledged the practice 
of data mining as what motivated the Bush administration to draw such connections:  
 
In prewar assessments, the Intelligence Community had little specific 
intelligence reporting that revealed Saddam Hussein’s personal opinion about 
dealing with al-Qa’ida. Instead, analysts looked at Saddam’s record of support 
for secular terrorist organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Front 
(http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf), p. 63. 
 
 
1.3. Regime Change 
 
Ever since his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein had been perceived by 
consecutive US governments as an undesirable character not in line with the US 
foreign policy objectives in the region. Regime change had, therefore, long been 
perceived as the only panacea for the Iraqi issue, which is why it was eventually 
publicly adopted by the Clinton and Bush administrations as a statutory policy 
objective. It was the policy objective on which key economic and geopolitical 
interests depended. Thus, the so-called inquiry into the charges levelled against Iraq 
was launched against the background of a practical agenda that had regime change as 
the ultimate end. Iraq was, therefore, in a no-win situation. Saddam Hussein had to go 
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regardless of WMD existence or Iraq’s compliance with the UN disarmament 
resolutions. It was an un-winnable battle for Iraq. Then head of MI6, Richard 
Dearlove, explains how the Bush administration fixed the available evidence to suit 
their regime-change policy. Following his return from consultations in Washington, 
Dearlove meets with Tony Blair at number 10 Downing Street on 23 July 2002 where 
he asserts that “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by 
the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being 
fixed around the policy” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/05/12/AR2005051201857.html). Moreover, Tyler 
Drumheller, then top CIA chief of clandestine operations in Europe, observes that 
during the lead-up to Iraq war, there was, on the part of the Bush administration, an 
“unprecedented drive for intelligence justifying the Iraq War” (2006: 4). He further 
argues:  
 
It may suit this White House to have Americans believe a black-and-white 
version of reality – that it could have avoided the Iraq War if the CIA had only 
given it a true picture of Saddam’s armaments. But the truth, as all CIA 
officers know, is always several shades of gray. The truth is that the White 
House, for a number of reasons, believed what it wanted to believe (Ibid: 5). 
 
 
That is, regime change was the ultimate policy goal, which is why the Bush 
administration pursued every lead of intelligence, no matter how unprobative it was, 
that conduced to the rationalisation of such goal. But this research denies the 
possibility of pragmatic belief which Drumheller attributes to the White House 
officials. Moreover, removing Saddam Hussein as a policy objective was also upheld 
by the leading neoconservative think tank PNAC. In January 1998, PNAC submitted a 
policy statement to President Clinton urging him to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power because of a future threat he may pose to the USA, his failure to comply with 
the UN resolutions, and his reluctance to cooperate with the UN inspection teams. 
The statement reads: “We urge you to articulate this aim [regime change], and to turn 
your Administration's attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's 
regime from power” (http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm). 
Subsequently, the US House of Representatives passed an act, Iraq Liberation Act, 
which was then signed by President Clinton in October 1998. The act was specifically 
designed to support and promote a regime-change policy through Iraqi opposition 
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groups. The act argued that “It should be the policy of the United States to support 
efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to 
promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime” 
(http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ338.105.pdf). 
Furthermore, President Bush himself explicitly manifested his desire to see regime 
change as the end result: “yes, we'd like to see a regime change in Iraq. That's been 
the longstanding policy of the U.S. government. Nothing is new there. That’s 
precisely what has been said since I became President of the United States”13 (22 
March 2002). Reiterating, on 8 September 2002, regime change as Bush’s policy 
objective towards Iraq, Cheney observes: “The president’s made it clear that the goal 
of the United States is regime change. He said that on many occasions. ... the 
president’s objective for the United States is still regime change” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). In addition, in his host 
meeting with the Republican governors on 20 September 2002 at the White House, 
Bush14 outlines his strategy to confront the alleged threat posed by Iraq with Saddam 
Hussein as the sole target: “Iraq is a threat we will deal with in a logical way. If we 
have to act, my choices are really three. One, someone kills him [Saddam Hussein]. 
Two, the population rises up and overthrows him. Three, military action” (in 
McClellan 2008: 140). Further, in his interview with the CBS's 60 Minutes program 
on 23 April 2006, Drumheller argues that the Bush administration was looking for 
corroborating intelligence to fit into the regime-change policy, pointing out that they 
ignored intelligence counter to the position they were defending:  
 [In September 2002] he [Naji Sabri] told us that they had no active weapons 
of mass destruction program. … The policy was set. The war in Iraq was 
coming. And they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify 
the policy. … The group that was dealing with preparation for the Iraq war 
came back and said they're no longer interested. And we said, well, what about 
the intel, and they said, “well, this isn't about intel anymore. This is about 
regime change  
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/21/60minutes/main1527749_page2.
shtml). 
 
                                                 
13
 See appendix (p. 87). 
14
 See appendix (pp. 87-88) for further statements vis-à-vis the regime-change policy.  
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The idea of going after Iraq was U.S. policy. It was going to happen, one way 
or the other. … I think it [the intelligence community’s conclusions] mattered 
[to the administration] if it verified this basic belief that had taken hold in the 
U.S. government that now is the time, we had the means, all we needed was 
the will [to remove Saddam Hussein]  
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/21/60minutes/main1527749.shtml). 
    
 
Moreover, Mel Goodman, a 20-year senior CIA analyst, also observes:  
 
The Bush Administration made up its mind to go to war on September the 
11th, 2001. From that time on, you were dealing with rationalisation and 
justification for the war. You weren’t dealing with real causes for the war, or 
real reasons for the war. There was never a clear and present danger, there was 
never an imminent threat (in Greenwald 2004). 
 
 
In terms of legality, Iraq war was in stark violation of the UN Charter, Articles 4115 
and 4216. That is, whereas enforcing the UN mandates or giving effect to them is 
solely vested with the UN Security Council, the US-led military action went ahead in 
the absence of the UN Security Council authority, there was no imminent or present 
threat to the peace and security of the international community, Iraq war was waged 
contrary to the terms and conditions of the UN Charter. Though the invasion was 
conducted multilaterally with some international support, it was not intended to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. The war can, thereby, be rightly 
considered an act of aggression under international law. It could not have been a 
preemptive response for there was no imminent threat from Iraq. Preemptive military 
action, according to the 2002 Pentagon Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
is defined as “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an 
enemy attack is imminent” (in Shue and Rodin 2007: 6). There was, as observed 
earlier, no imminent threat to the peace and security of the US homeland or any other 
states. It was a preventive war even according to the 2002 Pentagon’s aforementioned 
dictionary which defines preventive war as “a war initiated in the belief that military 
conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater 
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 “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations” (http://www0.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml). 
16
 “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate 
or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations” (Ibid).  
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risk” (Ibid: 6). Moreover, Jeffrey Record, a former professional staff member of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, also observes: 
 
Preventive war is … prompted not by a looming enemy attack, but rather by 
long-range calculations about power relationships17 … Preventive war 
assumes that conflict with the rising state is inevitable, and therefore striking 
before the military balance worsens becomes imperative (2004: 12). 
 
 
This chapter has examined the lead-up to Iraq war, outlining the professed rationale 
behind the war, providing a background insight into the issue of the Iraqi WMD and 
laying out the reasons that gave rise to the idea of Iraq being allegedly a threat to the 
US homeland security and its interests in the Middle East. In a bid to highlight the 
palpable absence of the evidential conditions that render a war an act of self-defence 
or preemption, I have touched on the nature of Iraq war in relation to preemptive and 
preventive wars, outlining the substantive differences that obtain between the two 
such as the imminence of a given threat or attack, the associated intent of action, and 
the probity of evidence required for action. Preemptive responses are characterised by 
the imminence or presence of a threat or an attack (p), probative evidence that p, and 
good-faith (the intention to defend yourself against an imminent or a present danger). 
By contrast, preventive responses are characterised by the absence of the imminence 
criterion. They are acts of aggression carried out for reasons other than self-defence. 
That is, preventive responses are neither driven nor constrained by the probity of 
evidence that p. In the case of the Bush administration's military response to the 
alleged Iraqi threat, there was a tangible absence of the kind of probative evidence 
that we normally require before engaging in acts of self-defence or preemption. It is 
the patent absence of probative evidential conditions that renders questionable the 
sincerity of the Bush administration's apparent belief that Iraq was an imminent threat, 
in possession of chemical and biological weapons along with a reconstituted nuclear 
weapons program, and in league with Al-Qaeda.   
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Preventive war is, therefore, a political concept, whereas preemptive war is a military concept as 
pointed out by Strachan: “Preemption was an idea that grew from the operational level of war; it was a 
military concept, whereas preventive war was a political one” (in Shue and Rodin 2007: 27). 
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1.4. The Research Question 
 
This research seeks to answer two fundamental questions concerning the build-up 
to the 2003 Iraq war. I have chosen to examine the nuclear and the terror propositions 
as a paradigm of the stated rationale behind the war. First, it aims to examine the 
justificatory status of the asserted beliefs in light of the available evidence for and 
against the given propositions, establishing what their epistemic status would have 
been if they were genuine cases of belief. Second, it aims to establish, in light of the 
evidential conditions at the time, whether the given asserted beliefs were cases of 
belief, pragmatic belief or mere propositional acceptance. To this end, I have 
undertaken a philosophical approach. Belief, propositional acceptance and epistemic 
justification form the basis of the philosophical methodology I have employed to 
pursue the inquiries in question. The philosophical methodology is developed with an 
inquiry into the nature of belief, acceptance and epistemic justification. Belief is a 
subjective mental attitude whose existence does not supervene on its manifestation. 
That is, neither the expression of a belief nor our acting appropriately to a belief can 
be taken as evidence for holding the belief. One might firmly assert a belief on a 
given matter, but still lack the corresponding belief. There are situations where we 
want to get others to believe a proposition we do not believe ourselves. I might feign 
belief in a proposition (p) in an attempt to get others to believe that p. Consider the 
conqueror who conquers other states under the guise of a threat of some sort. He 
feigns belief in a proposition (p) in a bid to get the public to believe that p. It could be 
the case that the conqueror needs public support in order to pursue his conquest of 
other lands and perceives the assertion of such a belief as a convenient way of 
garnering such a support. That is, we sometimes present ourselves as having a certain 
propositional attitude on an issue in an attempt to induce the corresponding attitude in 
others.  
 
Moreover, there are situations where we want to convince others of the truth or 
probability of our beliefs or where we want to get others to believe what we want 
them to believe. Further, Paul Grice argues that the asserter who engages in protreptic 
discourse intends, "via imparting a belief that he has a certain propositional attitude, 
to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer" (1989: 123). That is, often when we 
engage in hortatory communication, we typically intend to, through conveying the 
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impression that we have a certain propositional attitude about the given matter, induce 
in the addressees the corresponding attitude regardless of whether or not the given 
attitude represents the actual state of our mind. It could be the case that I genuinely 
believe what I intend to induce in the addressees. But it could also be the case that the 
attitude I intend to induce in the addressees is one which I do not believe myself. I 
might just accept a proposition for practical reasons, but intend to induce it in the 
addressees in the way of belief. Further, there are situations where we want to get 
others to believe a proposition we merely accept for practical reasons in the absence 
of the corresponding belief. That is, it could be the case that I engage in protreptic 
communication with the intention of inducing in the addressees a belief I am not 
holding myself. Consider a situation where the American Medical Association 
requires the public's approval in order to test an intriguing hypothesis on cloning the 
human embryos. It is a hypothesis they merely accept for practical purposes, that is to 
test it in an attempt to discover whether p or not p. They might engage in a protreptic 
campaign in a bid to gain the public's approval by getting them to assent to or, 
preferably, believe the essence of the hypothesis. Under such conditions, we might 
engage in protreptic communication in an attempt to induce in the addressees a belief 
whose essence we merely accept for practical reasons.  
 
Though we often, when engaged in protreptic communication, intend to induce in 
the audiences the attitude we hold or pretend to hold about a given matter, and that 
belief, as noted on p. 47, normally takes the form of an assertion, assertion alone or 
the assertion of a belief alone cannot be ipso facto taken as a demonstration that the 
asserter necessarily holds the belief he asserts or implies. He may be lying. Human 
beings can be deceptive. That is why observing the manifestation of the behavioural 
dispositions - whether they be verbal or actional - we typically associate with a certain 
belief cannot be taken as the sole linchpin for the attribution of the belief. Sometimes 
we, for some ulterior motive, just feign belief and engage in manifesting the core 
behavioural dispositions that one typically takes to imply the existence of a particular 
belief. He who does wrong under the pretence of belief deserves moral blame. But he 
who does wrong in the presence of a reasonable belief deserves a justification for 
doing the wrong. This is, of course, as far as the reasonable belief view of justification 
is concerned. It, therefore, for purposes of assigning moral blameworthiness, matters 
whether we attribute reasonable belief to the agent who does wrong. Belief is not only 
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thought of as a propositional attitude here; it is also a moral attribute when acquired 
on the basis of sufficient evidence. This, however, might imply epistemic 
deontologism which I do not uphold as a way of looking at how rational belief is 
acquired or what confers such a rationality status on a belief. But it, at least, makes 
sense as to why it matters whether or not to attribute belief to an agent who acts under 
the pretence of belief. In a bid to examine whether the evidential conditions at the 
time were in favour of belief or mere acceptance, and thereby establish whether the 
given asserted beliefs are most apt to be thought of as cases of belief or mere 
acceptance, I have chosen to draw a systematic distinction between belief and 
propositional acceptance (see chapter four). In an attempt to individuate belief as a 
propositional attitude unwillable in character, I have chosen to explain belief in 
relation to will (see chapter three). I have also looked into the concepts of acceptance 
and faith in order to further demonstrate the differentiae of belief as an attitude 
normally responsive to truth and usually shaped by epistemic evidence (see chapter 
four).   
 
Taking belief and acceptance into account is, therefore, appropriate and necessary 
for the nature of the inquiry pursued in this research. They are inextricably related to 
the research questions pursued. Belief and acceptance are both partly associated with 
action. They both dispose us to act appropriately to what we believe or accept as true. 
Belief often guides, motivates, influences and shapes action (Ramsey 1929, Peirce 
1877, and Clifford 1999). That is, belief often, though it need not, disposes us, from a 
Bainean (1859) and Rylean (1949) perspective, to act in a way appropriate to a certain 
belief. The philosophers who draw a sharp distinction between belief and acceptance 
look at acceptance as a pragmatic premissory policy for action (acting as if p). But 
they also take it that one necessary element of acceptance is to reason about a given 
matter as if p. Cohen is one of the leading philosophers who take acceptance to be 
radically different from belief. He argues that acceptance, despite being a premissory 
policy to act as if p, is "a policy for reasoning [as if p]" (1992: 5). Though neither 
belief nor acceptance is reducible to behaviour, behaviour is often guided or 
motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by a propositional attitude whether it be 
belief or acceptance. Most perceptual or memory beliefs unconsciously guide 
behaviour. But acceptance, by virtue of being a conscious assent to a proposition, 
normally concerns reflective behaviour. Here we are not concerned with mechanical 
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behaviour. I will be, in part two of chapter nine, aiming to establish whether the Bush 
administration's conduct towards Iraq can be appropriately characterised as being 
guided by belief, mere acceptance or regime change. In addition to denying the 
possibility of belief as an appropriate guiding attitude, I will be arguing that even if 
their behaviour was driven by regime change, it still does not follow that they did not 
accept the given propositions.  
 
Doxastic acceptance is normally driven by good epistemic evidence, whereas mere 
propositional acceptance is neither driven nor constrained by evidence of such 
probity. It is logically possible to think that the Bush administration officials were 
being insincere in their presentation of p as the real reason for the war but still, for 
practical purposes such as safety precautions in the battlefield, accepted that p in their 
war planning policy. That is, it might be that they invaded Iraq because they just 
wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein. But even if this is necessarily the case, it still 
does not follow that they rejected p altogether. It is possible that they lied about the 
real reason for the war but still took it for granted, at least in their war plans, that Iraq 
was in possession of some chemical or biological weapons or some enriched uranium 
capable of causing some toxic or infectious diseases or some radiation in the 
battlefield. Further, it is logically possible to think that though the Bush 
administration lied about the real reason for the war, the charges they levelled against 
Iraq were of some concern to them. It could be that they perceived the given 
propositions to be poorly supported by the current evidence, but still deemed it 
irrational to reject them in a post-9/11 security environment. Thus, lying about the 
real reason for the war does not mean the ultimate rejection of p. It could be that they 
lied about why they wanted to invade Iraq in which case p would not be the real 
reason as to why they went after Iraq, but still accepted p as a premise for planning 
possible war scenarios.  
 
    That is, it is likely that they accepted p as a premise for their contingency war plans 
due to the risk asymmetries associated with waging a war taking it for granted that not 
p while it turns out that p and waging a war taking it for granted that p while it turns 
out that not p. After all, it is, as noted on p. 105, safer to err on the side of prudence or 
caution, and it is such considerations that guide or shape our reasoning under 
conditions where we do not know, are not certain or have no good evidence whether p 
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or not p but where p is of major concern to us. Moreover, it is also logically possible 
to think that they neither believed nor accepted that p. That is, it could be that they 
just feigned belief in p in an attempt to gather some public support for the cause they 
were pursuing. But it is unlikely that they would have gone to war, taking it for 
granted that not p, against a country with a history of WMD possession and use. 
Though Saddam Hussein's past use of WMD was no good evidence to believe that p, 
it was good evidence to believe or accept his brutality and ruthlessness in the 
battlefield. It is also logically possible to think that they genuinely believed that p and 
it was due to such a belief that they waged the war against Iraq. But I argue that belief 
attribution to them is inappropriate given the evidential conditions at the time. It is 
equally possible to think that they merely accepted that p and it was due to such a 
propositional acceptance that they confronted Iraq. But the more likely explanation of 
all is that they wanted to take down Saddam Hussein's regime and it was this regime-
change objective that was the real reason for the war. But it still does not follow that 
they, at least the war planners, did not accept p as a premise for practical reasoning 
during the planning and operational phases of the war. That is, as a premise for the 
contingency war plans. 
 
The Bush administration officials, following the events of 9/11 and in the presence 
of scant evidence of unprobative nature, embarked on a public relations campaign 
endorsing the given propositions as if they believed them or knew them to be true. 
That is, they set out on a hortatory campaign endeavouring to garner public and 
political support for war with Iraq, adducing the given charges as the rationale behind 
the legitimacy of the war. That is why they can be rightly described as intending, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, to induce in the addressees a belief that Iraq 
had chemical and biological weapons, a reconstituted nuclear weapons program and 
was in league with Al-Qaeda. In light of belief and acceptance along with the 
evidence available at the time, I aim to establish whether they can be rightly 
characterised as holding the corresponding belief or whether it is more apt to think of 
the given asserted beliefs as mere propositional acceptances. Furthermore, I will also 
establish whether the given supposed beliefs can be appropriately characterised as 
pragmatic beliefs. Taking belief, acceptance and pragmatic belief into account is, 
therefore, appropriate and necessary for the nature of the inquiry pursued in this 
research. Part one of chapter nine seeks to establish the justificatory status of the 
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given supposed beliefs, taking them at face value, demonstrating what their rationality 
status would have been if they were genuine beliefs sincerely held. To this end, I have 
chosen to take into account epistemic justification and its central theories in the 
philosophical literature: the internalist, the deontological and the externalist theories 
of justification. In pursuing this object, I also aim to show the most plausible 
justification theory. I have weighed up the utility, plausibility and viability of the 
foregoing philosophical justification theories in a bid to demonstrate the 
indispensability of the common-sensical view, the internalist theory being its 
equivalent in philosophy, of justification. In order to show what justification is or 
what justifiability status amounts to in philosophy, I have first examined justification 
in relation to truth (see chapter five). I have shown that epistemic justification is just 
an ordinary expression for good evidence that neither entails truth nor does it preclude 
falsehood. Rather, justification is, in BonJour's terms, just "a means to truth" (1985: 
7).  
 
Further, I have also shown that having justification to believe a proposition does 
not entail having the corresponding belief. Thus, I might have justification to believe 
in God, but might not possess the corresponding belief. Justification is construed here 
as objectively good reason. Moreover, sometimes we have reason to believe 
something or somebody, yet might not possess or might never come to possess the 
corresponding belief. The Bush administration officials might have had some reason, 
but not justification, to believe the given propositions, yet they might not have held 
the corresponding belief. Thus, having justification or reason to believe something 
cannot be equated with holding the corresponding belief. It is possible that by 
asserting or implying belief in the given propositions, the Bush administration 
officials were just referring to or just meant having reason to believe them rather than 
holding the corresponding belief. In fact, Cheney explicitly refers, at least on two 
occasions, to having reason to believe the nuclear proposition rather than holding the 
corresponding belief. On 17 March 2002, prior to the November 2002 resumption of 
the UN inspections in Iraq, he argues that they “have reason to believe they're [the 
Iraqis] pursing the acquisition of nuclear weapons” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020317.html). 
Further reiterating this very position on the Iraqi nuclear issue, he, on 24 March 2002, 
states: “now, of course, for the last three years there've been no inspectors and there's 
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good reason to believe that he continues to aggressively pursue the development of a 
nuclear weapon” (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
 
Exhibiting that justification implies no truth entailment is appropriate and necessary 
for the nature of the inquiry pursued in this research because it is necessary that the 
conditions for the conferment of justificatory status are made manifest. In other 
words, it is necessary that it is made clear that justificatory status is, on the internalist, 
deontological and externalist views of justification, bestowed on a belief on the basis 
of truth-conducivity rather than truth itself. This truth-conducivity is understood by 
internalists as basing a belief on good evidence, by deontologists as responsibly or 
blamelessly acquiring a belief, and by externalists as reliably forming a belief. The 
externalist view of justification leans more towards restricting rationality status to 
truth alone by virtue of its insistence that such a status supervenes on the reliability of 
the cognitive process that generates a certain belief and that a process is reliable only 
if its preponderant realisations culminate in getting the truth. Thus, it is necessary to 
understand that if we deprive the given supposed beliefs from rationality status, it 
would not be because the Bush administration officials missed the truth. That is if the 
propositional attitudes they asserted were ever genuine beliefs. Rather, it would be 
because they either, on the internalist and the commonsensical view of justification, 
failed to base their apparent beliefs on adequate evidence and also failed to heed to 
the overwhelming contrary evidence (in the case of the nuclear proposition) and the 
serious living doubts raised by the CIA, DIA, DOE, and INR concerning both the 
nuclear and the terror propositions; or it would be, on the externalist view of 
justification, because the given supposed beliefs were the result of unreliable 
cognitive processes - a condition we cannot accurately determine due to the generality 
problem which externalism suffers from; or it would be, on the deontological view of 
justification, because they failed to properly fulfil their intellectual or epistemic 
obligations such as acquainting themselves with good evidence, being attentive to 
doubts and contrary evidence and other relevant intellectual obligations.  
 
Just like possessing justification to believe something does not necessarily mean 
possessing the corresponding belief, asserting p or acting as if p does not necessarily 
mean holding the corresponding belief that p either. Though we normally act 
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appropriately to our beliefs if we have to act, our acting as if p cannot be taken as 
evidence for holding the belief that p. But behaviourists reduce belief to behavioural 
manifestations. That is, the behaviourist dispositional theory of belief associates belief 
with our dispositions to act in a certain way. If belief were solely a behavioural 
disposition to act in a certain way, then we could determine whether or not one holds 
a certain belief solely through determining whether or not one conforms with the 
behavioural dispositions - whether actional or verbal - we normally associate with the 
belief. But belief attribution cannot solely supervene on publicly observable 
behaviour for even mere acceptance that p might involve acting as if p, as noted in 
chapter four. Besides, I can just pretend to believe that p and act as if I genuinely hold 
the corresponding belief I imply while in fact lacking the belief that p. That is why 
publicly observable behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for the attribution of 
belief. Rather, the necessary criterion for the attribution of belief is the disposition to 
"feel it true that p and false that not-p" (Cohen 1992: 4). But in the absence of easy 
access to empirical evidence whether or not one feels it true that p and false that not p, 
we need to consider the conditions under which belief normally obtains or the 
conditions under which belief is normally psychologically impossible. This, however, 
does not mean that in order to establish whether or not attributing a particular belief is 
appropriate, we have to consider every conceivable situation under which belief 
obtains or is psychologically impossible. Instead, it is done through studying the 
conditions that normally cause belief or render belief likely or possible such as the 
presence of good supporting evidence and the absence of sufficient contrary evidence 
along with the absence of living doubts. But this shall not imply that the obtaining of 
such conditions always causes or necessitates belief. I might have good evidence to 
believe that humans have evolved from apes but nevertheless lack such a belief. Many 
people believe in the Judgment Day, the divinity of the Quran or Moses' opening of 
the Red Sea on the basis of bad evidence. That is, we sometimes hold or retain a 
certain belief even in the face of degenerate supporting evidence or contrary evidence. 
Akratic or religious beliefs are the paradigm of such beliefs. Thus, belief is not always 
formed in response to evidence or good evidence. Practical reasons can sometimes 
indirectly cause belief, as noted in chapters three and four.  
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Thus, belief attribution requires knowledge of the conditions outlined earlier. It is, 
therefore, necessary to lay out the conditions that normally cause belief or render it 
psychologically possible, explaining what belief is and what belief is not as well as 
demonstrating the modes belief is normally taken to exist in such as the dispositional 
or state mode as opposed to the conscious occurrence mode. I will look into the nature 
and differentiae of belief in chapters two and three. Furthermore, the attribution of 
propositional acceptance also requires knowledge of the conditions that constitute this 
propositional attitude. It is, therefore, necessary to lay out the conditions under which 
a given propositional attitude can be rightly characterised as doxastic acceptance or 
mere acceptance. The nature and differentiae of propositional acceptance are explored 
in chapter four. In practical situations where we have to act, we typically act out of 
belief or acceptance that p. That is, our behaviour is either driven by belief or 
acceptance that things are a certain way. In chapter four we will learn that we do not 
always accept what we believe. In situations where we accept what we believe, our 
behaviour is driven by doxastic acceptance if the belief leads to some action. But 
under evidentially unprobative conditions where, due to the nature of the condition, 
we have to act on some basis, our action is normally driven by mere propositional 
acceptance (acceptance without the corresponding belief). That is, under such poor 
epistemic conditions, the propositional attitude that prompts or guides our action is 
more apt to be construed as mere acceptance rather than belief for we, due to the lack 
of good evidence whether p or not p, normally take belief in either possibility to be 
unwarranted from our own cognitive perspective.  
 
Consider a situation where I, in the midst of touring a very complex and confusing 
maze, deliberate on which route to take in order to get out of the maze quicker. It is a 
situation where I am in possession of no good evidence to consider any route closer 
than the others. They all look equally puzzling to me, and I have no good evidence to 
believe that the route I will be taking eventually is closer than other routes. Under 
such evidential conditions, though I might have a hunch that p, it will be inappropriate 
to characterise the propositional attitude that guides my action as one of belief. It is 
more likely that I, due to the lack of good evidence to settle doxastic opinion on the 
issue, just accept that one of the routes is the closest and act accordingly. Or I might 
just guess that p or follow my instincts on the issue. But the build-up to the 2003 Iraq 
war was not a situation lacking sufficient contrary evidence (at least in the case of the 
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nuclear proposition), nor was it a situation devoid of living doubts. Rather, it was a 
situation where there was adequate evidence, the IAEA's empirical findings18, to 
disbelieve the nuclear proposition or abandon belief, if it was ever a genuine belief, in 
the nuclear proposition. There were also grave doubts19 sufficient to, at least, suspend 
judgment on the terror proposition. It is logically possible to think that the Bush 
administration officials took the available contrary evidence along with the available 
living doubts to be insufficient to disbelieve or reject the given propositions, and took 
the available supporting evidence to be a reason to believe but insufficient to warrant 
belief in the given propositions and therefore had neither belief nor disbelief about the 
given matters. That is, it is possible that they did not trust the available contrary 
evidence.  
 
Given their demonstrated vulnerabilities as a result of the 9/11 attacks and their 
contention that evidential standards and certainty thresholds should be scaled down in 
a post-9/11 security environment (see pp. 249-250), it is likely that they perceived 
accepting that p as more prudent or safer than rejecting that p. Moreover, it is also a 
logical possibility that they eventually came to disbelieve that p or believe that not p 
but still perceived the acceptance of such a propositional attitude as irrational, unsafe 
or potentially costly in a post-9/11 security environment. There are situations where, 
due to the high cost of error or the importance of what is at stake, our acceptance of a 
proposition requires knowledge or certainty whether or not that p. That is, sometimes 
we perceive mere belief to be insufficient to accept a proposition for propositional 
acceptance can have unwelcome consequences (see p. 108). Belief is a fallible notion. 
I can have a very well-grounded belief and still be wrong. That is why in situations 
where I perceive the cost of error to be too high, I am normally driven to pursue 
knowledge, certainty or at least a diachronically justified belief whether p or not p. 
Under such conditions, our intuitions or gut feelings might not be satisfied with mere 
belief that p. Consider a situation where on the basis of visual evidence, I come to 
believe that the lake opposite my house is completely frozen (p). If I were to be asked 
whether p or if I were to consider whether p, I would feel it true that p. But if I were 
to consider whether to walk on the lake, I might not just take it for granted that p in 
spite of believing that p. It is very likely that the high cost of error prompts me to seek 
                                                 
18
 See appendix (pp. 17-32).   
19
 See appendix (pp. 33-61). 
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greater reassurance such as knowledge or certainty that p before I were to accept p as 
a premise for practical reasoning. Under such circumstances, propositional acceptance 
is normally driven by knowledge or certainty. But mere propositional acceptance is 
normally driven by practical reasons. That is, it does not require good epistemic 
evidence, belief, knowledge or certainty. I might believe a boat to be unsafe for use, 
yet still accept it for practical purposes when I see danger looming. Though I 
disbelieve the safety conditions of the boat, in my accepting it to be safe, I just reason 
and act as if it were safe for use. That is, I just treat it as if it were safe for use.  
 
Because belief sometimes results from our practical needs, it would be 
inappropriate for any account of belief attribution to be solely based on the conditions 
that we typically take to cause belief or render it likely. That is, we will be doing 
injustice if we were to base our belief attribution theory solely on the Lockean 
premise that belief “cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason” (in 
Plantinga 1993: 13). But we would equally be doing injustice if we were to take the 
given beliefs at face value, attributing them belief solely on the basis of publicly 
observable behaviour. It is possible that they were just lying about the given 
propositions and the given supposed beliefs did not, therefore, represent their actual 
state of mind about these propositions. This research will, therefore, look into the 
given beliefs from four different perspectives: belief, pragmatic belief, acceptance and 
lying. But pragmatic belief is not a moral to possess. The pragmatically motivated 
believing subject does not track the truth in his inquiries or in his quest for a state of 
belief. In other words, pragmatic beliefs are irrational because they are formed on the 
basis of practical considerations rather than a concern for truth. The conventional 
wisdom is that we always want to know or believe the truth and it is this truth goal to 
which we are committed in our inquiries. Though truth is normally taken to be the 
most valued cognitive desideratum, it is not always sought-after (Brown and Dutton 
1995). That is, we sometimes want to believe what we want to be the case rather than 
what actually is the case.  
 
Further, in our inquiries, we often arrive at a particular decision or conclusion when 
we arrive at a firm or reasonable belief about the object of inquiry (Pierce 1877). 
Though we normally launch our inquiries with the goal of getting the truth, truth 
might not necessarily be the outcome of our inquiries. Just like truth, firm belief has 
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the epistemic force to cease the doubts that prompt the need for inquiry (Pierce 1877). 
Moreover, truth's not being immediately and unproblematically accessible to us is the 
reason why the need for justification arises, and it is due to the immediate 
inaccessibility of truth that belief proves indispensable in settling opinion on matters 
(BonJour 1985). It is also due to the lack of immediate access to truth that we often 
act on the basis of what we believe to be the truth rather than the truth itself. States 
launch preventive wars on the basis of a belief that an enemy attack or a perceived 
threat – though not looming – is inevitable to confront (Luban 2004 and the 2002 
Pentagon Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Even evidence is construed 
as consisting of a belief attitude on some evidential condition. That is, since we often 
conceive of evidence as admissible, inadmissible, misleading, conclusive and 
inconclusive, epistemologists argue that evidence should be, for purposes of 
generality and accuracy, construed as consisting of beliefs rather than facts (Alston 
2005). Thus, even preemptive or defensive wars – initiated on the basis of good 
evidence that an enemy attack is imminent – are prompted by what we believe to be 
the truth. In part two of chapter nine, I will be looking into the possibility whether the 
given supposed beliefs can be rightly characterized as pragmatic beliefs, but will 
eventually rule out pragmatic belief as an appropriate characterization of the given 
beliefs. 
 
For reasons associated with the self-serving bias, sometimes we, in our doxastic 
cultivations, tend to seek or embrace favourable rather than accurate data (Brown and 
Dutton 1995). That is, our beliefs are not always driven or motivated by truth-
considerations. They are sometimes motivated by pragmatic desires, gains and goals 
(Barnes 1997 and Scott-Kakures 2000). In other words, we sometimes indirectly 
come to believe what we want to believe or what we want to be the case. Lacking 
adequate perceptual evidence, it is possible that some people just want to believe in 
God rather than believing it in actual fact. That is, being a repository of optimistic 
feelings and thereby pleasant thoughts, it is probable that a great number of people 
believe or want to believe in God for the positive promises and happy eventualities 
such a belief rewards. Due to the emotional attachment to the belief proposition and 
the consequent psychological pleasures such believing generates, we often tend to 
retain our belief in God even in the presence of good evidence to the contrary. In a 
given situation, it is highly likely to find creationists not wanting to believe evidence, 
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even if adequate, that debunks creationism or that confirms evolutionism. The same 
can be said with evolutionists. This, however, shall not imply that we normally 
believe what we want to believe. It is, rather, to stress the self-serving bias (Brown 
and Dutton 1995; and Winters 1979) and the emotional attachment (Alston 2005) that 
obtain in some of our belief acquisitions where certain pragmatic ends dominate or 
guide our cognition directionally. 
 
Religious beliefs are one type of pragmatic belief which owe their existence to 
pragmatic considerations. However, the desire to believe cannot be taken as evidence 
for holding the belief. There might be situations where one had long wanted to believe 
in God or Santa Claus without holding the corresponding belief. Belief, though 
sometimes susceptible to or even caused by practical considerations in an indirect 
way, does not normally arise nor can it normally be retained in the face of clear 
evidence that not p or in the face of grave doubts that p. Exceptional cases such as 
self-deception or akratic beliefs are, however, logically possible. Normally when we 
want to believe a proposition, we tend to focus on the supporting evidence and 
disregard evidence to the contrary. Though the Bush administration's public discourse 
reflects a clear focus on the supporting evidence, this cannot be taken as evidence that 
they wanted to believe the given propositions. We usually do not want to believe a 
proposition that creates or heightens tension or anxiety. When I see an armed stranger 
walking up to me with his gun pointed at me, I just come to believe that he is a 
present danger to me (p). It is not that I want to believe that p. Such a proposition is 
not a welcome proposition to be desired. Faced with clear evidence that p, I just come 
to believe that p. But if the situations were different and I therefore did not have good 
evidence whether or not that p, I might have just accepted that p due to the high cost 
of error or the risk asymmetries I would have associated with the eventualities of p 
and not p. Under such epistemically degenerate conditions where I merely fear or 
suspect that p where the eventualities of p are more costly than those of not p, it is not 
the case that I am more likely or more willing to believe than to disbelieve that p. It is, 
rather, the case that I am more likely or more willing to accept rather than to reject 
that p. That is, due to the given practical pressures, the high cost of error and the risk 
asymmetries associated with the two possibilities of p and not p, these evidentially 
unprobative conditions normally promote or lead to the acceptance of the most feared 
(Bratman 1992). That is if we were to take on an attitude on the given proposition or 
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if we had to act on some basis. This research, therefore, rules out the possibility of 
pragmatic belief as an appropriate characterization of the given beliefs. It, rather, 
argues that if the given beliefs were ever genuine propositional attitudes, they are 
better characterised as mere propositional acceptances. That is, in light of the 
evidential conditions at the time and given the new security environment along with 
the associated risk asymmetries, it is more apt to characterise them as mere 
propositional acceptances.  
 
Part one of chapter nine aims to show what their rationality status would have been 
if they were ever genuine cases of belief. The rationale for establishing their would-be 
epistemic status is to stress how irrationally, from an internalist perspective, and how 
irresponsibly, from a deontological perspective, those beliefs would have been 
acquired if they were to be genuine beliefs. The rationality of belief in the 
philosophical literature is typically taken to be either an internal or an external matter 
or purely a matter of duty fulfillment form a deontological perspective. The internalist 
theory of justification corresponds with the common-sensical view of justification. 
From an internalist standpoint, a belief is justified if and only if it is based on good 
evidence, acquired in the absence of sufficient contrary evidence and if the believing 
subject has some potential cognitive grasp of the evidence on which he came to 
acquire the belief. The common-sensical view of justification shares the core 
fundamentals of internalism. If we were to establish the rationality of a belief from a 
common-sensical perspective, our intuitions would compel us to look at the nature of 
the evidence on which the belief is said to be based, looking into the overall evidential 
conditions at the time to see whether the belief has been acquired contrary to the 
majority evidence. I take it that any common-sensical view of justification would take 
it for granted that believing subjects normally have what it takes to determine what is 
responsible for the rationality of their beliefs, unless extraordinary conditions obtain 
such as forgetting the original evidence on which they came to acquire a belief. The 
externalist theory of justification bases the rationality of belief solely on the reliability 
of the cognitive process which generates a certain belief, and the deontological theory 
solely on duty fulfillment or being blameless in acquiring a belief. This research takes 
these conditions as unnecessary for the rationality of belief. I will be arguing that 
externalist and deontological conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
rationality of belief. The rationale for taking the externalist and the deontological 
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theories of justification is to draw a contrast between the intuitive plausibility of these 
philosophical theories and that of the internalist theory which advocates a common-
sensical view of justification.  
 
I will be arguing that the internalist theory of justification remains the only 
competent account that can adequately, in line with our intuitions, address the 
epistemic status of beliefs of all modes whether stored or occurrent. This, however, 
excludes certain limited cases of lost or forgotten evidence. The intuitive force of the 
internalist constraint on justification far outweighs the objections raised against it by 
rival externalists. In a similar fashion, the intuitive uneasiness to count a belief as 
justified in the absence of any actual or potential grasp of the justifying condition far 
outweighs the so-called solution externalism promises to deliver to the problems 
internalism faces – a solution doomed by an insurmountable generality problem and 
rendered unattractive by the subjective irresponsibility and epistemic irrationality 
which externalism generates due to its argument that internalist conditions are not 
required for the rationality of belief. Because of the intractable generality problem, the 
externalist theory of justification cannot account for the epistemic status of the given 
beliefs (if they were ever genuine beliefs), whereas the internalist theory accounts for 
their epistemic status without risking the access issues associated with internalism. 
This research also addresses the untenability of the deontological conception of 
justification. It contests the necessity of duty fulfillment as sufficient for epistemic 
justification. But it recognizes that epistemic deontology can be thought of as a 
possible, but not primary, explanation for the internalist constraint on justification.  
 
I contend that the justificatory view that is most coherent with our intuitions is 
internalism (the common-sensical view of justification). Our intuitions and common-
sensical convictions underlie the very foundation of the internalist theory of 
justification. I have, therefore, chosen to employ the internalist theory of justification 
as the philosophical equivalent of the common-sensical view on justification. That is, 
I have chosen to use the internalist theory of justification in order to stress the 
intuitive force of the common-sensical view of justification. In philosophy, the choice 
of a particular justificatory theory rather than another is not rationalised through the 
nature of the belief in question. It is, rather, rationalised by its force to generate to 
scepticism the kind of response that is most consistent with our intuitions. There are 
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two explanations as to the motivation behind the internalist constraint on justification. 
The first explanation arises from our commonsensical view of justification as a 
cognitive desideratum superveninent on a belief's being based on good evidence with 
the believing subject's possessing some potential cognitive access to such evidence. 
The second one arises from the ethics of our intellectual endeavours: duty fulfilment. 
This deontological explanation concerns the access requirement on justification - a 
requirement which internalism is committed to. Deontologists argue that we have an 
epistemic duty to guide our doxastic cultivations by good evidence. But I can only do 
this if I have access to such evidence. This is one explanation behind the access 
requirement on justification. I have taken the deontological account of justification to 
show its untenability as a better response to scepticism, its inefficiency as a sufficient 
condition for justification, and its implausibility as a better explanation for the 
motivation behind the internalist constraint on justification. Furthermore, I also test 
the intuitive force of internalism against its rival theory: externalism. That is, in a bid 
to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of internalism as a more tenable response to 
scepticism, I examine the force of externalism as a necessary condition for the 
justifiability of belief. Examining it against its rival theory (externalism) and its 
possible motivational source (deontologism), I aim to show (weak non-deontological) 
internalism, the philosophical formulation of our common-sensical view of 
justification, to be the justification theory most consistent with our intuitions. 
Philosophers diverge over what justification theory better responds to our intuitions of 
what it is to be epistemically justified in holding or arriving at a belief. Further, there 
is disagreement among philosophers as to whether it is internalism or externalism that 
better accommodates our commonsensical convictions of justification. I am of the 
view that the internalist theory of justification aligns better with such convictions; 
though externalists would disagree. Bergmann, a fervent externalist, contends that 
"externalism fits very well with our commonsense attributions of knowledge and 
justified belief" (2006: 238). But BonJour disagrees. He argues that externalism 
provides "an intuitively unsatisfactory" account of justification (2002: 265). He 
further argues: 
 
 it seems to me quite doubtful that the commonsense conviction is that our 
 beliefs are justified in [an externalist sense] … because it is doubtful that 
 common sense really  has any inkling of that specific conception of 
 justification … On the contrary, the  commonsense conviction seems to me to 
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 be simply that we have good reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true  [the 
 internalism's raison d'être] (2003: 199-200).  
 
 
This long-standing debate over what justification theory better responds to our 
commonsensical convictions of positive epistemic status is hardly surprising for 
philosophy is, in the minds of key philosophers such as Thomas Reid20 and George 
Moore21, profoundly rooted in the principles of commonsense. Reid famously argued 
that "Philosophy … has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows 
out of them, and draws its nourishment from them" (in Lemos 2004: xi). Moreover, 
BonJour holds that  
 
 the judgments of common sense are at least one central part of the basis for 
 philosophical reflection about knowledge and justification, as about anything 
 else; to reject them as having no weight would arguably leave not enough of a 
 starting point  to give us any real chance of getting anywhere in our 
 epistemological inquiries (2002: 265).  
 
 
To conclude, belief, acceptance and justification underlie the philosophical 
methodology I have taken to explore the research questions. Being justified in holding 
a belief endows us with an epistemic status which polarises epistemologists as to 
whether it is an internal or an external matter to a believing subject. Internalists argue 
that it is counter-intuitive to accept a belief as justified in the absence of any inkling 
on the part of the believing subject as to what is responsible for the truth of the belief. 
That is, it is our intuitions, our common-sensical convictions, which underlie the 
internalist theory of justification. There is just something psychologically amiss with 
the idea of taking a belief as justified in the absence of any knowledge of the truth-
making features of the belief. But externalists go against such intuitions, regarding 
such knowledge as irrelevant to the rationality status of a belief. It is these two 
positions that dominate the philosophical literature regarding the rationality status of a 
belief. Internalists are driven by our intuitions, which is why they take a common-
sensical position on the rationality of belief. But, in a bid to detract from its intuitive 
plausibility, externalists charge internalism with a deontological origin. That is, they 
argue that the internalism's access requirement on justification is motivated by 
deontology. Deontologists contend that we can be rational in holding a belief only if 
                                                 
20
 See Thomas Reid, Inquiry and Essays (1983). 
21
 See George Moore, Philosophical Papers (1959). 
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we have responsibly or blamelessly arrived at the belief. That is, they argue that we 
have epistemic duties which we should abide by in our doxastic cultivations. But we 
can guide our doxastic cultivations in accordance with our epistemic duties only if we 
have knowledge of such duties. These epistemic duties, deontologists argue, consist of 
basing our beliefs on good evidence, seeking evidence for and against the proposition 
in question, not ignoring contrary evidence, not suppressing doubts, the pursuit of 
truth and the avoidance of falsehood. But we cannot be reasonably expected to guide 
our beliefs by such considerations when we have no inkling of such considerations.  
 
In other words, I cannot be reasonably expected to conduct my intellectual life by 
good evidence when I have no knowledge of such evidence. Externalists argue that it 
is these deontological considerations from which the internalist requirement on 
justification originates. I argue that internalism is motivated by our intuitions, and 
belief is not a willable mental phenomenon from an intuitive perspective, whereas the 
deontological account of justification implies doxastic voluntarism by associating 
justificatory status with being blameless in forming a belief. But we can be blamed for 
doing something only if we have voluntary control over whether or not to do that 
thing, as observed by René Descartes: "The supreme perfection of man is that he acts 
freely or voluntarily, and it is this which makes him deserve praise or blame" (1985: 
205). The deontological theory of justification, therefore, runs counter to our 
intuitions of how belief is acquired. I cannot be blamed for a belief I had no voluntary 
control over its acquisition, no matter how false or unjustified the belief is. It is 
appropriate to talk about the application of blame or responsibility only where we 
have voluntary control over the object of application. Here we have no direct control 
over our beliefs. From a non-deontological internalist perspective, neither belief nor 
justificatory status is up to us, whereas from a deontological perspective both belief 
and justificatory status are up to us. It is, therefore, not appropriate to think of 
deontology as the origin of internalism. I have explored the essence of deontology in 
chapter seven in an attempt to show its implausibility as the source of the internalist 
requirement on justification. Our endeavours to establish the rationality status of a 
belief normally take either a philosophical or a common-sensical form. Philosophers 
pursue a philosophical approach, whereas journalists pursue a common-sensical 
approach. Internalism represents our common-sensical convictions of justification for 
it is motivated by our intuitions of what it is to be justified in holding a belief. 
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Externalism is the philosophical justificatory theory that profoundly conflicts with 
such intuitions. I have examined the essence of externalism in chapter eight in a bid to 
show the implausibility of justificatory theories that are unmotivated by our intuitions 
of the rationality status of belief.  
 
1.5. The Research Argumentative Strategy  
 
Chapter one outlines the stated rationales behind the war in order to establish, in 
light of the evidential conditions at the time, whether the Bush administration's 
asserted belief in the given rationales could be rightly characterised as a case of belief, 
pragmatic belief, or mere propositional acceptance. It also touches on regime change 
as the key Bush administration's policy objective regarding Iraq. It is appropriate and 
necessary that regime change as the Bush administration's overriding pragmatic end is 
addressed for examining the possibility of pragmatic belief as the right 
characterisation of the given supposed beliefs requires consideration of the pragmatic 
ends at play during the build-up to the war. Furthermore, addressing regime change is 
necessary because in my attempt to establish the nature of the given beliefs - whether 
they are most apt to be construed as beliefs, pragmatic beliefs or mere propositional 
acceptances - I will also examine the possibility whether the Bush administration was 
being insincere in presenting p as the rationale for the war while regime change was 
the ultimate policy objective regarding the Iraqi issue. Further, the first chapter also 
addresses the alleged Iraqi threat to the US national security. Iraq was portrayed as 
posing a multi-faceted threat of a variety of nature ranging from emerging, grave, 
gathering, mounting, growing, uniquely urgent, immediate, and imminent. The 
entirety of these threats were all alleged fears that Iraq might, if left unchecked, 
dominate the Middle East, threaten the US economic and geopolitical interests in the 
region, or transfer WMD technology, equipment or stockpiles to terrorist networks 
and thereby pose a threat to the US homeland security.  
 
In a bid to highlight the potential risk asymmetries the Bush administration might 
have weighed up in their considerations whether p or not p, this research addresses the 
alleged Iraqi threat with an extended part (six) in the appendix outlining the threat 
statements asserted by the Bush administration officials during the lead-up to the war. 
Taking into account these epistemically ill-supported and allegedly feared threats is 
 34 
necessary to further the attribution of propositional acceptance for mere acceptance of 
a feared or unwelcome proposition is, as argued by Bratman on p. 104, normally 
prompted by practical pressures or the risk asymmetries we associate with accepting 
or rejecting that p. Here, if the alleged Iraqi threat was genuinely feared, then it would 
have naturally generated practical pressures on the part of the Bush administration 
officials or rendered them consider the risk asymmetries between the acceptance and 
the rejection of p. The philosophical methodology undertaken to address the research 
questions is developed in chapter two with an examination of the nature of belief and 
its differentiae. Explaining the concept of belief is necessary to further the attribution 
of belief and pragmatic belief. That is, in order to establish an appropriate attribution 
of belief, it is necessary to understand the nature of belief like its being a mental or a 
psychological state, its being a dispositional rather than an occurrent state, its natural 
responsiveness to truth along with its being occasionally sensitive to practical desires. 
In an attempt to stress the conditions under which belief is normally taken to exist and 
explain why the attribution of belief under certain epistemically degenerate conditions 
is inappropriate, I will examine the unwillability of belief in chapter three. The 
fundamental task of belief attribution is establishing, in light of the evidential 
conditions at the time, whether or not a given belief could have been warranted from 
the perspective of a given believing subject. In chapter three, I will be arguing that we 
cannot be rightly described as believing a proposition we take to be unwarranted from 
our own cognitive perspective. In an attempt to address the attribution of 
propositional acceptance, I will, in chapter four, examine the nature of acceptance and 
explain the differentiae that individuate such a mental act from mere public display or 
pretence. In addition, in a bid to further highlight the distinctive nature of belief as an 
involuntary propositional attitude normally shaped by epistemic evidence, I will also 
touch on faith in chapter four. Faith and belief are often used interchangeably in 
ordinary language. But we will learn in chapter four that faith is distinguished by its 
practical essence, whereas belief is individuated by its epistemic essence. It is because 
of this that we cannot will belief. 
 
Part one of chapter nine seeks to establish the justificatory status of the given 
beliefs, taking them at face value, demonstrating what their rationality status would 
have been if they were genuine beliefs. Furthering this requires an understanding of 
the nature of epistemic justification and what justifiability status amounts to. In an 
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attempt to emphasise that a belief’s enjoying justificatory status neither guarantees the 
belief’s being true nor does it preclude its being false, I will explore the connection 
between epistemic justification and truth in chapter five. It is necessary to understand 
that the conferment of justificatory status on a belief does not supervene on truth per 
se, but, rather, on truth-conducivity or good evidence along with the basing relation. 
This is our common-sensical perception of what it is for a belief to be epistemically 
justified. I intend to show that the prevailing view of epistemic justification is that of 
the internalist. The internalist account of justification is the philosophical equivalent 
of the common-sensical view of justification. That is, the internalist account of 
justification is fundamentally driven by our intuitions or commonsense. I aim to 
establish the justificatory status of the given supposed beliefs from the perspective of 
three central philosophical theories of justification: internalism, deontologism and 
externalism. I will explore such theories along with their drawbacks in chapters six, 
seven, and eight, respectively, in a bid to explain what it takes for a belief to be 
epistemically justified from such perspectives. There are two perspectives from which 
we normally establish the rationality of belief: a philosophical and a common-sensical 
perspective. I have chosen to employ the internalist theory as the philosophical 
stipulation of the common-sensical view of justification. Further, deontologism and 
externalism are employed in this research as two philosophical theories of 
justification in an attempt to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of the common-
sensical view of justification which is represented by the internalist theory. In chapter 
nine, I will, in light of belief, acceptance and justification, examine the given Bush 
administration belief propositions with the nuclear and terror propositions being the 
paradigm of the professed rationale for the war. In part one of chapter nine, I will 
examine the rationality status of the given beliefs, establishing whether or not the 
available evidence constituted justification to believe that p. In part two of chapter 
nine, I will analyse the nature of the given beliefs, establishing whether they can be 
rightly characterized as cases of belief, pragmatic belief or mere propositional 
acceptance. The findings of the research will highlight what their rationality status 
would have been if they were genuine beliefs and establish an appropriate 
characterization of these beliefs in light of the evidential conditions at the time. In 
chapter ten, I will draw the conclusion of the research.  
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Chapter Two 
2.1. The Concept of Belief 
 
This chapter examines the character of belief as an involuntary propositional 
attitude and its constitutive properties such as its typical truth-directedness, its being 
dispositional, its being a psychological or mental state and its entailing a dispositional 
feeling that p is true. Looking into the nature of belief is necessary to further the 
attribution of belief. That is, establishing whether or not belief attribution is 
appropriate in a given context requires an informed insight into the distinctive nature 
of belief as opposed to other voluntary propositional attitudes such as acceptance or 
faith. Belief is individuated from other propositional attitudes by its constitutional aim 
to get the truth, as we will learn on p. 67. In other words, belief is ideally motivated 
by truth considerations or acquired on the basis of epistemic reasons. But, as 
explained in chapters three, four and seven, our beliefs do not always originate from 
epistemic considerations. Rather, our desires cause some of our beliefs, but only 
through indirect routes. Ryle argues that belief belongs to the motive word family: 
“‘believe’ is of the same family as motive words, where ‘know’ is of the same family 
as skill words; so we ask how a person knows this, but only why a person believes 
that” (1949: 129). Thus, whenever we question a cognizer’s belief, we seek or 
question the cognizer’s grounds for believing a proposition. In this research, we 
question the adequacy of the stated rationale behind the Bush administration’s 
seeming belief that Iraq was in possession of WMD and in league with Al-Qaeda 
prior to the war. We will look into the evidential conditions at the time in an attempt 
to both establish whether or not belief attribution to the given subjects is appropriate, 
and determine what the given beliefs' rationality status would have been if they were 
genuine beliefs at all. Defining what it is to believe, Swinburne argues that belief is 
someone’s “view of the world, what they hold to be true about it, what they accept as 
true” (2001: 32). In other words, belief is an attitude that we take up towards a given 
proposition which we take to be true or probable. Swinburne, however, does not seem 
to distinguish between belief and acceptance here, but we will learn in chapter four 
that they are two different propositional attitudes. Furthermore, defining it as a 
feeling, James associates belief with the feeling or emotion that stops the state of 
doubt and anxiety: 
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In its inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more 
allied to the emotions than to anything else. … What characterises both 
consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation through the advent of 
an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of 
contradictory ideas (2007: 283).  
 
  
That is, to believe is to make sense of some reality. By defining it as a feeling or 
emotion, James upholds the thesis that beliefs are unwillable. He rightly argues that to 
arrive at a belief is to have the doubt or anxiety that initially prompted the quest for a 
state of belief cease. In other words, to arrive at a belief is to be psychologically at 
ease as far as the proposition in question is concerned. But, as noted on p. 71-72, 
belief and consent are not the same propositional attitudes. They are different in the 
sense that the latter is a voluntary act of assent whereas the former is not. Further to 
what it is to believe, Armstrong holds that “Our beliefs are our interpretation of 
reality” (1973: 4). That is, to believe a proposition is to conceive of it as true or 
probable. It is to have a conception of what the reality is from our subjective 
perspective. But a proposition should not necessarily be true in order to be believed as 
Armstrong argues that beliefs “point to the existence of a certain state of affairs 
though there may be no such state of affairs” (Ibid: 4); whereas a proposition should 
be true in order to constitute knowledge. Thus, truth is not a prerequisite for belief.  
Belief is, therefore, a fallible notion. Furthermore, belief is, argues Moser, as 
perspectival as justification, assenting and knowledge: “believing and assenting are 
perspectival in the sense that they are relative to a person, knowledge is similarly 
perspectival. My knowing that P does not entail your knowing that P, since my 
knowing that P does not require your believing or assenting to P” (1989: 23). In a 
similar fashion, my believing that p neither entails nor requires your believing that p.  
 
Neither the information at our disposal always generates a belief state, nor do we 
always believe what we assert to be our belief. Sometimes we just accept or assent to 
the proposition we assert, or our assertion that p might be the result of a mere guess or 
a hunch that p, or we might just feign belief in a proposition we do not genuinely 
believe. Further, sometimes we accept or assume a hypothesis to be true till we arrive 
at a state of belief about the hypothesis. States of belief are not attainable through the 
practice of free will as is the case with volitional propositional attitudes such as 
acceptance or consent. It is not at my disposal whether to believe that the human race 
 38 
has evolved from apes when I take the available supporting evidence to be insufficient 
to warrant such a belief. But it is at my disposal whether to accept this to be true. 
Thus, once presented with such a theory, I might, for practical reasons, just accept or 
assent to it, though I hold no such beliefs. That is why Armstrong argues that “We 
must distinguish between beliefs and mere thoughts: between believing that the earth 
is flat and merely entertaining this proposition while either disbelieving it or having 
no belief one way or the other” (1973: 4). Furthermore, Hume also argues that “We 
conceive many things, which we do not believe” (2008: 80). That is, we do not always 
form beliefs about the things we conceive of. But the data our sensory system 
registers is almost always belief-entailing, unless some untoward circumstances 
obtain. I join Reid in thinking that the perception of an object implies belief of some 
sort about the object. He contends that “the perception of an object implies both a 
conception of its form, and a belief of its present existence. … this belief is not the 
effect of argumentation and reasoning; it is the immediate effect of my constitution” 
(2000: 168). Reid further argues: 
 
My belief is carried along by perception, as irresistibly as my body by the 
earth. And the greatest sceptic will find himself to be in the same condition. 
He may struggle hard to disbelieve the informations of his senses, as a man 
does to swim against a torrent; but ah! It is in vain (Ibid: 169).    
 
 
I do subscribe to the contention that perception is almost always belief-entailing, 
but there are situations where one comes to disbelieve the evidence of one’s senses. 
For example, Oliver lives in an area where massive hawks can hardly be differentiated 
from eagles. It is an area where the heads of hawks turn white when they mature. He 
is generally ill-informed with birds. Jessica, his mother, is a keen bird watcher who 
often teaches Oliver about the different varieties of birds. On one occasion, Oliver 
learns that eagles can be identified by their white head and white tail. But he quickly 
forgets such details. One day, he goes to the nearby coast. He sees a big red-tailed 
bird which appears to him to be an eagle by its white head, not remembering at the 
time that eagles have white tails. Oliver wonders whether it is an eagle. Moments 
within such consideration, he recollects that it is diagnostic of eagles to have white 
tails. He, therefore, comes to disbelieve his visual evidence that the bird is a type of 
eagle. There are other situations where we come to disbelieve the evidence of our 
senses for their being unsatisfactory or unclear or because of other contradictory 
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memorial beliefs entering our reasoning at the time. But in most situations, perception 
or noticing is belief-entailing. 
 
My seeing or noticing a loose rhino on the driveway entails a belief of some sort 
about the physical object I perceive. Though it results from my perception, the belief 
could be false. The rhino I perceive might turn out to be a fake one. That is, though I 
have visual evidence that p, such evidence might be false. It is because of the 
fallibility of evidence that some epistemologists argue that evidence shall be 
construed as consisting of beliefs rather than facts or knowledge, as ordinarily 
conceived. Moreover, it is due to the fact that misleading evidence pertains, Alston 
contends that it is more appropriate to construe evidence as belief: “In ordinary 
language the tendency is to think of it [evidence] as consisting of facts the subject 
knows to obtain, ‘factual evidence’ … [but] for complete generality we need to speak 
of evidence as consisting of beliefs rather than facts” (2005: 82-3). Moreover, since 
evidence is often qualified as conclusive, inconclusive, incontrovertible, misleading, 
admissible, or inadmissible, it is more accurate to think of evidence as belief rather 
than facts or knowledge. This, however, does not reciprocate that every belief 
constitutes (admissible) evidence; nor does it reciprocate that all evidence constitutes 
belief. A mere belief that p might not constitute admissible evidence in the court in 
the same way that inadequate evidence might not trigger a belief state. Belief and 
evidence are, however, both fallible notions. Evidence is a fallible notion; that is why 
one’s believing that p on good evidence does not necessitate the truth that p. Further, 
one’s belief can be based on good evidence, but can still turn out to be false, as 
explained by Chisholm: 
 
 We have good evidence, presumably, for believing that there are nine planets. 
 This evidence consists of various other facts that we know about astronomy, 
 but it does not  itself include the fact that there are nine planets. It would seem 
 to be logically  possible, therefore, for a man to have good evidence for a belief 
 which is nevertheless  false (1977: 4).  
 
 
Thus, no matter how good our reasons are for our beliefs, our mental 
representations of the world can still be false. Moore argues that assertion normally 
implies belief or knowledge of what is being asserted, unless the asserter does not 
mean what he asserts: "Whenever we make any assertion whatever (unless we do not 
mean what we say) we are always expressing one or other of two things - namely, 
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either that we think [believe] the thing in question to be so, or that we know it to be 
so" (in Black 1952: 26). Moore further argues that "Even when I do not mean what I 
say, my words may be said to imply either that I think that A is B or that I know it, 
since they will commonly lead people to suppose that one or other of these things is 
the case" (Ibid: 26). Moreover, Cohen also argues that "the speech-act of making a 
statement normally implies that the speaker possesses the corresponding belief or web 
of beliefs" (1989: 376). This is normally the case, so far as we mean what we state or 
assert. In addition, Williams takes belief to be normally manifested as a belief-free 
assertion (refer to p. 47). That is, belief normally takes the form of an assertion. But 
asserting a proposition need not necessarily amount to believing the proposition. 
There are conditions where we disbelieve what we assert to be true. Guilty defendants 
in denial normally disbelieve what they assert to be the case. They know or believe 
that what they are asserting is false, yet they still assert it with the hope that they can 
escape their guilt with impunity or in a bid to convince the judge or jury that they are 
innocent. That is, there are situations where we, for practical reasons, pretend to 
believe what we in fact disbelieve to be the case. Furthermore, there are situations 
where we assert what we accept as true, though not necessarily believing it to be true, 
as we will learn in chapter four. Thus, we do not always believe what we assert to be 
the case.  
 
There are circumstances where we intend to deceive under the pretence of belief. 
That is, we sometimes insincerely assert a belief in p for practical reasons in a bid to 
get others to believe p. This could well be the case with the Bush administration's 
seeming belief that Iraq had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, was in 
possession of chemical and biological weapons and in league with Al-Qaeda. Nick is 
a long-standing dear friend of mine whom I taught a philosophy module during his 
undergraduate studies. I take him to lack the kind of intellectual rigour and necessary 
cognitive sophistication to undertake his postgraduate studies in philosophy. Yet in 
writing a reference to him, I, for practical reasons, assert a very firm, but insincere, 
belief that he has what it takes to carry out such a project. I just want to get the 
intended personnel to believe what I myself do not believe. Here I intend to induce in 
the addressee a belief I am not holding myself. Neither the title of this thesis nor any 
discussions of belief hereafter are intended to ascribe belief to the Bush administration 
officials. For the purposes at hand, we will just treat what they manifested as their 
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belief about then status of the Iraqi WMD and its relationship with Al-Qaeda as an 
alleged case of belief. In chapter nine, I will establish whether or not the given 
apparent case of belief was a case of belief.  
 
The expeditioner who clearly sees an avalanche coming their way automatically 
and immediately, without first engaging in any doxastic deliberation or decision, 
formulates a belief that an avalanche is occurring, approaching them or that they are 
seeing an avalanche or that what they are seeing is an avalanche. This belief is the 
output of a perceptual experience. We will leave the questions this example might 
provoke such as the properties that confer justificatory status on belief, the nature of 
such a status and the alleged willability of belief for other ensuing chapters (3, 5, 6, 7, 
and 8). Epistemologists would typically take this perceptual belief to establish two 
fundamental realities about the nature of belief. First, they would argue that this belief 
that p is an involuntary, mechanical response to some perceptual experience or some 
evidentiary condition. Second, this belief that p guides the behaviour or reaction of 
the expeditioner. In other words, they would argue that this belief that p is what 
motivates the expeditioner in their reaction towards the avalanche or is responsible for 
how they behave under the given perceptual condition. But not all beliefs are action-
guiding, as will be noticed on pp. 52-53. That is, not every belief that we form ends 
up guiding or motivating some action.   
 
Epistemically rational beliefs aim at truth. In fact it is this aim that constitutes 
rational and psychological constraints on belief, and it is due to this aim, as we will 
learn in the next chapter, that we cannot will ourselves to believe something we take 
to be unsupported by evidence. If belief did not have this truth aim, then generating 
beliefs would have been as willable as any other voluntary actions. But we do not 
always aim at getting the truth when we believe. That is, we sometimes deviate from 
this aim when we believe. It is because of this that truth cannot be regarded as the sole 
constitutive aim of belief. Some of our beliefs, such as akratic beliefs, aim at practical 
desire satisfaction. Thus, to state that belief solely aims at truth as a constitutive goal 
of its formation is to disregard the kind of beliefs we form for practical reasons. When 
I aim to acquire a belief on the basis of a practical goal, I want the world to 
correspond to what I aim to believe. That is, I desire that the world be as I want or aim 
to believe it to be. I just want the world to be a certain way, the way I want it to be, 
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and have a belief in how I want it to be. But when I form a belief on the basis of truth 
as a goal, I want my belief to correspond to how the world is. That is, I care about 
truth as an overriding goal. I, therefore, seek and focus on the kind of evidence that 
conduces to that goal. Shah argues that "When we deliberate whether to believe some 
proposition, e.g., whether to believe that it is snowing outside, we feel immediately 
compelled to look for evidence of its truth: we look outside" (2006: 481). That is, he 
argues that "the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question 
whether p is true" (2003: 447). In fact this is the true essence of paradigmatic cases of 
belief formation. This is what typically crosses our mind first and foremost when we 
consider whether to believe something. But akratic beliefs, if they are ever possible, 
cannot be said to aim at truth. I cannot be rightly described as aiming at truth when I, 
in the presence of adequate evidence to the contrary, come to believe that my 
girlfriend still loves me. What undermines the argument that truth is the sole 
constitutive aim of belief is that belief is not always truth-directed or epistemically-
oriented. That is, belief is neither always encouraged, nor is it always caused by 
epistemic considerations. Sometimes practical considerations promote and indirectly 
cause belief, as demonstrated in chapters three and four.  
 
Shah and Velleman argue that "being regulated for truth is part of the very concept 
of belief" (2005: 498). But they rightly contend that it cannot be a necessary condition 
for belief to have a literal aim: "belief cannot be required to have a literal aim, since 
only some instances of belief are caused by the goal-directed activity of their subjects; 
many others are the product of processes such as perception, which don't involve any 
agential goals or intentions" (Ibid: 498-9). Thinking whether p is true is, as argued by 
Shah before, a necessary part of whether to believe p where p is the sort of 
proposition that is not clear or clear enough in a way to generate belief outright in the 
absence of such deliberation. Thus, taking aim at truth is part of the deliberative 
process that we undergo when we acquire a belief through doxastic deliberation. But 
most of our perceptual beliefs are formed without first engaging in any such 
deliberative processes. That is, we normally do not first consider or wonder whether 
to believe the kind of perceptual experiences we are having, unless we have reason to 
doubt our perception or perceptual experiences. We usually just form them 
unconsciously without first engaging in any goal-directed activity or without 
consciously aiming at the truth. That is, we normally want our perceptual beliefs to be 
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true. But it does not follow that we aim at getting the truth when form them. There is 
no such explicit or conscious aim contained in the mechanical process of generating 
such beliefs. Walking down the nearby zoo, I suddenly come across a loose lion. 
Upon such perceptual experience, I immediately - providing that I know how lions 
look like - form a belief that I am seeing a lion or that what I am seeing is a lion. That 
is, before forming the belief, I do not first engage in any kind of deliberation, 
wondering whether what I am seeing is a lion or wondering whether to believe it. I 
just form the belief immediately upon the perceptual experience in a non-intentional 
and unconscious manner. But of course sometimes we wonder whether the perceptual 
experience we are having is true or deliberate whether to believe it. Imagine that I was 
sat on a beach during the night. I happen to see some flying object that I take to be 
unclear whether it is an unidentified flying object (UFO). I just wonder whether it is 
an alien spacecraft. I, therefore, reach out to my night vision monocular to take a 
closer look at it, seeking evidence to see whether it is an alien spacecraft. Being 
convinced that it is, I come to believe the flying object to be an alien spacecraft. Here 
my perceptual belief can be characterized as aiming at truth or being formed in a goal-
directed manner. That is, the belief is the result of a doxastic deliberation 
characterized or settled by whether p (whether p is true).  
 
But not all our beliefs are preceded by deliberations such as entertaining whether to 
believe p or wondering whether p. Perceptual beliefs are the paradigm in this regard. 
That is why entertaining a proposition cannot be a necessary condition for belief in 
the proposition. But some leading philosophers argue that believing entails 
entertaining. Braithwaite argues that my belief that p in "the sense of actual belief and 
not of a disposition to believe" entails "(1) I entertain p … and (2) I have a disposition 
to act as if p were true" (1933: 132). Price takes the same position too. He argues that 
"believing and disbelieving contain entertaining. It can occur without them but not 
they without it" (1935: 233). He, therefore, defines belief as "reasoned assent to an 
entertained proposition" (Ibid: 240). I take assent to be as voluntary as acceptance. In 
fact, acceptance and assent are often used interchangeably in the philosophical 
literature. But Price associates belief with assent. He argues that our assenting to p 
involves "(a) the preferring of p to q and r; (b) the feeling a certain degree of 
confidence with regard to p" (Ibid: 237). Thus, he identifies belief with some feeling 
of confidence, which we later on examine whether it can be tenably associated with 
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belief as a key differentia. Price, therefore, takes assent to be involuntary as he 
associates it with feelings, and feelings are involuntary. Disbelieving a proposition 
occurs only when the proposition has been entertained and rejected. Thus, disbelief 
entails entertaining. But belief need not, as illustrated in the lion example. Belief is 
generally characterised as a propositional attitude, a cognitive, mental or 
psychological state. But there is no identity among philosophers as to what constitutes 
that attitude or what it is like to be in such state. The following is how Russell 
characterises the essence of belief in philosophy:  
 
 Belief … is the central problem in the analysis of mind. Believing seems the 
 most  “mental” thing we do … The whole intellectual life consists of beliefs, 
 and of the passage from one belief to another by what is called 
 “reasoning”. Beliefs give knowledge and error; they are the vehicles of 
 truth and falsehood. Psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics 
 revolve about belief, and on the view we take of belief our philosophical 
 outlook largely depends (2008: 151). 
 
 
Few philosophical spheres have so far been at the centre stage of a decisive scrutiny 
of such magnitude in a way the concept of belief has been for all the right reasons. 
Belief plays an indispensable role in explaining behaviour. It, therefore, is a 
fundamental centrepiece in both the philosophy of action and the philosophy of mind. 
But I do not think it the case that the whole intellectual life revolves around belief 
alone. Much of our intellectual life comprises of other cognitive attitudes such as 
acceptance, faith, and judgement. Nor do I think that all our beliefs are formed as an 
upshot of reasoning. If it was the case that we passed from one belief to another 
through an act of reasoning or deliberation, then the entertainment of the target 
proposition would be a necessary condition for the constitution or attribution of belief. 
In fact, as we will observe later, some distinguished philosophers such as Hume and 
Price consider the consciousness or entertainment of a proposition a necessary 
requirement for belief in the proposition.  
 
But I take it that by passing from one belief to another through reasoning, Russell 
refers to the beliefs we acquire through deductive reasoning. For example, my belief 
that Washington is the capital of the United States entails a belief that Washington is a 
city not a village. Moreover, Russell recognizes that "Most of our beliefs, like most of 
our wishes, are "unconscious"" (Ibid: 157). He nevertheless argues that "What is 
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believed, and the believing, must both consist of present occurrences in the believer" 
(Ibid: 152). It is not clear whether Russell is committed to the occurrent or non-
occurrent view of belief. Beliefs are propositional bearers of truth and falsity values. 
That is, a belief can be true, but it can also be false. If a belief is true and the believing 
subject has good evidence that adequately supports the truth of the belief, then the 
belief confers knowledge. This is according to Plato's definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief. Russell rightly argues that the way we conceive of belief 
fundamentally determines our philosophical outlook, primarily that of cognition 
whether it is active or passive. There are two key arguments in the philosophical 
literature about the status of cognition with it being partially settled by whether we 
take the Humean or Cartesian view of belief. If we take belief as the sole product of 
cognition, which I do not, and conceive of it as an act of will in the way that Descartes 
does, then cognition can be said to be an active phenomenon. The following is how 
Descartes classifies the modes of thinking:  
 
 We possess only two modes of thinking: the perception of the intellect and the 
 operation of the will. All the modes of thinking that we experience within 
 ourselves can be brought under two general headings: perception, or the 
 operation of the intellect, and volition, or the operation of the will.  Sensory 
 perception[s], ... are simply various modes of perception; desire, aversion, 
 assertion, denial and  doubt [disbelief or belief] are various modes of 
 willing (1985: 204).    
 
 
That is, Descartes takes mental states such as desire, belief or doubt to be under 
voluntary control. Whether or not I assert a particular proposition is surely up to me. I 
can assert a proposition that I believe to be true, but I can equally assert a proposition 
that I disbelieve, doubt or know to be false. The same is true with denial. One can 
deny a charge one knows or believes to be true. Many defendants deny charges they 
know to be true. These are voluntary operations of free will. But it is not up to me 
whether I doubt a proposition that I know or believe to be true. I cannot help doubting 
a proposition that I perceive to be doubtful or unsupported by the current evidence. 
Furthermore, I cannot help believing a proposition I take to be true. Similarly, it is not 
up to me to desire something I abhor. These are mental states that cannot be 
manufactured by a direct act of will. But if we take cognition to be a phenomenon that 
always culminates in belief or disbelief, which I do not think it does always, and think 
of the resulting doxastic attitude from a Humean perspective, then cognition can be 
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said to be passive. Hume argues that belief is "an operation of the soul" which is as 
involuntary as it is to "feel the passion of love" (2008: 35). 
 
I do not think that the way we conceive of belief can establish whether cognition is 
active or passive. We can assign both activity and passivity to cognition, depending 
on the resultant cognitive attitude in question. In light of the emerging evidence I 
have, I consider whether Mars has ever been a habitable environment in the past. 
Being convinced of the probativeness of the evidence, I just come to believe that Mars 
has been, at some point in life, a habitable planet. My cognition here generates an 
attitude that is a passive state of mine. Thus, cognition can be aptly characterized as 
passive under such circumstances. Now suppose that NASA's Curiosity Mission to 
Mars proved a success and the robot managed to take some samples of rock which I 
take to be unprobative but still accept, for practical reasons, the hypothesis that Mars 
has been habitable in the past. Here cognition produces a voluntary attitude and it can, 
therefore, be aptly described as an active phenomenon. For certain practical 
considerations, I just assent to p or accept it to be true through a volitional act of will. 
We will learn more about acceptance as a volitional propositional attitude in chapter 
four. For now, we will focus on belief. Belief neither entails knowledge, nor does it 
entail certainty. Though it could involve both, as explained on pp.47-49, it is not a 
necessary condition that it should. Armstrong observes that "certainty entails belief" 
(1973: 140). He further argues: "certainty is a stronger notion than mere belief. 'A is 
certain that p' entails that 'A believes that p', for it is a contradiction to say that A is 
certain that the earth is flat but does not believe it to be flat. At the same time, that A 
believes p to be true does not entail that A is certain that p is true" (Ibid: 139). That is, 
we sometimes hold or assert our cognitive attitudes in the way of belief out of 
uncertainty. Consider the following example:  
 
 when asked where John is, I might reply, "I believe that he is upstairs, but you 
 had better check for yourself". In saying I believe that John is upstairs, 
 rather than simply saying that he is upstairs, I am implying that I do not 
 know with certainty where he is. From these facts it is concluded that my 
 believing consists in my not being quite sure where John is; for if I  were quite 
 sure (and if John were where I am quite sure that he  is), then I would know 
 where he is, not merely believe that he is there (Swain 1981: 29).  
 
 
 47 
Williams and Alston argue that we normally manifest our beliefs as belief clauses 
when we do not know them to be true or are not certain whether they are true. That is, 
beliefs are not always manifested in a belief-stipulated manner. Sometimes we 
communicate a belief without verbalising it as a belief clause such as I believe that the 
coffee is too hot. Williams argues that the most straightforward manifestation of a 
belief is a belief-free assertion rather than a belief-stipulated utterance:  
 
the most straightforward, basic, simple, elementary expression of a belief is an 
assertion. That is, the most straightforward way of expressing my belief that p, 
is to make a certain assertion. … the assertion that I make, which is the most 
straightforward or elementary expression of my belief that p, is the assertion 
that p, not the assertion ‘I believe that p’. The most elementary and 
straightforward expression of the belief that it is raining is to say ‘it is raining’, 
not to say ‘I believe that it’s raining’. ‘I believe that it’s raining’ does a rather 
special job. As a matter of fact, it does a variety of special jobs. In some cases, 
it makes what is very like an autobiographical remark; but very often in our 
discourse it does a special job of expressing the belief that p, or asserting that 
p, in a rather qualified way. On the whole, if somebody says to me, ‘Where is 
the railroad station?’ and I say ‘I believe that it’s three blocks down there and 
to the right’, he will have slightly less confidence in my utterances than if I 
just say ‘It’s three blocks down there and to the right’ (1973: 137-8). 
 
 
    Furthermore, Alston observes that “In most contexts, when one says, ‘I believe that 
p’, that is taken to imply that the speaker is disavowing knowledge that p” (in Jordan 
and Howard-Snyder 1996: 8). In other words, a belief clause typically implies the lack 
of knowledge or certainty. Thus, we often manifest a belief in a belief-stipulated 
manner when we do not know it to be true or are not certain whether it is true. That is, 
a belief-stipulated statement often communicates a qualified message for the notion of 
belief typically implies the lack of knowledge or certainty. Thus, we usually manifest 
a belief as a belief-free assertion when we are certain or know the belief to be true. 
Williams’ argument in favour of a belief-free assertion as the most straightforward 
way to manifest a belief entitles us to regard a number of the Bush administration 
assertions regarding the charges levelled against Iraq as their apparent beliefs about 
such charges. The Bush administration’s belief-free assertion about the alleged Iraqi 
connections to Al-Qaeda is, therefore, considered their seeming belief about such 
connections. Further, in our daily discourse, we communicate many of our beliefs 
without manifesting them as belief clauses. But our manifesting a belief as a belief-
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stipulated assertion does not necessarily mean that we are not certain of the belief or 
that we do not know the belief proposition to be true, as pointed out by Swain:  
 
When I say that I believe something, I usually imply that I am not absolutely 
certain. … [But] it is a mistake to claim that ‘I believe’ is always used in such 
a way that uttering it implies one is not quite sure about what one believes. 
Even though we often use ‘I believe’ with this force, we sometimes do not. 
Suppose I am visiting a friend in Alaska, and one day he tells me that there is a 
palm tree growing in the park nearby. When I express serious doubt about this, 
he takes me to the park and shows me the tree. Having seen many palm trees, I 
am easily able to tell that it is indeed a palm tree. I might very well remark to 
my friend, “All right, now I believe you”! In making this remark I am saying 
that I have been convinced there is a palm tree in the park. I am not saying that 
I do not know with certainty whether there is, nor am I implying any such 
thing; instead, I imply that I do know that a palm tree is there. In other words, 
my saying I believe something does not always imply that I do not know 
whether what I believe is true (1981: 29).  
 
 
Further, being in suspense to see a plausible sign of extraterrestrial life, most of us 
would be in disbelief to hear that an alien spacecraft has landed in California and is 
making contact with humans. Being told about such an event, Natalia comes to 
disbelieve the possibility of such an occurrence. She is then taken to the alien 
spacecraft landing site by her husband to witness the phenomenon herself. Having 
seen the aliens herself and clearly identifying them as aliens, Natalia turns to her 
husband, saying: now I believe extraterrestrial life exists or now I believe alien 
spacecrafts are real. By manifesting her belief in a belief-stipulated manner, she does 
not imply a lack of certainty or knowledge. Having seen the alien crew herself and 
thus been convinced of their existence, she is certain of her belief and manifests it in a 
belief clause with this connotation. Furthermore, being in possession of a true belief 
and a warranted certainty, Natalia can be rightly credited with knowledge rather than 
mere belief. Thus, belief clauses do not necessarily imply a lack of knowledge or 
certainty on the part of the believing subject. Though belief neither entails knowledge 
nor certainty, it might well be used to imply knowledge or certainty. Philosophers 
diverge over whether belief entails a feeling of conviction or certainty. Price holds 
that belief entails such a feeling. He argues that "When we believe something, we feel 
a feeling of sureness or confidence with regard to it" (1935: 234). But Audi rightly 
argues that belief "does not preclude some degree of doubt; but typically, if one 
believes a proposition, one does not doubt it" (2008: 97). Furthermore, Braithwaite 
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argues that since we do not have this feeling of conviction for all the beliefs we hold, 
or since we sometimes hold beliefs without experiencing any such feeling, belief does 
not entail this feeling: 
 
 This is the point to say something about the feelings of conviction which we 
 frequently associate with our beliefs, and which have been made the 
 differentia of  belief by many philosophers. I do not wish to deny that in a 
 great number of cases I have a feeling of conviction when I believe: 
 indeed I think that this feeling of conviction may reasonably be used as 
 evidence for the existence of the belief. But I seem to have a belief  frequently 
 with no feeling of conviction: I believe quite thoroughly that the sun will rise 
 tomorrow, but experience no particular feeling attached to  the proposition 
 believed. And it seems possible to have the feeling of conviction without 
 believing a proposition. So I cannot accept the feeling as part of the essence of 
 belief. ... I am convinced that belief and feeling are  different, and that the 
 latter is not part of the former although we may reasonably use it as a criterion 
 (1933: 141-2).  
 
 
There is a correlation between the proportion of evidence on which we base a belief 
and the feeling of conviction we might experience towards the belief. The more 
probative the evidence, the more likely we experience some feeling of conviction for 
what we believe. But since we do not always perceive the evidence on which we 
come to believe a proposition to be probative or sufficiently probative as in the case 
of pragmatic beliefs, we do not always have this feeling of conviction when we 
believe. Belief would entail certainty if we were to believe nothing other than things 
for which we have what we take to be probative or sufficiently probative evidence. In 
fact if we were to perceive the evidence on which we acquire a belief as probative or 
sufficiently probative, and if the belief is true, then we can be rightly credited with 
knowledge rather than mere true belief. This, however, shall not imply that whenever 
we lack this feeling of conviction which we often associate with belief, we perceive 
the evidence in such a way that leaves room for some reasonable doubt. Normally we 
do not have belief where we have reasonable doubt. I am inclined to think that we 
often have some feeling of conviction about what we believe whenever we perceive 
the evidence for the belief to be probative or, in some cases, sufficiently probative of 
the belief proposition in question. That is, we often lack such feeling whenever we 
take the evidence to be less than probative or, in some cases, less than sufficiently 
probative of the truth of the given belief or when we take the evidence to be indicative 
of the truth of the belief but not quite sufficiently. It sometimes happens that we take 
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the evidence at hand to be conducive of the truth of a belief proposition without 
having this feeling of conviction towards the belief in question. These are primarily 
situations where the given belief proposition is of special practical or scientific 
importance for which we often require sufficiently probative or incorrigible evidence 
in order for us to believe with certainty. Thus, we are normally compelled to seek 
sufficiently conclusive evidence when we try to resolve doxastic opinion on a 
proposition that has a special practical importance for us. Steglich-Petersen argues 
that 
 
 The reason why we are sometimes more meticulous about the evidence we 
 require in order to form a belief is that the truth of the propositions we believe 
 varies in importance for us. If I am deciding whether to believe that The 
 Simpsons is on TV tonight, I am a lot less fussy about the evidence I rely on in 
 forming my belief than I would be if I were a scientist deciding whether to 
 believe that global warming is caused by human activities (2006: 509). 
 
 
That is, it is the value of the proposition in question or our curiosity that compels us 
to seek higher evidential standards under certain conditions. A paradigm case would 
be the science of medicine, when a pharmacologist comes to believe with certainty 
that a particular medicine has certain effects and side-effects once applied. Due to the 
practical difference medicinal drugs make to our life, when pharmacologists form a 
belief about the effects of a particular medication, they normally do so on the basis of 
good evidence. But it is often the case that in order for them to believe with certainty, 
they require higher standards of evidence, something like sufficiently probative 
evidence or incorrigible evidence in some cases. It could be the case that they have 
good evidence to believe that a certain medicine has such and such effects when 
applied on a patient, and they come to so believe on the basis of such evidence, but 
given their awareness of the practical difference such medicines make to our health, 
for them believing with certainty normally requires sufficiently probative evidence or 
something close to such evidential standards. Braithwaite considers it a possibility 
that we sometimes feel convinced or certain that p is true without believing it to be 
true. I find this far from convincing. There are, however, situations where we are 
certain that p is true but do not want to believe it due to some overwhelming practical 
interest. Under such circumstances, belief is, despite the presence of good evidence, 
not desired. The following is one of such cases. It is a case where a woman is certain 
that her husband is dead but does not want to believe it:   
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A woman appears to know that her explorer-husband has perished. She has 
been given the proofs, and she verbally acknowledges their force. Yet, at the 
same time, much of her conduct appears to belie her acknowledgements. She 
does and says all sorts of things which would be naturally interpreted as 
expressions of a belief that he is still alive. She may say of herself that, 
although she knows he is dead, she cannot bring herself to believe it 
(Armstrong 1973: 143).  
 
 
It is counter-intuitive to say that I am certain that John F. Kennedy is dead but I do 
not believe that he is dead. If we were to establish, from a behaviorist1 dispositional 
perspective, what propositional attitude is attributable to the given woman, we might 
attribute the belief that her husband is still alive (p) for she acts appropriately to such 
a belief. That is, she does and asserts the kind of things that she would normally do or 
that we would expect her to do if it was the case that her husband was alive, things 
that we would normally associate with the kind of dispositions that we identify with 
such belief. If it is the case that she believes p, then such believing is akratic for she is 
believing something that she knows is unwarranted by the current evidence. But I am 
inclined to think that she knows that her husband is dead, but, for some practical 
reason, does not want to believe it. Or it is likely that she unconsciously believes her 
husband to be dead for “it is logically possible to be … unaware of the existence of 
any of our own current mental states just as much as any other state of affairs in the 
world”, observes Armstrong (Ibid: 146). But I take it to be more likely that she 
believes her husband is dead, but does not want to accept it. If we think of her 
cognitive attitude as such, we can then think of her behavior as an attempt to resist or 
repress the belief she does not want to accept. We will later, in discussions about 
acceptance, learn that we can believe something we do not accept for accepting or 
being committed to a belief might have undesirable implications. This seems to be a 
good description of the cognitive attitude of the given woman. That is, she believes 
her husband to be dead, but accepting or being committed to such belief and therefore 
acting appropriately to the belief will bring more misery, distress and hardship upon 
her life. Given the IAEA’s probative findings which clearly demonstrated that Iraq 
had not reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, it is likely that the Bush 
administration knew that Iraq did not have a reconstituted nuclear weapons program 
                                                 
1
 We will later on learn on pp. 62-63 that behavioural dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the attribution of belief. Instead, it is the feeling dispositions that count as necessary for the 
attribution of belief.  
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at the time, but did not want to believe it or that they believed it but did not want to 
accept such belief for practical reasons. That is, there was a true proposition and they 
had sufficient evidence to be certain that it was true, but it is probable that they, just 
like the woman, could not bring themselves to believe it or believed it but did not 
want to accept such belief as a premise for action or theoretical reasoning.   
 
The Bush administration's supposed belief that p apparently motivated and guided 
their conduct towards Iraq. Beliefs are often associated with action due to their role in 
influencing the choice of action. The concept of belief as action-guiding is attributed 
to Frank Ramsey in his General Propositions and Causality (1929). He defines belief 
as “a map of neighbouring space by which we steer” (1990: 146). By a map, Ramsey 
demonstrates the representational capacity of beliefs, and by steer, he denotes that 
beliefs guide our actions. Peirce also argues that “Our beliefs guide our desires and 
shape our actions” (1877: 5). Furthermore, Clifford argues that “If a belief is not 
realised immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the guidance of the future” 
(1999: 73). It is due to this fundamental role which beliefs play in the way of 
motivating or guiding our behaviour that Alston argues: “Without beliefs we would be 
thrown back on instinct as our only guide to behaviour” (2005: 30). But not all beliefs 
are action-guiding. There are certain beliefs, like some perceptual or memorial beliefs, 
that we possess without their guiding any of our actions. Some beliefs do not lead to 
any action in the same way that sometimes evidence does not lead to belief, as 
observed in chapter seven on pp. 168-169. But should I undertake to perform some 
action, my beliefs would normally motivate or guide my action through influencing 
my reasoning.  
 
Beliefs are, therefore, best thought of as abstract recourse for guiding behaviour or 
reasoning. They influence the choice of action we make, how we reason, how we 
proceed and respond to practical situations. But since not every belief is action-
guiding, Ramsey’s account of belief would be more applicable, as Armstrong 
observes, if linked to “the notion of a man’s holding a belief for a certain reason” 
(1973: 5). For example, the belief a jury or judge arrives at is held for a certain 
reason: to guide some decision or action, whether to send the defendant to prison or 
set him free. But this does not necessitate every case of holding a belief for a certain 
reason being followed by action guided by that belief. One can hold a belief for a 
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certain reason with one’s relevant subsequent action or decision being guided or 
motivated by factors other than the belief. A jury might arrive at a belief that the 
defendant is guilty, but pass their judgment out of resentment rather than on the basis 
of the belief they have arrived at. The Bush administration might have genuinely 
believed that Iraq was in possession of WMD and in league with Al-Qaeda, but their 
invasion of Iraq might have been guided or motivated by something else – by, for 
instance, their long-standing policy objective or urge to change the Iraqi regime. But 
in most cases, we are influenced in our reasoning, guided and motivated in what we 
do by what we believe to be the case in a given situation.  
 
    Belief is normally driven by epistemic reasons and it is these reasons that are 
credited with the force to render a belief justified. Epistemic reasons are, argues 
Fumerton, grounds that “make likely the truth of what is supported by those reasons” 
(in Moser 2002: 205). In other words, epistemic reasons do not guarantee the truth of 
a belief. They, rather, support the truth of the belief or render the belief proposition 
probable. Epistemologists differ as to what confers positive epistemic status, 
justificatory status, on beliefs. Internalists credit being based on good accessible 
epistemic grounds as the repository of epistemic justification. Externalists regard such 
status as the function of the reliability of the belief-forming process, whereas 
deontologists regard it as being blameless or responsible in acquiring a belief. That is, 
basing a belief on adequate epistemic grounds, or reliably forming a belief or being 
epistemically responsible in acquiring a belief are all different ways of articulating the 
contention that justificatory status obtains only when such a status – whether it be 
internalist, externalist or deontological – secures some truth-conducivity for the belief 
in question. From an internalist perspective, we should have some inkling as to what 
is responsible for such a truth-conducivity if we were to be rational in holding the 
belief. But externalists deny the necessity of such inkling. They argue that as long as 
the belief is reliably formed, we are justified in holding the belief irrespective of 
whether or not we have any knowledge as to what is responsible for the truth of the 
belief. Further, a belief’s enjoying positive epistemic status implies the belief’s 
counting, in some way, towards the truth of the belief for epistemic justification, 
argue Fantl and McGrath, has “a special relationship to truth-acquisition and 
falsehood-avoidance” (in Sosa et al 2008: 743). We will examine this special 
connection between epistemic justification and truth in chapter five. Moreover, the 
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possession of good evidence is a necessary condition for the conferment of 
justificatory status on a belief, but this alone cannot suffice for according such a 
status. No matter how adequate the evidence at our disposal is, no belief can be 
endowed with such a status unless it is based on such evidence. That is, the basing 
relation between a belief and its supporting evidence is a necessary condition for 
epistemic justification. Further, explaining the indispensability of the basing relation, 
Pollock observes: 
 
To be justified in believing something it is not sufficient merely to have a 
good reason for believing it. One could have a good reason at one’s disposal 
but never make the connection. … [In the absence of the basing relation, you 
are not justified in believing a proposition even if] you have impeccable 
reasons for it at your disposal. [under such circumstances] What is lacking is 
that you do not believe the conclusion on the basis of those reasons (1986: 36-
7).  
 
 
This basing relation also holds in ethics. Kant argues that for an action to count as 
morally good, it should be motivated by and done because of the moral law: “For if 
any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral 
law – it must also be done for the sake of the moral law” (in Greco 1990: 255). So far 
as beliefs are concerned, Alston defines this basing relation between a belief and its 
evidence as what gives rise or what leads to the belief: “My preference is to think of 
what a belief is based on as what gives rise to the belief, what leads S to form the 
belief. Or … as what strengthened or preserves the belief” (2005: 84). This is how I 
will construe the basing relation as in this research. 
 
2.2. Hume’s Conception of Belief 
 
The characteristic feature of Hume’s account of belief is the consciousness he 
associates with the attribution and constitution of belief. Hume defines belief as “a 
lively idea related to or associated with a present impression” (2008: 81). He further 
argues that “It is the present impression, which is to be considered as the true and real 
cause of the idea, and of the belief which attends it” (Ibid: 86-7). Hume holds that our 
ideas are derived from our impressions and that impressions are the true cause of both 
ideas and accompanying beliefs. That is, the Humean conception of belief considers 
the presence of an impression a necessary condition for belief in that impression. 
Thus, his necessary components for the attribution of belief are vivacity and a present 
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impression. From a Humean standpoint, I can be attributed belief only if I have a 
vivid idea of the object of belief; that is, only if I am conscious of the impression that 
initially caused my belief. Hume argues that “The idea of an object is an essential part 
of the belief of it” (Ibid: 80). This is where Hume’s element of consciousness arises as 
a necessary condition of attributing or constituting belief. Moreover, he further 
observes that “we must have an idea of every matter of fact, which we believe. … this 
idea arises only from a relation to a present impression. … the belief super-adds 
nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving it, and renders it more 
strong and lively” (Ibid: 86).  
 
    That is, we would have an idea of an object only when there is a present impression 
of the object for it is the present impression that causes the idea. Thus, to believe 
something is to have a present idea of that thing and that the belief is not distinct from 
the idea itself – rather, it is just the idea conceived of stronger and livelier. In other 
words, the belief only changes the way we think about the idea in the sense that we 
feel it to be true. The problematic feature of Hume’s account of belief is his 
consciousness element. We are not always conscious of our beliefs, yet we still hold 
them. Being conscious of a belief cannot be a necessary condition for the attribution 
of that belief. Armstrong argues that there is no rational ground to deny the 
unconscious or sleeping agent a belief he unconsciously holds: “it is perfectly 
intelligible to attribute a belief to somebody although there is no relevant vivid idea in 
his consciousness. We can, for instance, intelligibly attribute a current belief that the 
earth is round to a man who is sleeping dreamlessly or is unconscious” (1973: 7). 
Thus, holding a belief does not entail being conscious of that belief. In other words, 
being conscious of a belief is not a necessary condition for the attribution of the belief 
because “Beliefs are states of mind which, so far from us being currently conscious 
of, we need not even know that we possess” argues Armstrong (Ibid: 21).  
 
Hume gets more explicit about his bizarre conception of belief, arguing that the 
liveliness that individuates belief and distinguishes it from mere idea comes “from the 
present idea … this idea is not here considered as the representation of an absent 
object, but as a real perception in the mind, of which we are intimately conscious” 
(2008: 89). He goes on, saying: “I would willingly establish it as a general maxim in 
the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us, it not 
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only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates 
to them a share of its force and vivacity” (Ibid: 84). But I can be intimately conscious 
of an idea, without the idea’s striking me in the way of belief. Rather, the force that 
individuates belief originates from what corroborates the belief. That is, what 
individuates the belief that p is our feeling it to be true that p regardless of whether or 
not we are conscious of such feeling at the time of holding the belief. This feeling is 
normally dispositional that might be activated upon attending to the relevant 
proposition. There are two fundamental flaws in Hume’s account of belief. First, it 
does not take into account non-occurrent beliefs. Second, its conception of the force 
that individuates belief is misguided. Further to the challenges Hume’s conception of 
belief faces, Armstrong observes:  
 
The difficulty faces any theory which equates a man’s current belief with 
some current content of his consciousness, whether it be a vivid idea of p, an 
inward motion of assent to the proposition ‘p’, or whatever. For it always 
seems intelligible to suppose that the content of consciousness should be 
absent and yet that the believer held the relevant belief at that time (1973: 7-
8).  
 
 
    If Hume’s account of belief holds, then we can only be credited with occurrent 
beliefs – an eventuality that dramatically diminishes our doxastic outputs. Given 
Hume’s conception, belief is a transient attitude that is contingent on the believing 
subject's being conscious of a given belief. But no human intuition can corroborate 
this: I currently believe that p, but cannot be credited with such belief when I am 
asleep or unconscious of such belief. Thus, Hume’s account of belief cannot represent 
the apparent beliefs we are concerned with in this research. 
 
2.3. The Dispositional Theory of Belief 
 
The most prominent account of belief in the contemporary philosophical literature 
is that of the behaviorist or functionalist for which Bain, The Emotions and the Will 
(1859), takes the credit. The following is how he conceives of belief in his second 
edition of The Emotions and the Will:  
 
 It will be readily admitted that the state of mind called Belief is, in many 
 cases, a concomitant of our activity. But I mean to go farther than this, and 
 to affirm that  belief has no meaning, except in reference to our actions ... no 
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 mere conception that  does not directly or indirectly implicate our  voluntary 
 exertions, can ever amount to the state in question (1865: 524). 
 
 
Furthermore, in his third edition of The Emotions and the Will, Bain argues that 
belief is "essentially related to Action, that is, volition" and that "Preparedness to act 
upon what we affirm [believe] is admitted on all hands to be the sole, the genuine, the 
unmistakable criterion of belief" (2004: 505). Moreover, in his subsequent work, 
Mental and Moral Science (1868), Bain echoes the very behaviorist account of belief 
he lays out in his earlier work (1859). He holds that "The difference between mere 
conceiving ... and belief is acting, or being prepared to act, when the occasion arises" 
(2004: 372). Bain takes a radically behaviourist view of belief, regarding it as a 
mental state whose attribution is solely determined by the believing subject's aptness 
to, where appropriate, act as if it was the case that p. That is, he associates belief with 
the disposition to act in line with the belief in question. Of the leading proponents of 
the dispositional account of belief is Ryle. He argues that: 
 
 to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesitant in telling oneself 
 and others that it is thin ... in objecting to statements to the contrary, in 
 drawing consequences from the original proposition, and so forth. But it  is 
 also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on 
 possible disasters and to warn other skaters. It is a propensity not only to 
 make certain theoretical moves but also to  make certain executive and 
 imaginative moves, as well as to have certain feelings (2000: 129).  
 
 
Echoing Bain's conception of belief, Ryle associates belief with a set of 
dispositions relevant to a given belief. That is, from a Rylean standpoint, to believe 
that p is to be disposed to, under appropriate circumstances, assert p, reason and act as 
if p. Moreover, Braithwaite holds that the disposition to act as if p is "the differentia 
of actual belief from actual entertainment" (1933: 132). He further argues that the 
behavioural disposition is not only "a criterion of genuine belief", but "it is part of the 
actual meaning of believing" (Ibid: 133). Further to the disposition to act in a certain 
way, Braithwaite observes:  
 
 My belief that Locke was born in 1632 is just the sort of belief which it might 
 be alleged could have no effect upon my actions. Yet it would prevent my 
 buying an autograph letter alleged to be written by Locke, if there were 
 strong evidence that it was written before that date ... there is always one form 
 of behaviour which depends  upon my beliefs - my verbal  behaviour. If I am 
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 asked when Locke was born, and wish to inform my questioner, I shall 
 answer "1632" if I believe that he was born in 1632, and  "1633" if I 
 believe that he was born in 1633 (Ibid: 138-139). 
 
 
That is, the dispositional profile Braithwaite associates with the belief that p 
comprises both actional and verbal behaviour. Thus, if I were to be attributed belief in 
democracy and if I were in a position of power, an external observer would expect to 
see me acting in accordance with an acceptable set of democratic principles, engaging 
in the kind of activities that would affirm the existence of such belief, not condoning 
undemocratic practices, condemning dictatorial practices of governance, asserting 
such belief were I asked about my favourite forms of governance or the kinds of 
governance forms I take to be the best, and manifesting other kinds of both verbal and 
actional behaviour that are indicative of holding such belief. Thus, from a 
dispositional perspective, in order to "have a particular belief" is "just to match to an 
appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for having 
that belief", observes Schwitzgebel (1999: 289). Schwitzgebel further argues that "the 
greater the proportion of stereotypical dispositions a person possesses, and the more 
central those dispositions are to the stereotype, the more appropriate it is to describe 
her as possessing the belief in question" (Ibid: 289).  
 
Though possessing the kind of dispositions that we typically associate with a 
certain belief is often characteristic of genuine believers, exhibiting such stereotypical 
dispositions need not necessarily amount to having the corresponding belief. I can just 
pretend to have a certain belief and manifest the kind of dispositions we normally 
identify with the belief in question. Or I can genuinely hold the belief, but do not 
exhibit all the dispositions we ordinarily take to be characteristic of the given belief or 
fail to exhibit the kind of dispositions that we take to be central to the belief in 
question. For example, the CIA interrogator who sincerely believes the institution's 
raison d'être, guiding principles and interrogation techniques such as waterboarding to 
be antithetical to all that he stands for never exhibits the kind of dispositional profile 
we take to be most central and most characteristic of such belief, namely belief in the 
right to privacy, in treating detainees humanely and with dignity, in not coercing or 
putting detainees under duress and other relevant propositions.  
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He never asserts his belief that waterboarding is wrongful even when specifically 
asked for his opinion about the rightfulness of such technique, nor does he ever act 
appropriate to such belief. He just follows the institution's instructions, executing 
them for practical reasons even in the presence of the firm belief that does not favour 
such actions. That is, he simply does not want to lose his job. Though he fails to 
exhibit any dispositions that we take to be central to such belief, he can still be rightly 
attributed the belief in question. He just acts akratically contrary to what he believes 
on good evidence. Furthermore, we sometimes genuinely hold a specific belief but 
fail to exhibit all the dispositions we typically associate with the belief in question as 
argued by Schwitzgebel: "A person may be absolutely persuaded of the truth of a 
proposition in the sense of reaching a sincere, unequivocal, unmitigated, unqualified, 
unhesitant judgment, and yet that judgment may fail to penetrate her entire 
dispositional structure" (2010: 546). He further argues that under certain 
circumstances, there might be excusing conditions that would not preclude the 
attribution of belief:  
 
 In some ... cases, maybe, there are what we might call 'excusing conditions': 
 Ryle's  thin-ice believer doesn't warn the other skaters because he doesn't see 
 the other skaters or because he'd enjoy watching them fall through. ... If  he
 doesn't warn the other skaters out of schadenfreude or because he's blinded by 
 the sun, that deviation from the typical dispositional manifestation counts not 
 at all against ascribing him the belief that the ice is thin (Ibid: 534).   
 
 
There are situations where we hold a genuine belief, but fail to assert it either 
because we do not encounter any chance to assert it in response to a question, contrary 
propositions or because the belief is never challenged in a way to provoke a defence 
or an activity of justifying the belief - a process during which we might assert the 
belief. We might, nevertheless, act favourably to the belief in question. For example, 
the illiterate country layman who is told, on good authority, that believing in God is 
beneficial and rewarding comes to believe in God, acting appropriately to the given 
belief without encountering any chance to assert such a belief. Similarly, we 
sometimes hold a certain belief, frequently asserting the belief in response to contrary 
propositions, but might still fail to act appropriately to the belief. Many drug users 
believe that taking drugs is bad for their health and explicitly assert such belief in 
response to the health effects of drug consumption, yet they fail to act appropriately to 
the belief in question. Furthermore, Bain, despite his firm contention that belief is 
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explainable only in relation to the kind of actions it disposes us to perform, recognizes 
that we sometimes fail to act upon our beliefs:  
 
 We often have a genuine belief, and yet do not act upon it. One may have the 
 conviction strongly that abstinence from stimulants would favour health and 
 happiness, and yet go on taking stimulants. ... Belief is a motive, or an 
 inducement to  act, but it may be overpowered by a stronger motive - a present 
 pleasure, or relief from a present pain. ... The second apparent exception is 
 furnished by the cases where  we believe things that we never can have any 
 occasion to act upon. Some  philosophers of the present day believe that the 
 sun is radiating away his heat, and  will in some inconceivably long period 
 cool down far below zero of Fahrenheit. ...  [There are many such 
 propositions that] are beyond our sphere of action, and are yet believed by us. 
 ... many men that will never cross the Sahara desert, believe what is told of its 
 surface, of its burning days and chilling nights. It is not hard to trace a 
 reference to action in every one of these beliefs. ... When we believe the 
 testimony of travellers as to the Sahara, we view that testimony as the same 
 in kind with what we  are accustomed to act upon. A traveller in Africa has ... 
 told us of Sahara, and we have fallen into the same mental attitude in this case, 
 although we may not have the same occasion to act it out. We express the 
 attitude by saying, that if we went to Africa, we would do certain things in 
 consequence of the information (2004: 372-373).  
 
 
Moreover, Quine and Ullian also define belief as a latent disposition that does not 
necessarily have to be manifested or observed off behaviour in order for a belief to 
obtain or to be ascribable:  
 
 believing is not itself an activity. ... It is not something that we feel while it 
 lasts. Rather, believing is a disposition that can linger latent and unobserved. 
 It is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue 
 arises. To believe that Hannibal crossed the Alps is to be disposed,  among
 other things,  to say "Yes" when asked. To  believe that frozen foods will 
 thaw on the table is to be disposed, among other things, to leave such 
 foods on the table only when one wants them thawed (1970: 3-4). 
 
 
Quine further argues that beliefs are not reducible to behaviour as a single 
determinant for holding a certain belief: "Mental states and events do not reduce to 
behaviour, nor are they explained by behaviour" (1979: 167). I do not think that 
behavioural dispositions can account for all cases of belief. The examples mentioned 
earlier clearly demonstrate this. Schwitzgebel argues that in order for the dispositional 
account of belief to be more representative, we should also consider the "dispositions 
to undergo certain kinds of private experiences (such as surprise or disappointment) 
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and to engage in certain sorts of cognition (such as drawing conclusions)" (1999: 
292). Price associates belief with such feeling dispositions too. He argues that when 
we learn that a belief we have been holding is false, we find ourselves with a feeling 
of "surprise and disappointment" (1935: 238). Furthermore, Audi also observes that 
believing that p entails a "tendency to be surprised upon discovering not-p to be the 
case" (2008: 98). That is, suppose that I, on good authority, came to believe that there 
is an alien spacecraft on the ground in Ladybower. Trusting the source of the 
testimony, I just come to feel it true that there is an alien spacecraft in Ladybower. 
The possession of such belief cognitively disposes me to conclude that there is 
extraterrestrial life. I, therefore, reason accordingly, at least during the time I am 
holding the given belief to be true. Being so ardent about extraterrestrial life, I drive 
there to see it myself. I go over there out of curiosity, but also because I am not 
certain of the veracity of the belief I am currently holding. I want to verify it. I can 
have a feeling that it is going to rain today, though I am not certain that it will. Upon 
realising that the alleged alien spacecraft is a complete hoax by the local residents, I 
will be immediately and automatically struck by a profound sense of shock, surprise 
and disappointment.  
 
These are private internal experiences that are often detectable from external 
appearances or behaviour. But even the presence of such appearances need not 
necessarily amount to holding a certain belief. I can just pretend to be in a state of 
shock, surprise, or disappointment in the same way that I can pretend to be in a state 
of a belief I am not holding. But, for purposes of generality, it is important that we 
take into account of such non-behavioural dispositions. There are human agents that 
can have genuine beliefs without possessing the necessary capacity to engage in 
verbal or actional behaviour whose dispositions are taken by behaviourists to be 
indicative of a corresponding belief. Furthermore, Schwitzgebel argues that 
behavioural dispositions fail to explain the attribution of belief in situations where 
"behavior is severely limited, such as in cases of paralysis, or ... in the first few 
months of an infant's life. ... Both the quadriplegic person and the infant can feel 
surprise and anxiety" (1999: 292). The quadriplegic can, on good testimony, come to 
be in a genuine belief state that the Sahara desert is unbearably hot during the day 
without possessing the necessary physical capacity to act upon such belief. They can 
continue to be in such belief state without the belief's influencing their practical 
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behaviour. However, the belief can guide or influence their theoretical reasoning and 
verbal behaviour. That is, if one of their family members or friends were to visit the 
Sahara desert, they would warn them of its unbearable heat or they can infer other 
beliefs from the given belief. They can infer the belief that it is necessary to wear a 
hat or put on some special cream in order to avoid sunburn or the belief that it is 
necessary to have a supply of water. But none of these verbal or theoretical moves are 
necessary to be performed in order for the given belief to obtain. It could be the case 
that the quadriplegic acquires such belief and subsequently forgets it, or never 
entertains it or just never encounters any occasion to assert it or use it as a premise for 
theoretical reasoning.  
 
Now suppose that the family member who visits the Sahara desert and takes the 
quadriplegic's advice on board reports back to the quadriplegic that the Sahara desert 
is not really unbearably hot. It is, rather, unbearably cold. The quadriplegic will feel 
disappointed or surprised at learning that they have been holding a false belief. This 
is, of course, if the quadriplegic trusts the testimony of the family member. 
Furthermore, a pre-linguistic infant will presumably recognize the milk bottle he takes 
to be the container with what he takes to be milk. He has sufficient experience of how 
milk tastes to recognize the taste of milk. Of the fluids provided to infants, the given 
infant only drinks milk. Now suppose that the infant cries for milk and I am holding a 
milk bottle I have insulated with a material that gives its content the appearance or 
colour of milk in order to trick the perceptual experiences of the infant. I just want the 
infant to drink other necessary liquids like water. But he never drinks anything that 
does not taste like milk. Now suppose that I pass on the bottle to the infant. He grabs 
it and drinks it, and then he drops it. Upon realising that the fluid is not what he 
associates with the taste of milk, the infant undergoes an internal experience that we 
typically characterise as one of disappointment or surprise. Here we can rightly 
describe the infant as initially believing that that the milk bottle contained milk. 
Though he has neither the linguistic capacity to assert such belief, nor does he have 
the physical capacity to act upon it. That is why belief cannot be solely associated 
with a disposition to act in a way appropriate to a given belief. Rather, belief is, as 
argued by Cohen, a disposition to feel it true that p and false that not p: "belief that p 
is a disposition, when one is attending to issues raised, or items referred to, by the 
proposition that p, normally to feel it true that p and false that not-p, whether or not 
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one is willing to act, speak, or reason accordingly" (1992: 4). Further to the feeling 
dispositions he identifies belief with, Cohen observes:  
 
 Belief that p ... is a disposition to feel it true that p, whether or not one goes 
 along with the proposition as a premiss. Such a feeling takes many different 
 forms. One may feel convinced by the evidence of its being true that p, one 
 may feel surprised to learn of an event that is evidence against its  being true 
 that p, one may feel pleased at its being true that p, and so on (1989: 368). 
 
 
Moreover, Cohen argues that "a belief-disposition can exist before it is activated" 
(1992: 6). He further observes: 
 
 though many beliefs only commence at the time of their first being felt, there 
 are many others that apparently antedate this, just as by being dried in the  sun 
 a lump of clay may become brittle long before pressure is applied and it 
 breaks. Thus, if you  have long believed that London is larger than Oxford 
 and that Oxford is larger than St Andrews, then you will most probably 
 (though not necessarily ...) have long believed that London is larger than  St
 Andrews, even if the belief has never explicitly occurred to you until you 
 were asked. Indeed, even if you have never consciously believed anything
 implying that London is larger than St Andrews, your answer to the 
 question 'Do you believe that London is larger than St Andrews?' would 
 most probably still be  'Yes'. That is to say, a present feeling that London is 
 larger than St Andrews would be taken to display a pre-existing disposition to 
 feel this (Ibid: 5). 
 
 
Thus, we can be legitimately credited with many beliefs that have never and might 
never occur to us. These are mainly beliefs in the deductive consequences of the 
propositions we already believe. To sum up, believe is “a tendency verb” (Ryle 1949: 
128). Further, the dispositional notion of belief, argues Armstrong, stems from the 
fact that one can possess beliefs even if they are never manifested in the same way 
that a physical object can possess a disposition even if the disposition never 
materialises:  
 
We distinguish between a thing’s disposition and the manifestation of that 
disposition; between the brittleness of a piece of glass and its actually 
breaking. We recognize further that having the disposition does not entail 
manifestation of the disposition: a piece of glass may be brittle and yet never 
break. In similar fashion, we distinguish between a belief and its 
manifestation, or, as we also say, its expression2: between A’s belief that p and 
                                                 
2
 Armstrong deploys the term expression in the same sense as manifestation. He uses expression as the 
speech-act of holding a belief. But expressing a belief might not necessarily entail holding the belief. 
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the speech-act and other actions or occurrences in which the belief is 
manifested or expressed; and we recognize that having the belief does not 
entail manifestation or expression of the belief. Such a distinction enables us 
to give a plausible account of the case of the sleeping or unconscious believer 
(1973: 8).  
 
 
    It is this dispositional conception of belief which constitutes a comprehensive 
theory of belief, accounting for both occurrent and non-occurrent beliefs. Outlining 
the difference between the manifestations of the two, Armstrong observes that beliefs 
have multi-form manifestations whereas dispositions have single-form manifestations:  
 
If brittleness is manifested, it can be manifested in only one sort of way: by the 
brittle object breaking if struck. But there is no one such way that a belief that 
the earth is flat must manifest itself, if it does manifest itself. ... If A believes 
that the earth is flat and is an Anglo-Saxon he may well manifest his belief, on 
a particular occasion, by uttering the English sentence ‘the earth is flat’. Such 
a manifestation must surely figure in any list of possible manifestations of A’s 
belief. But what makes it a manifestation of A’s belief? Only the fact that the 
rules of English are such that uttering these phonemes would be a natural way 
of expressing such a belief (Ibid: 17).  
 
 
This corroborates what we earlier observed that a belief can be manifested both in a 
belief-stipulated manner and as a belief-free utterance. Furthermore, Armstrong 
argues that “beliefs, if manifested, are manifested in indefinitely many ways” (Ibid: 
21). That is, there is no single rule for manifesting a belief, but there is only one way 
through which a disposition can manifest what constitutes the disposition. I can 
manifest my belief that Iraq has WMD in a variety of different ways: there are WMD 
in Iraq; WMD exists in Iraq; Iraq has WMD; Iraq possesses WMD; the possession of 
WMD by Iraq is a given; I contend that Iraq has WMD; I contend that there are WMD 
in Iraq; I hold that Iraq possesses WMD; I hold that there are WMD in Iraq, and other 
relevant forms of manifestation. Belief is also often described as a mental or 
psychological state. The state view of belief runs fairly parallel to the dispositional 
view of belief in the sense that “dispositions are a species of state”, though “not all 
states are dispositions”, argues Armstrong (Ibid: 10). That is, all dispositions are 
states, but not every state is a disposition. For example, a piece of glass can be in a 
state of being dusty, though being dusty is not a disposition of glass. Thus, 
dispositions entail states, but states do not entail dispositions. According to the state 
view of belief, “A’s believing that p is a matter of A’s being in a certain continuing 
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state, a state which endures for the whole time that A holds the belief”, observes 
Armstrong (Ibid: 9). In other words, given the state view of belief, a belief can be 
attributed to us so long we continue to hold the belief, regardless of whether or not we 
are conscious of the belief or of the fact that we hold such belief. That is, as long as I 
continue to hold a belief, I continue to be in such belief state. The enduring state of 
my belief is not contingent on my being aware of being in such belief state. 
Armstrong attributes the enduring state of belief to our “mind being imprinted or 
stamped in a certain way” whenever we come to believe something (Ibid: 9).  
 
The inquiry into the nature of belief provides a touchstone against which the 
possible attribution of belief to the given alleged believing subjects will be 
investigated in chapter nine. This chapter has examined the constitution of belief as a 
propositional attitude we normally take involuntarily in response to evidence which 
we take to be adequate or satisfactory from our own cognitive perspective on a given 
issue. It has also established the essence of belief as a psychological state that entails a 
dispositional feeling that p is true. Belief is a propositional attitude we can, but should 
not, be conscious of. Many beliefs, such as perceptual beliefs, are formed and held 
unconsciously. Thus, consciousness is not a necessary part of the formation or 
retention of belief. The previous chapter presented the Bush administration's case for 
war with the nuclear and terror propositions identified as the objects of the inquiry in 
question. This chapter has provided an explanation as to what it is like to believe a 
proposition. The Bush administration expressed a belief in the professed rationale 
behind the war under epistemic conditions inadequate to warrant belief. Thus far, we 
have been concerned with how paradigmatic cases of belief obtain, but given the 
typical epistemic conditions under which they are formed, it is unclear how the Bush 
administration officials could have come to believe that p in the face of debunked 
evidence that p (in the case of the nuclear proposition) or unprobative evidence that p 
(in the case of the terror proposition). The next chapter will explore the possibility 
whether non-paradigmatic cases of belief are attainable through the exercise of free 
will.  
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Chapter Three 
Belief and Will 
 
    The subject who allegedly believes a proposition he takes to be unwarranted or 
evidentially unsupported from his own cognitive perspective cannot be rightly 
described as believing that p. That is, we cannot be rightly attributed belief in p when 
we take the available evidence that p to be inadequate or unsatisfactory from our own 
perspective. We normally take what we believe to be warranted or evidentially 
supported from our perspective. Furthermore, we normally take the evidence on 
which we come to believe a proposition to be adequate or satisfactory from our 
perspective. Normally belief does not obtain in situations where we take the available 
evidence for p to be inadequate, unsatisfactory or unprobative or where we take p to 
be evidentially unsupported. In a bid to stress the conditions that make the attribution 
of belief inappropriate, this chapter examines the constitutional unwillability of belief. 
We, as explained later, normally will a belief when we take the available evidence for 
p to be inadequate or when we take belief in p to be unwarranted or evidentially 
unsupported from our perspective on the given issue. But I cannot be rightly attributed 
belief that p when I merely desire such belief in the absence of any supporting 
evidence for p, in the presence of clear evidence that not p, or when I take belief that p 
to be unwarranted from my perspective. This chapter explains why belief is not a 
willable mental phenomenon. We cannot will ourselves to believe that p in the 
presence of clear evidence that not p or in the presence of inadequate evidence that p. 
In the case of the given nuclear proposition, there was clear evidence that not p, and 
unprobative evidence that p in the case of the terror proposition. Belief is partly 
individuated by its constitutional unwillability. Examining the psychological 
unwillability of belief is necessary to further the attribution of belief, one of the key 
research questions, for it explains why we cannot be rightly attributed belief that p 
when we take the available evidence for p to be inadequate or when we take belief in 
p to be unwarranted from our own cognitive perspective. In chapters nine and ten, we 
will learn that one of the conditions that render the attribution of belief to Cheney 
inappropriate is his taking the available supporting evidence to be inadequate. This is 
besides his knowledge of the presence of clear evidence that not p.  
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    One of the perplexing issues in philosophy is the potential willability of belief and 
the extent to which beliefs are under direct voluntary control, if they are subject to our 
direct control at all. Believing at will occurs when one believes the available evidence 
to be inadequate to warrant the willed belief as observed by Cook: “the notion of 
trying to will myself to believe something would only occur to me when I find the 
evidence for p insufficient to warrant belief in the normal way” (1987: 441). In other 
words, willing a belief transpires in an epistemic situation where “the subject is 
swimming against either a preponderance of contrary evidence or a lack of sufficient 
evidence either way”, observes Alston (2005: 73). There is also the case of doxastic 
incontinence (akrasia) where one motivationally believes that p and is simultaneously 
conscious of or simultaneously believes that there is adequate evidence for one’s 
disbelieving p. It is a situation where one knows or believes that one’s cognitive 
context contains sufficient evidence to disbelieve what one currently motivationally 
believes.  
 
    It is, in a sense, the typical eventuality where we would find ourselves in if we were 
to succeed in willing a belief – ending up believing the willed belief while 
simultaneously believing that the willed belief is false, acquired at will, unwarranted, 
unsupported by evidence or while simultaneously believing that there is sufficient 
evidence for us to disbelieve the willed belief (p) or to believe that not p. Such a 
paradoxical outcome would be the typical upshot of succeeding in willing a belief. 
But due to psychological constraints on belief, “no one believes that p if she also 
believes that the belief that p is unsupported by any consideration having to do with 
the truth of p” (in Scott-Kakures 1994: 87). Furthermore, Winters also observes that 
“it is impossible to believe that one believes p and that one’s belief of p originated and 
is sustained in a way that has no connection with p’s truth” (1979: 243). In other 
words, I cannot believe p and also believe that my belief that p has no connection with 
p’s being true because, argues Williams, to believe that p is just to believe that p is 
true: “beliefs aim at truth … to believe that p is to believe that p is true. … to say ‘I 
believe that p’ itself carries, in general, a claim that p is true” (1973: 136-7).  
 
    That is, since believing is a psychological state, I cannot believe p to be true and 
simultaneously believe it to be unwarranted or false. This is just counter-intuitive. The 
psychological impossibility of such cases is what underlies Williams’, 
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O’Shaughnessy’s and Alston’s conception of belief. Despite presenting a powerful 
case for the unwillability of belief, Scott-Kakures does not rule out the logical 
possibility of believing at will, which is why he argues that “there is no good a priori 
reasoning to support the claim that anomalous belief state transitions are impossible” 
(1994: 87). Though beliefs are ideally formed on the basis of epistemic 
considerations, we also at times try to acquire certain beliefs on the basis of pragmatic 
considerations. Sometimes we succeed, and sometimes we fail in our efforts 
(intentions) to acquire the belief we want to hold. Epistemologists who rule out 
doxastic voluntarism contend that we cannot will ourselves into a desired belief state 
directly, in Williams' terms, “just like that” (1973: 148). That is, they argue that we 
can succeed in willing a belief only indirectly through “selective exposure to evidence 
and deliberate attention to supporting considerations, seeking the company of 
believers and avoiding nonbelievers”, points out Alston (2005: 72). But doxastic 
voluntarism implies that we can bring about a willed belief directly in the same way 
that we can bring about the realisation of any intentional action. In other words, it 
presupposes that beliefs can be induced directly and immediately just like that through 
willing them alone. The philosophical principle of epistemic deontology is long-
standing and dates back to Descartes who observes that: 
 
We have free will, enabling us to withhold our assent in doubtful matters and 
hence avoid error. … we … experience within us the kind of freedom which 
enables us always to refrain from believing things which are not completely 
certain and thoroughly examined. Hence we are able to take precautions 
against going wrong on any occasion (1985: 194).  
 
 
    We will later on learn that propositional attitudes like assent, consent, 
acquiescence, and acceptance differ from belief in the sense that the former are 
intentional acts and can therefore respond to free will whereas belief cannot. But 
Descartes even associates free will with belief. There are many propositions that are 
not beyond reasonable doubt or are not completely certain, yet we are still not at 
liberty to withhold belief from them. Upon entertaining them, we come to either 
believe or disbelieve them or, as Plantinga1 (1993) points out, we find ourselves with 
no belief about them. Being in possession of good confirming evidence, I come to 
                                                 
1
 Refer to p. 90 for Plantinga’s example in which we find ourselves with no belief upon entertaining 
certain propositions.  
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believe that humankind went to the moon upon considering such proposition. Eris is a 
dwarf planet that I have hardly even heard of it and thus have no inkling of its 
extraterrestrial components. Lacking any evidence pro or con, I come up with no 
belief as to whether there is some special sort of rock x on Eris upon being asked 
about such possibility. Just as I have no knowledge about things I have no inkling 
about, I find myself with no belief about propositions I have no reason to believe or 
disbelieve. But my being void of any doxastic attitude toward a given proposition is 
not a matter of withholding belief at will. It is a matter of human nature and the nature 
of belief. Withholding is an intentional action, whereas believing or disbelieving is 
not. The two are, therefore, incompatible.  
 
    But doxastic voluntarists take the voluntary control we exercise to satisfy the desire 
to believe or the direct control we have over initiating an inquiry to suffice rendering 
belief voluntary. Losonsky argues that “It is especially difficult to see how belief itself 
will not be voluntary if it is allowed that the inquiry leading to belief is voluntary” (in 
Engel 2000: 105). The essence of initiating an inquiry is that we do not know whether 
or not the proposition under inquiry is true, and we lack the capacity to take up any 
attitude we please, which is why we initiate the inquiry. We do sometimes want to 
believe the things that please us even when we lack sufficient evidence in their 
favour. But, argues Wood, the desire to believe “would give us a reason to want to 
believe, but it does not give us the belief itself, or indeed any means at all of 
satisfying the want” (2002: 83). I want to believe many things without holding the 
actual belief itself. Possessing the desire to believe in the absence of some evidence in 
no way equips us with a direct causal factor which can bring about a desired belief 
directly upon willing it. Kant argues that our will has no direct influence on our 
beliefs:  
 
The will does not have any influence immediately on assent2; this would be 
quite absurd … If the will had an immediate influence on our conviction 
concerning what we wish, we would constantly form for ourselves chimeras of 
a happy condition, and always hold them to be true. But the will cannot 
struggle against convincing proofs of truths that are contrary to its wishes and 
inclinations (2007: 36).  
 
                                                 
2
 We treat assent as voluntary in this research, but Kant treats it as involuntary along with conviction. 
But we can take the involuntariness Kant associates with psychological states to reflect how other 
psychological states such as belief are acquired.   
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    That is, if we had free will over our beliefs, and should we want to believe, we 
could knowingly and directly come to believe even the most irrational or the patently 
false. But we lack direct control over our beliefs, which is why Kant argues that the 
will to believe disappears in the face of good reason to disbelieve, and vice versa. He 
contends that we lack free will over our psychological states, which is why we are 
unable to withhold belief or conviction that p in the face of clear evidence that p:  
 
a businessman, e.g., who sees from his bills that he owes much, more than he 
possesses or can hope to possess, will of course not be able to withdraw his 
approval and consent from this cognition, which is so evident, however much 
he might like to … since he is too much and too evidently convinced of the 
correctness of the arithmetic in this matter, and the account of the debts 
contains far too much evidence … The free arbitrium [free will] in regard to 
approval … disappears entirely in the presence of certain degrees of the 
grounds, and it is always very hard, if not utterly impossible, to withhold 
approval (Ibid: 36).  
 
 
    Kant, however, recognizes that free will can have an indirect influence on belief 
through a close direction of mind to corroborating grounds: 
 
Insofar as the will either impels the understanding toward inquiry into a truth 
or holds it back therefrom, however, one must grant it an influence on the use 
of the understanding, and hence indirectly on conviction itself, since this 
depends so much upon the use of the understanding (Ibid: 37). 
 
If approval does not arise immediately through the nature of the human 
understanding and of human reason, then it still requires closer direction of 
choice, will, wish, or in general of our free will, toward the grounds of proof 
(Ibid: 37).  
 
 
    It is this indirect influence of the will which most contemporary epistemologists 
subscribe to when it comes to the influence of free will on belief. Sometimes a judge 
or a jury ends up with no verdict due to the lack of decisive evidence. That is, they 
come up with no belief as to whether it is p or not p. They are in a state of no belief – 
they just do not possess what it takes to believe or disbelieve a proposition. Being able 
to withhold belief at will implies being able to control our doxastic attitudes directly – 
a physiological capability we lack. There are situations where we believe things in the 
absence of justification. We just cannot help believing them because we do not choose 
or decide what stance to take on as our attitude on a given issue as pointed out below 
by Swinburne. If we had, over our doxastic attitudes, the same autonomy we have 
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over our intentional actions, we would rarely go wrong in our beliefs. If beliefs were 
willable – capable of being acquired directly just through an intention, a choice or 
decision – then we would have been responsible and liable to blame for holding a 
false belief. The willability of belief is the underlying thesis of deontological 
justification, a notion that leads to doxastic voluntarism. But justification understood 
in epistemic terms obviates the assignment of blame or responsibility to belief by 
virtue of one’s inability to control what one takes up as one’s attitude towards a 
proposition or in virtue of one’s inability to withhold belief until the truth is known or 
emerges. Ideally, we believe when we have reason to. In the absence of such reason, 
we either disbelieve, reject, or we just have no belief. In many, but not all, situations, 
we believe because we are not certain.  
 
Blasting off to Mars, I believe my astronaut brother will touch down safe and sound 
because he has always made a sound descent in the past, although it is not the case 
that I am certain that he will do so this time. Further, many people believe in the 
existence of God without being certain of its existence. Though they lack such 
certainty, they are psychologically incapable of withholding or refraining from such 
belief at will. One reason is because “we believe our beliefs because we know that we 
do not choose them but because we believe that they are forced upon us by the outside 
world”, argues Swinburne (2001: 40). Of the famous advocates of doxastic 
voluntarism is William James. He, though withdrawing from his voluntarist position 
later, observes that: “Will and Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between 
objects and the Self, are two names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL 
phenomenon” (2007: 321). Moreover, James speaks of belief as “acquiescence” (Ibid: 
283), and defines consent as “a manifestation of our active nature” (Ibid: 283). 
Newman also defines assent as a voluntary act for which we can be held to account: 
“Assent is an act of the mind … it, as other acts, may be made both when it ought to 
be made, and when it ought not. It is a free act, a personal act for which the doer is 
responsible” (2010: 232). Doxastic voluntarists contend that belief responds to free 
will in the same way that other voluntary acts do, which is why they do not 
differentiate between belief and acceptance. But Gale rightly argues that belief is not 
an act of accepting, acquiescing or consenting to a proposition. He holds that the 
foregoing, unlike belief, are all intentional acts for they: 
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have an Austinian perfomatory use as illocutionary force indicators, [whereas] 
“believe” does not. “I hereby consent (acquiesce, accept)” is in order, but not 
“I hereby believe”. … Furthermore, one can consent to or accept a proposition 
that she does not believe, as might happen in the course of a debate in which 
one consents to or accepts a proposition just for the sake of argument. Thus, 
James is wrong to identify belief with consent; and this holds even for internal 
acts of consenting in the sense of committing oneself to treating a certain 
proposition as if it were true, for one can commit such an internal act without 
believing the proposition (1999: 89). 
 
 
Doxastic voluntarists associate belief with volitional activities like decision, choice, 
acceptance, consent, and intention. That is, the way they conceive of belief implies 
that we exert voluntary control in forming our beliefs as we do in performing any of 
the foregoing intentional acts. Beliefs fall into two categories with respect to their 
causal ancestry. Some beliefs’ causal ancestry entails the activities of evidence 
gathering that we carry out voluntarily, and some do not entail such activities for their 
being immediately clear to be true. The latter comprise perceptual, memory or 
introspective beliefs or beliefs about self-evident a priori propositions. Though 
sometimes even the causal ancestry of some perceptual beliefs involves the carrying 
out of voluntary actions instrumental in bringing about a given doxastic attitude, the 
attitude that eventuates in such cases would still count as one arrived at involuntarily. 
These cases are recognized by doxastic involuntarists; they contend that the voluntary 
intermediate activities only have an indirect influence on the resultant belief, as can 
be observed, for example, in Alston’s arguments in chapter seven. For example, I can 
bring it about that I have or form an attitude on the shape of a remote iceberg by 
making a trip to town, buying a telescope to look at the iceberg. Appearing clearly to 
be mushroom-like, I come up with a belief that the iceberg is in the shape of a 
mushroom. I form that belief because it is supported by my visual evidence. We 
voluntarily engage in such intermediate steps to gather evidence in order to settle 
opinion on issues that are not self-evident. If I had direct control over my doxastic 
attitudes, I could have brought about such belief directly solely through an intention 
or decision to so believe. Furthermore, if the telescope was of bad quality, producing 
invisibly grainy images and I was hence unable to determine the shape of the iceberg, 
I would end up with no belief about its shape. I have reason neither to believe nor to 
disbelieve.  
 
 73 
    We surely possess free will over things we have direct (voluntary) control and we 
routinely exercise such power in making choices or decisions. In any given situation 
where the object in question is something I can control directly, I am at liberty as to 
the decisions or choices I make about that object. That is, I have free will as to 
whether to choose or decide p or not p. Talking of free will is, therefore, coherent 
here. I have free will whether or not to launch an inquiry into an alleged sighting of an 
alien spacecraft in California. In other words, I have the autonomy to decide whether 
or not to settle opinion on such matter. I could just ignore it at will and remain in a 
state of no belief. But once I launch an inquiry, I am not at liberty as to what 
conclusion I arrive at or what doxastic attitude I take up as an upshot of the inquiry. 
Everything else about the inquiry I can control with no psychological constraints. I 
can decide to initiate the inquiry on Monday rather than Friday, I can choose to have 
ten witnesses rather than fifteen to testify, I can choose to hold the inquiry in London 
rather than California, I can also choose what analytical approaches to employ to 
examine the testimonies or the evidence. With the totality of the available evidence 
showing the familiarity of the spacecraft and thereby disconfirming the possibility of 
its being alien (p), I am not at liberty whether I take p or not p as my attitude toward 
the given matter.  
 
    In other words, I cannot directly will myself to believe that p while simultaneously 
believing that the available evidence does not warrant belief in p. It is the essence of 
believing at will, as will be articulated later, that for a belief to be brought about at 
will, we shall be able to acquire the willed belief directly, independent of truth 
considerations, immediately, intentionally, and with full consciousness of how the 
willed belief is being acquired. There are two arguments as to the viability of the 
resultant willed belief. Williams and O’Shaughnessy argue that given the nature of 
believing at will, it is necessarily the case that after the willed belief is acquired, if it 
can ever be acquired at will, we will be conscious of how we arrived at the willed 
belief and thus end up holding, aside from the willed belief, a simultaneous belief that 
the willed belief is not supported or warranted by evidence. The other argument 
shows that, following the acquisition of the willed belief, it is likely that we forget 
how we came about the willed belief or falsely believe that we arrived at the willed 
belief as a result of evidential considerations. But no argument can show that we can 
bring about a willed belief directly without going against our intuitions. I can, 
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however, just like the atheist3 who wants to believe in God, bring about the belief that 
p indirectly through cultivating an atmosphere that makes it psychologically alright 
for me to believe p – an atmosphere brought about through manipulating evidence, 
changing the analytical approaches, taking testimonies from believers rather than 
sceptics or disbelievers, or reading about similar incidents where the sighting had 
eventually turned out to be that of an alien spacecraft. Given the fact that perception, 
memory, and introspection are normally irresistible sources of belief whereas 
testimony is not at all times, there is a prima facie stronger case to support the 
phenomenon of withholding testimony-based beliefs. Audi espouses such position and 
argues that: 
 
There is a sense in which testimony-based belief passes through the will – or 
at least through agency. … The recipient commonly can withhold belief, if not 
at will then indirectly, by taking on a highly cautionary frame of mind (I am 
taking withholding to be roughly a kind of blocking of belief formation when 
a proposition is presented) (2006: 40). 
 
 
He goes on to say that so far as attested propositions are concerned, “commonly 
whether we withhold belief is ‘up to us’” for testimony “is not an irresistible [source 
of belief]” (Ibid: 41). But he recognizes that “we cannot withhold belief from 
propositions strongly supported directly by experience or by reason” (Ibid: 40). 
Furthermore, Depaul also holds that a cautious doxastic tendency is the optimal 
epistemic policy to avoid error:  
 
 It is, in my opinion, very often epistemically best for us to withhold belief. 
 Failure to withhold when the circumstances call for it, as I think they often do, 
 can wreak havoc with a person’s system of belief. Just think of gullibility and 
 jumping to conclusions. Both involve failures to withhold. … I am very 
 strongly inclined to say that the cautious policy is epistemically better (in Sosa 
 and Villanueva 2004: 97-98).  
 
 
    Though the discourse of both Depaul and Audi implies that we have some control 
over what doxastic attitude we take up once presented with a proposition, they both 
qualify their statements, implying the difficulty of withholding belief at will. They 
both suggest taking on a cautionary frame of mind to enable one to withhold belief, 
thus trying to avoid the direct control withholding itself implies. As observed earlier 
                                                 
3
 Refer to p. 174 for the atheist example.  
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in Audi’s arguments, doxastic voluntarists employ withholding to mean, as it naturally 
implies, blocking belief formation, preventing belief, restraining or refraining oneself 
from belief. But all this counts as an active phenomenon that implies agency and 
voluntary control, whereas belief is a passive state of mind as we have already learned 
in chapter two. But doxastic voluntarists (epistemic deontologists) treat belief as an 
active state under the direct influence of the will. We could have blocked belief 
formation or prevented belief at will if we had, over our doxastic attitudes, the direct 
voluntary control doxastic voluntarism implies. In other words, it would have been 
possible if we were at liberty to choose what attitude we take up once presented with a 
proposition. But sometimes although there is no good evidence to believe something, 
we find ourselves powerless to withhold belief. Though there is no adequate evidence 
to believe that God or extraterrestrial life exists, many will find themselves powerless 
to withhold such belief upon being presented with such a proposition. Free will does 
not speak for belief, which is why whether we believe or disbelieve is not up to us.  
 
    When I entertain or inquire into a proposition and eventually come up with no good 
satisfactory grounds to either believe or disbelieve it, I end up with neither belief nor 
disbelief. I just do not happen to take up any doxastic attitude because I lack what it 
takes to hold one. Thus, I am withholding nothing, neither belief nor disbelief. I am in 
a state of no belief or, more accurately, no doxastic attitude; and my being in such 
state just happens to me. It does not involve agency. In other words, it is not a matter 
of me doing something to bring about such state. It is a state whose realisation 
happens mechanically and non-intentionally in the same way a genuine belief state 
obtains, whereas withholding belief entails both intention and agency. It is a voluntary 
action. To withhold belief is to resist belief. That is, doxastic voluntarism implies that 
withholding, believing or disbelieving is up to us, subjecting belief to deontological 
treatment and thus rendering it liable to blame. In this way, doxastic voluntarists treat 
neither belief nor justification as something that happens to us, but, rather, as 
something we have direct voluntary control over and thus can bring about at will. 
Further, Plantinga argues that to epistemic deontologists  
 
Justification (unlike, say, a strong constitution) is not something that happens 
to a person; it is instead a result of her own efforts. … As the classical 
deontologist sees things, justification is not by faith but by works; and whether 
we are justified in our beliefs is up to us (1993: 15). 
 
 76 
     In other words, deontologists treat positive epistemic status as a matter of 
fulfilment of intellectual responsibilities and epistemic obligations – something whose 
realisation we have voluntary control over and can therefore be blamed for neglecting 
them in coming to acquire a belief. They, therefore, argue that whether or not we are 
justified in holding a belief relies on whether or not we have responsibly conducted 
ourselves in coming to acquire the belief. Justification so construed surely does not 
just happen to us. It, rather, is conferred on the basis of duty fulfilment. This I shall 
return to it in chapter seven where the adequacy and necessity of duty fulfilment is 
examined with the conclusion that one can possess deontological justification but lack 
epistemic justification for a belief. But for now, we are concerned with whether 
beliefs can be acquired at will. To bring about something at will is to have direct 
control over that thing. Beliefs can, from a doxastic voluntarist perspective, be 
brought about at will. Epistemologists are divided on the possibility of doxastic 
voluntarism. Those who conceive of belief as an ethical matter hold that we do have 
such control, whereas those who conceive of belief as an epistemic matter deny such 
possibility.  
 
Feldman holds that “our beliefs typically result from the functioning of our 
cognitive systems in response to environmental stimuli, or to the evidence those 
stimuli provide us. Control over beliefs is, therefore, in this way inside of us, and even 
inside our minds” (2008: 343). Furthermore, Scott-Kakures also observes that our 
“will is captive with respect to belief” (1994: 101). In other words, belief and will are 
not on the same par. Doxastic voluntarism treats belief as if it is a type of intentional 
action that can be brought about at will. But, as argued by Montmarquet, “belief and 
action are ‘asymmetrical’ with respect to direct voluntary control” (1986: 49). I can, 
therefore, “make myself act like a fool if I wish to, but I cannot make myself believe 
that I am a fool in the absence of adequate evidence for it, even if I really desire to or 
if I have practical reasons for so believing it” states Booth (2007: 115). Withdrawing 
from his earlier voluntarist position, James also argues that “If belief consists in an 
emotional reaction of the entire man on an object, how can we believe at will? We 
cannot control our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will abruptly” 
(2007: 321). That is, the prevailing wisdom among doxastic involuntarists is that 
“nothing could be a belief and be willed directly” (in Scott-Kakures 1994: 77). They, 
however, recognize that some beliefs are inducible indirectly through practical desires 
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or interests as we will learn later. But the general consensus among doxastic 
involuntarists is that “beliefs are often acquired willy-nilly”, states Alston (1989: 205-
206). Thus, “If the fact is I am sad and I consider this proposition, then whether or not 
I accept4 it is simply not up to me”, points out Plantinga (1993: 38). Speaking from 
his lately adopted involuntarist position, James further demonstrates the 
preposterousness and impotency of believing at will: 
 
Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions 
being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our intellect in its 
perceptions of truth? Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abraham 
Lincoln’s existence is a myth, and that the portraits of him in McClure’s 
Magazine are all of someone else? Can we, by any effort of our will, or by any 
strength of wish that it were true, believe ourselves well and about when we 
are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-
dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can say any of these 
things, but we are absolutely impotent to believe them (2006: 4-5). 
 
 
    Though I rule out the willability of belief in the greatest majority of our doxastic 
cultivations for the principal intuition shared by most involuntarist epistemologists 
that there are psychological and rational constraints on belief, I believe that there are 
situations where our will colours our perceptions of reality in a way that can, in the 
long run, cause belief, but only indirectly. That is, sometimes will, once driven by an 
irresistible desire, derails our intellect in its perceptions of reality in the direction of a 
preferred or desired attitude. But we can succeed in bringing about such willed belief 
states only indirectly. Further, Scott-Kakures notes that “a subject can alter what she 
believes through circuitous or instrumental means by bringing it about that she comes 
to have reason to believe that p” (1994: 81). This is attainable, he argues, when the 
subject “brings about conditions under which she comes to have reason for believing 
that p” (Ibid: 80). For example, Basanio does not now believe that Portia likes him for 
he knows of no signals, indications or gestures that might indicate her affection for 
him. But he adores her and wants her affection dearly. That is why he wants to believe 
that Portia likes him. He knows that she is impressionable to romantic gestures. He, 
therefore, brings about conditions he knows would produce some reason to believe 
that she likes him. One day Basanio takes her out for dinner at her favourite 
                                                 
4
 We have already observed that belief and acceptance are two different propositional attitudes, but not 
all epistemologists differentiate between the two. But here Plantinga uses accept to mean believe in this 
example.  
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restaurant. Being grateful to his generosity and his being gallant towards her, Portia 
manifests certain gestures which Basanio wrongly takes to be an indication that she 
likes him. He, thereby, comes to believe that she likes him on the basis of such 
gestures which he takes to be evidence for his belief. But he did not believe at will. 
He, rather, got himself to believe that Portia likes him in an indirect way. 
Epistemologists of all bents recognize that we can bring about desired belief states 
through indirect routes. Williams argues that we can bring it about that we believe 
something we want to believe through roundabout routes that are neither motivated by 
truth considerations nor are causally truth-conducive: “there is room for the 
application of decision to belief by more roundabout routes. For we all know that 
there are causal factors, unconnected with truth, which can produce belief: hypnotism, 
drugs, all sorts of things could bring it about that I believe that p” (1973: 149). 
Furthermore, O’Shaughnessy, though denying the willability of belief as a general 
phenomenon, also recognizes occasional cases of willed belief: 
 
Believing is in itself essentially inactive. Nonetheless, our desires cause some 
of our beliefs, as do some of our intentions. Thus, there exist acts which fall 
under the instrumental description ‘the installing of belief in the mind’, and in 
this sense belief can sometimes owe its existence to the will (2008: 66).  
 
 
    But he argues that any such act of willing a belief “necessarily is irrational and 
practiced self-deceptively” (Ibid: 65). Rejecting voluntary believing as a viable 
mental phenomenon, O’Shaughnessy attributes the source of the intuition behind the 
logical unwillability of belief to belief’s “intimate bond with reason” (Ibid: 60). 
Furthermore, Scott-Kakures also observes that it is due to the “truth-directedness of 
belief, beliefs are not psychological states which can be willed directly” (1994: 81). It 
is this intimate bond with reason or truth-conducivity that constitutes rational and 
psychological constraints on belief. And it is precisely due to such constraints that 
“neither belief, nor desires … could ever immediately be willed”, states 
O’Shaughnessy (2008: 61). Moreover, he argues that belief, unlike actions or events, 
is a continuous state rather than a processive continuant: “while belief is a continuous 
state, it is not a processive continuant, just as the continuity of time or of some 
object’s shape is not, whereas that of a whistle or skid is a processive continuant” 
(Ibid: 65). That is why belief cannot be an action type to be brought about at will 
directly and immediately.  
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    This, however, does not imply that every processive continuant can be willed 
directly and immediately. Heartbeat is a processive continuant – the continuity of 
which relies on the occurrence of other actions such as, among other things, pumping 
blood to the heart – that cannot be brought about just like that. But things we have 
voluntary control over can be brought about at will immediately. Thus, if the act of 
immediately willing belief “were possible, an irrational belief would have to be 
actively and instantaneously installed in a mind by the use of an act-mechanism”, 
states O’Shaughnessy (Ibid: 62). This, the bringing about of belief at will, is regarded 
by epistemologists ruling out the willability of belief as “a phenomenon that logically 
falls outside the domain of willable phenomena” (in O’Shaughnessy 2008: 67). That 
is why Bennett considers this whole idea of believing at will chokingly 
unswallowable: “There is indeed something so chokingly unswallowable about the 
idea of someone’s voluntarily coming to believe something that I have to suspect that 
this is ruled out at a deeper level than the contingent powers of our minds” (1990: 90). 
The following are what Winters argues to be the conditions for a belief to meet in 
order to qualify as being brought about at will:  
 
To constitute a genuine case of believing at will … three necessary conditions 
must be met. First, the belief must have been acquired directly and as a result 
of intending to hold it, rather than by some indirect route such as concentrating 
only on the favourable data or discrediting uncongenial evidence through 
considerations of fallibility of testimony. … A second necessary condition is 
that the belief be acquired independently of any consideration about its truth: 
that is, one does not utilize data relevant to the truth or falsity of p in coming 
to believe p. … Finally, it is required that the action of acquiring the belief at 
will be performed with the agent fully aware that he or she is attempting to 
arrive at the belief in this way. … The agent thus must realize that truth 
considerations play no role in the attempt. Believing at will, then, requires the 
acquisition of a belief directly, independently of truth considerations, and in 
full consciousness (1979: 244-245).  
 
 
    That is, in order to successfully will a belief, we must be able to self-consciously 
will the belief with no heed to its truth values, with the intention to hold it, with full 
awareness that the belief we are willing is unwarranted or irrational and be able to 
find ourselves in the willed belief state immediately after willing it. One of the factors 
that give rise to the phenomenon of voluntary believing is our being emotionally 
biased in some of our doxastic cultivations. That is, our belief acquisitions are not 
always motivated by epistemic considerations. We sometimes nourish beliefs for 
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practical reasons. There are, argues Winters, situations where non-evidential factors 
play an instrumental part in the acquisition or retention of a belief:  
 
non-evidential factors play a large role in belief sustainment. We are not 
emotionally neutral toward all the things we believe; we often have much at 
stake in their being true and will maintain them at all costs. Sometimes such 
factors are the causally relevant ones; we can hold beliefs solely because 
certain needs and desires are satisfied in doing so (Ibid: 247).  
 
 
But even though we are not always emotionally neutral in all our belief 
acquisitions, we can only arrive at the beliefs we want to arrive at indirectly through, 
as Alston pointed out earlier, selective exposure to evidence or manipulating 
evidence. If the given Bush administration beliefs were cases of pragmatic belief - a 
possibility which this research considers inappropriate in light of the nature of the 
given propositions along with the evidential conditions at the time - then it might be 
said that the key non-evidential factor instrumental in giving rise to such beliefs was 
the fear that p. This research argues that fearing the possibility that p in the absence of 
good evidence whether p normally promotes propositional acceptance rather than 
belief or pragmatic belief. I, however, recognize that some beliefs, notably wishful or 
welcome beliefs, originate from pragmatic considerations. That is, in situations where 
our pragmatic desires override truth considerations, the force of such desires renders 
our doxastic tendencies doctrinally oriented or desire-oriented. The possibility of 
pragmatic belief might give rise to doxastic voluntarism. But pragmatic beliefs can 
only be brought about indirectly, whereas doxastic voluntarism implies direct control 
over our beliefs. The contemporary arguments trying to debunk doxastic voluntarism 
have concentrated on Bernard Williams endeavour to refute such mental 
phenomenon. He holds that one of the reasons behind our inability to bring about 
belief at will just like that is attributable to “the characteristic of beliefs that they aim 
at truth” (1973: 148). In other words, we cannot, just like that, will ourselves to bring 
about that we believe that p regardless of whether or not it is true that p. That is, since 
we know that to believe that p is just to believe it to be true, we cannot will ourselves 
to believe that p irrespective of any consideration to the truth values of p. It is for this 
reason that O’Shaughnessy argues that “an overt self-conscious b-believer [wilful 
believer] openly performs a deed that negates the very foundations of the 
phenomenon of belief in a self-conscious consciousness” (2008: 64). There are two 
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principal theses that underlie Williams’ attempt to refute the willability of belief: a 
prospective thesis and a retrospective thesis:  
 
If I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it whether it was true or not; 
moreover I would know that I could acquire it whether it was true or not. If in 
full consciousness I could will to acquire a ‘belief’ irrespective of its truth, it is 
unclear that before the event I could seriously think of it as a belief, i.e. as 
something purporting to represent reality. At the very least, there must be a 
restriction on what is the case after the event; since I could not then, in full 
consciousness, regard this as a belief of mine, i.e. something I take to be true, 
and also know that I acquired it at will. With regard to no belief could I know 
… that I had acquired it at will. But if I can acquire beliefs at will, I must 
know that I am able to do this; and could I know that I was capable of this 
feat, if with regard to every feat of this kind which I had performed I 
necessarily had to believe that it had not taken place? (1973: 148). 
 
 
    The underlying theme of his prospective argument is that it is impossible to think of 
a willed attitude as belief while trying self-consciously to acquire the intended attitude 
with no regard to whether the attitude one wants to acquire is true. But this is not a 
plausible reason for ruling out doxastic voluntarism because the whole point behind 
my conscious endeavour to bring about that I believe p is because I know that I do not 
believe p now at t, but I want to believe it. So of course at t I do not and cannot think 
of p as a belief or as one of my beliefs because I do not yet believe it. Responding to 
Williams’ prospective argument, Scott-Kakures argues that whether one regards p as a 
belief before one succeeds in one’s trial to get oneself to believe p is irrelevant to 
whether one can will oneself to believe something one does not currently believe: 
 
It is true that before I believe the target proposition, I cannot believe it since I 
believe it is not true. Nonetheless, I can seek to believe that proposition. If 
somehow I succeed, and also forget that the belief was produced by volitional 
fiat, the fact that before success I could not regard the aimed at state as belief 
is irrelevant (1994: 82). 
 
 
    The primary logic of Williams’ retrospective argument is that every act of believing 
at will, if it ever succeeds, necessarily ends up with the believer’s realising how the 
willed belief has been arrived at. But the reason he outlines behind such inevitable 
outcome fails to convince our intuitions. He argues that in order to be able to acquire 
beliefs at will, we must know that we have such ability: “But if I can acquire beliefs at 
will, I must know that I am able to do this”. But such a conception is false. We 
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possess many capacities – voluntary or involuntary – we do not know we possess. 
That is, the existence of a capacity is independent of our knowledge of the capacity. I 
possess many neurological capacities I have no inkling about. This, however, shall not 
imply that we are necessarily unaware of (some of) our capacities. But it is not a 
prerequisite that to be able to do something, we must know that we can do so. If 
believing at will were to require knowledge of such capacity, then cognitively 
unsophisticated individuals who hardly possess any grasp of such doxastic capacities 
should be unable to will a belief. But if they can consciously and intentionally 
exercise other capacities they have no knowledge about, so could they exercise the 
capacity to believe at will. If believing at will is an intentional conscious action, 
which clearly is, and is a real possibility, then we should be able to acquire beliefs at 
will without knowing that we possess such capacity in the same way that we are able 
to consciously and intentionally exercise other capacities without knowing that we 
even possess them. I do not find anything distinctive between believing at will and 
other intentional actions to merit an exemption in this respect. Moreover, Winters 
argues that:  
 
it is certainly not true of every capacity that to have it we must know we have 
it … to acquire a belief at will one must be aware of what one is doing. But 
even given this fact, it does not follow that if I can acquire beliefs at will, I am 
aware that I have this ability. Evidently many of us, under suitable guidance, 
can lower our rate of heartbeat directly, as a basic action, in full consciousness 
(not by indirect means such as thinking of calm spring days, etc.). However, 
very few of us are aware of having this ability. Thus, the possession of an 
ability to perform a basic action in full consciousness does not entail 
awareness of that possession (1979: 255).  
 
 
    That is, though believing at will is necessarily done consciously and intentionally, 
my being conscious of willing a belief does not entail my knowing that I possess such 
capacity. I can consciously exercise a capacity without knowing that I possess such 
capacity. For example, Talia is a non-contemporary uninformed individual who lacks 
knowledge of our basic capacities. She has never considered the question of how long 
she can hold her breath, nor has she ever tried holding her breath. Talia is completely 
ignorant of such capacity. She is once taken for a flight tour to learn about some 
basics of human advancement. Talia boards the plane. The flight manager forgets to 
read out the flight instructions. Thus, Talia is necessarily unaware of how breathing 
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conditions are sustained onboard and what might happen to her if the cabin goes 
depressurised. En route to its destination, the cabin goes depressurised, and Talia ends 
up holding her breath for two minutes till a faulty mask is repaired for her. Before the 
event, Talia did not know that she could even hold her breath, let alone knowing that 
she can hold it for two minutes. But she was still able to exercise such capacity 
without knowledge of its possession. Holding breath, like acquiring belief at will, is 
necessarily done consciously and intentionally. Thus, the absence of knowledge of a 
capacity neither neutralises the capacity, nor does it preclude us from exercising such 
capacity.  
 
    Moreover, Williams also argues that to know that we can acquire beliefs at will is 
to, in any given case of successfully willing a belief, necessarily believe that the given 
belief has been acquired at will – that we have exercised the capacity to believe at will 
in arriving at the given belief – otherwise we could not know that we have such 
capacity: “and could I know that I was capable of this feat, if with regard to every feat 
of this kind which I had performed I necessarily had to believe that it had not taken 
place?”. In other words, he associates knowledge of the capacity to believe at will 
with observation of such capacity. But Winters rightly argues that “[The] principle 
that one can learn one has an ability only from observing that one has exercised it… is 
surely false: I can become aware of capacities I have as a result of extrapolation from 
other data I have about myself or through the reliable testimony of others” (1979: 
254). In other words, knowledge is not necessarily attained through observation or 
experience. For example, I know I can hold my breath for two minutes and through 
extrapolation I can come to know or learn that I have the capacity to stay under the 
water without oxygen for two minutes, although I have not yet observed the exercise 
of such capacity. Testimony and extrapolation (inference) are all legitimate means of 
acquiring knowledge and learning about our capacities. If I can withhold belief at will 
just like that when I have good evidence to believe, through extrapolation I can come 
to learn that I have the capacity to believe at will. Though I have not yet observed 
such capacity in order to know it on the basis of observation or experience, I can, 
through extrapolation, come to know that I possess such capacity. Thus, the premise 
behind Williams’ retrospective argument fails to recognize that we can exercise the 
capacity to believe at will even in the absence of knowledge of such capacity and that 
we can know of such capacity through other non-observational means.  
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    The question of the retrospective awareness of how one has come about a willed 
belief becomes relevant only when one makes a successful transition from t where 
one wills to believe p and thereby does not yet believe p to t1 where one believes p. 
O’Shaughnessy explores this transition by first raising the question whether there can 
be “an act that is the bringing about of belief in the way there is an act that is the 
immediate bringing about of arm rise” (2008: 61). He then goes on arguing that “the 
existence of such an act [the act of bringing about belief immediately at will] would 
seem to entail the existence of the capacity voluntarily at a certain instant light-
fingeredly to install a certain belief in one’s mind” (Ibid: 61). O’Shaughnessy 
observes that if there is ever an act of immediately willing a belief, then such act must 
be “caused by an act-desire” (Ibid: 61). But desires or volitions cannot bring about 
belief immediately and directly just like that through willing it alone when at the time 
of willing the belief at t we believe the available evidence to be insufficient to warrant 
the belief we are aiming at. That is why if a successful transition transpired from the 
cognitive perspective from which we will to believe p at t to the cognitive perspective 
where we believe p at t1, then “something must have interposed causally between the 
act-desire [the act of willing the belief at t] and the [willed] belief [at t1]”, points out 
O’Shaughnessy (Ibid: 62). Moreover, we cannot enter from a non-belief state to a 
willed belief state without having our reasoning causally interrupted during the period 
of such transition in a way that makes the willed belief possible for us to believe. In 
the absence of such causal interruption, no such transitions are possible so long we 
believe the available evidence to be inadequate to warrant the belief we are aiming at. 
It is this causal interposition between the two cognitive perspectives that Scott-
Kakures takes to be the source of the unwillability of belief:  
 
the only way of making sense of th[ese] transactions … is to imagine a 
cognitive rift between the two states, a more or less dramatic alteration of the 
agent’s cognitive perspective. It is just this fissure or blind spot which allows 
us to comprehend the source of the unwillability of belief (1994: 95).  
 
 
That is, Scott-Kakures takes this cognitive rift between the cognitive perspective 
from which we generate the intention to bring about a willed belief (p) and the 
cognitive perspective where we come to believe p to both show how a willed belief 
can possibly be brought about and demonstrate the source of the unwillability of 
belief. First, he argues that it is this cognitive rift that makes the willed belief (p) 
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possible through rendering the intentional action to bring about the willed belief 
unmonitored and thereby enabling us to abandon the intention to bring about such 
willed belief. Second, he argues that the fact that the willed belief is brought about in 
virtue of a cognitive rift that renders the intentional action unmonitored before we 
come to believe that p shows that the willed belief is not brought about at will for 
believing at will is necessarily an intentional action and an intentional action is 
necessarily monitored till fulfilled. In other words, he argues that the intentional 
action to bring about the willed belief is rendered unmonitored by the cognitive rift 
half way through before we come to believe the willed belief. Thus, he rightly regards 
the willed belief as being brought about indirectly whereas wilful belief is, as noticed 
earlier, necessarily brought about directly, consciously and intentionally. Therefore, 
he argues, believing at will is impossible. This is the logic of Scott-Kakures’ 
argument for the unwillability of belief. The following is how he proceeds:  
 
Beliefs, unlike arm-rises, are, we might say, constitutive of my cognitive 
perspective. … They [beliefs] along with desires, etc., are the background 
against which I formulate my plans, intentions, etc. So when I do formulate 
my here-and-now intention, “Now I will believe that p”, my current cognitive 
perspective, the one from which that intention is generated, includes the 
beliefs that I do not now believe that p and that nothing I do currently believe 
is sufficient epistemic justification for my believing that p. These two beliefs 
are importantly related. I do not believe that p because it is the case that I also 
believe that nothing I currently believe epistemically justifies the belief that p. 
We are granting that I cannot believe that p, and also believe that belief is 
sustained solely as a matter of the will. And note that when I formulate my 
intention to believe that p I must regard my current cognitive perspective as 
not sanctioning the belief that p. That is why I do and must formulate the 
intention to believe that p if I am to believe it (Ibid: 94-5).  
 
 
Furthermore, the epistemic situation where I will to believe p is such that I do not 
currently believe p because nothing I am currently aware of or nothing I currently 
believe warrants such belief. Thus, the willed belief I aim to bring about is one that I 
would normally disbelieve or consider irrational in the absence of the desire that 
prompts me to bring it about, or just end up having no belief when there is evidence 
neither in support nor against it. Though at t, where I will myself into a desired belief 
state, I neither believe that p nor consider it rational the belief that p, I still want to 
believe that p. In other words, the current cognitive perspective from which I will 
myself to believe p at t is one which I believe to contain no evidence to support the 
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proposition I intend to believe. Thus, from my current cognitive perspective, the 
willed belief I want to bring about is not epistemically justified. I might even have 
sufficient evidence to disbelieve it or to believe the opposite. If believing at will were 
psychologically possible, I should have been able to take up the cognitive perspective 
that contains the willed belief just like that directly through willing it alone. But if I 
were able to take on the willed belief directly just like that, then I should have also 
been able to revert directly at will to my previous cognitive perspective where I did 
not believe that p. But this is not how we come about our doxastic attitudes. That is 
why if I were to move on from the cognitive perspective where I want but do not 
currently believe p to the cognitive perspective where I believe p, there must be a 
causally effective factor interposing between the two cognitive perspectives. And it is 
this cognitive rift that Scott-Kakures takes to be the causally effective factor that 
makes believing p possible through rendering the intentional action to bring about the 
belief that p unmonitored and thereby enabling us to abandon or become unconscious 
of the intention we formulate at t from the non-belief state cognitive perspective:  
 
Once I have – somehow or other – produced the belief that p, my current 
cognitive perspective [at t1] contains the belief that p. My cognitive 
perspective at t+1 contains nothing immediately available which rules out the 
belief that p. Recall that the belief that p is ruled out, at t, by other beliefs and 
that the transition from t to t+1 is meant to be one which is accomplished 
directly by an act of will. If the above descriptions of the belief state transition 
and the relevant aspects of my cognitive perspectives are correct, then there 
must be a cognitive blind spot, or fissure, between t and t+1. [Otherwise] I 
cannot, from my cognitive perspective at t, see my way through to my altered 
cognitive perspective at t+1 (Ibid: 95). 
 
 
    If I were to succeed in bringing about a willed belief directly, so far as the willed 
belief is concerned, the two cognitive perspectives must necessarily be the same 
epistemically and I must be able to move on from my current cognitive perspective 
where I believe the willed belief to be unwarranted by what I currently believe to the 
cognitive perspective that contains the willed belief directly just like that. In the case 
at hand, the only marked difference between the two is that the cognitive perspective 
that contains the willed belief is clear of the intention we formulate from the cognitive 
perspective where we do not yet believe the willed belief. And it is the absence of 
such intention or its awareness at t1 – brought about by the cognitive rift’s rendering 
the intentional action unmonitored – that renders me unaware of the fact that the 
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cognitive perspective where I come to believe p at t1 is the same as the cognitive 
perspective where I did not believe p at t. In the absence of the awareness that both 
cognitive perspectives are the same epistemically, I become unaware that the willed 
belief is as unwarranted at t1 as it was at t, unless it is the case that between t and t1 I 
encounter some supporting evidence as we will notice later. But in both cases, the 
bringing about of the willed belief fails to meet the requirements of believing at will. 
Thus, the cognitive fissure just makes it possible that I am unaware of the intention I 
formulate at t and thereby rendering me unaware that the cognitive perspective at t1 is 
epistemically the same as the one at t, providing that I do not come across supporting 
evidence between the two perspectives which even if I were I would still fail to satisfy 
what it takes to bring about a belief at will. 
 
    Thus, Scott-Kakures’ argument of the cognitive fissure just provides an explanation 
of how a transition from a non-belief state to a willed belief state could possibly 
transpire from t to t1. At t we, as Scott-Kakures pointed out earlier, formulate the 
intention to bring about the willed belief that p because we know that we do not 
currently believe p at t, but want to bring it about that we believe it. Thus, our 
formulating such intention at t is directly related to the fact that we do not currently 
believe the intended belief we want to bring about. In other words, the formulation of 
the intention is related to our consciousness that p is unwarranted by our cognitive 
perspective at t, but we want to bring it about that we believe it. That is why if I 
become unaware of such intention, I consequently become unaware that p is 
unwarranted by what I currently believe. Thus, if I abandon such intention or become 
unconscious of it as a result of the cognitive fissure, I no longer consciously believe p 
to be unwarranted by what I currently believe. And if I necessarily become unaware 
of such intention at t1 as a result of the cognitive rift, then at t1 I do not consciously 
believe p to be unwarranted by my cognitive perspective at t1. It is because of this 
that I am able to believe p at t1. But if I were still conscious of the intention at t1, and 
if my cognitive perspective at t1 remains the same epistemically as the one at t, then I 
cannot come to believe p at t1 because even at t1 I still consciously believe p to be 
unwarranted by my cognitive perspective. Thus, it is due to my belief or awareness 
that p is unwarranted by my cognitive perspective at t that a transition to t1 where I 
come to believe p is attainable only when I abandon the intention or become unaware 
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of it at t1. That is why Scott-Kakures argues that the intention to bring about the 
willed belief must be abandoned before I come to believe p at t1:  
 
I formulate this intention because I want to believe that p and do not currently 
believe it. But a content like the one possessed by this intention cannot carry 
me to the belief state of believing that p – and this because there must be a 
cognitive fissure between the intention and the state I am aiming at. For if I 
aim directly at believing that p, then I must leave behind the intention to 
believe that p before I am to believe that p. In a standard case of successful 
intentional basic action (e.g., raising one’s arm), the intention is abandoned 
once its satisfaction conditions are realised (or rather once the agent believes 
they are realised). But if the above argument is correct the intention to believe 
that p must be abandoned before one could believe that p. This is why the 
behaviour must be unguided and thus, unmonitored. … As long as I intend to 
believe that p (i.e., so long as I inhabit the cognitive perspective which 
generates that intention), I cannot believe that p. This is because the beliefs 
which generate the intention are incompatible with my believing that p. Thus 
the intention must be abandoned before its satisfaction conditions are realised. 
If the intention that I formulate must be abandoned before I succeed in 
bringing about the state of affairs it represents, then that intention cannot be 
one by which I direct and monitor my activity until success. There must be a 
cognitive fissure between the intention or willing to believe and the arrival at 
the belief state (Ibid: 95-96). 
 
 
That is, the willed belief I aim to bring about is one that is both incompatible and 
incoherent with what I currently believe. And I know that the willed belief is not 
warranted by my current beliefs or by my current cognitive perspective on the whole, 
which is why I formulate the intention to bring it about that I believe it. Thus, the 
intention to bring about the willed belief is prompted and produced by beliefs that 
reject the willed belief as a viable or rational belief. That is why so long I sustain such 
intention or am aware of it, I cannot believe p because being aware of the intention, 
possessing or sustaining it just means that I believe p to be unwarranted by what I 
currently believe. I, therefore, cannot believe the willed belief and simultaneously 
believe it to be unwarranted by my cognitive perspective. Hence, the intention must 
be abandoned before I could come to believe p (the willed belief). But even then, my 
coming to believe p at t1 fails to constitute a successful case of bringing about belief 
at will due to the intentional action’s being rendered unmonitored through the 
cognitive rift before its success and thereby failing to count as a successful intentional 
action as observed by Scott-Kakures: “since the arrival at the belief state at t+1 is 
ungoverned or unmonitored, my arrival at that belief state cannot count as something I 
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succeed in willing directly, as I do when I succeed in directly willing an arm rise” 
(Ibid: 95). That is, believing at will is, as observed earlier, an intentional action 
carried out directly with full consciousness. And we have already learned that in a 
successful case of intentional action, the intention is abandoned when the agent 
believes that the aim of the action is realised. But in this case of the cognitive rift, the 
intention to bring about a willed belief is, as it must be, abandoned before the willed 
belief is brought about. It is abandoned through the intentional action’s going 
unmonitored in virtue of the cognitive fissure. Thus, the intentional action to bring 
about the willed belief fails to meet the conditions of a successful intentional action 
for its failure to be monitored and thereby its failure to have the intention sustained till 
success is made or till the action goal is believed to be realised as observed by Scott-
Kakures:  
  
The intention guides or governs the relevant activity that it causes and in such 
a way as to permit the monitoring of the relevant behaviour. … Basic 
intentional actions are … guided and controlled and so monitored by the 
intentions by which they are caused. … To say that an intention directs 
activity is just to say that I monitor and guide my activity against the 
background of the intention. Thus, when I intend to raise my arm and I 
succeed, I know when to stop trying (Ibid: 90-91).  
 
 
    In the case of intending to raise my arm, I know when to stop trying because I 
monitor the activity. That is, I know when the action goal is realised because I 
monitor the activity till the goal of my intention is realised. That is why as far as non-
doxastic attitudes are concerned, the intention is abandoned when the action goal is 
believed to be realised. But this cannot be the case with the intention to bring about a 
willed belief. In the case of willing a belief, if I were to monitor my activity till I 
come to know that the goal of the intention is realised – till I come to know that I now 
believe the willed belief – and abandon the intention only then, then the outcome is 
paradoxical: I will end up believing the willed belief and simultaneously believing it 
to be false, irrational or unwarranted by what I currently believe. So long I monitor 
the activity of bringing about a willed belief, I do so against the background of an 
intention produced by beliefs that rule out the willed belief as rational, and as long as 
I sustain such intention, I necessarily believe that the belief I am trying to bring about 
is irrational or unwarranted, and as long as I believe the willed belief to be 
unwarranted by what I currently believe, believing the willed belief remains a 
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psychological impossibility for me. It is because of this that the intention must be 
abandoned before I am able to believe the willed belief. But an intentional action is 
necessarily monitored and has its intentionality abandoned once the action goal is 
believed to be realised. This cannot, for the reasons outlined earlier, apply to the 
intentional action to bring about a willed belief if we were to be able to believe the 
willed belief. Thus, in order for me to be able to bring about that I believe the willed 
belief, the activity must necessarily be unmonitored. But all intentional actions are 
monitored. If the intentional action must necessarily be unmonitored in order for me 
to be able to believe p, then that action cannot count as an intentional action. It is 
because of this, argues Scott-Kakures, that we cannot succeed in directly bringing 
about a willed belief:  
 
If an event is to count as an intentional basic action it must be produced by 
some contentful mental state(s) which guides the activity. It is this guidance 
which makes for the obvious way in which we may say that intentional 
activity is monitored activity. I argue … that the reason I cannot succeed in 
directly willing to believe that p is that the process which results in the 
generation of the belief would have to be unmonitored or ungoverned by the 
content of the intention or the plan. … My intention to believe that p just like 
that cannot initiate a process whereby that very intention directs or guides 
activity the result of which is the coming to believe that p. No one can will a 
belief that p, because nothing could count as willing a belief … nothing could 
count as initiating a guided and monitored process which succeed[s] in 
producing a belief (Ibid: 92).  
 
 
That is, if I am able to bring it about at will that I believe p, then I must be able to 
bring it about directly, just like that, that I believe p, but for such action to count as an 
intentional action is for the action to be monitored, and for the action to be monitored 
is for me to be aware of the intention that guides and enables the monitoring of the 
activity, and for me to be aware of such intention is for me to necessarily believe that 
the willed belief I am aiming to bring about is unwarranted by what I currently 
believe. I cannot come to believe p so long I believe it to be unwarranted by my 
current cognitive perspective. Therefore, the action to bring about that I believe p 
must be unmonitored. Believing at will is an intentional action, and intentional actions 
are necessarily monitored. If the action to bring about that I believe p must necessarily 
be unmonitored, then such action cannot count as an intentional action. Therefore, this 
cannot count as an instance of believing at will. Believing at will is, thereby, 
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impossible. Scott-Kakures’ argument of intentional activity as one that is necessarily 
monitored could give rise to some confusion between intentionality and 
consciousness. He argues that intentional action is either consciously or 
unconsciously monitored, but is necessarily monitored. Furthermore, he observes that 
the fact that we must lose sight of the intention before we could come to believe p is 
sufficient evidence that we cannot come to believe p as a direct result of will:  
 
it is a necessary condition of something’s counting as basic intentional activity 
that it be monitored. … We must certainly distinguish between conscious and 
unconscious monitoring of activity. And surely it is likely that most of the 
processes which result in basic action are unconsciously monitored. In a 
familiar way my raising my arm in order to open the window, or my grasping 
a key in order to start the car are actions which are intentional, but which are, 
at least typically, unconsciously guided and monitored. So the point is not that 
all intentional behaviour is consciously guided or monitored but rather that 
behaviour, if it is to count as basic intentional action must be guided and 
monitored. … These [actions of bringing about belief at will] are after all 
cases in which a subject intends fully consciously, “I will believe that p”. But 
if someone must lose sight of this intention, if the intention must, that is, first 
become unconscious before it can be pursued, then that is enough to show that 
one can’t directly will a belief. Rather something else must first occur – the 
pushing into unconsciousness of the intention – before it can be pursued. Thus 
one comes to believe only as a by-product and not as a direct result of the will 
(Ibid: 92). 
 
 
 
If believing at will were psychologically possible, then a direct transition from t to 
t1 must have been possible. But doxastic involuntarists rule out the possibility of such 
direct transition and contend that “there are no transitions of the following kind: At t, 
an agent does not believe that p and at t+1 the agent believes that p, and the transition 
from the one belief state to the other is accomplished by a direct and unmediated 
willing to believe that p” (in Scott-Kakures 1994: 77-78). Thus, if I were to bring 
about a belief at will, my epistemic situation at t1 must necessarily be the same as the 
one at t where I believe the willed belief to be unwarranted by what I currently 
believe, and I must be able to make a direct transition from t to t1 just like that. This, 
as shown earlier, is not something we are psychologically capable of. I, however, 
could come to believe p indirectly if between t and t1 I came across some supporting 
evidence that warranted the willed belief from my cognitive perspective. But that 
could not count as bringing about the belief as a direct result of will. Rather, I would 
come to believe p on the basis of evidence as argued by Scott-Kakures:  
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If I had, first [between t and t1], come to believe something else which 
rendered rational my believing that p then I would not have succeeded in 
willing the belief directly; rather I would have come to believe that p 
indirectly by coming to believe something else first. Indeed, in urging that I 
can directly will a belief that p, the advocate for believing at will should agree 
that I do not, between t and t+1, first come to believe things that make rational 
my coming to believe that p (Ibid: 93).  
 
 
    We have already observed Cook and Scott-Kakures arguing that believing at will 
occurs when I find the current evidence insufficient to warrant belief in something 
that I want to believe or when I believe the willed belief to be unwarranted by my 
current cognitive perspective, but for some pragmatic reason want to bring it about 
that I believe it. This is how doxastic voluntarism is generally conceived of. 
Therefore, believing at will must be practically motivated. In other words, if believing 
at will is ever possible, we will ourselves to bring about belief in order to satisfy some 
pragmatic interest. Believing at will is, as already observed, necessarily carried out 
consciously with the intention to hold the willed belief. We can, following an initial 
success to enter the willed belief state, hold the willed belief only if we become 
unaware of how we arrived at the willed belief. To become unaware of how we came 
about the willed belief is construed as either forgetting how we arrived at the willed 
belief or falsely believing that we came about the willed belief on the basis of 
evidence. That is, Scott-Kakures observes that: 
 
The fact that I self-consciously will to believe that p, does not thereby entail 
that if I succeed, I must also believe that [I have brought about the willed 
belief independently of its truth] … Thus I might succeed in willing a belief, 
and simultaneously forget that I have willed it (Ibid: 82). 
 
 
    He further argues that “If I succeed [in willing a belief] … my inability to believe 
that it was produced at will is irrelevant to an evaluation of the success or failure of 
my original project” (Ibid: 82). This surely cannot be contested, if I succeed in willing 
myself to believe p, then the fact that after success I do not (come to) believe that I 
have brought about the willed belief independently of its truth does not negate the fact 
that I came about the willed belief as a direct result of will. Furthermore, Winters 
argues that the self-conscious nature of willing a belief shall not be construed as being 
necessarily retained until after the success to enter the willed belief state; she argues 
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that after success we might falsely believe that we have come about the willed belief 
on the basis of evidence: 
 
since the acquisition of beliefs at will is always performed in full 
consciousness, it might seem that it is a necessary truth that if x acquired a 
belief at will, there would be a time (perhaps immediately after the 
acquisition) at which x was aware both that x believed b and that b was 
sustained at will. … [but] the “in full consciousness” stipulation requires only 
that, at the time of the attempt, one be aware that one is trying to believe 
something at will; it is not required that at such time as one fully succeeds in 
believing it, the awareness of the voluntary nature of the acquisition be 
retained. Afterwards, I might falsely think that I had not succeeded in 
acquiring b at will and hold that my belief of b was due to other (evidential) 
factors. A person might lower his heart-beat through the direct effort of will, 
although he may think that he did so indirectly (say, by swallowing a placebo); 
his belief in this false causal efficacy does not alter the fact that he performed 
the basic action (1979: 255-256).  
 
 
But if believing at will were to be a viable mental phenomenon, then a direct 
transition from t to t1 must be possible, and therefore it must be possible for a willed 
belief to be brought about just like that immediately after willing it in the same way 
we bring about an arm rise immediately after willing it. If that is necessarily the case, 
then it is unclear how we can forget the way we come about a willed belief during 
such a very short period of time. Moreover, if after success I falsely believe that I 
have arrived at the willed belief as a result of evidential considerations, then at least 
some of this evidence should be accessible to me upon entertaining the belief. After 
all, I will to bring about such belief in order to satisfy some practical desire that 
matters to me. It is, therefore, rarely the case that the willed belief just fades away 
from sight soon after successfully willing it. Following the initial success, there 
should come a time where I entertain such belief and attend to its credentials. This, 
however, shall not imply that holding a belief is necessarily a conscious mental 
phenomenon. But since the desire that prompts me to will such belief is one that 
makes a difference to my mental and psychological life, it is often the case that the 
desire will at some point enter my consciousness following a successful willing of the 
belief. After all, the willed belief is just belief in the content of the desire. I cannot 
feel the desire’s satisfaction without believing it to be a certain way or the way I want. 
That is, I cannot feel my desire to be satisfied that my deceased uncle be alive without 
believing him to be alive. And if this is necessarily the case, then it is inevitable that I 
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will, sometime after successfully willing it, come to entertain the willed belief in a 
way that exposes it to be a belief with no evidence in its favour.  
 
    If Williams’ argument for the unwillability of belief were altogether true, then 
believing at will would be impossible at all times and under all circumstances. He 
presents a no-win situation for the agent who wills belief. That is, he argues that in 
order for us to be able to acquire a belief at will, we must know that we have such 
capacity otherwise we could not do it. The inevitable failure for one who wills belief, 
given Williams’ argument, comes after one succeeds in willing a belief. He argues 
that after successfully willing a belief, one must necessarily believe that one has 
arrived at such belief at will otherwise one could not know one has the capacity to 
believe at will, and for one to not know one has such capacity is to be unable to will 
belief. But for one to believe that one has acquired a belief at will is just to believe 
that one has arrived at the belief irrespective of its truth, and for one to so believe is to 
be in two contrary belief states: believing p to be true and believing that p is false or  
unwarranted by one’s cognitive perspective. Believing p at will is, therefore, not 
possible. Thus, considering Williams’ argument, in any given case of willing a belief, 
even if one initially succeeds to enter the willed belief state, it is inevitable that after 
the initial success, the agent eventually realises how the willed belief has been arrived 
at.  
 
    That is, the fundamental reasoning behind Williams’ retrospective thesis is that 
even if we initially succeed in willing ourselves to believe a proposition, we, after the 
initial success, become necessarily conscious of the fact that we had acquired the 
belief at will. With this being necessarily the case, we cannot believe something to be 
true and simultaneously believe it to be false or unsupported by evidence. Thus, given 
his conception of the unwillability of belief, we either cannot will belief or if we 
could, we ineluctably end up realising that we have reached the given belief as a 
direct result of will – an eventuality that inevitably leads to the abandonment of the 
willed belief and therefore a failure to believing at will. This is how we end up at both 
ends of the no-win situation – either incapable of acquiring belief at will for not 
knowing we have such capacity or ending up doomed to abandon the willed belief 
even after an initial success to enter the willed belief state. That is, we will abandon 
the willed belief upon realising that we have come about it independently of its truth 
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for it is human nature that “If a man recognises that what he has been believing is 
false, he thereby abandons the belief he had”, contends Williams (1973: 137).  
 
Moreover, Nottelman also argues that we normally cannot maintain a belief while 
consciously believing that we have good evidence to disbelieve it: “In typical cases I 
cannot stably hold on to a belief while consciously believing that I have a good reason 
for believing its opposite” (2007: 120). Given Williams’ retrospective thesis, after the 
initial success of willing a belief and then realising how the willed belief has been 
arrived at, the wilful believing subject's epistemic condition would be as such: s 
believes p to be true while concurrently believing that s’s belief that p is false, 
unwarranted or while simultaneously believing that s’s current evidence supports not 
p rather than p. But this is not how genuine belief obtains for in any “epistemic case, 
when I have a good reason to believe a proposition, I have an equally good reason not 
to believe its opposite”, states Nottelman (Ibid: 120). In addition, reiterating 
Williams’ retrospective thesis that the agent who wills a belief is, following an initial 
success to enter the willed belief state, necessarily conscious of how one has arrived at 
the willed belief, O’Shaughnessy observes:  
 
[A] belief that occurs in a self-conscious consciousness self-consciously aims 
at the true … Self-conscious belief that p is the belief that p is true, which is 
the belief that the world is such that p is true. Then a self-conscious b-believer 
ought to be able to make such alarming utterances as: ‘This belief that p, this 
belief that the world is such that the claim p is true, is purely and simply 
engendered by a desire that is wholly insensitive to such concerns’. 
Conceivably, he might even say: ‘My b-believed belief that it is raining is one 
that I hold irrespective of the state of the weather’ (2008: 64).  
 
 
    The retrospective self-consciousness phenomenon of how one inevitably comes to 
believe, after successfully willing a belief, that one has come about the willed belief at 
will is representative of how all willed beliefs end up, providing that one does not 
subsequently forget how one came about the willed belief. If I will to bring about that 
I believe something I know to be unwarranted by what I currently believe, then I 
cannot be said to be epistemically motivated in my doing so. There must be some 
pragmatic considerations that prompt me to will such belief. Believing at will is, 
therefore, a case of motivated believing which is thought to be brought about to serve 
some practical interest, as we will learn in Barnes’ and Scott-Kakures’s discussions 
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about motivated believing in chapter four. It is, therefore, rarely the case that we 
forget how we came about a willed belief because the sorts of propositions that we 
will to believe against all odds are primarily the ones that matter to us, hence we want 
to believe them because a key aspect of our life depends on them. They are the sorts 
of things whose presence, in our psyche, in the way of belief makes a difference to 
our mental or psychological life; they are the sorts of things that we care about. They 
are the sorts of things that serve an interest and that we consider to be congenial to our 
reasoning and belief system. In general, they are propositions that, once believed, 
respond to and satisfy some psychological or emotional need. I do not believe that we 
are psychologically capable of willing beliefs. But if willing a belief were ever 
possible which I contend is not, typically the kind of propositions outlined earlier 
would be the object of the willed belief.  
 
    That is why after the initial success to enter the willed belief state, we will, at some 
point, entertain the willed belief, attend to it, consult it, reflect on it, or assert it. Thus, 
since we bring about the willed belief to serve some practical interest, reflection on 
any ensuing willed belief becomes normally inevitable. It is this reflection (the 
retrospective consciousness of the willed belief) that dooms willed beliefs to 
abandonment. This, however, shall not imply that epistemically-driven beliefs do not 
end up being reflected on. It is, rather, to emphasize the special purpose such 
reflection serves in the case of willed beliefs. Entertaining a belief entails attending to 
its truth values. Therefore, reflecting on a willed belief almost always results in the 
realisation that the belief in question has been acquired at will with no regard to its 
truth. If one forgets how one came about a willed belief, then surely the willed belief 
becomes psychologically sustainable. One can, therefore, be said to have succeeded in 
willing the belief. Under such circumstances, doxastic voluntarism can account for 
belief. This might pertain to people with cognitive deficiencies or memory problems. 
But as far as the overall willability of belief is concerned, I cannot see how any 
rational or normal human being can possibly move on from a non-belief state to a 
willed belief state directly just like that through willing it alone. Unless one is, as 
Alston points out below, psychologically abnormal, otherwise such direct belief state 
transitions are psychologically impossible:  
 
If I, not currently believing that X loves me, were to set out to bring about that 
belief in one fell swoop, that is, during a period of activity uninterruptedly 
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guided by the intention to produce that belief, then, unless I am markedly 
abnormal psychologically, I am doomed to failure. We just don’t work that 
way (1989: 133).  
 
 
To sum up, we lack what it takes to be psychologically capable of taking up 
doxastic attitudes at will: “we are not so constituted as to be able to take propositional 
attitudes at will”, observes Alston (2005: 62). And it is because of the lack of such 
direct control over our doxastic attitudes that the notions of belief and will do not pan 
out on the same par. Alston contends that it is highly unlikely that we can succeed in 
willing a belief or manipulating our doxastic tendencies to bring about a willed belief 
for “most of our beliefs spring from doxastic tendencies that are too deeply rooted to 
permit of modification by deliberate effort” (Ibid: 73). He further argues that 
volitional notions of choice or decision are incompatible with psychological states 
such as belief: “Volitions, decisions, or choosings don’t hook up with propositional 
attitude inaugurations” (Ibid: 63). In addition, Alston observes that our inability to 
take up doxastic attitudes at will applies to both patently false propositions as well as 
patently true propositions: “our inability to believe at will is [not] restricted to what is 
obviously false. It also extends to beliefs that are obviously true. … voluntary control 
attaches to sets of contraries” (Ibid: 63). He further argues that “If the sphere of my 
effective voluntary control does not extend both to A and to not-A, then it attaches to 
neither” (1989: 123). In other words, if I could bring about at will that I believe 
something I take to be patently false, then I must also be able to bring about at will 
that I disbelieve something I take to be patently true. But we just do not have what it 
takes to bring about doxastic attitudes at will. I can set out to bring it about that I 
believe some desired proposition I do not currently believe, but, observes Alston, my 
doxastic state after the trial would remain as it was before the trial: 
 
If I were to set out to bring myself into a state of belief that p, just by an act of 
will, I might assert that p with an expression of conviction, or dwell 
favourably on the idea that p… All this I can do at will, but none of this 
amounts to taking on a belief that p. It is all show, an elaborate pretence of 
believing. Having gone through all this, my doxastic attitudes will remain just 
as they were before (Ibid: 122-3).  
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    Thus far, we have only considered clear-cut cases where a proposition is either 
patently false to be believed at will or patently true to be disbelieved at will. The 
following is a case which Alston presents to show that bringing about doxastic 
attitudes at will is not only impossible where the proposition in question is evidently 
true or evidently false, but also impossible where the agent has reason neither to 
believe p nor to disbelieve p. It is a case where the agent has no reason to believe that 
p is true, but also has no reason to believe that p is false. In other words, it is a 
situation where the agent has reason neither to embrace nor to rule out belief in any 
given possibilities. It is a situation where the agent feels that neither belief nor 
disbelief is licensed under the given epistemic conditions. If he had direct control over 
his doxastic attitudes, he could just choose or decide to take up some belief or any 
doxastic attitude he may have fancied. The case is about a field commander who just 
does not have what it takes to settle doxastic opinion on the current disposition of the 
enemy forces, but given the urgency of the military situation, he must dispose his 
forces in some way and on some basis. And in doing so, 
  
he must act on some assumption about the enemy’s forces. Hence he is forced 
to decide on a hypothesis as to that disposition [of the enemy forces] and act 
on that basis. … [or he] may be resolving to act as though it is true that p, 
adopting it as a basis for action without actually believing it. This could well 
be a correct description of the military commander. He may have said to 
himself: “I don’t know what the disposition of enemy forces is. I don’t even 
have enough evidence to consider one hypothesis much more likely than any 
other. But I have to proceed on some basis or other, so I’ll just assume that it 
is H and make my plans accordingly”. If that’s the way the land lies, it would 
be incorrect to describe the commander as believing that the disposition of 
enemy forces is H or having any other belief about the matter. He is, self-
consciously, proceeding on an assumption concerning the truth of which he 
has no belief at all (2005: 64-65).  
 
 
This chapter has examined the potential willability of belief. We have learned that 
due to their close connection with reason, beliefs are not the sort of propositional 
attitudes that can be brought about as a direct result of will. If beliefs were willable at 
all, then we would be able to bring about belief in an evidentially unsupported 
proposition directly and consciously through willing it alone or solely through 
formulating an intention to bring it about just like any other intentional action. But as 
we have already learned, the intentional action to bring about a willed belief succeeds 
only through the occurrence of a cognitive fissure between the cognitive perspective 
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(t) where we will a belief and the cognitive perspective (t1) where we come to believe 
the willed belief. That is, the intention to bring about a willed belief should be 
abandoned before we can come to believe the willed belief. This intention or its 
awareness should be abandoned or forgotten before the end of the intentional action is 
realised for we cannot come to believe that p in the presence of such intention or its 
awareness. So long as we retain the intention to bring about the willed belief or so 
long as we are conscious of such intention, we will be conscious of the fact that the 
belief we are aiming to bring about is unwarranted or evidentially unsupported from 
our perspective. But as we have observed earlier, it is characteristic of intentional 
actions that the intention of a given intentional action is abandoned only after the end 
of the intentional action is realised or is believed to be realised. In the case of wilful 
believing, the end of the intentional action can only be realised if the intention or its 
awareness is abandoned before the intentional action succeeds otherwise the 
endeavour to bring about the willed belief would be doomed.  
 
    In other words, we should forget that p is evidentially unsupported or we should 
forget that p is the same proposition that we willed at t otherwise we cannot come to 
believe p at t1. We cannot come to believe p in the presence of a conscious judgment 
that p is evidentially unsupported. It is the occurrence of this cognitive rift between t 
and t1 that makes possible the unconsciousness, forgetting or abandoning of the 
intention we formulate at t. That is, the occurrence of the cognitive rift renders the 
intention of the intentional action abandoned through rendering the intentional action 
unmonitored. Intentional actions are necessarily monitored, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, till their ends are believed to be realised. The intentional action to 
bring about a willed belief cannot succeed unless rendered unmonitored prior to the 
realisation of its end. In other words, it cannot succeed if it were to be monitored till 
success is made. The intention to bring about a willed belief cannot, therefore, count 
as an intentional action for intentional actions are necessarily monitored till fulfilled. 
Believing at will is necessarily an intentional activity. Believing at will is, thereby, 
psychologically impossible. This chapter has underlined the special relationship 
between belief and reason, and established that it is this relationship that underlies the 
rational and psychological constraints on belief and it is due to this relationship that 
beliefs cannot be brought about directly through the practice of free will alone. While 
the objects of the given inquiry were not welcome propositions to have been willed, 
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this chapter has stressed the rational and psychological constraints on belief. It is 
psychologically impossible to believe a proposition you take to be unwarranted from 
your perspective. It is these rational and psychological constraints on belief that 
prompt us to challenge the sincerity of a belief expressed in the presence of clear 
evidence that not p or in the absence of any supporting evidence that p.   
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Chapter Four  
4.1. Propositional Acceptance  
 
    The agent who merely fears or suspects that p, but who has no good evidence 
whether or not that p, is better understood as merely accepting that p. That is if there 
were to obtain, on the part of the given agent, any genuine attitude regarding p. This 
section examines the nature of acceptance in a bid to further the attribution of 
propositional acceptance, one of the key research questions. This research argues that 
the Bush administration's manifested belief that p is more characteristic of mere 
propositional acceptance than genuine belief. It is, therefore, appropriate and 
necessary that the nature of propositional acceptance along with its differentiae are 
addressed in this research. There is a substantive difference between belief and 
acceptance. Though some epistemologists use them interchangeably, they are not the 
same propositional attitudes. There are four distinguishing features that individuate 
the notion of belief. First, beliefs are “normally shaped by evidence”, argues Engel 
(2000: 3). The second distinguishing characteristic, observes Engel, is that “belief is a 
passive state of mind, rather than an active one” (Ibid: 3). The third characteristic is 
that beliefs are involuntary for they are “states which we can’t help having”, argues 
Engel (Ibid: 3). Fourth, believing is, as pointed out on p. 76, a feeling. Further, Cohen 
argues that belief is “a disposition … normally to feel it true that p and false that not-
p” (1992: 4). Alston also takes this to be one of the key differences between believing 
that p and merely accepting that p, arguing that when we believe a proposition, we 
tend to feel it to be true that p whenever the question of whether it is the case that p 
arises: “If S believes that p, then if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will 
tend to feel it to be the case that p, with one or another degree of confidence” (in 
Jordan and Howard-Snyder 1996: 4); whereas “accepting p will definitely not include 
a tendency to feel that p if the question of whether p arises” (Ibid: 9). Further to the 
feeling a belief entails, Alston observes:  
 
I have used the term “feel” [in the definition of belief] … in order to convey 
the idea that it possesses a kind of immediacy, that it is something one 
experiences rather than something that one thinks out, that it is a matter of 
one's being struck by (a sense of) how things are rather than deciding how 
things are (Ibid: 5). 
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Further, Cohen holds that beliefs are “states of mind that are normally responsive to 
the truth, not to our own decisions” whereas acceptance “occurs at will, whether by an 
immediate decision or through a gradually formed intention. This is because at bottom 
it executes a choice” (1992: 22). That is, acts of acceptance respond to free will. It is, 
therefore, up to us whether to accept p or not p, but it is not within our direct control 
to believe something we merely please for beliefs are, typically, shaped and 
constrained by reason, as pointed out earlier by Engel. Further to the voluntariness 
that distinguishes these two propositional attitudes, Alston observes: 
 
belief is something that one finds oneself with, something that springs into 
consciousness spontaneously when the question is raised. Whereas acceptance 
of a proposition is, at least in the first instance, a deliberate voluntary act of 
accepting a proposition as true. … [In accepting p], S does commit himself to 
p’s being true. He “takes it on board” as one of the things he acts on and draws 
consequences from. It is, we might say, just like belief except that the 
commitment to p’s being true doesn’t arise spontaneously but, at least at the 
outset, has to be kept in activation by a deliberate voluntary act (2005: 66). 
 
 
    Moreover, acceptance of a proposition is “the adoption, the taking on, of a positive 
attitude to the proposition. It is something one does at a particular time”, argues 
Alston (in Jordan and Howard-Snyder 1996: 8). Thus, just like belief, acts of 
acceptance involve a positive attitude with a commitment to the truth of the 
proposition accepted. But, unlike belief, in accepting p, the commitment to the truth 
of p does not entail feeling it true that p. Rather, the commitment associated with 
propositional acceptance is through a volitional act. Further, to accept that p is “to 
have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p – i.e., of including 
that proposition or rule among one's premises for deciding what to do or think in a 
particular context” (Cohen 1992: 4). Thus, when we accept a proposition for practical 
reasons, we voluntarily commit ourselves to its truth, employing it as a basis for some 
decision, using it as a premise for practical reasoning, taking it on board as a policy to 
guide some action or proceed accordingly. Some epistemologists discriminate 
between belief and acceptance in a bid to highlight the involuntary character of belief. 
But they are used interchangeably by others. Chisholm argues that “it will sometimes 
be convenient to replace the word ‘believe’ by the word ‘accept’” (1977: 6). 
Furthermore, Clarke also holds that “Coming to believe in something seems to be a 
species of acceptance” (in Engel 2000: 31). He, therefore, argues that “there can be no 
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acceptance without belief” (Ibid: 51). Deontologists do not find significant sense in 
differentiating between belief and acceptance for they treat belief as a willable mental 
phenomenon. That is, since belief is construed by deontologists as a voluntary 
propositional attitude, there would be little point for them to distinguish it from 
acceptance which is itself a constitutionally voluntary propositional attitude. 
 
    But I take it that there is a legitimate distinction between believing a proposition 
and merely accepting it for practical reasons. Driven by practical considerations, we 
often accept things even in the absence of the corresponding beliefs. Acceptance is 
not necessarily driven by evidence, though it could be. That is, we may have evidence 
for what we accept as in the case of the physician who, on good evidence, accepts that 
a patient has tuberculosis, and therefore reasons and acts accordingly. Or the bomb 
squad who, on good evidence, accepts that the bomb planted on the main road will 
explode in thirty minutes and therefore reasons and acts accordingly. Or the fighter jet 
pilot who, on good evidence, accepts that the enemy target to be struck is t and 
therefore reasons and acts accordingly. These are all cases of acceptance driven by 
evidence and presumably coexistent with the corresponding beliefs. But there are 
situations where acceptance arises from a lack of evidence whether it be confirming 
or disconfirming evidence to settle doxastic opinion, as the example of the field 
commander illustrates (see p. 98). Further, the expeditioner lost in the vastness of 
North Pole with no evidence either way as to which direction is the closest to safety 
might just accept a certain hypothesis p, taking it as a premise to reason and act 
accordingly. This is a case of acceptance in the absence of the corresponding belief. In 
fact Price argues that "it is not true that in acceptance (or taking for granted) we have 
evidence for what we accept; though we could have it" (1935: 240). That is, Price and 
Alston both argue that acceptance often arises when we have no evidence to settle 
doxastic opinion in the way of belief or disbelief. The following is a paradigm of this. 
It is a case of acceptance driven by the uncertainty of whether p or not p and a caution 
to avoid unaffordable risks:  
 
 I am planning for a major construction project to begin next month. I need to 
 decide now whether to do the entire project at once or instead to break the 
 project into two parts, to be executed separately. The rationale for the second 
 strategy is that I am unsure whether I presently have the financial resources to 
 do the whole thing at once. I know that in the case of each sub-contractor - 
 carpenter, plumber, and so on - it is only possible at present to get an estimate 
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 of the range of potential costs. In the face of this uncertainty I proceed in a 
 cautious way: In the case of each sub-contractor I take it for granted that the 
 total costs will be at the top of the estimated range. On the basis of these 
 assumptions I determine whether I have at present enough money to do the 
 whole project at once. In contrast, if you offered me a bet on the actual total 
 cost of the project - the winner being the person whose guess is closest to the 
 actual total - I would reason differently. In this example I take for granted, in a 
 certain practical context, something which I do not believe. Further, my taking 
 the top of the estimated range for granted seems reasonable of me even though 
 I would not take this for granted in a different context. I proceed in this way 
 largely because of my uncertainty and the high costs of certain kinds of errors 
 in prediction. Of course, I thereby run an increased risk of unnecessarily 
 delaying the completion of my project. But I have made a judgment that the 
 error of going ahead with the total project when it turns out to cost too much is 
 less acceptable than the error of not going ahead when I could in fact have 
 afforded to. When I bet with you on the actual total cost, in contrast, there isn't 
 such an asymmetry; for here there is no relevant difference between errors of 
 overestimating and errors of underestimating the costs (Bratman 1992: 6). 
 
 
That is, under such circumstances, we are often driven in our acceptances by the 
gravest of possible consequences or worst case scenarios. In the case at hand, 
Bratman accepts the hypothesis whose ignorance, in his mind, is costly enough that he 
cannot safely overlook. That is if he went ahead with the total project all at once with 
the project's ending up costing far too much - more than he could afford - or with the 
project's being eventually abandoned due to the overall cost underestimation or an 
error in the overall cost estimate. This is the eventuality Bratman considers 
unaffordably costly. Though he is aware that what he accepts about the overall cost 
estimate for the construction project is just a mere possibility, if he were to bet on the 
actual total cost of the project, he might accept a different hypothesis to the one he 
initially accepts in a context where the risk asymmetries are too substantial. Bratman, 
therefore, argues that "pressures of risks ... typically shape what one accepts in the 
context" rather than "what one believes" (Ibid: 6). He further argues that "reasonable 
acceptance ... really is affected by asymmetries in the costs of errors, and not solely 
by relevant degrees of confidence" (Ibid: 7). Consider the Iranian nuclear issue vis-à-
vis the American or Israeli response to allegations that Iran is weaponising its nuclear 
power. Suppose they want to bring the Iranian issue to a head.  
 
Though there is still no good evidence to show that Iran is weaponising its uranium, 
if they were to consider the issue against the background of the current evidence 
which is not sufficient to warrant belief, their cognitive attitudes would be driven not 
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only by the force of the current evidence, but also by the risk asymmetries associated 
with the two possibilities they might consider: whether to accept that the Iranian 
nuclear program is solely intended for peaceful purposes, or accept the proposition (p) 
that Iran is weaponising its uranium. Due to the substantial risk asymmetries involved, 
it is more likely that they would opt to accept the proposition that Iran is weaponising 
its uranium. Though they might not believe what they accept - they may even doubt 
what they accept - they might still accept that p because for them, just like for 
Bratman, the error of standing idle taking it for granted that the Iranian nuclear 
program is for peaceful means when it eventually turns out that Iran has already been 
weaponising its uranium is less acceptable than the error of confronting Iran on the 
basis of the accepted proposition (p) with Iran eventually turning out to have neither a 
nuclear bomb nor any weaponised uranium. That is, they both involve potential risks, 
but the risks of the former are unacceptably higher than the risks of the latter. Thus, 
under such circumstances, we are driven by a consideration that it "is safer to err on 
the side of prudence" (Engel 1998: 146). In light of the evidential conditions at the 
time along with the new security environment, I take this to be a more appropriate 
explanation for the Bush administration's apparent belief that Iraq was in possession 
of WMD and in league with Al-Qaeda. The following example further demonstrates 
the risk asymmetries that influence our acceptances: 
 
 I have a chair and a two-storey ladder. In each case I think it equally and 
 highly likely that it is in good condition. Indeed, if you offered me a monetary 
 bet about whether the chair/ladder was in good condition I would accept 
 exactly the same odds for each object. But when I think about using the 
 chair/ladder things change. When I consider using the chair I simply take it for 
 granted that it is in working order; but when I am about to use the ladder I do 
 not take this for granted. When I am considering using the objects the 
 differential costs of error with respect to a chair and a two-storey ladder 
 explain differences in what I accept in the context. It is one thing to fall off a 
 chair, another to fall off the top of a two-storey ladder (Bratman 1992: 7). 
 
 
    Similarly, it is one thing to have a hostile adversary emerging as a nuclear power, 
but another to have it confronted under a false premise. Frankish argues that to accept 
a proposition that p "is to be committed to a policy of taking p as a premise in one's 
conscious reasoning and decision making" (2012: 24). He, therefore, defines 
acceptances as "personal commitments to deliberative policies, which are conscious, 
controlled" (Ibid: 24). Furthermore, Cohen also defines acceptance as "a conscious 
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adoption of a policy about premisses" (1992: 27). Frankish, therefore, argues that the 
"direct influence [of acceptance] is confined to reflective behaviour (that is, behaviour 
that is the product of conscious reasoning)" (2012: 25). Moreover, Bratman contends 
that whenever we accept a proposition, we do not only act as if p, but also reason as if 
p: "In accepting that p I do not simply behave as if I think that p: I also reason on the 
assumption that p" (1992: 9). In other words, acceptance, argues Folely, requires "a 
degree of intellectual engagement that need not be present when you are merely 
acting as if a claim were true. Commitment requires intellectual resolve, a resolve, for 
instance, to think about matters in a certain way" (1991: 382). He further argues that 
"merely acting as if the proposition were true. ... can be entirely a matter of public 
display. Commitment cannot be. It is a deeper phenomenon" (Ibid: 382). The 
distinction between merely acting as if p and accepting p - acting and reasoning as if p 
- is also drawn by Price. He argues that "there are two practical analogues. There is 
the deciding to act as if p was true [acceptance], and there is the mere acting as if p 
was true, from habit or possibly from instinct" (1935: 240). Thus, "acting as if it is 
true that p", argues Cohen, "is not necessarily a way of declaring that you accept that 
p" (1992: 14). That is, to accept that p is not only to act as if p, it is, as pointed out 
earlier by Bratman and Folely, also to be intellectually committed to reason as if p. 
Thus, the expeditioner who accepts a certain hypothesis p does not only act as if he 
thinks that p, but also reasons as if p, taking p as a premise for his practical reasoning. 
That is, he is intellectually committed to the truth of p. But the person who pretends to 
be a statute does not reason as if he is a statute. Though he acts as if he is a statute. 
That is, his acting as if p is just a matter of public display with no intellectual 
commitment to think about matters as if p. The following is how Mosterín 
differentiates between belief and acceptance:  
 
 We often use the same word "belief" to refer to two different cognitive 
 attitudes. Both of them are dispositions to behave in the same way, but one of 
 these dispositions is involuntary and context independent (and will continue to 
 be called belief here), while the other one is voluntary and context dependent 
 (and will be called acceptance). Belief, like perception, is the result of the 
 automatic workings of our biological cognitive apparatus. Acceptance is the 
 result of a decision, which can be guided by a variety of goals. Acceptance can 
 be accompanied by belief, but need not, and very often is not (2002: 313).  
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Further to the involuntariness that individuates belief, Mosterín observes:  
 
 Think of love. You find yourself in love, you fall in love. Love is nothing you 
 decide upon. Love is the result of unconscious brain mechanisms you neither 
 know nor control. Dating, sharing the same apartment or marriage, on the 
 contrary, are things you decide upon. You can choose whether to date, to 
 marry or to share your apartment, but you cannot choose whether to fall in 
 love or to be in love. Believing is like being in love, acceptance is like dating 
 or marriage (Ibid: 318-319).  
 
 
    Moreover, Cohen also argues that "Beliefs are said to come over you, arise in you, 
or grow on you, like anger or affection does. You cannot don, raise, or grow them 
yourself. You can plant them in others, but not in yourself" (1992: 21). That is, belief 
and love are not the kind of mental phenomena that we can will ourselves to be in, 
whereas acceptance is a cognitive attitude that we can adopt at will. But, unlike 
Mosterín, I do not think of belief solely as a disposition to behave. Understanding 
belief solely as a behavioural disposition to act in a certain way, as if p, makes it 
difficult whether to attribute belief or acceptance or both to an agent who acts 
appropriately to p. This is because acceptance, like belief, is partly associated with a 
tendency to act as if p. Thus, thinking of belief purely as a disposition to act in a 
certain way does not help lay out a systematic distinction between belief and 
acceptance. If I believe that p, I necessarily feel it true that p, but, as observed in 
chapter two, I might never encounter any chance to assert p or act appropriately to p. 
That is why I take the Bainean and the Rylean behaviourist account of belief to be 
subservient to Cohen's account of belief as a feeling disposition. Behavioural 
dispositions alone are neither necessary nor sufficient for the attribution of belief. We 
sometimes assert p or act as if p for practical reasons while lacking the belief that p. 
Cohen defines acceptance as "a mental act ... or policy of mental action, rather than a 
speech-act" (1989: 368). He further argues that "acceptance implies commitment to a 
pattern, system, or policy - whether long or short term - of premising that p as a basis 
for a decision" (1992: 12). That is, whenever we accept a proposition for practical 
purposes, we tend to use the proposition as a premise in our practical reasoning, 
asserting that p or acting as if p. But Cohen rightly denies that such acceptance is 
necessarily reflected in our verbal or behavioural manifestations: "What a person 
accepts may in practice be reflected in how he or she speaks or behaves, but it need 
not be" (1989: 368). Thus, just like belief, I might accept a hypothesis in a debate 
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about the possibility of a certain rock on Venus, but no appropriate situations might 
subsequently arise to render me to use it as a premise in my practical reasoning, assert 
that p or act as if p if I were to visit Venus or I might just forget what I have accepted 
altogether.  
 
Furthermore, Cohen argues that acceptance and belief can, though need not, 
coincide: "There is a natural tendency for states of belief that p to be associated with 
policies of acceptance that p and vice versa, but it is always conceptually possible for 
one of the two to exist without the other" (1992: 1). He further argues that "a person 
can fully believe that p without accepting it. That is to say, he could be convinced that 
p while nevertheless rejecting the use of that proposition as a premiss for any proofs, 
deliberations, etc." (1989: 369). Folely takes the same position too: "Just as you might 
commit yourself to hypotheses that you do not really believe, so, too, you might not 
commit yourself to a hypothesis that you do believe, since commitment might have 
unwelcome consequences" (1991: 382). That is, since acceptance entails a 
commitment to premising p as a basis for practical reasoning or action, and since such 
commitment might bring about undesirable eventualities, there are situations where 
we do not accept or do not want to accept a proposition we believe. Consider the 
person who believes in God, but does not accept such belief proposition as a premise 
for practical reasoning or as a premise to act accordingly. He might just find acting as 
if p too dull. Or the police officer who believes blacks to be inferior to whites, but 
does not commit himself to such proposition as a premise for action or practical 
reasoning in his career; or the woman who believes herself to be inferior to men, but 
does not commit, at least in pubic, herself to such proposition as a premise to act or 
reason accordingly. These are all examples of belief without the corresponding 
acceptance of the proposition believed. We have already learned that belief is 
normally driven by epistemic reasons, but practical reasons can also sometimes cause 
belief, though not outright. Similarly, we sometimes accept a proposition on the basis 
of very good epistemic reasons. But acceptance can also be driven by practical 
reasons. Cohen argues that "reasons for accepting that p can ... be ethical, 
professional, prudential, religious, aesthetic, or otherwise pragmatic instead of 
evidential" (1992: 20). Further to the influence which belief and acceptance might 
have on each other, Cohen observes: 
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 though acceptance that p sometimes causes or helps to cause belief that p, the 
 fact that a person accepts that p is (rightly) not taken by him as a reason for 
 believing that p. Otherwise he could manufacture a reason for believing 
 anything. But having a belief that p could normally be taken to be some at 
 least prima facie reason for accepting that p, even though it may well not be 
 the only, or the best reason, or even a sufficient one (1989: 369). 
 
 
He takes the same position in his subsequent work on belief and acceptance: 
 
 acceptance does quite generally tend to promote belief. Not that acceptance 
 that p can ever be taken as a reason for believing that p. For if it could be so 
 taken we should be in the absurd position of being able at will to manufacture 
 a reason for believing anything, simply by deciding to take it as a premiss. 
 (There is a definite asymmetry here between belief's normally being a reason 
 for acceptance and acceptance's never being a reason for belief). But 
 acceptance that p very often causes belief that p - in the long run if not in the 
 short run (1992: 18). 
 
 
That is, sometimes our acceptance of a proposition promotes and eventually causes 
belief in the proposition. The sceptic who wants to believe that Islam is not inherently 
violent might initially just accept that Islam is a peaceful religion and that his 
followers are peace-loving. That is, he does not currently hold any such beliefs, but he 
wants to, probably because he has a good Muslim friend or because he might find the 
lack of such belief damaging his perception of or harming his friendship with his 
Muslim friend. In a bid to improve his perception of Islam and eventually acquire the 
intended belief, he just accepts Islam to be peaceful, taking this as a premise to think 
about Islam and treat its followers accordingly. That is, he is intellectually committed 
to what he accepts. His acceptance of p can encourage and cause belief in the end. 
That is if the acceptance leads him to forge a good friendship with them, improving 
his perception of them. In other words, if the acceptance culminates in some evidence 
that favours belief from his own perspective. But it could also be the case that the 
acceptance ends up neither promoting nor causing any corresponding belief in the 
proposition. Thus, acceptance need not promote or cause belief. Nevertheless, we 
often come to believe the hypotheses we accept for practical reasons if they end up 
being positive or corroborated by evidence that favours belief. I have no good 
epistemic reasons to believe that the combination of two rare radioactive materials 
produces a certain by-product p - a detrimental material that causes infertility. But for 
practical reasons, I just accept that the combination will generate p, reason and act 
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accordingly. If the experiment proves positive, it is most likely that I will come to 
believe what I originally accepted in the absence of this corresponding belief. Further, 
the police have reason to believe or suspect that a neighbourhood guy is engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking. The reason they have is somehow indicative of this alleged 
activity, but it is not good enough to produce or warrant belief in the matter. On the 
basis of this reason, they obtain a warrant to monitor his movements. That is, they just 
accept that he is engaged in illicit drug trafficking, reason and act accordingly. In 
other words, they just reason and act as if p. If the activities they subsequently engage 
in - such as tracking his movements, tapping his telephones, or intercepting his emails 
- corroborate what they initially accepted as their cognitive attitude, it is very likely 
that they eventually come to believe it. Moreover, Cohen argues that "One common 
case" of acceptance followed by belief is:  
 
 when in learning a skill, and acquiring fluency in its exercise, we pass from 
 accepting what has to be done to believing it. A detailed acceptance of 
 appropriate instructions eventually promotes a corresponding disposition to 
 feel what has to be done at any particular point of the skill's operation. That 
 way, for example, a driver becomes able to feel the coexistence of several 
 different requirements. Perhaps he needs at the same time to depress his car's 
 clutch pedal, move his gear lever forward, relax pressure on his accelerator, 
 and turn the steering wheel to the left. But, if he were still at the stage of 
 accepting each requirement as taught by his instructor, he would have to do so 
 sequentially (Ibid: 19).  
 
 
Other paradigms of this acceptance-belief transition would be learning how to cycle 
or fly a plane. These are cases where belief might ensue acceptance. Similarly, the 
person who believes in God but does not currently accept it as a premise for 
behaviour or practical reasoning might eventually come to accept it and thereby 
reason and behave appropriately to such belief. That is if the retention of the belief 
generates desirable or good reasons for such acceptance. We have observed earlier 
that belief in a proposition can be a reason to accept the proposition, but it might not 
be enough or it might not be a good reason for such acceptance. That is, we might 
need other reasons beyond our belief in the proposition in order to accept what we 
believe for, as pointed out earlier by Folely on p. 108, acceptance could have 
implications at odds with our desires and practical interests, as the possible 
acceptance of the belief in God illustrates. That is why Folely argues that "belief is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for commitment" (1991: 382). Further to this belief-
 111 
acceptance transition or coexistence, Cohen argues that we often undergo some 
verification to see whether the credentials of a belief warrant acceptance of the belief 
or whether they make the belief worthy of acceptance:  
 
 though a person who accepts nothing that he believes is intellectually self-
 paralysed, a person who habitually accepts everything that he believes is 
 recklessly uncritical. One often needs to go through some process of checking 
 or monitoring the relevant facts in order to determine whether acceptance is 
 justifiable and such a process may well reveal deviant elements in the genesis 
 of the belief. Visual illusion, mishearing, linguistic misunderstanding, 
 numerical miscalculation, misinformation from others, and many other such 
 factors may have played their part in generating a belief that does not deserve 
 acceptance. Moreover, while such a belief will often cease to exist when found 
 undeserving of acceptance, there are other kinds of belief that may be 
 maintained even though acceptance is thought inappropriate. A person might 
 be convinced that p while nevertheless not accepting the use of that 
 proposition as a premiss for any proofs, deliberations, etc. For example, this 
 sometimes happens with beliefs due to racial or sexist prejudice (1992: 19). 
 
 
That is, we often check whether acceptance of a belief is warranted because we do 
not want to commit ourselves to something false. This is especially the case with 
commitment to reflective behaviour. My belief that a certain political party is more 
patriotic than others will, upon being subjected to some scrutiny to see whether its 
acceptance is warranted, fade away when I discover that the bulk of my belief owes 
its existence to media disinformation, unreliable testimony, credulity, a bias of 
affiliation with the party itself and other non-alethic factors. I, therefore, refuse to 
accept the belief as a premise for behaviour or practical reasoning upon being exposed 
to such non-truth-conducive factors causally instrumental in the generation of my 
belief. Most children with a belief that Santa Claus exists will, at some point at their 
teenage or adulthood life and with their gradual cognitive development, wonder 
whether their belief deserves acceptance any longer or whether to accept such belief 
any longer. That is if the belief has not already been extinguished by the force of 
reality. Most of them will presumably cease to accept such belief upon discovering 
the mythical origin of the belief and the belief itself will, most probably, eventually 
evaporate. These are some of the cases where considerations of truth encourage such 
scrutiny, rendering the acceptance of a belief unwarranted, and eventually dispelling 
the belief from mind. But sometimes, when deeming it costly, we refuse to accept a 
particular belief not because of discovering non-evidential factors in the causal history 
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of the belief, but because of practical interests. The racist police officer might refuse 
to accept his racist beliefs as a premise for behaviour or practical reasoning, at least in 
his work circle, for pragmatic considerations. Similarly, the woman who believes men 
to be superior to women might not, due to pragmatic considerations, accept, at least in 
public, such belief as a premise for behaviour or practical reasoning. She might be an 
important public figure who does not want to come across perceiving herself to be of 
inferior social status. Though she might have some subjectively good reasons for her 
belief, she also has good reasons not to accept such belief, at least in certain contexts. 
That is, due to pragmatic considerations, neither the police officer nor the woman 
commits themselves to their beliefs in public.  
 
Furthermore, Cohen argues that "there may ... be circumstances in which it is 
reasonable to accept that p and yet not to believe that p ... there may also be 
circumstances in which it is reasonable to believe that p and yet also reasonable not to 
accept that p" (1989: 373). Thus, certain practical considerations might make it 
reasonable for the expeditioner to accept a hypothesis, but not reasonable to believe it. 
The person who believes in God might have some good epistemic reasons that make it 
reasonable for him to so believe, but certain practical considerations might also make 
it reasonable for him not to accept such belief as a premise for behaviour or practical 
reasoning. Mosterín argues that "belief is context independent or context invariant, 
whereas acceptance is context dependent" (2002: 319). Engel also observes: "Unlike 
belief, acceptance is context-dependent. ... I believe (to a degree) that p independently 
of a context. But my acceptances are contextual: I may withdraw them in other 
contexts" (1998: 147). Moreover, Stalnaker argues that "what a person accepts can be 
compartmentalized in a way in which what he believes cannot be. A person may 
accept something in one context, while rejecting it or suspending judgment in 
another" (1987: 80). That is, the commitment that arises from our acceptance of a 
proposition is, argues Folely, context-relative: "When you commit yourself to a 
proposition ... you are ordinarily prepared to do so only in a limited range of 
situations. ... Genuine belief, by contrast, is not like this. You don't believe a 
hypothesis relative to a context. You either believe it or you don't" (1991: 382). In this 
way, "what we reasonably take for granted [accept], in contrast with what we believe, 
can vary across different contexts and be in part shaped by various practical 
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considerations", argues Bratman (1992: 4). Further to the practical considerations that 
issue practical reasons for acceptance, Bratman observes:  
 
 I might reasonably accept that p relative to one context but not relative to 
 another. Such acceptance can be driven by a wide range of practical 
 considerations, considerations that provide practical reasons for acceptance 
 rather than evidence for the truth of what is accepted (Ibid: 9).  
 
 
Thus, because acceptance is a voluntary propositional attitude not necessarily 
shaped by epistemic reasons, and because it does not entail any feeling that what is 
accepted is true, we might withdraw our acceptances in other contexts, as pointed out 
earlier by Engel. Frankish therefore argues that "a lawyer may accept that her client is 
innocent in her professional life, but not in private" (2012: 24). Similarly, the racist 
police officer may accept his racist beliefs in his private life, but might withdraw 
acceptance from them in public or in his work environment. The Bush administration 
claimed to have knowledge1 and manifested a belief-free assertion2 that Iraq had a 
relationship with Al-Qaeda and that it was harbouring, training and aiding the Al-
Qaeda elements at the time. The available evidence corroborating such claims met 
with plausible caveats raised by the US intelligence community, demonstrating the 
anecdotal, conflicting, contradictory, fragmentary and opaque nature of the evidence. 
Given the presence of such caveats along with the absence of adequate evidence for 
and against the possibility whether p, it is likely that the Bush administration just 
accepted the proposition that Iraq had a relationship with Al-Qaeda. Lacking what it 
takes to possess a state of belief, sometimes we, for practical reasons, just accept a 
proposition. It is often the case that when a judge or jury is presented with a 
proposition for which they lack what it takes to settle doxastic opinion, they 
provisionally accept that p, employing it as a basis for inquiry in order to discover the 
truth or arrive at a state of belief whether p. Lacking the kind of appropriate evidence 
to be certain that not p, the Bush administration might have found it imprudent to take 
it for granted that not p. They might have, therefore, just accepted that p due to the 
risk asymmetries associated with accepting or rejecting that p. It is also logically 
possible to think that they just feigned belief in the terror proposition in a bid to 
                                                 
1
 Refer to appendix (pp. 131-140) for the Bush administration’s knowledge-constituted statements 
about the Iraqi connections to Al-Qaeda. 
2
 Refer to appendix (pp. 33-61) for the Bush administration’s belief-free statements about the Iraqi 
connections to Al-Qaeda.  
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demonise Iraq in the face of the international community and discredit its side of the 
story. The notion of propositional acceptance is further examined in relation to the 
Bush administration's case for war in chapter nine.  
 
    This section has examined the essence of acceptance as a voluntary propositional 
attitude that entails reasoning appropriately to the accepted premise. That is, 
propositional acceptance differs from pretence or mere public display in the sense that 
accepting that p necessarily involves reasoning as if p whereas the latter does not. In 
other words, propositional acceptance entails, as noted earlier, an intellectual 
commitment to the truth of the proposition accepted. But it is not a necessary 
condition of acceptance that we act appropriately to the proposition we accept. Thus, 
neither belief nor acceptance entails acting as if p. We have learned that belief is 
normally driven by good or satisfactory epistemic reasons, whereas propositional 
acceptance by practical reasons. Though there are situations where we are compelled 
to accept a proposition only on good epistemic grounds or that our acceptance of such 
propositions requires good epistemic grounds due to the high cost of error as the case 
of the physician and the surgeon demonstrates (see pp. 250-251), mere propositional 
acceptance is normally driven by practical reasons or the risk asymmetries associated 
with accepting or rejecting that p. While doxastic acceptance is normally driven by 
epistemic reasons, mere propositional acceptance is neither driven nor constrained by 
epistemic reasons. Furthermore, propositional acceptance is context-dependent. In 
other words, acts of acceptance are withdrawable. I can accept that p in one context, 
but not in others. The UN weapons inspector who has no good evidence to believe 
that Iraq is weaponising its uranium (p) might just take it for granted that p while on a 
mission to discover whether p. Though in his private life he might not accept that p, 
he might well reason and act as if p once on duty on a suspect Iraqi uranium 
enrichment site. By contrast, if I believe that p, I will be in a continuing state of 
holding such belief and I will feel it true that p whenever the question whether p 
arises. That is, I do not believe p relative to a context, but not relative to others. There 
might, however, be situations where I might not assert such belief even upon being 
asked whether p. But this does not mean that I do not feel it true that p under such 
circumstances. The racist police officer might not assert his racist belief that blacks 
are inferior to whites upon being asked whether p. But it does not follow that he does 
not feel it true that p when the question whether p arises. That is, believing that p does 
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not entail acting - whether verbally or behaviourally - as if p. Nonetheless, it entails 
feeling it true that p. Similarly, accepting that p entails reasoning as if p, but it does 
not entail acting as if p. Thus, neither belief nor propositional acceptance is reducible 
to behaviour. 
 
4.2. Pragmatic Belief 
 
    Though beliefs are normally responsive to truth, non-alethic considerations 
promote and cause some of our beliefs indirectly. Non-truth-conducive beliefs are 
normally referred to as pragmatic or practical beliefs in the philosophical literature. 
Epistemologists classify pragmatic beliefs into two categories: wishful beliefs and 
unwelcome (fearful) beliefs. This research examines whether the Bush 
administration's manifested belief that p can be rightly characterised as a case of 
pragmatic belief. Thus, in an attempt to further the attribution of pragmatic belief, one 
of the core research questions, this section analyses the essence of pragmatic belief. 
The post-9/11 security environment along with the 2002 US National Security 
Strategy (NSS) were shaped and driven by an alleged fear that any unmet security 
challenges might pose a grave and sudden threat to the US homeland security or its 
interests overseas. Further, the 2002 NSS was fundamentally preventive in nature, as 
we will learn in chapter nine. That is, the essence of the 2002 NSS was to bring any 
feared or perceived threats to a head, no matter how ill-supported the imminence of 
those feared threats were epistemically (see p. 249). After all, preventive responses do 
not supervene on the probity of evidence whether a feared threat would materialise if 
left unchecked or unattended. This research aims to explore the possibility whether 
the Bush administration's apparent belief that p could be appropriately characterised 
as a fear-driven belief. It is, therefore, appropriate and necessary for this research to 
take account of the nature of pragmatic beliefs.  
 
    In chapter three we learned that the principal reason behind our inability to will a 
belief is belief’s intimate connection with reason. But philosophers, notably Kant and 
Peirce, recognize that our will can shape our doxastic attitudes, but only indirectly 
through focus on supporting evidence, stifling doubts and ignoring contrary evidence. 
That is, they argue that we are not always emotionally indifferent in the attitudes we 
take towards the propositions we entertain or the hypotheses we test. Epistemologists 
distinguish between epistemically motivated beliefs and pragmatically motivated 
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beliefs. Once epistemically driven in our quest for a state of belief, we seek, embrace 
or want to believe the truth; but once our quest for a state of belief is motivated by 
some pragmatic end, our doxastic cultivation is driven by pragmatic desires, 
preferences, hopes, and wishes, as will be observed later. Furthermore, 
epistemologists argue that our beliefs are either accuracy driven or directionally 
driven. That is, they contend that we are motivated in our beliefs either by accuracy 
goals (the truth) or by directional goals (pragmatic ends). Kunda argues that both 
goals influence reasoning through influencing the strategies we employ to settle 
opinion on an issue:  
 
both kinds of goals affect reasoning by influencing the choice3 of beliefs and 
strategies applied to a given problem. But accuracy goals lead to the use of 
those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas 
directional goals lead to the use of those that are considered most likely to 
yield the desired conclusion (1990: 481). 
 
 
That is, directional and accuracy goals influence our doxastic attitudes indirectly 
through influencing the way we approach evidential considerations. I want to know 
the truth about the possibility of extraterrestrial life. Once setting out to acquire a state 
of belief, I tend to seek the evidence that conduces to the truth about the possibility of 
such life. Wanting to believe the truth is both an epistemic goal and an epistemic 
desire. My desire to know the truth has an indirect influence on what doxastic attitude 
I end up with in my quest for a state of belief. But if I am pragmatically motivated in 
my quest for a state of belief, then I would seek and focus on the evidence that 
conduces to the satisfaction of the pragmatic end in question. That is, as far as wishful 
believing is concerned, “our cognition is driven and directed by desire4”, argues Scott-
Kakures (2000: 349). In other words, in situations where we are pragmatically driven 
and thereby want to arrive at the doxastic attitude we desire, we are more responsive 
and sensitive to our pragmatic desires and what conduces to the satisfaction of those 
desires than to the pursuit of truth: “In cases of wishful believing, cognition, it seems, 
is responsive and sensitive to hedonic interests”, observes Scott-Kakures (Ibid: 360).  
 
                                                 
3
 This is not intended to imply that beliefs are a matter of choice. The choice of beliefs here refers to 
the choice of supporting evidence in the way of the (background) beliefs one considers or adduces in 
support of a given belief.  
4
 We have epistemic and pragmatic desires, but here desire refers to pragmatic desire, unless stated 
otherwise.  
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In addition to the pragmatic desires, interests and goals that give rise to wishful 
believing, wishful believing, argues Scott-Kakures, is also motivated by “reflection 
upon the cost incurred by failing to believe the relevant proposition” (Ibid: 366). The 
cost of failing to believe a desired proposition or sustain a desired belief might be the 
absence or loss of the pleasures or psychological comfort such believing brings about. 
That is, it might be the prevention or abortion of some pragmatic end. It could also be 
a sacrilege to a belief system. Sometimes we think of the failure to believe what is 
entailed or upheld by our belief system as a sacrilege to that belief system. Being a 
devout Muslim entails a commitment, faith or belief in the divinity of the Quran. 
Thus, Muslims would normally regard the failure to believe – no matter how poor the 
given epistemic conditions are – what is entailed or upheld by Islam as a sacrilege to 
the Muslim faith. In situations like this, the cost of failing to believe a desired 
proposition might be the loss of the peace of mind.  
 
Under circumstances where a doctrinal value is at stake, pragmatic considerations 
normally override epistemic considerations. That is, we feel more committed to what 
supports or conduces to the doctrinal value than to the pursuit of truth. Kunda argues 
that “people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at” (1990: 
480). It is true that we normally want to believe what conduces to the pragmatic end 
that prompts our quest for a state of belief, but this cannot be taken as evidence that 
we normally come to believe what we want to believe. Belief has a special connection 
to truth, as noted on pp. 67 and 80. Furthermore, Scott-Kakures also observes that 
where the quest for a state of belief is pragmatically motivated, our “cognition is 
directionally driven and, apparently, insensitive to truth” (2000: 371). This reinforces 
Winters' argument (p. 80) that we are not always emotionally neutral in our doxastic 
attitudes. Thus, we are more likely to affirm the conclusion we desire in situations 
where there is an emotional bias in favour of that conclusion. The other kind of 
motivated5 belief is the case of unwelcome or fearful believing. Lacking good 
evidence to settle doxastic opinion, we, argues Scott-Kakures, sometimes come to 
believe what we do not want to be the case: in cases of unwelcome believing 
“individuals come, on the basis of poor evidence, to believe just what they want not to 
be so” (Ibid: 349). Further, Pears also argues that fears “often lead people to form 
intrinsically unpleasant beliefs” (in Scott-Kakures 2001: 322). That is, Scott-Kakures 
                                                 
5
 The unmodified motivated belief refers to pragmatically motivated belief.  
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and Pears argue that in cases of unwelcome believing, our cognition is more 
responsive or sensitive to our fears in the same way that it is to our desires and 
interests in the case of wishful believing, as observed earlier. That is why motivated 
believing is considered a perversion of reason:  
 
Motivated beliefs … are driven by psychical states of unease, by hedonic 
interests rather than epistemic ones. It is this view, in part, that gives substance 
to the claim that motivated believing is a real perversion of reason; for, in such 
cases, cognition is directed by or sensitive to pleasures and pains rather than to 
how things stand in the world (Scott-Kakures 2000: 350). 
 
 
Thus, motivated believing leads to epistemic irrationality; Scott-Kakures argues 
that what constitutes such irrationality is “that the cognizer’s reasons for believing 
that p are not good reasons for believing that p (is true)” (Ibid: 370). Unlike accuracy 
driven beliefs where truth values are overriding, motivated beliefs are driven by 
pragmatic considerations. That is why most epistemologists, among them Barnes, 
contend that there “must be some perceived gain” behind motivated believing (1997: 
46). Further to the perceived gain in question, Scott-Kakures argues that “motivated 
believing is in the service of the realization of the subject’s goals and values” (2000: 
350). That is, the perceived gain behind wishful believing is the realisation of certain 
pragmatic ends and values. But the perceived gain behind unwelcome believing is 
said to be the avoidance of feared eventualities: “In the case of fear[ful believing], we 
may conjecture that the ulterior goal is avoiding the [feared] danger” (Pears 1986: 42-
3). Further to the perceived gain behind unwelcome believing, Scott-Kakures 
observes: “What motivates the unwelcome beliefs is the desire to avoid … fearsome 
possibilities” (2001: 323). He further argues that in the face of a feared eventuality 
and the desire to preempt that feared eventuality, we can only be more willing to 
believe the unwelcome than disbelieve it: “the subjects [of fearful believing] are 
willing to incur the short-term magnification of anxiety (embrace of the unwelcome 
belief) in order to avoid the potential greater anxiety associated with the realisation of 
the feared possibility” (Ibid: 323-324). The following is what Scott-Kakures argues to 
be the paradigm of unwelcome believing:  
 
Barbara, a busy young attorney, leaves home on her daily commute, late for an 
important meeting. As she nears the freeway entrance, she is suddenly taken 
with worry that she has left her gas stove on. She begins to rehearse her 
morning’s routine: she made hot water for tea as usual, but cannot recall 
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whether she replaced the tea kettle on the burner (realizing that had she done 
so, the whistling kettle would have warned her to extinguish the flame), or left 
it on the counter by the sink. She considers, as well, the fact that she and her 
husband had a disagreement as to which of them had agreed to pick up their 
daughter from after-school care; and she notes that this could well have 
distracted her from her routine. She does recognize that she has had such 
concerns before and they have very nearly invariably proved unwarranted, but 
she immediately notes that relying on the past in this way when her routine 
was upset is none too compelling. (She thinks as well, with horror, of what she 
would say to husband and friends if she has not turned off the stove and 
tragedy does result: “But I always had turned it off in the past, so I thought I 
must have done so this time”). She desperately tries to visualize turning off the 
burner, but she cannot. Convinced now that she has left the stove burning, she 
calls her husband, but he has already left home. At great inconvenience, she 
returns home – to discover that the burner is off (Ibid: 314-315).  
 
 
I disagree that Barbara can be rightly attributed belief in the feared possibility that 
p. That is, the propositional attitude that prompts her to act as if p cannot be rightly 
described as one of pragmatic belief driven by fear. She has no good reason to regard 
p as more likely than not p. The only reason she has is a memory belief that her 
routine was upset by a disagreement with her husband. But such reason is not directly 
related to whether or not that p. I take it that she merely accepts that p without holding 
any corresponding beliefs. In the case of wishful believing, pragmatic ends bias our 
cognition in the way of predisposing us to favour the conclusion that conduces to the 
realisation of such ends. Believing a proposition in a bid to head off a feared danger is 
far too bizarre. Though belief is normally action-guiding, practical purposes of such 
nature under such poor epistemic conditions are normally associated with mere 
propositional acceptance. That is, merely fearing that p in the absence of good 
evidence whether p normally promotes mere acceptance that p. In the case at hand, we 
can take neither Barbara's acting as if p nor her reasoning as if p as evidence that she 
believes that p. She considers the eventuality if p. That is, she weighs up the 
consequences of p and not p. Being driven by the high cost of error or the risk 
asymmetries associated with p or not p, she comes to accept that p and acts 
accordingly. Just like Bratman's case of the ladder, it is one thing to have your house 
burnt down, another to experience the inconvenience of a journey back home.  
 
    Furthermore, pragmatic belief is like faith in the sense that they are both motivated 
by practical considerations. That is, religious belief is just one type of pragmatic 
belief. Russell argues that faith does not arise from evidential considerations. It, he 
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observes, emanates from our emotions and practical needs: “Where there is evidence, 
no one speaks of ‘faith’. We do not speak of faith that two and two are four or that the 
earth is round. We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for 
evidence” (1954: 215). That is, faith differs from belief in the sense that the essence 
of faith has a practical origin. Further, one of the distinguishing characteristics 
between belief and faith is that belief is involuntary, whereas faith is voluntary. Faith, 
argues Sartre, is by “decision” (in Engel 2000: 139). Moreover, Kant also defines 
faith as “assent from a need of reason” (in Wood 2002: 82). In this sense, faith is 
equivalent to mere propositional acceptance. He further describes it as an attitude 
stemming from a “voluntary determination of judgement” (Ibid: 82). That is, faith is a 
matter of choice and can therefore respond to free will. I can decide to have faith in 
my wife’s fidelity till I properly inquire into an alleged case of infidelity. But I cannot 
decide to believe that my wife is faithful with this alleged infidelity being accessible 
to my consciousness. That is, I normally cannot come to believe that p in the presence 
of grave doubts that p. Moreover, Marti associates faith with “an alignment” (1946: 
33). Furthermore, Eagleton also defines it as “a commitment and allegiance” (2009: 
37). That is, faith differs from belief in the sense that faith arises from one’s voluntary 
commitment to a proposition whereas belief typically stems from one’s truth-
considerations of a proposition. I uphold libertarianism. This is my political alignment 
and it is to this that I am committed. It is to such principle I give my allegiance. Given 
such background of mine, upon being presented with any proposition entailed by the 
libertarian philosophy, I can normally come to have faith in it just through an act of 
decision even if I lack good evidence in its favour. I will have faith in it simply 
because I do not want to go against my political philosophy. I want to stay true and 
loyal to its values, and in doing so, I ensure some psychological comfort. Freud 
describes faith, religious belief, as an illusion arising from our desires and wishes:  
 
Religious ideas … which are given out as teachings, are not precipitates of 
experience or end-results of thinking: they are illusions, fulfilments of the 
oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their 
strength lies in the strength of those wishes. As we already know, the 
terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for 
protection – for protection through love – which was provided by the father; 
and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it 
necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful 
one. Thus the benevolent rule of a divine Providence allays our fear of the 
dangers of life (in Wood 2002: 59).  
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Further, Wood also argues that religious beliefs are “motivated by wish-fulfilment 
rather than on the basis of the evidence” (Ibid: 68). That is, faith does not normally 
arise from sensory evidence or reflective reasons, but from our desires and wishes. 
This, however, shall not imply that we are epistemically motivated in all our 
believings. Some of our beliefs are pragmatically motivated as noted earlier. The 
acquisition or sustenance of faith is not influenced by truth-values. It is, as observed 
earlier, driven by doctrinal considerations such as one’s commitment, allegiance, 
affiliation or attachment to something. It is because of this that Alston argues that the 
epistemic position of faith is weak in contrast to that of belief: “‘faith that’ has at least 
a strong suggestion of a weak epistemic position vis-à-vis the proposition in question. 
One would say that one has faith that Jim will be promoted only when one’s evidence 
is less than conclusive” (in Jordan and Howard-Snyder 1996: 12). Many people 
believe or continue to believe in God even though they know that their evidence for 
such belief is less than conclusive or adequate. They continue to believe in the 
existence of God for such belief provides them with the joy and happiness they seek. 
Wood argues that it is this very joy that motivates religious belief:  
 
 Religious beliefs … are …consoling, they bring us joy, they give our lives 
 meaning, and we hold them by “faith” – not through the operations of our 
 intellect but with the  warmth and fervor of our desires. It is often said that 
 people have a “hunger” for faith – “for something they can believe in”. …  The 
 hunger for faith is the wish to find some teaching that is not rationally 
 credible, but is still capable of captivating us emotionally so as to  persuade
 us that life has some meaning or other that we wish that  it had. This hunger 
 is a wish to be protected from reality. … religious beliefs portray reality to us 
 as we wish it to be, that we hold them either in order to give ourselves 
 pleasure or to ease the pain of life, and that in forming and  maintaining these 
 beliefs, we indulge our feelings and wishes rather than facing up to our lives 
 as they are (2002: 62-63). 
 
 
This section has examined the nature of pragmatic belief in a bid to further the 
research question that concerns the attribution of pragmatic belief to the given alleged 
believing subjects. Though I recognize the possibility of pragmatic belief, I contend 
that conditions, such as that of Barbara's, where we merely fear or suspect that p in 
the absence of any good evidence whether p normally promote or lead to mere 
pragmatic acceptance rather than pragmatic belief. Normally we have a practical 
reason when we desire belief in a wishful or welcome proposition for which we lack 
good epistemic evidence. The practical reason that promotes such wishful beliefs 
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might be the satisfaction of some practical interest such as bringing about the peace of 
mind, harmony or some psychological comfort. In situations where we dread the 
eventualities of a merely feared proposition for which we possess no good epistemic 
evidence, the given practical pressures, the high cost of error or the risk asymmetries 
we associate with accepting or rejecting that p normally promote or lead to mere 
propositional acceptance if an attitude had to be taken on whether or not that p. That 
is, they normally prompt or lead us to accept what we fear most. It is, however, not 
the case that we normally want to believe what we fear most under such conditions. 
Nor is it the case that we normally are more willing to believe than to disbelieve what 
we fear most. I take it that we are more likely or more willing to accept than to reject 
what we fear most under such circumstances. Even if we grant that we are more 
willing to believe than to disbelieve what we fear most under such conditions, it still 
does not follow that the willed belief obtains given the unfavourable epistemic 
conditions at the time. That is, in light of the degenerate evidential conditions at the 
time, it is still more appropriate to characterise the propositional attitude that guides 
our action as mere acceptance than pragmatic belief.  
 
    I am inclined to think that most cases of pragmatic acceptance are mistaken for so-
called evidentially unsupported fear-driven beliefs. In situations where I have no good 
evidence whether p or not p but where I fear or suspect that p or where I dread the 
feared eventualities of p more than those of not p, I am more likely to accept rather 
than reject that p. Fearful epistemically degenerate conditions normally promote or 
lead to mere propositional acceptance rather than belief of a pragmatic essence. That 
is, if we had to act on some basis and for that reason had to take a stance on the given 
issue on the basis of the unprobative evidential conditions at the time. Consider the 
ship captain who cannot, due to poor visibility conditions, the lack of a telescope and 
a faulty electronic system on-board, determine with any reasonable degree of certainty 
or belief whether the object looming up in the distance is an iceberg (p) or just a thick 
patch of cloud (not p). He is faced with a worrisome situation where he has no good 
evidence whether to believe p or not p but where he must act on some basis, just like 
the field commander (see p. 98). That is, he lacks what it takes to settle doxastic 
opinion on the issue. In such a situation, it would be inappropriate to characterise the 
basis on which he acts as one of belief or pragmatic belief. Due to the high cost of 
error, it is very unlikely that the captain just takes it for granted that not p, providing 
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that he is a rational human being. That is, due to the risk asymmetries he associates 
with whether p or not p, it is very likely that he just accepts that p and acts 
accordingly.  
 
Further, the more appropriate characterisation of the captain's stance on the given 
issue would be that the fearsome epistemically unprobative condition prompts him to 
accept p as a premise for practical reasoning under the circumstances. The following 
example further illustrates this. Rose is a ship captain who, on one of her voyages, 
suddenly plunges into a state of confusion as a result of invisible weather conditions 
along with a concurrent breakdown in the electronic system on-board. We can assume 
that the ship she is sailing is not equipped with a telescope or other related 
equipments. Not being able to see through the thick foggy weather worries her as to 
whether she is sailing through safe waters. When she considers the possibility whether 
there are any icebergs ahead (p), she, due to the factors outlined above, cannot 
determine with any reasonable degree of certainty or belief whether or not there is one 
on the route she is sailing. That is, she has no evidence whether it is the case that p or 
not p. She considers both possibilities but lacks evidence to believe either. Faced with 
the feared eventualities of p, she just does not take it for granted that not p. Due to the 
high cost of error and given the risk asymmetries associated with the eventualities of 
the two possibilities, Rose just accepts that p and reasons accordingly. That is, she, for 
practical reasons, just accepts that there is an iceberg ahead and therefore anchors the 
ship till visibility conditions improve. It is, however, not the case that she believes 
that p. We have already learned in our discussions on propositional acceptance that 
mere acceptance that p, just like belief that p, disposes us to reason and act as if p. I 
contend that such conditions normally lead to mere propositional acceptance rather 
than pragmatic belief. In the case of the Bush administration and in light of the 
considerations outlined on p. 256, one can argue that though there was no good 
evidence to believe that p, it was safer or more prudent to accept than to reject that p.  
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Chapter Five 
5.1. Epistemic Justification 
 
    One of the fundamental aims of the given inquiry is to determine the epistemic 
status of the given supposed beliefs, demonstrating what their justificatory or 
rationality status would have been if they were genuine cases of belief. Establishing 
the justificatory status of a belief requires an insight into the differentia of (epistemic) 
justification as opposed to other types of justification such as prudential justification. 
In an attempt to further the argument on the properties required for the conferment of 
justification on a belief, this chapter examines the essence of justification and 
investigates its supposed connection with truth. Though justification is conferred on 
the basis of the truth-conducivity of a given belief, it is not a necessary condition that 
a belief be true in order to possess such an epistemic desideratum. It is, therefore, 
appropriate and necessary that the connection between justification and truth is made 
clear. That is, it is necessary to understand that the rationality of a belief does not 
supervene on the truth of the belief. Thus, justification does not require incorrigible or 
indefeasible evidence. It, rather, requires adequate or good evidence. This is the basis 
on which the rationality of the given beliefs will be judged in chapter nine.   
 
Epistemic justification is one of the underlying fundamentals of epistemology. It is 
an epistemic property whose existence determines the rationality or justifiedness of a 
belief. There is no unanimity among epistemologists as to whether justification1 
obtains internalistically, deontologically or externalistically. This section aims to 
explore the nature of justification, delineating the state and the activity conceptions of 
justification. Upon being challenged for one of our beliefs or for a proposition we 
claim to have knowledge about, we tend to adduce the grounds that make us rational 
in holding the belief or show the truth of the proposition we claim to know. This is 
what some epistemologists consider to be the essence of epistemology, and it is 
because of this Pollock argues that justification is the primary bedrock of 
epistemology:  
 
Epistemology is “the theory of knowledge” and would seem most naturally to 
have knowledge as its principal focus. But that is not entirely accurate. The 
theory of knowledge is an attempt to answer the question, “How do you 
                                                 
1
 The unmodified term justification or justified refers to epistemic justification.  
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know”, but this is a question about how one knows, and not about knowing per 
se. In asking how a person knows something, we are typically asking for his 
grounds for believing it. We want to know what justifies him in holding his 
belief. Thus epistemology has traditionally focused on epistemic justification 
more than on knowledge (1986: 7).   
 
 
Moreover, Chisholm also argues that epistemic justification is the core thesis of 
epistemology: “The theory of knowledge [epistemology] could be said to have as its 
subject matter the justification of belief” (1977: 5). That is, epistemology is committed 
to one central issue, epistemic justification, which defines the raison d’être behind the 
theory of knowledge. Epistemology concerns both knowledge how and knowledge 
that, and in both cases the presence of epistemic justification is a necessary condition 
for the attribution of knowledge. To demonstrate my knowledge that the threat under 
which I resorted to defensive force was existential, I necessarily have to adduce the 
grounds on which I came to truly believe that the threat was existential. This is to 
show my knowledge of the threat (knowledge how). But even if my knowledge of the 
threat were not to be challenged, or even if I were not to show such knowledge, I still 
must have access to the grounds responsible for the truth of my belief that the threat 
was existential, that is if I were to be credited with knowledge about the threat.  
 
Thus, epistemic justification is the essence of epistemology whether it is primarily 
concerned with knowledge how or knowledge that. In legal philosophy, the presence 
of justifying conditions determines the rightfulness of conduct. That is, guilt or 
innocence is assigned on the basis of the presence of justifying conditions. But in 
epistemology, justification plays a different role. The presence of justifying conditions 
and our being motivated by them render us epistemically rational or deontically 
responsible in our doxastic cultivations. In other words, the presence of epistemic 
justification is employed to gauge the epistemic status of our beliefs, establishing their 
probability or truth-conducivity. Truth-conducivity is what internalists take to be a 
necessary condition for a ground to count as epistemic justification, whereas the 
reliability of a belief-forming mechanism is what externalists take to be the necessary 
condition for the obtaining of epistemic justification, and being blameless in holding a 
belief is what deontologists take to be the necessary condition for the obtaining of 
epistemic justification.  
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Internalists argue that a ground should be truth-conducive or adequate in order to 
count as epistemic justification. Alston takes truth-conducivity to be not only entailing 
that a given belief is likely to be true, but also rendering the belief likely to be true or 
being responsible for the truth of the belief: “in order to count as TC [truth-
conducive], they [the grounds] must be so construed that their realization renders or 
tends to render beliefs that have them probably true” (2005: 50). Thus far, there is no 
unanimity among epistemologists as to what constitutes epistemic justification. They 
have different conceptions of what it is for a belief to possess positive epistemic 
status: justification. The most credible account of justification is the truth-conducivity 
conception which internalists subscribe to. But both internalists and externalists 
concur that justification does not entail the truth of the belief it supports, as we will 
learn later. Alston observes that to be epistemically justified in holding a belief is just 
to be in an epistemically strong position to know the truth of what is believed. He 
argues that we may conceive of epistemic justification as “a matter of being in a 
strong position to get the truth in believing that p” (1989: 175).  
 
Of the contemporary epistemologists, Alston provides the most lucid and detailed 
analysis of what it is for a belief to possess justificatory status. Constituting his 
formulation of justified belief, he submits that s's belief that p is justified if “S's belief 
that p is based on adequate grounds, and S lacks overriding reasons to the contrary” 
(1989: 177). Further, following a critical survey of a variety of different concepts of 
epistemic justification, Alston singles out the candidate he thinks most apt for 
epistemic justification: “S is [justified] in believing that p iff S’s believing that p, as S 
did, was a good thing from the epistemic point of view2, in that S’s belief that p was 
based on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary” 
(1985: 77). That is, what emerges from his formulation of justified belief is a triad of 
necessary conditions: the presence of adequate supporting evidence, the absence of 
sufficient overriding evidence and the basing relation.  
 
    The absence of the basing relation means the absence of epistemic justification, no 
matter the sheer volume of adequate supporting evidence available at the time of 
belief. Stressing the indispensability of the basing relation, Lehrer observes: “if a 
person has evidence adequate to completely justify his belief, he may still fail to be 
                                                 
2
 Refer to p. 89 (footnote 2) for what epistemic point of view implies.  
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completely justified in believing what he does because his belief is not based on that 
evidence” (in Roth and Galis 1970: 56). I can have impeccable evidence to believe a 
proposition, but might come to believe it on the basis of things other than the evidence 
in my possession. One could be in possession of good evidence to disbelieve 
evolutionism, but might come to disbelieve it on the basis of the sacrilege it 
constitutes against one’s religious creed rather than the better evidence available at the 
time. That is why Alston stresses the stipulation “as s did” in his formulation of 
justified belief:  
 
The qualification ‘as S does’ is inserted to make it explicit that in order for S 
to be [justified]
 
in believing that p it need not be the case that any believing of 
p by S would be a good thing epistemically, much less any believing of p by 
anyone. It is rather that there are aspects of this believing of p by S that make 
it a good thing epistemically (1985: 70).  
 
 
    The aspects that render a belief epistemically justified are the triad of the necessary 
conditions we outlined earlier. There are many ways whereby we come to acquire a 
belief, ways that are epistemically desirable, but not necessarily justification-
conferring. The following are just some of the ways through which a belief can be 
acquired. They are all epistemically desirable but do not necessarily count towards the 
truth of a given belief proposition: 
 
having a belief formed by a reliable belief-producing mechanism; knowing 
that one’s beliefs are formed by a reliable belief-producing mechanism; being 
… rational with respect to one’s beliefs; … believing on the basis of a reliable 
indicator; believing on the basis of an accessible reliable indicator; believing 
on the basis of an accessible reliable indicator you know or justifiably believe 
is reliable; and many more. The rejectees as well as the lucky winner are all 
epistemically desirable; each is an epistemically valuable state of affairs 
(Plantinga 1993: 187).     
 
 
Samuel Huntington’s belief that religion is the source of the clash of civilisations 
could be the outcome of a reliable belief-forming process or it could be a belief 
acquired in the absence of violations of epistemic duties, but the way through which 
the belief is arrived at could still fail to render the belief epistemically justified, no 
matter how true the belief might be. However epistemically valuable, but reliable 
belief-forming processes do not necessarily make it rational from the perspective of 
an epistemic agent to hold a belief, as noted in chapter eight; similarly, epistemic 
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dutifulness does not necessarily generate the kind of adequate evidence necessary to 
warrant belief, as observed in chapter seven. By being a good thing from the 
epistemic point of view, Alston refers to the triad of conditions explained earlier. 
Introducing his second stipulation “much less any believing of p by anyone”, Alston 
reiterates that a belief is justified only if it meets the given three conditions. If 
Huntington acquired his belief satisfying the three conditions in question, then his 
belief can be endowed with justificatory status. That is, it was rational for him to 
arrive at such belief and it is rational for him to retain his belief providing that the 
epistemic situations remain the same. But someone else, not Huntington, might come 
to acquire the same belief on the basis of a personal resentment against a particular 
race or religion; or they could arrive at such belief solely on the basis of corroborating 
evidence, disregarding counter-evidence, and stifling doubts. Furthermore, the same 
belief might result from one's being too subservient or credulous in a way to believe 
things unreflectively without regard to evidential considerations. Under such 
circumstances, belief is not justified.  
 
Alston’s conception of epistemic justification is what underlies the principal thesis 
behind weak internalism, and it is such conception which this research advocates. 
Epistemologists diverge over what confers epistemic justification on a belief. 
Internalists understand justificatory status as being based on adequate grounds which 
the believing subject has some potential cognitive access to, externalists understand it 
as the reliability of the cognitive process which produces the belief, and deontologists 
understand it as duty fulfilment in a given doxastic situation. But there is broad 
consensus that justification is an evaluative concept, a term of epistemic appraisal. 
Plantinga observes that “such terms as ‘justification’ and ‘justified’ are …terms of 
epistemic appraisal; to say that a proposition is justified for a person is to say that his 
believing or accepting it has positive epistemic status for him” (1986: 3). Moreover, 
Chisholm also observes that “The term ‘justify’, in its application to a belief, is used 
as a term of epistemic appraisal – a term that is used to say something about the 
reasonableness of belief. The term ‘reasonable’ itself, therefore, may also be used as a 
term of epistemic appraisal” (1977: 6). Furthermore, the following is what Alston 
thinks to be the nature of justification: 
 
(1) It [epistemic justification] applies to beliefs. … This is the common 
philosophical concept of belief, in which S's believing that p entails neither 
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that S knows that p nor that S does not know that p. It is not restricted to 
conscious or occurrent beliefs. (2) It is an evaluative concept, in a broad sense 
in which this is contrasted with ‘factual’. To say that S is justified in believing 
that p is to imply that there is something all right, satisfactory, in accord with 
the way things should be, about the fact that S believes that p. It is to accord 
S's believing a positive evaluative status. (3) It has to do with a specifically 
epistemic dimension of evaluation. Beliefs can be evaluated in different ways. 
One may be more or less prudent, fortunate, or faithful in holding a certain 
belief. Epistemic justification is different from all that. Epistemic evaluation is 
undertaken from what we might call the “epistemic point of view”. That point 
of view is defined by the aim at maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a 
large body of beliefs. The qualification “in a large body of beliefs” is needed 
because otherwise one could best achieve the aim by restricting one's beliefs 
to those that are obviously true. … it remains true that our central cognitive 
aim is to amass a large body of beliefs with a favorable truth-falsity ratio. For 
a belief to be epistemically justified is for it, somehow, to be awarded high 
marks relative to that aim. (4) It is a matter of degree. One can be more or less 
justified in believing that p. If, e.g., what justifies one is some evidence one 
has, one will be more or less justified depending on the amount and strength of 
the evidence3 (1985: 58-59).    
 
 
    That is, the broad consensus among epistemologists is that epistemic justification is 
an evaluative status that pertains to our beliefs, endowing them with a status in the 
absence of which we are deemed irrational to hold or retain a certain belief. Being 
justified in holding a belief is just a state of rationality we are in. This is what 
epistemologists refer to as the state (property) conception of justification where it 
does not involve a believer to carry out any defense or act of justification in order to 
possess justificatory status for holding a belief. Alston defines the state conception of 
justification as a:  
 
state or condition one is in, not anything one does or any upshot thereof. I 
might be justified in believing that there is milk on the table because I see it 
there, even though I have done nothing to show that there is milk on the table 
or to show that I am justified in believing there to be (1985: 58).  
 
 
    But sometimes we carry out a justification of our beliefs, warding off criticism 
against them. This is what is referred to as the activity (process) conception of 
justification where it involves the believer engaging in the process of justifying, 
adducing supporting evidence against skepticism, and thereby trying to show 
justification for the belief in question. That is, the activity conception of justification 
                                                 
3
 Justification is treated as absolute in this research.  
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entails, points out Alston, one's “doing something to show that p, or to show that one's 
belief was justified, or to exhibit one's justification” (Ibid: 58). Audi argues that 
justification – whether as process or property – possesses a teleological connection 
with truth:  
 
I have spoken of a request for justification and an answer to it. Here 
‘justification’ denotes a process. We may also ask whether someone has 
justification for a belief; and there the term designates a property. There are 
still the same two faces [property and process], however; for even in the latter 
case the justifiers succeed only if they show or at least support the truth of the 
belief … [Thereby] we can hold that  justification, both as process and as 
property, has a teleological connection with truth: the aim of the process of 
justification is to show truth (or at least an objective probability of it) (1993: 
26-7).  
 
 
Thus, since justification – whether it obtains as property or as process – aims at 
showing or supporting the (probable) truth of a belief, justification has a teleological 
connection with truth. That is, both conceptions of justification entail an aim which is 
to conduce to the truth of a belief. This, however, shall not imply that justification as a 
status necessarily entails a process. But, argues Alston, to successfully exhibit 
justification for a belief or to successfully respond to challenges against the belief's 
credentials, we “must specify an adequate ground of the belief, a ground that provides 
a sufficient indication of the truth of the belief” (1989: 225). That is, we shall adduce 
good evidence if we were to be successful in our endeavour to show the rationality of 
our doxastic attitudes. Epistemologists diverge over the fundamentality of the state 
and activity conceptions of justification. Alston rightly argues that the state 
conception is of a “more fundamental epistemological interest” (1985: 58) because 
“Most human subjects are quite incapable of carrying out a justification of any 
perceptual or introspective beliefs” (Ibid: 84). That is, had the practice of justification 
been a necessary requirement for justificational status, we would have had very few 
justified beliefs and consequently very little knowledge.  
 
This, however, shall not imply that we do not engage in the practice of justification 
at all. We often engage in the process of justifying the core beliefs we champion. 
Political and religious figures often engage in the practice of justifying their beliefs or 
belief systems, trying to show the rationality of their beliefs and convince others of 
the virtues of their beliefs. In relation to the supposed beliefs in question, the Bush 
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administration officials were engaged in the practice of justifying what they professed 
to be their beliefs about the charges levelled against Iraq. In order to cite some 
supporting evidence in defense of a belief, we must have access to the evidence. That 
is, the evidence shall be within our cognitive perspective. That is why the internalist 
account of justification is indispensable for the activity conception of justification. 
Internalist access is, therefore, essential to a successful process of justifying a belief. 
Further, Audi argues that an advantage of internalism is “its capacity to help us 
answer skepticism by positive refutation, which requires showing, and thereby 
(normally) becoming justified in believing” (1993: 31).  
 
    Though the state conception of justification is of prime importance, Alston argues 
that the activity conception of justification is fundamental to the concept of being 
justified in holding a belief: “though the activity of responding to challenges is not the 
whole story, I do believe that in a way it is fundamental to the concept of being 
justified” (1989: 236). The activity conception of justification is fundamental to the 
concept of being justified in holding a belief for our ability to successfully engage in 
the practice of justification ensures our cognitive grasp of what it is that is responsible 
for the truth of the belief, and our cognitive grasp of what is responsible for the truth 
of a belief is the essence of internalism which Alston subscribes to and also one of the 
necessary repositories of epistemic justification from an internalist perspective. But 
overall, they are both essential to our doxastic outputs. They are both complementary 
in their accounting for the epistemic status of our beliefs. Audi observes that the state 
of being justified can be construed as recourse to the activity of justifying a belief: 
“having the property of justification [justifiedness as a state] equips one to engage in 
the process of justification” (1993: 31). That is, if I were to be in a state of being 
justified in holding a particular belief, I would be able to engage in the practice of 
justification as long as I have some recollection of the credentials responsible for the 
truth of the belief I am holding. But not all human agents are able to engage in a 
practice of justification. Unsophisticated or verbally unskilful people might not be 
able to realize this cognitive potential for reasons outlined by Alston on p. 130 of the 
thesis. He argues that though the concept of epistemic justification has developed 
against the background of critical reflection on our beliefs and the practice of 
justifying them, but it does not follow that for a belief to be epistemically justified it 
should have been put into such test and emerged successful:  
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My suggestion is that the background against which the concept of epistemic 
justification has developed is the practice of critical reflection on our beliefs, 
the practice of the epistemic assessment of beliefs (with respect to the 
likelihood of their being true), the challenging of beliefs and responses to such 
challenges. To respond successfully to such a challenge one must specify an 
adequate ground of the belief, a ground that provides a sufficient indication of 
the truth of the belief. It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that in order to 
be epistemically respectable, laudatory, or acceptable (justified), a belief must 
have actually been put to such a test and have emerged victorious. In 
suggesting that the concept has developed against the background of such a 
practice the idea is rather that what it is for a belief to be justified is that the 
belief and its ground be such that it is in a position to pass such a test; that the 
subject has what it takes to respond successfully to such a challenge (1989: 
225-226).     
 
 
5.2. Epistemic Justification and Truth 
 
    This section explores the supposed connection between justification and truth. In 
ordinary language, we sometimes think that our justification for a belief entails the 
truth of the belief. This is not only, at times, a common conception among ordinary 
language users, but also a plausible one for some epistemologists. But being justified 
in holding a belief does not entail that the belief in question is true. A justified belief 
could be true, but it could also be false. This is recognized by both internalist and 
externalist epistemologists as observed later. Lehrer and Cohen argue that the appeal 
that justification and truth are conceptually related and that there is an internal 
connection between them is “rooted in the conviction that knowledge does not arise 
when a belief merely happens to be true. Justification must be connected with truth in 
an appropriate way” (1983: 191). The justification required for knowledge is surely 
indefeasible. But it does not follow that justification itself entails, at all times, the 
truth of what it supports.  
 
It is because of this that we have merely justified beliefs as well as knowledge. Not 
all justified beliefs count as knowledge for the justification that supports them could 
be defeasible. We have knowledge when the justification we possess for a belief is 
indefeasible, but merely justified belief if the given justification were to be defeasible 
but good enough to warrant belief. Furthermore, Cohen observes that the argument 
that justification is required for a true belief in order for it to constitute knowledge is, 
in a way, just to connect justification to truth: “The motivation for requiring that a true 
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belief be justified in order for it to count as an instance of knowledge just is, in some 
sense, to provide a connection to truth” (1984: 279). I do not believe this to be the 
rationale behind the argument that a true belief must be justified from the perspective 
of a potential knower in order for it to count as an instance of knowledge. The real 
reason for requiring that a true belief be justified in order for it to amount to 
knowledge is that knowledge does not obtain when a belief happens to be accidentally 
true from the perspective of a given cognizer.  
 
    This is the traditional reasoning behind knowledge which dates back to Plato. That 
is, if we were to claim knowledge of p, then we must be in possession of some 
infallible reason which renders p true. Lehrer and Cohen provide another explanation 
for the alleged connection between justification and truth. They argue that this 
conceptual connection might emanate from the fact that “a person is justified in 
believing P only if the person is justified in believing that P is true. [but] This 
connection is trivial, because to believe that P is just to believe that P is true” (1983: 
191). Descartes takes a radical approach to the connection between justification and 
truth. For him, justification entails the truth of the belief it supports. That is, according 
to the Cartesian view, “justification logically entails truth. To put it schematically: It 
is a conceptual truth that, if conditions C justify belief B for subject S, then C logically 
entails that B is true” (in Cohen 1984: 280). Thus, Descartes takes justification to be 
infallible. But we have already learned that justification and belief are both 
perspectival and fallible notions (see pp.37 and 39). Cohen further argues that even if:  
 
C comprises facts about sensory data, and where B is a belief about the truth of 
some empirical proposition, it is always logically possible that the evil demon 
has arranged for C to obtain where B is false. … [Thus] given any plausible 
specification of C for any S, it will always be logically consistent to suppose 
that not B (Ibid: 280).  
 
 
 
Further, we sometimes come to acquire a perceptual belief under optimal epistemic 
conditions without the belief’s turning out to be true. The belief is, nevertheless, a 
justified belief. Under impeccable visual conditions, we have often come to believe 
some unusual flying object to be an alien spacecraft. Being based on adequate visual 
evidence, our belief could not have been irrational or unjustified. It, nevertheless, has 
always been false. The flying object has always turned out to be either a hoax or a top 
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secret military plane in the shape of an alien spacecraft intended to communicate to 
possible real alien spacecrafts. It is, therefore, wrong to equate a belief’s justifiability 
with how things are in real. Many of our beliefs are false, nevertheless justified. That 
is why epistemic justification shall be construed as perspectival and fallible, and this 
is how most contemporary epistemologists understand justification. They advocate a 
fallibilist conception of justification which, argues Cohen, is an account that “allows 
that where C makes B justified for S, it is still possible that B is false” (1984: 280). 
We are, thereby, justified in believing many things that are false or non-existential, 
providing that our believing them is based on good evidence. Justified beliefs are, 
therefore, not restricted to true propositions alone. Moreover, Audi rightly argues that 
the only type of justification that entails truth is the strong axiomatic justification 
possessed by beliefs of self-evident propositions:  
Whatever the connection between justification – whether as process or 
property – and truth, justification does not entail truth. Granted, there may 
well be strong axiomatic justification: a kind possessed by beliefs which are 
based simply on understanding the proposition believed and cannot be 
unjustified, e.g. beliefs of simple self-evident propositions, say that if some 
dogs are mammals, some mammals are dogs. Strong axiomatic justification 
apparently does connect the concepts of justification and truth; for it is a kind 
of justification whose possession seems to entail truth (1993: 300).  
 
 
    That is, only the incorrigible justification possessed by self-evident beliefs entails 
truth. But this does not constitute a general account of the connection between 
justification and truth. A general account of such connection shall not only take into 
account instances of knowledge or self-evident beliefs, but all possible cases of 
justified believing. That is why the connection between justification and truth cannot 
be construed as one of entailment or necessitation of the latter. Cohen provides an 
explanation for such connection. He argues that this connection could be understood 
as one of probabilification at a doxastic or subjective level rather than an objective 
level: 
 
we might consider the possibility that the connection between justification and 
truth is to be found at the subjective or doxastic level. To put it schematically, 
one might propose that it is a conceptual truth that if C justifies B for S, then C 
entails that S believe that certain conditions obtain which make it probable that 
B is true (1984: 285).  
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    In other words, if I come to believe p on the basis of c, then c entails that p is 
probable from my cognitive perspective. Thus, from my subjective perspective, c 
entails the probable truth of p. But this is just the same trivial connection we observed 
earlier. My believing that p is just my believing that p is true. Thus, c entails the 
probable truth of p from my cognitive perspective, and that is why I base my belief 
that p on c. But it does not follow that p is true from an objective standpoint. Thus, 
there is no objective truth entailment for the connection between justification and 
truth. However, there are accounts of epistemic justification that border with the 
Cartesian view of the connection between justification and truth. Reliabilism leans 
towards the Cartesian view of such connection due to its argument that a reliable 
belief-forming process is one that tends to produce true or mostly true beliefs. Thus, 
according to reliabilism, a belief is justified if the preponderant realisations of the 
given belief-forming process eventuate in true belief. Hence, on a reliabilist view, our 
being justified in believing that p entails, at least in most realisations of the given 
belief-forming process, that p is true. The most plausible explanation for the 
connection between justification and truth is that justification only conduces to the 
truth of the belief it supports. The argument in favour of a truth entailment would 
have been plausible only if justification were to require incontrovertible evidence. 
Moser recognizes that justification is closely related to the cognitive goal of truth, but 
argues that it only conduces to that goal rather than entailing that things are as they 
are in real:  
epistemic justification is essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal of 
truth, insofar as an individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is 
appropriately directed toward the goal of truth. More specifically, on the 
present conception, one is epistemically justified in believing a proposition 
only if one has good reason to believe it is true. To accept a proposition in the 
absence of good reason is to neglect the cognitive goal of truth. Such 
acceptance … is epistemically irresponsible. On this conception, one has an 
epistemic responsibility to believe only those proposition[s] which are likely 
to be true on one’s evidence; and thus one has an epistemic responsibility to 
believe only those propositions one has good reason to believe are true (1985: 
4-5).   
 
    Here Moser treats belief as being subject to epistemic responsibilities – a subject 
we attend to in chapters three and seven. If justification were to entail or necessitate 
truth, then truth would be a necessary requirement for justificational status. But if the 
truth of a belief were to be a necessary condition for being justified in holding that 
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belief, then we would end up having fewer justified beliefs than we would normally 
have. But most epistemologists do not regard the truth of a belief as a necessary 
condition for being justified in holding the belief. Alston attributes the reason why 
justificationist epistemologists take the truth of a belief as not counting in favour of its 
being justified to “the fact that truth – in contrast to having strong evidence or 
reasons, being based on an adequate ground … having direct accessibility to the 
ground of one’s belief … is too external to the process of acquiring, retaining, and 
using beliefs” (2005: 40). That is, it is the truth’s external nature or the lack of easy 
access to it, as pointed out below, at the time of belief that creates the need for 
justification. In other words, we have no easy access to truth, and it is for this reason 
that justification becomes necessary. BonJour argues that the need for justification 
arises because truth is often not immediately accessible. He contends that the essential 
role of justification is that of a means to truth and that the concept of justification 
would be of little importance were truth somehow immediately and unproblematically 
accessible:    
 
What makes us cognitive beings at all is our capacity for belief, and the goal 
of our distinctively cognitive endeavours is truth; we want our beliefs to 
correctly and accurately depict the world. If truth were somehow immediately 
and unproblematically accessible (as it is, on some accounts, for God) so that 
one could in all cases opt simply to believe the truth, then the concept of 
justification would be of little significance and would play no independent role 
in cognition. But this epistemically ideal situation is quite obviously not the 
one in which we find ourselves. We have no such immediate and 
unproblematic access to truth, and it is for this reason that justification comes 
into the picture. The basic role of justification is that of a means to truth, a 
more directly attainable mediating link between our subjective starting point 
and our objective goal. We cannot, in most cases at least, bring it about 
directly that our beliefs are true, but we can presumably bring it about directly 
(though perhaps only in the long run) that they are epistemically justified 
(1985: 7-8).    
 
 
    That is, truth is neither a requisite for justification nor is it a prerequisite for belief. 
If we had immediate or easy access to truth, then most of our belief attitudes would be 
true. We would, thereby, rarely go wrong in our affairs or beliefs. Consequently, most 
of our beliefs or conduct would be in need of no justification – an eventuality that 
diminishes the role of justification in our doxastic and also behavioural life. But, due 
to the lack of immediate access to truth, we often arrive at our beliefs on the basis of 
good evidence and act on the basis of what we reasonably believe to be the case rather 
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than what is actually the case. There is also no consensus among legal philosophers as 
to whether justification requires truth. In epistemology, due to the lack of immediate 
or easy access to truth, both internalists and externalists argue in favour of excluding 
truth as a necessary requirement for epistemic justification. But in legal philosophy, 
aside from the lack of immediate access to truth, we take into account a fundamental 
practical eventuality when laying out conditions for justificatory defense: the unlawful 
harm inflicted upon someone who had no intention to cause harm (mistaken self-
defense). Some legal philosophers tie justification to reasonable belief; some tie it to 
truth. One of the key proponents of the reasonable belief view is Baron.  
 
    Baron argues “in favor of tethering justification to reasonable belief rather than to 
truth (thus allowing that mistaken self-defense should count as justified as long as the 
mistaken belief is reasonable)” (2005b: 387). Moreover, Stewart also espouses the 
reasonable belief conception of justification and therefore recognizes reasonably 
mistaken defensive force as justified. He argues that “what one responds to, and what 
one is justified in responding to, in a situation of defensive force, is not the attack 
itself, but something else: the reasonable appearance of an attack” (2003: 324). 
Further, the legal philosophers’ reference to reasonable belief is equivalent to the 
justified belief which internalist epistemologists subscribe to. Stewart argues that 
“The use of the word ‘reasonable’ in criminal law is … normative. It marks out 
behaviour which, whatever other deficiencies it may have, is not subject to criminal 
punishment” (Ibid: 329). But he cautions against the entailment this could imply, that 
is, whatever conduct that is not criminally punishable is reasonable. He rules out such 
entailment and argues that he does not mean to “suggest that all behaviour that is not 
criminally punishable is reasonable, rather that all behaviour that is reasonable is not 
criminally punishable. Thus, a reasonable mistake of fact should always be a good 
defense to a criminal charge” (Ibid: 329). Further to the use of reasonable belief in 
legal philosophy, Baron observes:  
 
There is an ambiguity in ‘reasonably believes’ and (especially) ‘reasonable 
belief’ that needs to be disambiguated. 'Reasonable belief' is ambiguous 
between a belief for which there are reasonable grounds, and a belief that is 
in fact held on reasonable grounds. I intend the latter meaning. Although it is 
not always made clear in law, I take the reasonable belief requirement (e.g., 
for self-defense) to be a requirement that the agent held the belief in question 
on reasonable grounds. It would not be good enough that the agent held a 
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belief for which, as it happens, there are reasonable grounds; she has to have 
held it on reasonable grounds (2005a: 377).  
 
 
    Thus, we – no matter how reasonable an imminent or threatened attack appears to 
be – cannot be credited with justification if we are not motivated in our use of 
defensive force by the reasonable appearance of the attack. This is similar to the way 
internalist epistemologists attribute justification to belief. They also argue that a belief 
cannot be endowed with justificatory status if the belief is not motivated by or if it is 
not based on the evidence that supports it. But other legal philosophers disagree with 
the reasonable belief view of justification. They argue that a reasonable belief that 
justifying conditions obtain is not sufficient to accord justificatory defense. Hurd 
observes: “It literally makes no sense to maintain that an action is justified if and only 
if the actor reasonably believes that the action is justified” (1999: 1559). She further 
argues that “for an actor to reasonably believe that an action is justified, his beliefs 
must approach truth about the matter. There thus must be a truth about the matter 
separate from his beliefs about it” (Ibid: 1559). Furthermore, Fletcher, the leading 
truth view advocate, also contends that “Justification is an objective phenomenon. 
Mere belief cannot generate a justification, however reasonable the belief might be” 
(1985: 972). But Stewart argues that: 
 
The law cannot ask us to base our conduct on facts that we cannot reasonably 
be expected to know, particularly where in many situations all the facts will 
never be known. For these reasons, in any theory of criminal liability that 
takes attributions of wrong-doing seriously, it is more plausible to treat 
reasonably mistaken defensive force as a justification (2003: 336).   
 
 
    This chapter has examined the essence of justification and investigated its alleged 
connection with truth. Justification is an epistemic desideratum that underlies the 
epistemic assessment of belief. It is an epistemic status that is conferred on the basis 
of truth-conducivity but not dictated by truth itself. Justificatory status obtains 
regardless of the truth or falsity of a belief. We have learned that justification is 
necessarily an epistemic state, but it could also involve the practice of justification. 
Being justified in holding a belief does not entail the activity of justifying the belief. 
Justificatory status is, rather, a state of being rational in holding a belief. It could, 
however, be shown by adducing evidence or engaging in the practice of justification. 
In fact, we often engage in such a practice when one of our beliefs is challenged or 
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when we want to convince others of the rationality of a belief. But engagement in 
such a practice is not a necessary condition of being justified in holding or retaining a 
belief. Epistemologists diverge over whether the rationality of a belief is an internal or 
external matter to a believing subject. Internalists take it to be an internal matter, 
whereas externalists take it to be an external matter. I will explore such possibilities in 
chapters six and eight. 
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Chapter Six 
6.1. The Internalist Theory of Epistemic Justification  
 
Establishing the rationality of a belief normally takes either a common-sensical or a 
philosophical form. Investigative journalists pursue the common-sensical form, 
whereas epistemologists pursue the philosophical form. That is, in ordinary life, 
investigative journalists exhibit the rationality of a belief though establishing the 
probity of the evidence behind the belief. Their criterion for the conferment of 
rationality status on a belief is the adequacy of the evidence behind the belief. Further, 
from a common-sensical perspective, a belief is justified only if it is based on 
adequate or good evidence. This is what underlies the internalist theory of 
justification too. Internalists regard a belief as justified or rational only if it is based 
on adequate or good evidence that is accessible to the believing subject. In fact, the 
essence of the internalist theory originates from our common-sensical conviction of 
justification. The internalist theory just philosophises such a conviction and converts 
it into a three-fold premise: the adequacy of the supporting evidence, the basing 
relation, and the accessibility requirement. This triad is what underlies our most 
fundamental intuitions about the rationality of belief. Though our common-sensical 
convictions of justification seem to be primarily guided by the adequacy requirement 
and the basing relation, the accessibility requirement underlies the heart of our 
common-sensical convictions of the rationality of belief.  
 
That is, our gut feelings or common-sensical convictions do not go along with the 
idea of accepting a belief as justified in the absence of any cognitive access on the 
part of the believing subject as to what is responsible for the truth of the belief. That is 
why I take (weak) internalism to be merely a philosophical or an orderly 
interpretation of our common-sensical convictions of justification. In an attempt to set 
out the philosophical equivalent of our common-sensical view of justification, this 
chapter examines the internalist theory of justification and explores the different ways 
through which internalism is conceived of in the philosophical literature. It also lays 
out the objections levelled against the plausibility of internalism. Establishing the 
epistemic justificatory status of a belief requires an orderly description of the 
differentiae of such a status as opposed to the differentiae of the statuses conferred by 
other types of justification such as prudential or moral justification. I contend that the 
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differentiae of epistemic justificatory status are inspired by and originally emanate 
from our most fundamental common-sensical convictions of justification: adequate 
supporting evidence, the basing relation, and the accessibility requirement. These are 
the raison d'êtres behind the internalist theory of justification. I intend to show the 
intuitive plausibility of the common-sensical view of justification which is 
represented by internalism. It is, therefore, necessary to address the differentiae of the 
internalist theory of justification and explain what it takes for a belief to be justified 
from an internalist perspective.  
 
One of the key polarizing issues in epistemology is whether epistemic justification 
is of internalist or externalist nature. Externalists contend that justification is 
conferred on the basis of external factors such as the reliability of the cognitive 
process that generates the belief, thus denying the necessity of any actual or potential 
cognitive access to what it is that gives rise to the belief. In contrast, internalists argue 
that justification obtains only if the believer has access to what gives rise to the belief, 
providing that what gives rise to the belief that p makes it likely that p is true. That is, 
the fundamental thesis of internalism is some cognitive access to what motivates – the 
justifying condition – an agent in coming to believe something. It is this accessibility 
requirement on justifying conditions that individuates internalism as an account of 
epistemic justification.  
 
    There are three ways to understand what it is for a justifying condition to be 
accessible to a believer: mentalism, accessibilism and perspectival internalism. 
Mentalism holds that the justification of a belief resides in factors that are 
metaphysically internal to the believing subject’s psyche in the sense of being the 
subject’s properties or mental states: “justification supervenes upon introspectively 
accessible properties of the believer”, observes Brueckner (2009: 13). In other words, 
mentalists argue that “justification depends only on states, like experience and belief, 
that are in a recognizable …sense internal to the believer” (Plantinga 1992: 48). 
Moreover, Pollock also argues that internalism is the view according to which only a 
given believer’s internal states can bestow justification: “Internalism in epistemology 
is the view that only internal states of the cognizer can be relevant in determining 
which of the cognizer’s beliefs are justified” (in Greco and Sosa 1999: 394). Thus, 
mentalism restricts justifying conditions to a cognizer’s mental states or properties.  
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    The mentalist account of internalism diminishes what could count as justifying 
conditions. It cannot account for the epistemic status of beliefs whose justificatory 
conditions are not a matter of the cognizer’s properties or state. For example, it fails 
to account for the epistemic status of the belief that I base on good authority. I, on 
testimony, come to believe that Pluto is the biggest dwarf planet. The testimony on 
which I base my belief is neither a state of mine nor is it a feature of mine, yet I can 
still be justified in holding such belief so long I have some memory as to what gave 
rise to my coming to acquire such belief. Mentalism is espoused by its proponents, 
Conee and Feldman, on the basis that “the special kind of access on which many 
internalist theories rely can reach only mental items” (in Kornblith 2001: 233). 
Restricting justifying conditions to a cognizer’s internal states alone seems plausible 
if internalism were to provide for the epistemic status of empirical beliefs only and if 
the access required for justification were to be direct rather than indirect. Furthermore, 
they argue that “The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly 
supervenes on the person's occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and 
conditions” (Ibid: 234). In other words, Conee and Feldman contend that one's being 
epistemically justified in one's doxastic attitudes is “settled by what goes on inside of 
cognitive beings” (Ibid: 235). They, therefore, argue that “on any account of 
internalism … internalism is nothing more than a broad doctrine about the location of 
the determining factors for epistemic justification” (Ibid: 256). But BonJour rightly 
argues that the internal of internalism does not refer to what is metaphysically internal 
to a cognizer in the sense of being a state or feature of the cognizer: 
 
the basic internalist requirement is sometimes misconstrued as saying that 
justification must depend only on the believer's internal states, that is, on 
states that are, from a  metaphysical standpoint, properties or features of that  
individual person. … But in fact this  understanding of the internalist 
requirement is simply mistaken. … the “internal” of internalism refers to what 
is internal to the person's first-person cognitive perspective in the sense of 
being accessible from that perspective, not necessarily to what is internal in 
the sense of being metaphysically a state or feature of that person. Thus the 
contents of conscious  mental states satisfy the internalist requirement, not 
simply because they are features of internal states of the person, but rather 
because those contents are arguably accessible in the right way. And if self-
evident a priori knowable truths are also accessible from the first-person 
cognitive perspective (as both moderate empiricists and rationalists hold), then 
those  truths are equally acceptable as part of the basis for internalist 
justification (2002: 223).   
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That is, the internalist condition on justification does not require that a justifying 
condition be necessarily internal to a believer in a metaphysical sense. It, rather, 
requires that a justifying condition be internal to the believer's first-person cognitive 
perspective in the sense of being accessible to the believer from his or her own first-
person cognitive perspective. Thus, being internal implies falling within a believer's 
first-person cognitive perspective and thereby making it accessible in some way from 
that perspective, rather than being metaphysically internal to the believer as mentalists 
hold. Falling within one's first-person cognitive perspective on the world does not, 
however, necessitate being accessible from that perspective as we will learn in 
discussions on perspectival internalism. It is misguided to argue that the access or 
awareness that internalism requires can only be satisfied by a state or feature of the 
cognizer. We are and can be conscious of many things that are not internal to us in a 
metaphysical sense or that do not constitute a feature of us or our mental life. Reading 
through a reliable medical article, I come to learn that nausea is one of the symptoms 
of pregnancy and thereby acquire a belief in such proposition. Being nauseous is 
neither a state of mine nor is it a feature of my mental life, yet I can still acquire 
cognitive access as to what gave rise to my coming to form such belief through 
reflection or a priori reasoning. As long as I have some way of remembering the basis 
that makes it rational for me to hold such belief, I hold the belief justifiably. There is 
no good reason for excluding such conditions from meriting internalist access. The 
location of the justifying condition being internal to me in a metaphysical sense is, 
therefore, irrelevant to my being justified in holding a belief.  
 
The other account of internalism is accessibilism. The accessibilist account of 
justification requires that justifying conditions be in some way – directly or indirectly 
– accessible to the cognizer. Cognitive accessibility is normally construed as “a 
relation holding between a subject S and what S can discover on reflection alone”, 
argue Staley and Cobb (2010: 3). Further, Pryor also defines it as “meaning that one 
can know by reflection alone whether one is in one of the relevant states. By 
‘reflection’ I mean a priori reasoning, introspective awareness of one’s own mental 
states” (2001: 103-104). Explaining the routes whereby we acquire cognitive access to 
what gave rise to a belief we are now holding, Audi observes: “introspection can be 
simply focusing on what is in consciousness and reflection can be as brief as 
considering a proposition” (2003: 238).  
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    Further, Audi associates a justifying condition’s accessibility to our being 
conscious or our being able to become conscious of such condition through 
introspection or reflection: “To have (internal) access to something is either to have it 
in consciousness or to be able through … reflection … to become aware of it” (Ibid: 
238). BonJour argues that “an epistemological theory counts as internalist if and only 
if it requires that all of the elements needed for a belief to satisfy this condition 
[justification] must be cognitively accessible to the person in question” (in Moser 
2002: 234). Furthermore, Plantinga also observes that “The basic thrust of internalism 
in epistemology … is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are 
properties to which the believer has some sort of special epistemic access” (1993: 6). 
Thus, argues BonJour, no matter how true a belief is, if I have no accessible reason to 
think it true, it is not rational for me to hold that belief: “If the subject holding a belief 
isn’t aware, or at least potentially aware, of what that belief has going for it, then, 
from her perspective, it can only be a matter of dumb luck that that belief is true (if 
true). But then she has no business holding it; her belief is unjustified” (1985: 41). 
That is, the accessibilist account of internalism restricts justifying conditions to 
factors that are, immediately or mediately, accessible to the cognizer’s first-person 
cognitive perspective whether they be mental states or extra-mental conditions. Thus, 
being accessible to the cognizer’s first-person cognitive perspective is what BonJour 
takes to be the core raison d’être behind internalism:   
 
The fundamental claim of internalism … is that epistemological issues arise 
and must be dealt with from within the individual person’s first-person 
cognitive perspective, appealing only to things that are accessible to that 
individual from that standpoint. The basic rationale is that what justifies a 
person’s beliefs must be something that is available or accessible to him or 
her, that something to which I have no access cannot give me a reason for 
thinking that one of my beliefs is true (though it might conceivably provide 
such a reason for another person viewing me from the outside) (2002: 222). 
 
 
In other words, internalist epistemology only responds to first-person 
epistemological issues. Thus, from an internalist perspective, factors inaccessible to a 
given epistemic agent do not bear on the justificatory status of the agent’s beliefs even 
if they were to provide sufficient indication of truth to those beliefs. Epistemologists 
associate the intuitive appeal of an internalist requirement on justifying conditions to 
both the deontological and the rationalist conceptions of justification. There is a 
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strong appeal for the contention that “the acceptance of the belief must be 
epistemically rational, that it must not be epistemically irresponsible”, observes 
BonJour (1980: 53). Moreover, Langsam also argues that “What underlies internalism 
is the idea that if our beliefs are to be justified, they must be held in a rational way” 
(2008: 100). He further argues that “We act in a rational way when we exercise our 
rationality, that is, when we engage in conscious deliberation, for when we engage in 
conscious deliberation, we can become conscious of reasons for beliefs” (Ibid: 100).  
 
That is, our consciously deliberating on a belief renders its justifying conditions 
accessible for us, providing that they are not forgotten. That is why rationalists hold 
that conscious deliberation is a necessary condition for being rational and thereby 
justified in holding a belief. Thus, according to the rationalist conception of 
justification, a belief is “justified if and only if it stands in a certain kind of relation to 
an actual or possible instance of conscious deliberation that would endorse that 
belief”, contends Langsam (Ibid: 88). The internalist condition on justification arises 
from the contention that we need to know whether we are justified in holding a belief 
if we were to be justified in holding that belief. It is because of this that a “subject 
needs access to his justification so that he can figure out whether or not he is justified, 
for what would be the point of having access to one’s justification if one could not 
know that one was justified?”, argues Langsam (Ibid: 82).  
 
    Being epistemically rational in holding a belief is not only a matter of possessing 
some actual or potential access to what it is that makes it rational the belief I hold. 
Epistemic rationality could also be understood as being epistemically responsible in 
holding a belief as BonJour pointed out earlier. I subscribe to the contention that to be 
epistemically justified in a belief, we must be epistemically rational in holding the 
belief. But the rationalist conception of justification runs into trouble if it is 
understood as being epistemically responsible in holding a belief or if it is understood 
as implying that all beliefs are consciously formed or formed as a result of conscious 
deliberation. Though it sounds appealing to accept that being epistemically rational is 
just being epistemically responsible in holding a belief, given the untenability of such 
view vis-à-vis beliefs, I shall take epistemic rationality as basing a belief on good 
evidence along with some epistemic access to the evidence on which I acquire the 
belief. Further to the rationale behind internalism, BonJour argues that “the central 
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rationale for internalism … arises when I ask simply whether or not I have good 
reasons for thinking that my various beliefs are true” (in Moser 2002: 237).  
 
    He further argues that internalism requires some cognitive access to justifying 
conditions for “the internalist approach pertains to … the situation where I ask what 
reasons I have for thinking that my own beliefs, rather than someone else's, are true” 
(in Moser 2002: 234). That is, the rationale behind the internalist requirement on 
justification arises primarily from an intuitive unease to count a belief as justified in 
the absence of some first-person epistemic access to the justifying condition. 
Examining the irreducible relevance of the epistemic accessibility of justifying 
premises, Alston observes that whenever one lacks any basis, ground, or sign that can 
support a given belief or show its truth “we feel uneasy in taking S’s belief to be 
justified. Thus it looks as if there is a basic, irreducible, requirement of epistemic 
accessibility of ground for the belief that attaches to our concept of epistemic 
justification” (1989: 225). Furthermore, there seems to be something amiss to 
consider a belief rational in the absence of any inkling as to what it is that makes the 
belief rational.  
 
    The other conception which critics of internalism take to be what fundamentally 
motivates internalism is the deontological conception of justification. Plantinga argues 
that “internalism flows from deontology and is unmotivated without it, and 
justification is at bottom and originally a deontological notion” (1993: 29). The 
reasoning behind associating internalism with epistemic deontologism is the 
deontologists’ contention that we have an epistemic duty to guide our doxastic 
cultivations by good evidence. It is a conceptual fact that we can guide our doxastic 
attitudes by evidence if we have access to such evidence. Similarly, we can guide our 
conduct according to our duties if we know what our duties are. We can, therefore, be 
rightfully blamed for failing to fulfil an obligation we know to be our duty, providing 
that there is no excuse or justification for such failure. That is, the argument goes like 
this: if an agent is “not in a position to know what his duties are or whether or not he 
is violating them, then he cannot be held responsible for violating (or not violating) 
them, and therefore he cannot be blamed for violating them (or praised for not 
violating them)”, points out Langsam (2008: 83). Further, the following is what 
Goldman argues to be the origin of the internalist constraint on justification:  
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What motivates or underlies this rationale for internalism? Historically, one 
central aim of epistemology is to guide or direct our intellectual conduct … 
The guidance and deontological conceptions of justification are intimately 
related, because the deontological conception, at least when paired with the 
guidance conception, considers it a person's  epistemic duty to guide his 
doxastic attitudes by his evidence, or by whatever factors determine the 
justificational status of a proposition at a given time. … There is an intimate 
connection, then, between the GD [guidance-deontological]1 conception of 
justification and the requirement that justifiers must be accessible to or 
knowable by the agent at the time of belief. If you cannot accurately ascertain 
your  epistemic duty at a given time, how can you be expected to execute that 
duty, and how can you reasonably be held responsible for executing that duty? 
(in Kornblith 2001: 208-209).   
 
 
    That is, critics of internalism rightly assume, as deontological justification itself 
implies, that in order to be held responsible for dereliction of duty or in order to be 
expected to fulfil one’s duties, one must know what one’s duties are. But Langsam 
argues that “it is not at all obvious that in order to be held responsible for violating 
one’s duties, one needs this kind of access to the relevant facts” (2008: 83). I disagree. 
I cannot be rightfully blamed for violating a norm whose obedience I do not know to 
be my duty. I have an excuse in violating such norm. For example, Nikki leads a 
secluded life and is ignorant of the customs, traditions and legal duties beyond her 
borders. She lives in an area where certain norms are public practice and are, 
therefore, not regarded as reprehensible conduct. Nikki once decides to break her 
secluded lifestyle and for that reason moves to a new living environment where 
exercising those norms is considered a violation of one’s legal duties and a 
contravention of one’s responsibility as a civilized being. Ignorant of such customary 
differences, Nikki is once seen violating one of the public orders she takes to be 
normal practice. In the absence of any knowledge that what she practises is a violation 
of a public order or a customary norm, Nikki shall be entitled for an excuse to her 
conduct.  
 
She violates the norm inculpably for she neither knows her relevant duties nor does 
she know whether what she does is a violation of her duty. Langsam recognizes that 
“certain kinds of ignorance can provide the violator with a legitimate excuse” (Ibid: 
83). But he argues that “ignorance is not an excuse for violating one’s legal 
                                                 
1
 Explaining what GD denotes, Goldman argues: “The GD conception implies that justifiers must be 
readily knowable” (in Kornblith 2001: 222).  
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obligations, for a person is expected to know what his legal obligations are, and is 
thus held responsible for violating them even if he fails to know them” (Ibid: 83-4). 
But, as we noticed in chapter five, even in legal matters we are entitled, according to 
the reasonable belief view of justification, for justification as long as what we do is 
something we reasonably believe to be the right thing to do. In the case at hand, Nikki 
reasonably believes that what she does is normal practice. She would have been 
rightfully reproached and held culpable for what she did if she knew her relevant 
duties or if she knew what she was doing was a violation of public order. However, 
what Nikki does is still wrongful, but excusable and does not therefore merit blame. 
She is inculpable in her conduct. We have already observed on pp. 32 and 147 that 
blame and responsibility can be rightfully attributed to one’s conduct only when one 
knows what one’s relevant duties are or when one knowingly violates one’s duties 
without any legitimate excuse or justification.  
 
    It is because of the wrongdoer’s necessary relevant knowledge that conditions the 
attribution of blame and responsibility that he along with Plantinga rightly argue that 
epistemic deontology implies internalism. We have already learned that epistemic 
deontology implies that epistemic duties guide our intellectual conduct and that 
deontological justification presupposes that we are able to determine what and when 
to believe. But an epistemic duty cannot guide my doxastic cultivations if I have no 
knowledge of such duty. I should know what my duties are if I were to proceed 
accordingly or if I were to be held responsible for dereliction of such duties. It is 
because of the necessity of such knowledge, that I share the position that 
deontological justification implies an internalist constraint on epistemic justification. 
Being deontologically justified in holding a belief implies having fulfilled relevant 
epistemic duties in arriving at such belief. The principal epistemic duty is to guide our 
beliefs by evidence. We can guide our beliefs by evidence only if we have access to 
such evidence. Deontological justification implies internalism. However, that being 
said, I take the internalist constraint on justification to be primarily motivated by a 
rationalist conception of justification – that we are epistemically justified in holding a 
belief only if we are epistemically rational in holding such belief.  
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6.2. Perspectival Internalism  
 
    Thus far, we have touched on mentalism and accessibilism as conceptions of the 
internalist constraint on justification. The accessibilist account of justification is 
sometimes referred to as access internalism. We will now explore a different 
conception, perspectival internalism, which Alston takes to be a way of understanding 
what it is for a justifying condition to be internal to a cognizer. We have already 
learned that the awareness requirement on justifying conditions is understood as either 
direct (immediate or non-conceptual2) or indirect (potential, mediate or conceptual) 
through reflection. If the internalist theory were to provide for the epistemic status of 
all beliefs – with the exception of beliefs whose justifying grounds are forgotten – it 
shall not constrain justifying grounds to conditions that are internal to one’s mind in a 
metaphysical sense such as one’s states or features. It shall also recognize extra-
mental factors that are beyond one’s psyche or are beyond one’s features or states. 
Further, in order not to risk impoverishing or diminishing the number of justified 
beliefs one would otherwise possess, internalism shall speak of the accessibility 
requirement as potential rather than actual. We have already learned that the tenable 
account of internalism, accessibilism, holds that what makes for the justification of a 
belief is internal to a given agent’s cognitive perspective and that only factors 
accessible to the agent bear on the justification of a belief. Alston points out two ways 
of understanding what it is for a justifying factor to be internal to an agent:    
 
First there is the idea that in order to confer justification something must be 
within the subject’s “perspective” or “viewpoint” on the world, in the sense of 
being something that the subject knows, believes, or justifiably believes. It 
must be something that falls within the subject’s ken, something of which the 
subject has taken note. Second, there is the idea that in order to confer 
                                                 
2
 Moser defines non-conceptual awareness as “awareness that does not essentially involve the 
application or the consideration of a concept” (1989: 80). Moreover, Bergmann also defines non-
conceptual awareness as: 
 
awareness that doesn’t involve the application of any concepts to the object of awareness. 
Cows and dogs presumably experience pain of some sort. And presumably these animals are 
aware of such experiences. Yet although they are aware of these experiences, it seems likely 
that they do not apply any concepts to them. Humans too can be nonconceptually aware of 
experiences they undergo. The difference is that we are also able to be conceptually aware of 
those experiences (by applying concepts* to them) whereas dogs and cows presumably aren’t 
able to be conceptually aware of their experiences (2006: 19).   
 
* In the conceptual account of awareness, Bergmann refers to applying concepts to a given object of 
awareness as “conceiving of the object of awareness in a certain way” (Ibid: 19).  
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justification, something must be accessible to the subject in some special way, 
for example, directly accessible (1989: 186).   
 
 
That is, Alston puts forward two construals as to how to understand the internalist 
constraint on epistemic justification. First, the perspectival internalism account (PI) 
according to which what confers justification on a belief falls within a cognizer’s ken 
such as, paradigmatically, the knowledge, beliefs, or justified beliefs that fall within 
the cognizer’s perspective on the world – something of which the believer is or can 
become cognizant of. Second, the access internalism account (AI) whose underlying 
thesis is some sort of access to the justifying condition, preferably direct access. 
Formulating his perspectival internalism account, Alston observes that PI argues that 
“Only what is within the subject’s ‘perspective’ can determine the justification of a 
belief” (1989: 188). We noticed earlier that Alston restricts the scope of an agent’s 
perspective on the world to, typically, one's knowledge, beliefs or justified beliefs 
about the world. Specifying an agent’s perspective on the world, Alston chooses 
justified beliefs over beliefs for he holds that an unjustified belief cannot transfer to a 
given belief a justification it does not itself possess: “it seems that beliefs cannot 
acquire justification by being brought into relation with unjustified beliefs. One belief 
cannot ‘transfer’ to another belief a justification it does not possess” (Ibid: 193). In 
addition to that, he chooses justified belief over knowledge (justified true belief) as 
well and thus requires that the supporting belief to a given belief be justified rather 
than true as he considers requiring a supporting belief to be true an overkill: “To 
require that my supporting beliefs be true might be appropriate it [if] we were laying 
down requirements for knowledge, but it is clearly too strong a requirement for 
justification” (Ibid: 190).  
 
    Specifying an agent’s perspective on the world as justified beliefs, Alston 
constitutes a more specific formulation: “The only thing that can justify S’s belief that 
p is some other justified beliefs of S” (Ibid: 191). Furthermore, Schmitt also argues 
that perspectival internalism is “the view that justified belief is belief sanctioned by 
the subject’s epistemic perspective” (1992: 116). He, thus, observes that “S is justified 
in believing p just in case S is justified in believing that the belief p is reliable 
[justified]” (Ibid: 116). That is, one’s perspectival context is tethered to justified belief 
as perspectival internalism’s optimal determinant of the epistemic status of belief. 
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With respect to how a justifier should be related to a given belief in order to function 
as a justification for the belief, Alston specifies adequate support for the truth of the 
belief as a requirement for the candidate justifier: “the way in which any justifier has 
to be related to a belief in order to do its job is to provide ‘adequate support’ or 
‘adequate evidence’; it must be an ‘adequate reason’” (1989: 196). Moreover, he 
defines the adequacy of justifying grounds in terms of truth-conducivity: “I take a 
ground, G, of belief B to be adequate if and only if it is sufficiently indicative of the 
truth of B” (Ibid: 240-241). Thus, from a perspectival internalism’s perspective, a 
justifying ground should be truth-conducive of the belief in question and also be in the 
form of a justified belief falling within a given epistemic agent’s perspective on the 
world. That is, the agent should justifiably believe the justifying ground.  
 
     If we are to determine whether or not a given belief enjoys justificational status, 
we need to determine whether the evidence on which one acquires the belief is 
adequate and whether one justifiably believes the evidence. Though we often tend to 
believe the evidence on the basis of which we come to acquire a belief, requiring that 
a justifying condition itself be a justified belief creates otherwise avoidable 
complications to the epistemic assessment of belief. Perspectival internalism 
introduces a dispensable requirement without which epistemic justification would still 
obtain as long as other internalist requirements are met. The underlying thesis of 
perspectival internalism is to navigate how a justifying factor can be accessible to a 
potential believer. It argues that if a justifying factor is something one has come 
across in the past, then it is within one’s perspective on the world and thus one can 
become conscious of it in some way either through reflection or through recollection. 
The argument perspectival internalism advances is similar to memory retrieval.  
 
If one has encountered something in the past, it would have been preserved in one’s 
memory. One can, thereby, become aware of it through recollection so long as it is not 
irretrievably lost or forgotten. Subjecting a justifying condition to a justified belief is 
just another way of endorsing the second-order internalist requirement on justifying 
conditions. Internalists diverge over whether the internalist constraint shall apply only 
on justifying conditions or on their adequacy as well. The internalist account of 
justification potentially implies two orders of access to justifying conditions with the 
first-order being necessary and the second immaterial. The first-order internalism 
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argues that “justified belief requires access to what justifies the belief” whereas the 
second-order internalism holds that justified beliefs “require introspective access to 
how what justifies does so”, observes Audi (1989: 311). That is, the second-order 
internalism holds that for a belief to count as justified, the cognizer should not only 
have access to the justifying condition, but also to its adequacy. I join Alston in his 
contention that the second-order internalist constraint on justifying conditions is 
immaterial and unattractive for it leads to an infinite regress:   
 
it would seem that internalist conditions concerning adequacy are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for justification. And so the view here being defended 
is resolutely and uncompromisingly externalist, so far as adequacy of grounds 
is concerned. In order for my belief that p, which is based on ground G, to be 
justified, it is quite sufficient, as well as necessary, that G be sufficiently 
indicative of the truth of p. It is in no way required that I know anything, or be 
justified in believing anything, about this relationship. No doubt, we 
sometimes do have justified beliefs about the adequacy of our grounds, and 
that is certainly a good thing. But that is icing on the cake. … it is both 
necessary and sufficient that the world be such that the ground be “sufficiently 
indicative of the truth” of the belief, both necessary and sufficient that this 
actually be the case, and neither necessary nor sufficient that the subject have 
any cognitive grasp of this fact. Thus my position has definite affinities with 
reliabilism … But it differs from a pure reliabilism by holding that the 
justification of a belief requires that the belief be based on a “ground” that 
satisfies an AI constraint … (1989: 243-244).     
 
 
    Thus, having justified belief or knowledge about the adequacy of a justifying 
condition is epistemically valuable, but unnecessary for a belief to count as justified. 
The second construal of the internalist constraint on justification is characterised as 
access internalism (AI) according to which “possible justifiers are restricted to items 
to which we have a specially favored access. This special access is variously specified 
as direct, incorrigible and obtainable just by reflecting”, points out Alston (Ibid: 211). 
That is, Alston speaks of the accessibility requirement as direct. But, as we have 
already learned, we can have direct access to a condition or state if we can be directly 
aware of its obtaining without conceiving of it or without having to reflect on it to 
gain such awareness or access. However, his associating the obtaining of the 
necessary access to the justifying condition with reflection implies that he has indirect 
access in mind.  
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    I endorse a moderate version of internalism that regards the first-order internalist 
requirement as necessary whereas the second-order one as immaterial, and recognizes 
potential access to justifying conditions. Thus, we can determine whether one of our 
beliefs is justified if we have direct access to the justifying condition in the way of the 
condition’s being the content of our consciousness or a conscious state of ours or if 
we, upon reflection on the belief proposition, come to realise what gave rise to the 
belief in question. So long our access to the justifying condition obtains in one of the 
aforementioned ways with the justifying condition’s adequately counting towards the 
truth of a given belief, the belief in question enjoys positive epistemic status. But 
Ginet pursues a direct recognizability view of justifying conditions: “there can be no 
set of facts giving S justification for being confident that p that has an essential part 
that is n[ot] directly recognizable to S” (1975: 36). But associating the direct 
recognizability of justifying conditions with reflection shows his lack of confidence in 
the viability of the direct accessibility thesis. The following is how he demonstrates 
this:  
 
Every one of every set of facts about S’s position that minimally suffices to 
make S, at a given time, justified in being confident that p must be directly 
recognizable to S at that time. By ‘directly recognizable’ I mean this: if a 
certain fact obtains, then it is directly recognizable to S at a given time if and 
only if, provided that S at that time has the concept of that sort of fact, S needs 
at that time only to reflect clear-headedly on the question of whether or not 
that fact obtains in order to know that it does (Ibid: 34). 
 
 
    But, as observed earlier, my finding out through reflection that a fact obtains just 
demonstrates that I have indirect access over whether or not that fact obtains. Direct 
accessibility is too high a requirement to render the majority of our beliefs justified. In 
most non-axiomatic situations, we do not have direct access to what is responsible for 
our being justified in our beliefs. Direct accessibility is achievable in the case of most 
occurrent or self-evident beliefs whose nature is axiomatic enough that we can know 
directly what gives rise to our believing them or what is responsible for our being 
justified in holding them. To require direct accessibility for justification will mean 
that many non-occurrent or non-self-evident beliefs will count as unjustified. The 
logic behind associating potential access to justifying conditions with reflection is that 
whenever we reflect on a belief, we entertain its truth values and thereby come to 
realise what makes the belief truth-conducive or what gave rise to our coming to 
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acquire such belief; that is if the evidence on which we acquired the belief is 
preserved in our memory.  
 
Thus, according to access internalism, a justified belief is “one that could survive a 
critical reflection. But then the justifier must be accessible to the subject. Otherwise 
the subject would be in no position to cite it as what provides a sufficient indication 
that the belief is true”, points out Alston (1989: 226). That is, for a belief to have 
survived a critical reflection is for the believer to have had some access to what had 
given rise to the belief, or some access to the belief’s credentials or to what is 
responsible for the belief’s being true – a situation that satisfies the access internalism 
requirement on justification. Given the fact that PI and AI are both different 
conceptions of the internalist constraint on justification, it may seem tempting at face 
value to lump them together. But Alston argues that PI cannot be a special case of AI 
for one’s entire perspective is not, normally, directly accessible. That is, he observes 
that the totality of one’s justified beliefs is too vast to be readily retrievable and thus 
directly accessible. He argues that PI can be a special case of AI, 
 
Only if one’s own perspective is directly accessible, and this does not seem to 
be the case. The sum total of my justified beliefs cannot be depended on to 
spread themselves before my eyes on demand, not even that segment thereof 
that is relevant to a particular belief under consideration. I may know 
something that provides crucial evidence for p and yet fail to realize this even 
on careful reflection. … It may be that the sheer volume of what I know about, 
for example, ancient Greek philosophy is too great for my powers of ready 
retrieval; or some of this material may be so deeply buried as to require special 
trains of association to dislodge it. We are all familiar with cases in which 
something we knew all along failed to put in an appearance when it was 
needed to advance a particular inquiry (Ibid: 213).   
 
 
    That is, though we might have access to some stored justified beliefs relevant to a 
belief in question, this is not sufficient to consider perspectival internalism a special 
case of access internalism. For PI to be a case of AI is for our entire cognitive 
perspective on the world to be accessible to us. But, as noticed earlier, we might have 
encountered something in the past, and by virtue of our observing it, it becomes part 
of our perspective on the world, but we might still not be able to retrieve it or access it 
even on reflection. In addition, in answer to whether access internalism is a special 
case of perspectival internalism, Alston points out: “Only if nothing other than my 
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knowledge3 and justified beliefs is directly accessible to me. But that is clearly not the 
case. My feelings and other conscious experiences are directly accessible if anything 
is” (Ibid: 214). In other words, we have access to many of our feelings, yet the fact 
that I have access to some feeling does not imply that AI is a case of PI for the feeling 
I have access to might not necessarily count as a justified belief in order to qualify as 
my perspective on the world. One’s perspective on the world here is limited to one’s 
justified beliefs on the world. That is why not everything that is accessible to us falls 
within our perspective on the world to render AI a case of PI.  
 
6.3. Objections to Internalism  
 
    Though the internalist theory of justification has the most of intuitive support, it too 
has its own drawbacks. It leads to infinite regress if the adequacy of justifying 
conditions is subjected to an internalist requirement. In addition, the three most 
common objections levelled against internalism are its alleged inability to account for 
the justification of stored beliefs, beliefs whose original leading evidence has been 
lost or forgotten, and also its inability to respond to the epistemic condition of 
unsophisticated agents. We have already noticed that there are two trends among 
internalists regarding the internalist constraint on justification. One argues in favour 
of direct accessibility in the sense of the justifying condition’s being a conscious state 
of the believer. The other argues in favour of indirect accessibility in the sense of the 
believer’s being able to become aware of the justifying condition in question. First, 
the drawback of stored beliefs: this is a difficulty that faces internalism only if the 
internalist constraint on justification is required to be direct access. But if the 
internalist requirement is taken to be potential accessibility, then internalism escapes 
this criticism. Even if the justifying condition is not the content of our consciousness 
at the moment, we can reflect on the belief and gain cognitive awareness as to what 
gave rise to our coming to believe as we do. The internalists’ direct awareness 
requirement on justifying conditions is fatal as far as stored beliefs are concerned and 
therefore untenable in the case of the majority of our beliefs.  
                                                 
3
 We have already noticed that of the three candidates (knowledge, belief, and justified belief) 
mentioned for the specification of one’s perspective on the world, Alston singles out justified belief. 
He, in this quote, includes knowledge as well because knowledge necessarily entails justified belief 
given the definition of knowledge as justified true belief.  
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    The majority of our beliefs are stored beliefs and thereby non-occurrent as argued 
by Goldman: “At any given time, the vast majority of one's beliefs are stored in 
memory rather than occurrent or active. Beliefs about personal data … about world 
history, about geography … are almost all stored rather than occurrent at a given 
moment” (in Kornblith 2001: 212-3). Moreover, Conee and Feldman also recognize 
that the problem facing the direct awareness requirement arises from the fact that 
almost nothing we know is consciously entertained: “The problem is this. At any 
given moment almost nothing of what we know is consciously considered” (in 
Kornblith 2001: 243). Thus, if the cognitive awareness necessary for justification 
were required to be direct, then we would have very few justified beliefs and even 
those very few justified beliefs would lose their justificatory status the moment we 
stop entertaining them consciously. Consequently, our doxastic life would be 
tremendously diminished as observed by the internalist's leading critic Goldman: 
“Strong internalism4 threatens a drastic diminution in the stock of beliefs ordinarily 
deemed justified, and hence in the stock of knowledge, assuming that justification is 
necessary for knowledge” (in Kornblith 2001: 213). Internalism, therefore, cannot 
escape the objection of stored beliefs unless it relaxes its awareness constraint on 
justification to incorporate the indirectly accessible as pointed out by Goldman:  
 
The obvious solution to the problem of stored beliefs is to … allow justifiers 
to be merely indirectly knowable. … simply allow knowledge of justifiers to 
include memory retrieval. Stored evidence … can qualify as justifiers because 
the agent can know that they obtain by the compound route of first retrieving 
them from memory and then introspecting their conscious contents (Ibid: 213-
214). 
 
  
    Thus, most of our beliefs are stored in our memory. We come to believe something, 
and then the belief becomes part of our stored memory. There is no good epistemic 
reason to deprive non-occurrent beliefs from epistemic justification. No good rational 
explanation can account for the reasoning that only occurrent beliefs enjoy 
justificatory status or that only what is in our current consciousness can provide us 
with what it takes to be epistemically justified in holding a belief. Only a very tiny 
minority of our beliefs can satisfy the strong internalist requirement. Internalism 
would lose its intuitive appeal if it were to require that justifying conditions be the 
                                                 
4
 Strong internalism is the view that requires direct awareness of justifying conditions.  
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content of current consciousness. But the internalism’s leading proponents, Conee and 
Feldman, ward off the criticism of stored beliefs by proposing a dispositional and an 
occurrent sense of justification, arguing that such stored beliefs can be justified 
dispositionally:  
 
 there are occurrent and dispositional senses of “justified”, just as there are 
 occurrent and dispositional senses of “belief”. In the most fundamental sense 
 of “justified” a belief can be justified for a person only by the person's current 
 evidence, and one's current evidence is all conscious. In this sense, non-
 occurrent beliefs are typically not justified. However, in the same way that 
 there are stored beliefs, one can have “stored justifications” for these beliefs. 
 That is, one can have in memory reasons that justify the belief. Beliefs like 
 this are dispositionally justified. Thus, although stored beliefs are seldom 
 justified in the most fundamental sense, they are often dispositionally justified  
 (in Kornblith 2001: 244).  
 
 
    But the proposal to distinguish between an occurrent and a dispositional sense of 
justification to account for the justification of stored beliefs is just one way of 
recognizing the indispensability of potential awareness. To require direct access for 
justifying conditions is, as observed earlier, to risk doxastic impoverishment. The 
dispositional view of justification resolves the problem of stored beliefs so long the 
stored evidence is not irretrievably lost or forgotten – a problem that we now attend 
to. The second drawback of internalism is that of forgotten evidence: this is a problem 
that faces any account of internalism regardless of whether the internalist constraint 
on justification is required to be direct or indirect awareness. Though such criticism is 
not as severe as the problem of stored beliefs as we do not often irretrievably forget 
evidence for a great number of our beliefs, it presents internalism with a puzzling 
situation where some sort of cognitive access needs to be attainable in order for 
justificatory status to obtain. Goldman argues that we have many justified beliefs 
whose evidence, on the basis of which we came to believe, we have forgotten. He puts 
forward an example where Sally justifiably acquires a belief about the health benefits 
of broccoli but does not recall the original evidence on the basis of which she came to 
acquire such belief while still retaining the belief:  
 
 Many justified beliefs are ones for which an agent once had adequate evidence 
 that she subsequently forgot. At the time of epistemic appraisal, she no longer 
 possesses adequate evidence that is retrievable from memory. Last year, Sally 
 read a story about the health benefits of broccoli in the “Science” section of 
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 the New York Times. She then justifiably formed a belief in broccoli's 
 beneficial effects. She still retains this belief but no longer recalls her original 
 evidential source (and has never encountered either corroborating or 
 undermining sources). Nonetheless, her broccoli belief is still justified, and, if 
 true, qualifies as a case of knowledge. Presumably, this is because her past 
 acquisition of the belief was epistemically proper (in Kornblith 2001: 214-
 215). 
  
 
In the absence of any cognitive access as to what makes it rational for Sally to hold 
such belief, internalists, no matter how true it is, would deny the belief positive 
epistemic status. But Goldman argues that Sally's belief is justified as long as it was 
acquired in an epistemically proper or reliable manner, and that her cognitive access 
to the original evidence is not necessary to the question of whether or not the belief 
enjoys positive epistemic status. In a fundamental sense of internalism, Sally's belief 
is not justified because she neither has direct cognitive awareness of the evidence that 
gave rise to her coming to acquire such belief, nor does she recall it. But Conee and 
Feldman provide a roundabout answer to the justification of Sally's belief, arguing 
that her justification consists of a triad of the conscious qualities of her recollection, 
her associated felling of confidence and her background belief in the reliability and 
accuracy of what she remembers:  
 
 Our internalist answer to this question is that Sally's justification consists in 
 conscious qualities of the recollection, such as its vivacity and her associated 
 feeling of confidence. … We note that not all memory beliefs are justified 
 according to this theory. Some memory beliefs are accompanied by a sense of 
 uncertainty and a lack of confidence. Other memory beliefs are accompanied 
 by a recognition of competing evidence. This competing evidence can render 
 vivacious memory beliefs unjustified. … If Sally is a normal contemporary 
 adult, she is likely to have quite of a bit of readily retrievable evidence 
 supporting her belief about broccoli. The healthfulness of vegetables is widely 
 reported and widely discussed. … Finally, she, like most people, probably has 
 supporting evidence consisting in stored beliefs about the general reliability 
 and accuracy of memory. She knows that she is generally right about this sort 
 of thing. So Sally would have justification for her broccoli belief, though it is 
 not her original evidence. If Sally lacks any supporting background 
 information and also lacks any reason to trust her memory, then we doubt that 
 her belief about the broccoli really is justified (in Kornblith 2001: 246). 
 
 But the conscious qualities of recollection are not the sort of things that constitute 
memorial evidence to confer justification. The only thing that has that force is the 
substance or outcome of recollection. The most plausible internalist answer for the 
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justification of Sally’s belief about the health benefits of broccoli is her confidence or 
background belief in the reliability and accuracy of her memory and thereby in what 
she remembers to be true. Goldman recognizes that Sally has some such evidence for 
the belief, but argues that such evidence is not sufficient for justification:  
 
It might be replied that Sally does currently possess evidence in support of her 
broccoli belief. One of her background beliefs, we may suppose, is that most 
of what she remembers was learned in an epistemically proper manner. So 
does she not, after all, now have grounds for the target belief? Admittedly, she 
has some evidence, but is this evidence sufficient for justification? Surely not 
(in Kornblith 2001: 215). 
 
 
Given the fact that the internalists' necessary requirement for justification is direct 
or indirect awareness of the justifying condition that gives rise to a belief, Sally's 
belief is not justified from a strictly internalist standpoint as Sally has neither direct 
nor potential awareness of the original evidence that led her to acquire such belief. 
But such cases of forgotten evidence are not preponderant in our doxastic life and are 
not representative of most normal people who possess a cognitive capacity to recollect 
at least some original supporting evidence that gave rise to a belief. The problem of 
forgotten evidence is, therefore, not fundamentally sufficient to rule out or undermine 
internalism as an account of justification. That is, although cases of forgotten 
evidence obtain, we, often in most cases, have some sort of cognitive access to what it 
is that makes our beliefs true as BonJour argues that our fundamental commonsense 
conviction is that we normally have reasons within our ken for thinking that our 
beliefs are true:  
 
Our fundamental commonsense conviction … [is] the conviction that in 
general we actually do have good reasons within our cognitive grasp for 
thinking that our various beliefs about the world are true …. Indeed that 
anyone who denies such things is flying in the face of reason and good sense 
(2003: 39-40).               
 
 
The third charge levelled against internalism is its alleged inability to account for 
the justification of people who are not or are less cognitively sophisticated or do not 
have the necessary intellectual capability to exhibit what it is that justifies their 
beliefs. This is a criticism that can best speak to the activity conception of 
justification. The logic of such criticism against internalism makes it sound like 
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internalism is solely concerned with being able to show one's justification for a belief 
or successfully defend a belief against criticism – a phenomenon for which a 
reasonable degree of sophistication and some basic communication skills are required. 
It might appear, at face value, that being aware or being able to become aware of 
one's evidence for a belief entails one's being able to exhibit such evidence. But 
sometimes one is or can become aware of one's evidence for a belief, but might not 
necessarily be able to adduce the evidence in response to challenges to the legitimacy 
or credentials of the belief due to being unsophisticated or not being sufficiently 
sophisticated to possess the necessary verbal skills to present such evidence in 
response to criticism as pointed out by Alston on p. 130 of the thesis.   
 
 This chapter has analysed the essence of the internalist theory of justification and 
assessed the weight of the objections raised against the intuitive superiority of 
internalism. Strong internalism is plagued with the problem of stored beliefs by virtue 
of requiring direct access to justifying conditions. It is this direct accessibility 
requirement that undermines the intuitive plausibility of the internalist theory. That is, 
internalism cannot account for the justification of stored beliefs if direct access is 
required for justifying conditions. Furthermore, strong internalism also leads to an 
infinite regress by subjecting the adequacy of justifying conditions to an access 
requirement. Through its tendency to result in an infinite regress, strong internalism 
generates a profound scepticism as to whether any of our beliefs can ever be justified. 
But the objection that internalism cannot account for the justification of the beliefs of 
unsophisticated subjects does not undermine the intuitive plausibility of internalism 
for the internalist theory is not committed to the practice of justification. I contend 
that weak internalism is the theory that is most consistent with our intuitions of what 
justifiability status amounts to. Weak internalism requires indirect access for 
justifying conditions. That is, from the perspective of weak internalism, a belief is 
justified as long it is based on good evidence with some potential cognitive 
accessibility on the part of the believing subject. The only problem it faces is that of 
lost or forgotten evidence which is not a common phenomenon. In addition, the 
problem of lost or forgotten evidence can be resolved indirectly though appeal to the 
believing subject's confidence in the reliability of his memory.  
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Chapter Seven  
The Deontological Theory of Epistemic Justification  
 
Epistemologists disagree over the source of the motivation behind internalism's 
access requirement on justification. Non-deontological internalists argue that the 
accessibility requirement is motivated and driven by our intuitions of what it is to be 
justified in holding a belief. But externalists and critics of internalism argue that the 
internalism's accessibility requirement is motivated by epistemic deontology. The 
reason behind lumping internalism and deontology together is the conviction that 
underlies epistemic deontology – the conviction that we have an epistemic duty to 
direct or guide our doxastic cultivations by good evidence. That is, it is the conviction 
that we have an epistemic responsibility to conduct our intellectual life in accordance 
with good evidence. It is this conviction that apparently connects the internalist 
constraint on justification and deontology. I can conduct my intellectual life in 
accordance with good evidence only if I have access to such evidence. I can be rightly 
expected to abide by an epistemic duty, or I can be rightly blamed for violations of 
such a duty only if I have knowledge of the duty. Though I recognize that subjecting 
beliefs to epistemic duties provides us with a possible explanation as to the origin of 
the internalists’ accessibility requirement, I deny the validity of such an explanation. 
Deontologists argue that it is epistemically irresponsible to believe that p in the 
absence of good evidence that p. Such beliefs, they argue, are epistemically 
blameworthy. Internalists argue that it is irrational to believe that p in the absence of 
any inkling as to what is responsible for the truth of p.  
 
Epistemic deontology implies doxastic voluntarism, which is profoundly at odds 
with our common-sensical convictions of belief. Internalism, by contrast, is 
profoundly motivated by our intuitions. This chapter explores epistemic deontology in 
an attempt to show the untenability of deontology as a possible source of motivation 
behind internalism. Epistemic deontology fails to account for the motivation behind 
internalism for its raison d'être conflicts with the intuitions that motivate internalism. 
From an intuitive perspective, beliefs are not willable. But from a deontological 
perspective, beliefs are willable. I aim to examine the essence of epistemic deontology 
in an attempt to expose the counter-intuitive nature of its premise which is considered 
by some epistemologists to be behind a theory, internalism, motivated by our very 
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intuitions. It is just counter-intuitive for me to accept a belief of mine to be justified in 
the absence of any knowledge on my part as to what is responsible for the truth of my 
belief that p. Our gut feelings do not go along with the idea of accepting a belief as 
justified in the absence of any inkling on the part of the believing subject as to what 
renders the belief to be true. I aim to show that the deontic premise, though giving rise 
to an accessibility requirement on justifying conditions, fails to be a tenable 
explanation for the motivation behind internalism due to the premise's being 
antithetical to the intuitions that both motivate and underlie internalism itself.  
 
In the end, we will notice that it is our intuitions that better explain the motivation 
behind internalism rather than a deontic premise which fundamentally conflicts with 
our intuitions of belief. Beliefs are not subject to epistemic duties, nor are they 
assessable in terms of blame. It is epistemically desirable to be dutiful to our 
intellectual obligations such as basing our beliefs on good evidence, not suppressing 
doubts or ignoring contrary evidence. But, as we will learn later, duty fulfilment is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic justification. Justificatory status does 
not supervene on being blameworthy or blameless in holding a belief. Belief is not a 
voluntary propositional attitude to merit praise or blame. We can be blamed for 
something only if we have voluntary control over that thing. We cannot decide or 
control what to believe and what to disbelieve, which is why we cannot be blamed for 
what we believe or disbelieve. It is because of this that our beliefs cannot be assessed 
in relation to blame or responsibility. But deontologists argue that one’s justification 
for a belief resides in one’s fulfilling one’s epistemic duties in acquiring the belief. 
They argue that we have epistemic duties in our doxastic cultivations, duties such as 
looking for evidence pro and con, not ignoring counter-evidence, not suppressing 
doubts, not nourishing belief in the absence of good supporting evidence and other 
relevant epistemic responsibilities. They, therefore, conceive of justification as 
freedom from blame as far as one’s epistemic obligations are concerned. 
Deontologists are, thereby, criticised for assuming voluntary control over doxastic 
attitudes. They view justification as a normative concept and believing as epistemic 
permissibility.  
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    The motorist who speeds up can be blamed for doing so because he can choose not 
to do so. That is, he has free will over whether or not to speed up. Thus, he can be 
held responsible for violating his duty to abide by the speed limit because fulfilling 
such duty is within his power. If epistemic deontologism is correct, then this is the 
basis on which the epistemic status of beliefs should be evaluated. Epistemic 
deontologism implies doxastic voluntarism. Doxastic voluntarists regard beliefs as 
“legitimate objects of blame and praise” (in Nottelman 2007: 106). Similarly, 
epistemic deontologism also “includes, among other things, a commitment to the idea 
that we can legitimately be reproached, scorned, and blamed for not believing what 
we ought to believe and that we can be legitimately praised and the like for believing 
what we ought to believe”, observes Ryan (2003:48). In other words, epistemic 
deontologism implies that “beliefs are typically voluntarily formed, that we are 
responsible for them, and we deserve praise and blame for them”, points out Feldman 
(2008: 355). Thus, given the deontological conception of epistemic justification, to be 
justified in holding a belief is “to be without blame, to be within your rights, to have 
done no more than what is permitted, to have violated no duty or obligation, to 
warrant no blame or censure”, argues Plantinga (1993: 26). That is, on the 
deontological view of justification, “a belief that is epistemically justified is a belief 
that is epistemically permissible, a belief for which the subject cannot be blamed, or a 
belief the subject is not obliged to drop”, observes Steup (1999: 375). In this way, 
given what the deontological treatment of belief implies, epistemic justification, 
argues Plantinga, is “entirely within my power; whether or not my beliefs are justified 
is up to me, within my control” (1993: 19). This notion of epistemic deontologism 
dates back to Descartes and Locke. Descartes argues that we are epistemically 
obligated to refrain from believing propositions we do not have good evidence in 
favour:  
 
But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive 
it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly. … But 
if I determine to deny [disbelieve] or affirm [believe], I no longer make use as 
I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I 
deceive myself; even though I judge according to truth, this comes about only 
by chance, and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom; for the 
light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should 
always precede the determination of the will. It is in the misuse of the free will 
that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met 
with (in Plantinga 1993: 12-13). 
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Locke also observes that one must be held accountable for believing something that is 
not true:  
 
Faith [belief] is nothing but a firm assent of the mind; which, if it be regulated, 
as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, and so 
cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without having any reason for 
believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he 
ought, nor pays the obedience due his maker, who would have him use those 
discerning faculties he has given him to keep him out of mistake and error. He 
that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on 
truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the 
accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, 
that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into; whereas he 
that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks 
sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this 
satisfaction [justification] in doing his duty as a rational creature, that though 
he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward [justification] of it; for he 
governs his assent right, and places it as he should, who in any case or matter 
whatsoever believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that 
does otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties 
which were given him (in Plantinga 1993: 13). 
 
 
    Both Descartes and Locke view doxastic attitudes and their respective epistemic 
status as if we are at liberty whether or not to believe something. Descartes holds that 
we are epistemically obligated to abstain from belief unless we perceive the object of 
belief with sufficient clearness or unless we have sufficient epistemic grounds that 
warrant such belief. But, argues Alston, one “can be obliged to do A only if one has 
an effective choice as to whether to do A” (1989: 118). Furthermore, Plantinga 
observes that it is not within my power whether to believe something I perceive to be 
true: “Driving down the road I am confronted with what appears to be an approaching 
automobile; it is ordinarily not, in such a case, up to me whether I believe that there is 
an automobile approaching” (1993: 24). Alston also states: “When I look out my 
window and see rain falling, water dripping off the leaves of trees, and cars passing 
by, I [do not have] … control over whether I accept those propositions… I form the 
belief that rain is falling willy-nilly. There is no way I can inhibit this belief” (1989: 
129). This is as far as perceptual beliefs are concerned, which Alston observes: “With 
respect to almost all normal perceptual, introspective, and memory propositions, it is 
absurd to think that one has any such control over whether one accepts, rejects, or 
withholds the proposition” (Ibid: 129).  
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But our inability to choose whether to believe something also extends to testimonial 
propositions. Facing clear evidence that the American Civil War started in 1861, I 
find myself incapable of making a choice as to whether to believe this. I just happen 
to believe it upon what I believe to be reliable evidence without first – at the moment 
of belief formation – deciding whether to believe this. This, however, does not mean 
that I am totally impotent to make use of my free will vis-à-vis the proposition in 
question. We will later on learn that whenever we are presented with a non-self-
evident proposition for which we lack the necessary grounds to settle doxastic 
attitude, we are at liberty whether to take up an attitude towards the given proposition. 
We can choose to ignore such propositions. But we are not at liberty as to what 
doxastic attitude we take up towards any such propositions. If I did not know the date 
on which the American Civil War started, but wanted to settle doxastic opinion on 
such proposition, I can decide to go to the library. Once in the library, I can decide to 
go to level five. Then I can decide to look for specific historical books. Once I find a 
collection of relevant books, I can choose to read some and ignore the rest. While in 
possession of the most relevant books, I can make a decision as to what chapters to 
read.  
 
These are all processes that respond to my free will. But, as we noticed in chapter 
three, believing is not a process. “Believing a proposition is”, argues Price, “a 
disposition and not an occurrence or ‘mental act’” (1954: 15). That is, believing is 
neither a process nor an occurrence or action. Thus, once I am in possession of good 
evidence as to the issue at hand, it is not up to me whether to believe that the 
American Civil War started in 1861. I just happen to believe it. Furthermore, many 
people believe, on testimony, that Moses miraculously had God open the waters of the 
Red Sea for him and his fellow Israelis in order to cross the sea unharmed. They hold 
such belief without possessing sufficient epistemic grounds for it. No matter how ill-
supported a proposition epistemically is, sometimes we just cannot help believing 
such propositions. Being objectively probative or probable is not a prerequisite for 
belief. Belief is psychologically possible as long as we perceive the supporting 
evidence to be satisfactory from our own subjective perspective. It is the conferment 
of epistemic justification that supervenes on objectively good evidence, not the 
attribution of belief. Belief that p is, however, not psychologically possible when we 
ourselves take such belief to be unwarranted from our own cognitive perspective. 
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Belief is a subjective mental or psychological phenomenon, whereas justification is an 
objective desideratum. After all, we do not choose or decide what to believe or what 
to disbelieve. We believe many things that are false. If we had the doxastic control 
implied by epistemic deontologism, we could have suspended belief until truth came 
to light. Descartes argues that unless we misuse our free will, otherwise we could 
discover the truth or believe truly and therefore escape reproach.  
 
    But as Alston’s cultural isolation case demonstrates later (see p. 181), we could 
make proper or reasonable use of our free will in the way of evidence gathering or 
attention to evidential considerations but still miss the truth or still believe something 
for bad reasons. That is why fulfilment of intellectual obligations is not a necessary 
condition for a belief to possess positive epistemic status. Further, Descartes argues 
that: “But if I determine to deny or affirm, I no longer make use as I should of my free 
will… the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should 
always precede the determination of the will”. He speaks of belief and free will as if 
we make a decision when we believe or disbelieve something, or as if it is a matter of 
choice whether to believe a proposition following our understanding of the 
proposition. But once I know or understand a proposition to be true, it is not a matter 
of choice for me to decide whether or not to believe it.  
 
It is not up to me whether to believe that the Liberty Spring is sweeping through the 
streets of the Middle East when I see it happening. Knowing or understanding it to be 
a true occurring phenomenon, I mechanically happen to believe it. If it was up to me 
whether to believe it, or if it was a matter of choice or decision whether to believe it, 
then I must have also been able to voluntarily believe otherwise even in the face of 
my perceiving the phenomenon with the sufficient clarity that warrants, from my 
perspective, belief in the given proposition. We will later on learn that if I were 
psychologically able to voluntarily believe p, then I must also be able to voluntarily 
believe p’s negation just like that. Given the Lockean conception of believing, belief 
is attributed only upon good evidence. But, as we have learned in chapters three and 
four, some of our beliefs owe their existence to our pragmatic desires. Furthermore, 
Scott-Kakures argues that “In certain circumstances, some desires may … generate a 
belief the content of which matches that of the desire” (1994: 89).  
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    Deontologists conceive of epistemic justification as a normative concept 
characterised by epistemic permissibility. In this way, a belief enjoys justificatory 
status only if it is epistemically permissible for us to hold such belief: “a justified 
belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief”, argues Steup (2000: 25). 
Furthermore, deontological justification, observes Alston, is “most centrally a concept 
of freedom from blameworthiness, a concept of being ‘in the clear’ so far as one’s 
intellectual obligations are concerned” (1985: 63). In other words, normative 
considerations of being free from blame as far as one’s intellectual obligations1 are 
concerned are the sole fundamental conferring factors of deontological justification. 
Furthermore, deontologists view justification as a matter of fulfilling one’s epistemic 
obligations in coming to believe something and regard believing as a matter of 
epistemic permissibility. Pollock argues that “A justified belief is one that it is 
‘epistemically permissible’ to hold. Epistemic justification is a normative notion. It 
pertains to what you should or should not believe. But it is a uniquely epistemic 
normative notion” (1986: 7). In line with such deontological reasoning, BonJour also 
observes that “the concept of epistemic justification is fundamentally a normative 
concept. It has to do with what one has a duty or obligation to do, from an epistemic 
or intellectual standpoint” (1980: 55). Thus, from a deontological standpoint, one’s 
“being justified in holding a belief is having fulfilled one’s epistemic duties in 
forming or continuing to hold that belief”, argues Plantinga (1993: 14). That is, being 
epistemically responsible in one’s doxastic cultivations is what deontologists take to 
be the necessary condition for being epistemically justified: 
 
[O]ne’s cognitive endeavors are epistemically justified only if and to the 
extent that they are aimed at this goal, which means very roughly that one 
accepts all and only those beliefs which one has good reason to think are true. 
To accept a belief in the absence of such a reason, however appealing or even 
mandatory such acceptance might be from some other standpoint, is to neglect 
the pursuit of truth; such acceptance is, one might say, epistemically 
irresponsible. My contention here is that the idea of avoiding such 
irresponsibility, of being epistemically responsible in one’s believings, is the 
core of the notion of epistemic justification (BonJour 1985: 8).  
                                                 
1
 Alston defines intellectual obligation as “the obligation to refrain from believing that p in the absence 
of adequate evidence” (1985: 64). Feldman also observes that “what we epistemically ought to do is 
follow our evidence” (2000: 695). Moreover, James argues that “There are two ways of looking at our 
duty in the matter of opinion … We must know the truth; and we must avoid error – these are our first 
and great commandments as would-be knowers” (2006: 17). That is, to fulfil epistemic obligations is to 
believe, whenever we take an attitude on something, what is supported by our evidence and abstain 
from believing whenever we judge the available evidence to be insufficient to warrant belief.  
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    BonJour looks at epistemic justification as a prescriptive notion and as an epistemic 
status whose obtaining hinges on fulfilling one’s epistemic obligations in coming to 
believe a proposition. Moreover, Feldman argues that in a doxastic situation where 
only one attitude is licensed, we are epistemically obligated to take on the attitude 
sanctioned by the evidence: “It seems to me reasonable to say that when only one 
attitude is permitted, then one has an epistemic obligation to have that attitude” (2000: 
676). Thus, he holds that “we do have a form of voluntary control over a substantial 
number of beliefs” (Ibid: 695). That is, deontologists assume that we have effective 
voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes and that we are psychologically 
constituted in a way that we are capable to take on such attitudes at will or by choice. 
That is why they think of justification as a normative concept whose presence or 
absence, according to deontologists, dictates what one should or should not believe in 
a given situation and regard justificational status as freedom from blame as far as 
one’s epistemic obligations are concerned. Ginet, a fervent deontologist, argues that 
one ought always to possess belief whenever one possesses justification and ought 
always to abstain from belief whenever one lacks justification or ought always to, at 
least, withhold belief in the absence of justification:  
 
 Assuming that S has the concept of justification for being confident that p, S 
 ought always to possess or lack confidence that p according to whether or not 
 he has such justification. At least he ought always to withhold confidence 
 unless he has justification. This is simply what is meant by having or lacking 
 justification. But if this is what S ought to do in any possible circumstance, 
 then it is what S can do in any possible circumstance (in Alston 1989: 214).      
 
 
That is, given Ginet’s conception of justification, we ought always to believe 
anything we have adequate evidence in favour of and ought always to abstain from or 
withhold belief in the absence of such evidence. But this is not how we normally find 
ourselves in doxastic situations. For example, a fervent American patriot might 
possess substantiating evidence sufficient to warrant belief in the conspiracy theories 
behind the events of 11 September 2001, but might still not come to believe them in 
spite of possessing such evidence. Conversely, a devout Muslim might come to 
believe that the Quran is divine even in the absence of good epistemic evidence. It is 
just a psychological fact that we cannot help believing what we believe or 
disbelieving what we disbelieve. It is true that we ideally tend to believe only when 
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we possess adequate supporting evidence for the object of belief. But it is not the case 
that we are epistemically obligated to possess belief whenever such evidence obtains.  
 
    The presence of adequate supporting evidence, rather, points out Alston, entitles us 
to possess belief: “The presence of justification gives me a right to believe, but I am 
not obliged to exercise that right; I have a choice as to whether or not to do so. … if I 
were obligated to believe everything for which I have a justification, I would be in a 
pretty pickle” (Ibid: 217). Thus, the presence of good evidence provides us with a 
justification to believe, but having the justification to believe does not entail having a 
justified belief. There is a difference between having justification for a belief and 
having a justified belief. Alston argues that “S’s having a justification for believing 
that p is independent of whether S does believe that p; I can have adequate grounds 
for believing that p, and so have a justification, even though I do not in fact believe 
that p” (1985: 74). Furthermore, Fumerton also observes:  
 
 There seems to be a perfectly clear sense in which there may be enormously 
 strong epistemic reasons for me to believe a given proposition even though I 
 don’t end up believing it. In such a situation we can say that there was 
 justification for me to believe the proposition even though I didn’t, of course, 
 have a justified belief (or a belief at all) in the relevant proposition (in Moser 
 2002: 206). 
 
 
    Moreover, Alston argues that “to say that a belief was deontologically justified is 
not to say that the subject was obligated to believe this, but only that he was permitted 
to do so, that believing this did not involve any violation of relevant obligations” 
(1985: 60). Thus, the presence of justification entitles us to believe, but does not 
oblige us to exercise such right. One of the fundamental drawbacks of the 
deontological conception of belief is that it treats doxastic attitudes as if they are 
subject to obligation – that, we are epistemically obligated to possess, abstain from or 
withhold belief depending on whether or not we possess justification. The following 
is what Alston thinks the deontological treatment of belief implies if doxastic attitudes 
were subject to obligation:  
 
As I see it, the major divide in this terrain has to do with whether believing, 
and refraining from believing, are subject to obligation, duty, and the like. If 
they are, we can think of the favourable evaluative status [justificatory status] 
of a certain belief as consisting in the fact that in holding that belief one has 
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fulfilled one’s obligations, or refrained from violating one’s obligations, to 
achieve the fundamental aim in question2 (Ibid: 59). 
 
 
Thus, given Ginet’s deontological conception of belief, Cheney had to either 
abstain from or withhold belief in the Iraqi nuclear proposition for he was in 
possession of no justifying evidence to believe. But in coming to, apparently, believe 
that Iraq had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, he flouts his core epistemic 
duty to withhold or refrain from belief in the absence of good evidence. And since he, 
seemingly, comes to believe something when the evidence does not call for belief, he 
is rightly to blame for his so believing. Thus, he cannot be afforded deontological 
justification for what he supposedly believes. Even if we assume that the IAEA’s 
findings either did not exist or were not accessible to him at the time of belief, Cheney 
would still not escape epistemic blame for his alleged belief. Given what epistemic 
deontologism implies and considering the fact that Cheney was a rational being, it 
would have been within his power to properly look into the given matter before 
arriving at his alleged belief that p. Had he done what he was epistemically obligated 
to do in the way of intellectual responsibilities, he would have either suspended or 
refrained from belief in the matter. That is if he ever genuinely came to believe that p. 
 
    Thus, deontological justification resides in the fulfilment of one’s epistemic 
obligations in coming to believe a proposition. That is, I am deontologically justified 
in holding the doxastic attitude I hold so long I abide by my epistemic obligations in 
holding such attitude regardless of whether or not, prior to the acquisition of the 
attitude, the fulfilment of my epistemic duties had culminated in good epistemic 
reasons for the attitude I now hold. For deontologists, what counts as justification-
conferring is being blameless in holding a belief. They explicitly treat doxastic 
attitudes as if they are open to choice or decision. In fact Pollock believes this to be 
one of the fundamental issues of epistemology: “I have taken the fundamental 
problem of epistemology to be that of deciding what to believe. Epistemic 
justification, as I use the term, is concerned with this problem. Considerations of 
epistemic justification guide us in determining what to believe” (1986: 10). But 
                                                 
2
 By the fundamental aim in question, Alston refers to the epistemic point of view which he defines as 
being “characterised by a concern with the twin goals of believing the true and not believing the false” 
(1989: 116). The epistemic point of view is the perspective from which the epistemic evaluation of 
belief is carried out. 
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Plantinga rightly argues that believing is not up to us to be able to choose or decide 
whether to believe p or not p: 
 
the fact is in typical cases I neither undertake to believe (anymore than I 
undertake to breathe) nor make any decisions as to what to believe. I have too 
little direct control over my beliefs for that. … I find myself with an 
ineluctable inclination to believe that this proposition is true and indeed 
necessarily so. You ask me what I had for breakfast: I find myself believing 
that what I had for breakfast was a grapefruit. I am appeared to redly; I find 
myself with the belief that I am perceiving something red. I consider the 
question what Caesar had for breakfast the morning he crossed the Rubicon: I 
find myself with no belief on that topic. In each of these cases (as in general), I 
have little or no direct or conscious control. … I can’t just decide not to 
believe that I had a grapefruit for breakfast; and I can’t just decide to form a 
belief as to what Caesar had for breakfast that fateful morning (although I can 
decide to go to the library and look it up) (1993: 177).  
 
 
Ginet associates justifiability status with doxastic permissibility. He argues that one 
is justified in believing that p so long as one is epistemically permitted in so 
believing: “One is justified in being confident that p if and only if it is not the case 
that one ought not to be confident that p: one could not be justly reproached for being 
confident that p” (1975: 28). That is, just like the rest of other deontologists, Ginet 
associates justificatory status with the permissibility of belief. Alston observes that it 
is this permissibility that underlies this whole notion of the deontological evaluation 
of belief: “for an action or whatever to be justified in a deontological sense is for it to 
be permitted, rather than required. Thus it is the necessity of an effective choice for 
something to be permitted that is crucial here” (1989: 118). In other words, he argues 
that the deontological assessment of belief concerns the permissibility rather than the 
obligation to believe, and that for the concept of permissibility to apply in any given 
context, the agent must be able to make an effective choice as to whether to believe p 
or not p. This rightly counters Ginet’s contention that we ought to believe whenever 
we have evidence that warrants such believing. Thus, given the deontological 
conception of belief, we can be rightly reproached for believing something that is not 
permitted by our evidence. But Alston argues that a “person cannot be blamed for 
having something she can’t help having” (Ibid: 148). We do not have voluntary 
control over our beliefs, which is why we cannot help believing what we believe; and 
in the absence of such control, the concept of blame or responsibility will have no 
legitimate application.  
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That is why Alston argues that the notion of doxastic permissibility holds only if 
we, in any given doxastic situation, had the freedom to make an effective choice 
whether to believe p or not p: “it makes no sense to speak of S’s being permitted or 
forbidden to do A if S lacks an effective choice as to whether to do A” (Ibid: 118). He 
argues that we could be blamed for believing p if prior to believing p, there were 
epistemic duties that we could and should have fulfilled, and that had we fulfilled 
them we would not now be believing p: “we may say that I am subject to reproach for 
believing that p, provided that I am to blame for being in that doxastic condition, in 
the sense that there are things I could and should have done, such that if I had done 
them I would not now be believing that p” (1985: 66). Putting it into a formula, he 
further states:  
 
 S is justified in believing that p iff it is not the case that if S had fulfilled all 
 her intellectual obligations, then S’s belief-forming habits would have 
 changed, or S’s access to relevant adverse considerations would have changed, 
 in such a way that S would not have believed that p (1989: 143).  
 
 
    That is, the underlying thesis of the deontological conception of justification is that 
we can be justified in believing p only if we have blamelessly come to believe p. But, 
as observed earlier, the concepts of blame and permissibility pertain only if we have 
voluntary control over our beliefs or only if we had the freedom to choose whether to 
believe p or not p. Deontologists, however, treat belief as an appropriate object of 
epistemic blame. That is why they contend that it is within our power to prevent belief 
whenever an epistemic obligation obtains such that had we, before coming to believe 
that p, fulfilled the obligation, we would not have come to believe what we now 
believe: “Whenever a belief is an appropriate object for the attribution of epistemic 
blame, it must have been within the agent’s power to do something that would have 
led him to refraining from this belief” observes Steup (1988: 72).  
 
    In chapter three, we learned that the desire or intention to believe does not carry us 
directly to the belief state we aim at. But since our doxastic cultivations are not 
always epistemically motivated or oriented, there is still some prima facie intuitive 
appeal in favour of some control over some of our beliefs. We are, as noted on pp. 79-
80, not emotionally neutral in all our believings. That is, sometimes we are 
emotionally biased towards a particular proposition in favour of satisfying a desire, a 
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need, an emotion, being (or remaining) faithful or committed to a doctrine or a 
principle. That is, in certain doxastic situations, our beliefs either stem indirectly from 
our desires or their acquisition is influenced indirectly by our desires. Propositional 
attitudes that are so acquired primarily consist of faith, religious, love or political 
beliefs. Alston argues that such beliefs are often acquired in a non-truth-conducive 
manner, paradigmatically with an irresistibly or unshakably strong emotional 
attachment, commitment, or allegiance to the proposition in question: 
 
For many people their religious or irreligious beliefs have this status 
[irresistible and unshakable strong emotional attachment to something], as do 
beliefs concerning one’s country, one’s close relations, or one’s political party. 
Such beliefs are often not formed in a truth-conducive way that would render 
them likely to be true (2005: 79-80).  
 
 
    That is, such beliefs are often acquired under the indirect influence of a certain 
desire, a doctrinal commitment or allegiance that overrides truth-conducivity or the 
epistemic goal of our cognitive endeavours. Further, Yee, herself a voluntarist, argues 
that “what I believe stems from what I want” (2002: 446). But, faced with the 
implausibility of the direct control voluntary believing implies, she states: “Doxastic 
voluntarism is not about believing what one wants. Rather, it is about how one’s 
wants influence what one believes” (Ibid: 446). But the way our desires influence 
what we come to believe cannot count as bringing about belief at will just like that. 
The only way such desires constitute doxastic voluntarism is if they can bring about 
belief directly after my desiring to be in a particular belief state. Desires, as already 
explained, have an indirect influence over our believings in the way of rendering us to 
primarily or solely consider or look for corroborating evidence in a bid to get 
ourselves to believe what we want to believe. If I could bring about belief directly 
solely through desire, I could bring it about that I believe John Kennedy is still the 
President of the United States just through my desiring this to be the case.  
 
    But, lacking any adequate supporting evidence, I’m psychologically incapable of 
bringing about such belief state solely on the basis of the desire that it be true. Thus, 
the proposition that Kennedy is still the President of the United States remains solely 
as a desired belief, I do not hold any such belief. The role desires play in our belief 
acquisitions cannot provide for the kind of direct voluntary control which doxastic 
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voluntarism presupposes. Yee recognizes that beliefs are not under direct control but 
argues that the lack of such control shall not amount to the involuntariness of belief: 
“We do not have direct influence over what we believe. We, as agents, do not cause 
our beliefs. … But our lack of direct control need not amount to involuntariness” 
(Ibid: 454). Furthermore, she takes the voluntary control we exercise over some desire 
to account for doxastic voluntarism: “the role that desires play in belief is sufficiently 
significant to justify calling beliefs voluntary” (Ibid: 446). Explaining the logic of her 
argument in practice, Yee instantiates the role of desire in affording us with direct 
control over our beliefs with the case of an atheist who wants to believe in God:  
 
It must be noted that the desire to believe … requires the intervention of 
practical desire in order to be satisfied. For the atheist who wants to believe, 
actions such as frequenting places of worship, reading sacred texts, and 
spending time with believers will satisfy some of the practical desires that 
pave the road to the desired belief that God exists. ... In order for desired 
beliefs to be formed, practical desires need to be satisfied. The forming of a 
belief requires the satisfaction of some practical desire. Belief is inextricable 
from desire and action. … Without desire, there can be no belief. Belief, desire 
and action are interdependent. Belief is inextricably caught up in the flow of 
action and desire satisfaction. The subject plays an active role in the forming 
of his belief (Ibid: 452-453). 
 
 
Yee provides us with two contradictory theses. She first argues that “The subject 
plays an active role in the forming of his belief”, later on she retracts this, stating that 
“We, as agents, do not cause our beliefs”. We certainly play an active role in the 
causal ancestry of any belief whose acquisition entails some inquiry. But this cannot 
count as actively causing or forming a belief. “Belief”, argues Frankish, “does not 
seem to be the sort of state that can be actively created and sustained. It seems, rather, 
to be a dispositional state, which is passively formed and cannot be altered by a 
simple act of will” (2007: 523). Ignoring the perceptual, memory or introspective 
beliefs or other beliefs whose existence owes not to active agency or the satisfaction 
of any practical desire, Yee contends that all instances of belief formation require the 
satisfaction of some practical desire or there can be no belief. I am stood in the 
balcony of my flat overlooking River Don, a duck crosses my vision, and I thereby 
acquire a belief that there is a duck in the river. It is a perceptual belief that I acquire 
without satisfying any practical desire, without performing any action or playing an 
active role in the formation of such belief. Not only she conceives of belief formation 
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as voluntary, Yee even argues that holding a belief is, at best, relatively less voluntary 
than its formation: “The holding [of a belief] may be relatively less voluntary than 
forming, but it is difficult to see how it could be involuntary given that it occurs 
between the voluntarism of its forming and the agency of the action3 of which it forms 
the root” (2002: 453). But if holding beliefs were voluntary which I contend is not, 
then I can voluntarily retain a belief even in the presence of a conscious belief that the 
grounds that first gave rise to the given belief are now defeated or undermined by the 
emergence of new counter-evidence. Similarly, I can voluntarily abandon, if I so 
desire to, a held belief I take to be warranted from my perspective.  
 
Epistemologists disagree over whether doxastic attitudes are under the influence of 
direct control. Doxastic involuntarists concede that we possess some indirect 
voluntary control over certain belief acquisitions in the way of initiating inquiries or 
seeking evidence. That is, they submit that voluntary control obtains in the causal 
ancestry of certain beliefs, but deny that such control has any direct influence on the 
resultant belief. Further, Alston observes that “One certainly has voluntary control 
over whether to keep looking for evidence or reasons, and voluntary control over 
where to look, what steps to take to find relevant considerations, and so on” (2005: 
69). But doxastic voluntarists hold that belief formations are themselves voluntary. 
There are two considerations that could give rise to doxastic voluntarism and make it 
prima facie plausible. First, we are not always driven in our believings by epistemic 
considerations. That is, our beliefs are sometimes directionally driven, as clarified in 
chapter four; driven by certain pragmatic goals, we sometimes arrive at the belief we 
want to arrive at even if the belief is not supported by the majority evidence. Second, 
the provenance of the concept of justification. Alston argues that given the original 
use of justification as an exculpatory status deployed in relation to actions performed 
voluntarily, it is plausible to assume this to be the origin where epistemic justification 
emanates from, and therefore equally plausible to conceive of the justification of 
belief in terms of epistemic responsibilities, obligations and duties and regard 
believing as being liable to requirement, permission and prohibition:  
                                                 
3
 Yee speaks of belief formation as if every belief, after its being formed, is going to be action-guiding 
or is going to be used as a ground for doing something afterwards. She argues that once a belief is 
formed, one “holds it and uses it to satisfy some desire” (2002: 453). She also argues that “Because 
beliefs are part of the causes of action, they are formed in order for actions to occur” (Ibid: 454). 
 176 
it is plausible to suppose that ‘justified’ came into epistemology from its more 
unproblematic use with respect to voluntary action. I am justified in doing 
something, for example, appointing someone to a Teaching Assistantship on 
my own, provided my doing so is in accordance with the relevant rules and 
regulations, provided it is permitted4 by those rules and hence that I could not 
rightfully be blamed or held to account for it, and was acting responsibly in 
doing so. The rules could be institutional, as in the above example, or legal or 
moral. Thus I would be morally justified in failing to make a contribution to a 
certain organization provided my doing so doesn’t violate any moral rule. 
Because of this provenance it is natural to think of believing, when taken to be 
subject to being justified or unjustified, as subject to requirement, prohibition, 
and permission. We say things like “You shouldn’t have supposed so readily 
that he would not return”, “You have no right to assume that”, “You shouldn’t 
jump to conclusions”, and “I ought to have trusted him more than I did”. 
Locutions like these seem to be interchangeable with speaking of a belief as 
being, or not being, justified (Ibid: 59).  
 
 
    In addition, Alston also observes that we “often seem to suggest the voluntary 
control of belief: ‘I finally decided that he was the man for the job’, ‘Make up your 
mind…’, ‘I had to accept his testimony; I had no choice’” (1989: 119). And it is 
because of such linguistic background of the concept of justification that he argues: 
“My linguistic intuitions tell me that ‘justified’ and its cognates are properly used 
only in a deontological sense. To be justified in doing or believing something just is to 
not have violated any relevant rules, norms, or principles in so doing, believing” (Ibid: 
143). Thus, given the background against which our use of epistemic justification has 
developed, it is normal to associate volitional terminology such as requirement, 
prohibition and permission with epistemic justification. Just as actions are explainable 
in terms of their permissibility and blameworthiness and the actors’ justifiability 
status in terms of the fulfilment of their legal, moral or institutional obligations, 
responsibilities and duties, deontologists explain beliefs in terms of permissibility and 
blameworthiness and the believers’ justifiability status in terms of the fulfilment of 
their epistemic or intellectual obligations, responsibilities and duties. But in practice, 
the background use of justification proves incompatible with its use as epistemic 
evaluative status for beliefs are not actions. But Chisholm argues that if we have self-
                                                 
4
 Alston points out that one cannot be rightfully faulted for violating a rule if one has a valid excuse for 
the violation, but once such excuse is not mentioned in the text, then it is presupposed that there is no 
such excuse for the violation: “I don’t suggest that doing what is not permitted by the rules is 
coextensive with being subject to blame for doing it. One might have a valid excuse for doing it despite 
the rules. When I speak of violating a rule as being blameworthy, it is presupposed that there is no such 
excuse” (2005: 59).  
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control over our activities, then some of our beliefs whose causal ancestry entails 
activities of evidence-gathering would seem to be actions:  
 
 If self-control is what is essential to activity, some of our beliefs, our 
 believings, would seem to be acts. When a man deliberates and comes finally 
 to a conclusion, his decision is as much within his control as is any other deed 
 we attribute to him. If his conclusion was unreasonable, a conclusion he 
 should not have accepted, we may plead with him: “But you needn’t have 
 supposed that so-and-so was true. Why didn’t you take account of these other 
 facts?” We assume that his decision is one he could have avoided and that, had 
 he only chosen to do so, he could have made a more reasonable inference. Or, 
 if his conclusion is not the result of a deliberate inference, we may say, “But if 
 you had only stopped to think”, implying that, had he chosen, he could have 
 stopped to think. We suppose, as we do whenever we apply our ethical or 
 moral predicates, that there was something else the agent could have done 
 instead (in Alston 2005: 69).  
 
 
That is, we often encounter retrospective statements about our doxastic attitudes. 
This retrospective discourse appears to put instances of believing under voluntary 
control. In retrospect, I come to realise that I should not have so readily trusted a 
messenger or accepted some testimony. In hindsight, I reproach myself for 
unreflectively accepting the reliability or competence of an employee. Through self-
reflection or retrospection, I come to blame myself for being too credulous towards 
some political promise, or I come to reproach myself to so readily accept or believe in 
the fidelity of my girlfriend. These are retrospective evaluations of my propositional 
attitudes that seem to imply that I could and should have been more sensitive or 
attentive to epistemic or evidential considerations or more reflective of testimony. In 
turn, they imply that I could have drawn a better or a more informed conclusion or 
that I could have refrained from such beliefs had I only chosen to do so. But I cannot 
be said to possess direct control over my beliefs in retrospect while impotent to 
successfully exercise such power at the time of belief formation. These retrospective 
statements should, therefore, serve a different purpose. Furthermore, we observed 
earlier that Chisholm takes the voluntary control we exercise in the intermediate steps 
of a belief as voluntary control over the belief formation itself. But Alston argues that 
the self-control we have over the activities we undertake in the causal ancestry of a 
belief cannot amount to direct control over the resultant belief:  
 
 178 
the mere fact that one often looks for evidence to decide an unresolved issue 
does not show that one has voluntary control over one’s propositional 
attitudes. … In order that the phenomenon of looking for more evidence 
would show that we have voluntary control over propositional attitudes, it 
would have to be the case that the search for evidence was undertaken with the 
intention of taking up a certain attitude toward a specific proposition. For only 
in that case would it have any tendency to show that we have exercised 
voluntary control over what propositional attitude we come to have. … the 
only voluntary control I have over my propositional attitudes is to enter onto 
an investigation that will eventuate in some propositional attitude or other on 
what is being considered (2005: 70-71). 
 
 
But even if I were to set out seeking evidence with the intention to take up a certain 
doxastic attitude towards a specific proposition, this still would not count as having 
direct voluntary control over my doxastic attitudes. If I had such control, I could take 
up the willed belief directly, just like that, without focus or heed to corroborating 
evidence. My setting out to gather evidence with the intention to bring about a certain 
doxastic attitude is just an indirect route of getting myself to believe the willed belief. 
I lack direct control over my beliefs, which is why I engage in a search for confirming 
evidence with the hope or intention that I can bring it about that I believe what I want 
to believe. We exercise voluntary control in the intermediate steps of certain belief 
acquisitions. Faced with a non-self-evident proposition, I cannot just take up any 
doxastic attitude I desire without some supporting ground. I, therefore, initiate a 
process of evidence gathering voluntarily if I wanted to settle doxastic opinion on the 
given issue. I seek evidence both pro and con if I were to acquire a truth-conducive 
belief, or just seek confirming evidence and ignore disconfirming evidence if I were 
to satisfy some pragmatic desire in my quest for a state of belief as the case of the 
atheist demonstrated.  
 
    A coroner voluntarily launches an inquest into a suspicious death, seeking evidence 
pro and con to resolve doxastic opinion on the issue. The inquest comes up with 
conclusive evidence that the victim was drowned. The coroner has voluntary control 
over the activities associated with the process of gathering evidence such as initiating 
a forensic examination or choosing the witnesses to testify. But this voluntary control 
does not imply that the resultant doxastic attitude which the coroner eventually comes 
up with is arrived at voluntarily. Faced with adequate evidence, the coroner cannot 
help believing that the victim was drowned. This kind of voluntary control only 
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makes it possible that a doxastic attitude is brought about or that doxastic opinion is 
settled on the matter. Furthermore, Alston argues that the voluntary control we 
exercise in the intermediate steps of such belief acquisitions just “shows that I have 
long-range voluntary control over whether I take up some propositional attitude 
toward some proposition” (Ibid: 70). But, he argues, deontologists “locate the 
voluntary control in the moment of attitude formation rather than in the preliminary 
investigation” (Ibid: 71).  
 
Moreover, Alston argues that voluntary control obtains in the intermediate steps of 
certain doxastic attitudes rather than at the moment of attitude formation, that is why 
the deontological evaluation of belief as being subject to blame is “a derivative one. It 
is the (actual or possible) voluntary acts in the causal ancestry of the belief to which 
blameworthiness and other deontological terms of evaluation apply in a primary way” 
(Ibid: 74). Thus, if beliefs were ever subject to blame, I would be primarily blamed 
for failing to fulfil some intellectual obligation in the intermediate steps of a belief 
and derivatively blameworthy for holding the belief I hold. Alston does not rule out 
the significance of fulfilling intellectual obligations in settling doxastic opinion. 
Rather, he argues that “fulfilment of intellectual obligations has an intrinsic cognitive 
value that is independent of truth” (Ibid: 78). He contends that we can blamelessly 
believe something for bad reasons: “I may have done what could reasonably be 
expected of me in the management and cultivation of my doxastic life, and still hold a 
belief on outrageously inadequate grounds” (1985: 67). That is, he rightly argues that 
being in the clear with regard to our intellectual obligations does not always 
necessitate the possession of good epistemic evidence for belief. It cannot be an 
alternative to good evidence. Though he has recently retracted from his earlier 
deontological position, BonJour was one of the pioneers of the premise that epistemic 
dutifulness is a necessary condition of (epistemic) internalist justification. The 
following is his current position on such alleged necessity:  
 
 While I am, alas, one of those responsible for the idea that being epistemically 
 responsible or satisfying one's epistemic duties is tantamount to being justified 
 in the  internalist sense, it is in fact relatively easy to see that this is wrong, 
 indeed that being epistemically responsible or satisfying one's epistemic duties 
 is not even sufficient for internalist justification. … one main reason for this is 
 the possibility of situations of what I will refer to as epistemic poverty. 
 Suppose that a group of people is in a situation where the kinds of  evidence 
 or the methods of inquiry available to them are so limited as to make it 
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 difficult or even impossible to come up with strong evidence or good 
 epistemic reasons for answers to many important questions. In fact, it is clear 
 that many human beings living in earlier eras have found themselves in such 
 situations, and perhaps less clear than is often thought that we are not still in 
 one to a considerable extent. It is quite implausible to insist that in a situation 
 of this kind, epistemic duty still requires accepting only beliefs for which there 
 are strong reasons, since this would mean that the people in question are 
 required to have no beliefs at all about many important issues. To insist on 
 such a view is in effect to give the avoidance of error an absolute and 
 unwarranted priority over the discovery of truth. But while it is plausible to 
 think that it is no violation of epistemic duty to accept beliefs on a weaker 
 basis in such a situation, it remains the case that the people in question fail to 
 possess good reasons for thinking that beliefs accepted in this way are true and 
 hence that their beliefs are not justified to any substantial degree in the main 
 internalist sense, even though the requirements of epistemic duty have been 
 satisfied. (I think that virtually all internalists would accept this result and that 
 their occasional suggestions to the contrary are a result of focusing on 
 situations of at least approximate epistemic plenty). Cases of epistemic 
 poverty are cases in which it seems possible to fulfil one's epistemic duty 
 without being epistemically justified in the main internalist sense. … [but 
 there are] also cases of the opposite sort, cases in which a person has good, 
 truth-conductive reasons for his or her beliefs, but still fails to satisfy the 
 requirements of epistemic duty, thereby showing that the satisfaction of duty is 
 … not necessary for internalist justification … It is plausible to suppose that 
 … [one] is violating an epistemic duty [in one's doxastic cultivations], but it 
 also seems entirely possible that he or she might still happen to have good 
 reasons for the beliefs that result and so be justified in the internalist sense. … 
 For these reasons, it seems to  me clear that epistemic justification cannot be 
 simply identified with the fulfilment of epistemic duty as the deontological 
 conception claims. What is true, I would suggest, is rather something 
 substantially weaker: seeking good epistemic reasons and believing on the 
 basis of them is, at least in situations of relative epistemic plenty, one 
 important requirement of epistemic duty and arguably the most central of all. 
 This makes it easy to understand how some internalists, myself included, were 
 led to overstate the connection between the two concepts. But it remains the 
 case that the idea of satisfying epistemic duty turns out to be quite distinct 
 from the main internalist conception of epistemic justification (2003: 175-
 177).  
 
 
    That is, though the epistemic poverty agent might come to believe a proposition 
blamelessly, his so believing will not be epistemically justified. These epistemically 
poor or restricted conditions warrant an epistemic excuse which, in turn, renders a 
potential believing subject blameless in his believing under such conditions. But, as 
far as epistemic justification is concerned, the existence of an epistemic excuse in a 
given doxastic situation does not supersede the necessity of good epistemic reasons. 
Thus, being blameless or epistemically dutiful in arriving at a belief is not tantamount 
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to being epistemically justified in holding the belief. One might be epistemically 
responsible in one's doxastic cultivations, but still lack epistemic justification for one's 
beliefs, as observed above. Similarly, one might come to believe a proposition on the 
basis of good epistemic reasons, but still be in violation of some relevant epistemic 
obligation. Fulfilling the entirety of one's relevant epistemic obligations is too 
difficult a requirement to be satisfied, which is why epistemic obligations, if they are 
ever necessary for epistemic justification which I contend are not, shall be construed 
as a reasonable fulfilment of such obligations, as pointed out on p. 183. Furthermore, 
in an attempt to show that fulfilment of epistemic obligations is insufficient to confer 
epistemic justification on belief, Alston presents a case of cultural isolation where 
everyone blamelessly, but for bad epistemic reasons, believes the tribal traditions to 
be authoritative just because they are traditions of the tribe:  
 
there is what we might call “cultural isolation”. If I have grown up in an 
isolated community in which everyone unhesitatingly accepts [believes] the 
traditions of the tribe as authoritative, then if I have never encountered 
anything that seems to cast doubt on the traditions and have never thought to 
question them, I can hardly be blamed for taking them as authoritative. There 
is nothing I could reasonably be expected to do that would alter that belief-
forming tendency. And there is nothing I could be expected to do that would 
render me more exposed to counter-evidence. (We can suppose that the 
traditions all have to do with events distant in time and/or space, matters on 
which I could not be expected to gather evidence on my own). I am 
[deontologically justified] in believing these things. And yet the fact that it is 
the tradition of the tribe that p may be a very poor reason for believing that p 
(1985: 67-68).  
 
 
    Under such circumstances, we can be attributed deontological justification for 
being blameless in what we believe, but cannot be endowed with epistemic 
justification for basing our belief on bad evidence. The logic behind the obtaining of 
the deontological justification is this: since verifying or properly looking into the 
matter has never crossed my mind nor have I ever encountered anything either to 
prompt such inquiry or doubt the veracity of such traditions, and since obtaining 
evidence or additional evidence is beyond my capacities, I have a legitimate epistemic 
excuse to believe the tribal traditions on the basis of their being the traditions of the 
tribe I am a part of, and since I have a legitimate epistemic excuse for holding such 
belief on this basis, I believe blamelessly. I, therefore, am entitled to deontological 
justification. But Steup counters this drawback against epistemic deontology and 
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argues that “Cultural isolation, or a lack of opportunities to get second, critical, 
opinions, just isn’t good enough for an epistemic excuse” (1988: 78). He holds that: 
“No matter how grim the circumstances are, if an agent holds a belief contrary to 
evidence, it is within his power, given that he is a rational agent, to reflect upon his 
belief and thereby to find out that he had better withhold it, or even assent to its 
negation” (Ibid: 78). But Alston argues that:  
 
what can reasonably be expected of a subject with respect to, for instance, 
critical examination of beliefs and their bases will differ across cultures. We 
require adults in our culture to be critical of “tradition”, but this is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, given the time humans have been on earth; it cannot be 
reasonably required of everyone in every society. Note that I am not saying 
that what is adequate evidence varies with the culture. I am no cultural 
relativist. On the contrary. My judgment that S’s belief lacks adequate grounds 
was based on the supposition that there are objective standards for adequacy of 
grounds that hold whatever is accepted in one or another culture. … 
Deontological justification is sensitive to cultural differences because it 
depends on what can reasonably be expected of one, and that in turn depends 
on one’s social inheritance and the influences to which one is exposed. But 
truth conducivity does not so depend. Hence they can diverge (1989: 146). 
 
 
    Steup bases his response to Alston’s cultural isolation case on the assumption that 
the deontological treatment of belief pertains only to rational agents who possess the 
necessary intellectual sophistication to properly reflect on a proposition, scrutinising 
its credentials before taking up any doxastic attitude towards the proposition. That is 
why he argues that “as long as we are dealing with rational agency, it seems to me, 
beliefs as much as actions are appropriate objects for deontic evaluation” (1988: 73). 
Thus, the only counter-example to the deontological treatment of belief Steup 
recognizes is the case of the incapacitated agent: “there is just one condition that 
epistemically excuses believing contrary to evidence, namely the condition of being 
incapacitated as a rational agent” (Ibid: 78). In other words, however in violation of 
the deontological norm that forbids belief contrary to evidence, the incapacitated 
agent, due to his being incapacitated, is inculpable in his so believing and therefore 
rightly entitled for deontological justification. But non-deontologists deprive such 
beliefs from epistemic justification due to the absence of acceptable epistemic 
grounds. That is why Alston argues that “the deontological conception of justification 
… fails to deliver what is expected of justification if those expectations include truth 
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conducivity” (1989: 150). Thus, deontological justification does not entail epistemic 
justification.   
 
    Moreover, the agent who, on testimony, comes to believe in the opening of the Red 
Sea or the divinity of the Quran can be afforded deontological justification, but lacks 
epistemic justification for basing the belief on epistemically degenerate grounds. That 
is, we can be endowed with deontological justification – but not necessarily epistemic 
justification – for most of our testimony-based beliefs because, argues Alston, in 
“most cases in which I uncritically accept testimony I have done as much as could 
reasonably be expected of me” (Ibid: 148). He further argues that “even if we had the 
time to check up on each authority, in most cases we lack the resources for making an 
informed judgment” (Ibid: 148). Aside from the voluntary control it presupposes, 
Alston argues that one of the difficulties that pose a challenge for the deontological 
treatment of justification is the impossibility to fulfil one’s entire relevant epistemic 
obligations and one’s inability to know whether that limit is reached. That is why he 
suggests that fulfilling one’s epistemic obligations be understood as what could 
reasonably be expected of one:   
 
Consider the obligation to look for relevant considerations pro and con when it 
is not clear whether the proposition in question i[s] true. … To require that 
every conceivably relevant consideration must be taken into account would be 
a counsel of perfection that is beyond any of our powers, not to mention the 
fact that we couldn’t know whether that limit had been reached. It seems that 
to make the notion of fulfilling intellectual obligations usable we have to build 
in a limitation to what could reasonably be expected of a subject ... [But] what 
could be reasonably expected along this line will vary for different people in 
accordance with their abilities, experience, education, propensities, and so on 
(2005: 78). 
 
 
    To conclude, given the original use of justification, the deontological argument 
seems, at face value, plausible in associating epistemic justification with one’s being 
blameless in holding or retaining a belief. But the original use of justification 
demonstrates the provenance where the concept of epistemic justification first 
emanates from. It is not representative of how the concept of epistemic justification is 
applied or how its presence is assessed. The object of application for epistemic 
justification is not the same as the one for act justification. Beliefs are not actions. 
Thus, the two objects of application are not the same to share the same assessment 
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criteria. It is not like a metaphor where the originating source of the metaphor 
conveys its characteristics and relevant assessment criteria to the metaphorised object. 
The metaphorised object is, therefore, explainable in terms of the characteristics of the 
originating source of the metaphor. But this is not the case with epistemic justification 
and the originating source (act justification) of its use. The deontological account of 
justification faces profound counter-intuitive difficulties. On the one hand, fulfilling 
all relevant intellectual obligations with respect to a given proposition is too difficult a 
requirement to be met. On the other hand, doing what one is reasonably expected to 
do in the way of intellectual obligations does not necessarily lead to good epistemic 
grounds to warrant an epistemic settlement of doxastic opinion. Fulfilling relevant 
intellectual obligations is important in resolving doxastic opinion on a proposition. 
But it does not necessitate good epistemic grounds to ensure epistemic justification. 
That is why fulfilling intellectual obligations is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
conferment of epistemic justification. This is apart from the fact that doxastic attitudes 
are not under the direct control which epistemic deontology implies.  
 
From a deontological perspective, we are epistemically obligated to guide our 
doxastic cultivations by good evidence. But we can do so only if we have knowledge 
of such evidence. It is this deontological premise which critics of internalism take to 
be the motivation behind the internalist constraint on justification. On the 
deontological view, belief is a willable mental phenomenon for deontologism 
presupposes voluntary control over doxastic attitudes. But the notion of doxastic 
voluntarism is inconsistent with the very intuitions that both motivate and underlie 
internalism. The deontological premise cannot, therefore, tenably account for the 
motivation behind internalism without countering the very intuitions that motivate 
internalism itself. The motivation behind an internalist access on justifying conditions 
arises from the common-sensical conviction that justification normally obtains when 
there is some inkling on the part of the believing subject as to what is responsible for 
the truth of his belief that p. In the absence of such inkling, we feel uneasy to accept a 
belief as justified. The failure of the deontological premise to tenably account for the 
internalist constraint on justification further reinforces the intuitive plausibility of the 
common-sensical convictions that underlie internalism.  
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Chapter Eight  
8.1. The Externalist Theory of Epistemic Justification   
 
The underlying issue among justificationist epistemologists is whether justification 
is an internal or external matter to a believing subject. From a common-sensical or an 
internalist perspective, it is an internal matter. But from an externalist perspective, it is 
an external matter. I have argued in favour of internalism thus far. This chapter 
examines the essence of externalism in an attempt to demonstrate the untenability of 
justificatory theories that do not issue from our common-sensical convictions of 
justification. The analysis of externalism further reinforces the intuitive plausibility of 
the common-sensical convictions that underlie internalism. Externalism does not 
assume any actual or potential awareness requirement on justifying conditions. From 
an externalist perspective, the fundamental and necessary repository for justification 
is the reliability of the cognitive process that generates the belief. It is a theory which 
appears to provide a solution to the problems internalism faces. But as we will learn 
below, externalism cannot function as an efficient justificatory account for three 
reasons. First, the theory lacks specificity as to what process type among the relevant 
process types of a given process token shall be assessed for its reliability. Second, due 
to its denial of the necessity to have some sort of cognitive access to justifying 
conditions, the theory tends to render cognizers epistemically irrational for believing 
something in the absence of any inkling as to what is responsible for the truth of the 
belief. Third, the underlying thesis of externalism runs counter to the intuitions that 
explain the raison d'être behind epistemic justification. The raison d'être behind the 
existence of epistemic justification is a common-sensical or an internalist conviction 
that we can be justified in believing that p only if we possess some inkling as to the 
evidence that led us to such a belief. This is, of course, if our believing that p is based 
on good evidence. It is our intuitions that explain the raison d'être behind justification. 
From an intuitive standpoint, justification obtains only when there is, on the part of 
the believing subject, some inkling as to its conferring premise. That is only if we 
have some knowledge of what is responsible for the truth of our belief that p. In the 
absence of such knowledge, we feel an intuitive unease to accept a belief as justified.  
 
The fundamental thesis of the externalist account of justification is that we can be 
justified in holding a belief without our being actually or potentially aware of its 
 186 
justifying conditions. That is, the relationship between the cognizer and the justifying 
premise has no bearing on conferring justification according to externalism. 
Externalism considers cognitive access to justifying conditions extraneous to our 
possessing justificational status for a belief. We have already outlined three different 
conceptions of internalism. First, mentalism – a theory contending that justifying 
factors are internal to the cognizer in a metaphysical sense. Second, accessibilism or 
access internalism (AI) – a theory requiring that justifying conditions be actually or 
potentially accessible to the cognizer. Third, perspectival internalism (PI) – a theory 
requiring that justifying conditions be within the cognizer’s perspective on the world 
with the cognizer’s perspective on the world being paradigmatically specified as the 
cognizer’s justified beliefs. Of the three internalist conceptions, mentalism turned out 
to be the least tenable. On the whole, internalists require that in order to be justified in 
holding a belief, the believer should have some actual or potential awareness of the 
justifying condition. It is this awareness requirement on justifying conditions that 
polarises internalists and externalists. The core fundamental of externalism is the 
reliability of the belief-forming process that produces the belief. That is, externalists 
regard such reliability as the necessary and sufficient requirement for justification. 
Externalist (reliabilist) accounts of justification contend that a belief is justified only if 
it is acquired through a reliable process that makes it objectively likely that the belief 
in question is true without the believer being required to be aware that the belief is 
reliably produced:  
 
According to the reliabilist, the main requirement for epistemic justification is 
roughly that a belief be produced or caused in a way or via a process that 
makes it objectively likely that the belief is true. Such a mode of belief 
production is thus a reliable source of true beliefs. … But what is not required 
for justification on any such view is that the person for whom the belief is 
justified be in any way aware (whether justifiedly or not) that the belief is 
produced in a reliable way. In the absence of such an awareness, that person 
will also in general be aware of no reason of any sort for thinking that the 
belief is true. It is the insistence that the cognitive availability of such a reason 
is unnecessary for epistemic justification that is the distinctive – and 
problematic – feature of externalism (BonJour 2003: 25-26).  
 
    That is, according to externalists, the necessary and sufficient requirement for 
epistemic justification is the reliability of the cognitive process through which one 
acquires a belief – a reliable process being construed as a process that makes it 
objectively likely that the belief in question is true. Thus, from an externalist 
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standpoint, S is justified in believing p or retaining the belief that p providing that p 
has been acquired through a reliable process. On externalist views, for a belief to 
possess justificational status, the believer is not required to be aware of the fact that 
the belief is reliably produced or that the believer's relevant cognitive process is 
reliable. Furthermore, in his reliabilist account of justification, Goldman contends that 
the justificational status of a belief “is a function of the reliability of the process or 
processes that cause it, where (as a first approximation) reliability consists in the 
tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false” (in Pappas 
1979: 10). Goldman's theory of justified belief is, therefore, related to the provenance 
or causal history of a belief. He calls it Historical Reliabilism which “makes the 
justificational status of a belief depend on its prior history” (Ibid: 14). He, then, 
constitutes his formulation of a justified belief as: “If S’s believing p at t results from 
a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in p at 
t is justified” (Ibid: 13). And as to the characterisation of such cognitive processes, 
Goldman observes:  
 
Let us mean by a ‘process’ a functional operation or procedure, i.e., something 
that generates a mapping from certain states – ‘inputs’ – into other states – 
‘outputs’. The outputs in the present case are states of believing this or that 
proposition at a given moment. On this interpretation, a process is a type as 
opposed to a token. This is fully appropriate, since it is only types that have 
statistical properties such as producing truth 80% of the time; and it is 
precisely such statistical properties that determine the reliability of a process 
(Ibid: 11).     
        
In other words, by a cognitive process Goldman refers to whatever process – 
whether it be visual, memorial, introspective or reasoning – that generates a belief 
output from a given input (whatever it may be). But Goldman does not specify what 
relevant process type of a given process token (whether it be memorial, visual, 
introspective or reasoning) shall be assessed for its reliability in order to determine 
whether or not a belief is reliably acquired. Externalism as a whole suffers from a lack 
of such specificity. The theory of justified belief Goldman advocates is founded on a 
general basis: “A theory of justified belief of the kind I seek … must be couched at a 
suitably deep, general, or abstract level” (Ibid: 2). It is this lack of specificity that 
creates the problem of generality to externalism as we will learn later in Objections to 
Externalism. Reliability is defined in terms of generating true beliefs in preponderant 
realizations of a given process. BonJour defines a reliable belief-producing process as 
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“a process of a general kind that in fact produces true beliefs in a high proportion of 
the cases in which it occurs” (2002: 221). That is, reliability is understood as a 
propensity notion rather than a track-record one as observed by Alston: 
 
 reliability is not a matter of actual track record but rather is a dispositional or 
 propensity notion. To say that a thermometer, medicine, or atlas is reliable is 
 not to make a report of the relative frequency of favourable outcomes in the 
 cases in which it has been used. It may never have been used, but that doesn’t 
 keep it from being reliable or unreliable. We may not be able to tell how 
 reliable it is if it hasn’t yet been used, but here as elsewhere it is a great 
 mistake to conflate X's being P with our ascertaining or being able to 
 ascertain that X is P. An atlas may be very reliable even though no one ever 
 consults it. … In parallel fashion a reliable type of belief formation is one that 
 would generate preponderantly true beliefs in a large run of suitable cases 
 (2005: 119). 
  
 
Thus, reliability is associated with and determined by the tendency of a cognitive 
process to generate favourable outcomes in preponderant realisations of the process. 
That is, reliability's assessment criterion requires a process's realisations to generate 
preponderantly favourable outcomes rather than requiring that the totality of the 
process's realisations be favourable. Reliability is, therefore, usually understood as a 
non-absolute notion. As far as belief formations are concerned, the reliability of the 
cognitive process that generates an output belief is not required to be total in order for 
the process to be considered reliable. That is, because of our fallible character and 
thus logical vulnerability to error, our beliefs or belief-producing processes could go 
wrong at times, that is why the reliability of our beliefs or belief-forming processes 
shall not be required to be total or absolute, as pointed out by Vogel:  
 
reliability, whether it pertains to beliefs or to processes, need not be total or 
absolute. Something may do Y reliably, even if it would fail to do Y under very 
extreme or extraordinary conditions. An alarm clock may be reliable, despite 
the fact that it would not ring if the power went out, or if the ceiling collapsed 
on it. ... Thus, perception, or particular beliefs formed by perception, may 
count as reliable, despite the fact that perception, or particular beliefs arrived 
at by perception, can go wrong under certain circumstances (2000: 603-604).     
 
 
That is, since we are not logically infallible or cognitively invulnerable to error, our 
cognitive processes, though usually reliable, could go wrong and thus produce false 
output beliefs. But malfunctioning under certain circumstances does not mean a 
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particular cognitive process cannot be reliable under other circumstances to produce 
true beliefs as occasional cognitive malfunctioning is likely to occur even to the most 
rational people. Thus, an occasional cognitive malfunctioning does not necessarily 
render a cognitive process permanently unreliable. Externalists take the reliability of a 
belief-forming cognitive process as the sole linchpin that suffices for the justification 
of a belief. Goldman argues that when one enjoys justificational status for a belief, 
one is not necessarily unaware of such status, rather, one is not required to be aware 
of such status in order to be entitled to possess the status. He, therefore, considers 
one’s justificational status for a belief as one of the things for which one lacks 
cognitive access:    
 
There are many facts about a cognizer to which he lacks ‘privileged access’, 
and I regard the justificational status of his beliefs as one of those things. This 
is not to say that a cognizer is necessarily ignorant, at any given moment, of 
the justificational status of his current beliefs. It is only to deny that he 
necessarily has, or can get, knowledge or true belief about this status. Just as a 
person can know without knowing that he knows, so he can have justified 
belief without knowing that it is justified (or believing justifiably that it is 
justified) (in Pappas 1979: 15).     
 
 
There is a general consensus that there are many facts about one to which one has 
no privileged access. Being ignorant of a particular fact or of details about the fact 
does not render the fact non-existential from an objective perspective, but the lack of 
any potential cognitive grasp of some basic details about the fact renders one 
unjustified were one to claim belief about the fact or one of its relevant aspects. 
Justification, as we have already learned, is perspectival and relative to a cognizer's 
perspective alone. In other words, my justificational status for a belief is assessed 
from the perspective of what is accessible to me rather than someone else. Thus, the 
objective existence of a justifying condition does not obviate the necessity of some 
sort of cognitive access to such condition if I were to be rational in holding a relevant 
belief. What puzzles internalists is the argument that if factors external to one's 
consciousness can bestow justification on a belief, why reliability, why not truth while 
truth is the most fundamental rationale for believing something. Of such internalists is 
Bonjour who argues that if a factor, such as reliability, external to one's cognitive 
perspective, can confer justification, why not truth, while truth is the best reason for 
holding a belief:  
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 if features of a belief that are in this way external to the believer's cognitive 
 perspective can yield justification, why not truth itself? Surely the fact that a 
 belief is true is, in a way, the best possible reason for holding it, so that if 
 access to the justifying feature by the believer is not required, why doesn’t it 
 simply follow that any true belief is justified simply by virtue of being true, no 
 matter how or why it was arrived at or how irrational or careless or even crazy 
 the person in question may have been. In fact, no externalist is willing to go 
 this far, but in a way that merely heightens the puzzling character of the 
 externalist view: why should some external facts and not others be relevant to 
 justification? (2002: 222). 
 
 
    There are two things to note here. Externalists hold that “If a method is 
justificatory, it must at least be possible that all beliefs the method yields are true”, 
observes Leplin (2009: 34). But they also recognize that a belief can be false but 
justified: “there can be justified beliefs that are false”, argues Goldman (in Pappas 
1979: 11). Thus, though externalists associate a reliable cognitive process with the 
tendency to produce true beliefs and thereby identify a justificatory process as one for 
which it is at least possible that all the beliefs it produces are true, they still constrain 
justification to reliability rather than truth. One reason is because to associate 
justification with truth is to require justification to be infallible or incorrigible – a 
condition necessary for knowledge rather than belief. The other reason is because 
they, as do internalists, recognize that a belief can be true but unjustified if, from an 
externalist standpoint, it is produced by an unreliable cognitive process. Since being 
justified in a belief is just being rational in holding such belief, surely the most 
plausible explanation to why a belief is unjustified from my perspective is my being 
ignorant of what is responsible for the belief’s being true or my being ignorant of 
what it is that makes it rational for me to hold such belief rather than the unreliability 
of the belief-forming process, not only because reliability is unnecessary to confer 
justification, but also because it is impossible, given the current form of externalism, 
to establish the reliability of a belief-forming process as we will learn in the generality 
objection to externalism. Internalists contend that when a belief is justified, there is, 
on the part of the cognizer, some sort of accessible evidence or basis that initially 
gave rise to the belief. But externalists deny that there is something in the form of 
evidence possessed by one when one's belief is justified. That is, externalist accounts 
of justification do not assume that there is something possessed by a cognizer in the 
form of evidence (justification) when one of the cognizer’s beliefs is justified, as 
observed by Goldman:  
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 I do not … assume that when a belief is justified there is something 
 “possessed” by the believer which can be called a “justification”. I do assume 
 that a justified belief gets its status of being justified from some processes or 
 properties that make it justified. In short, there must be some justification-
 conferring processes or properties. But this does not imply that there must be 
 an argument, or reason, or anything else, “possessed” at the time of belief by 
 the believer (Ibid: 2).  
 
 
We have already learned that, from an internalist perspective, one has 
justificational status – whether as property (state) or process (activity) – only if one 
has actual or potential cognitive access to the justifying condition behind the belief. 
Given the internalist considerations that explain the background against which 
epistemic justification has developed, the externalist account of justified belief faces 
serious intuitive problems. From an internalist standpoint, so far as the activity 
conception of justification is concerned, a belief is justified for one if one is able to 
successfully adduce the justifying grounds that gave rise to the belief. But in the case 
of the state conception of justification, one is justified in holding a belief if one has 
the potential to be cognitively aware of the justifying condition behind the belief or 
can recollect why or how one came to acquire such belief. Thus, on internalist views, 
both the activity and the state conception of justification require some sort of access to 
justifying conditions as we have observed in the problem of memory beliefs in the 
objections to internalism. Whether the account in question is the state or activity 
conception of justification, and whether or not skepticism is raised against the merits 
of a given belief, we just find our intuitions disapprove of conferring justificatory 
status in the absence of some inkling of its truth values. The externalist conception of 
justification is, therefore, incompatible with the background against which the concept 
of epistemic justification has developed. We have already observed on p. 41 that the 
concept of epistemic justification has developed from the practice of critical reflection 
on our beliefs, the practice of epistemic evaluation of beliefs, the challenging of 
beliefs and responses to such challenges.  
    
    Thus, the background against which the concept of epistemic justification has 
developed strongly suggests an internalist constraint on justifying conditions. Since 
belief has an intimate connection with reason, we normally believe when we have 
some reason to believe. In the absence of such reason, we do not tend to believe. And 
it is because of this intimate connection between belief and reason that we are 
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psychologically unwilling to regard a belief as justified when no supporting reason 
can be attainable on reflection. We, by nature, want to know why a proposition is true 
or probable before forming a belief about it. Similarly, we, also by nature, tend to 
consider it irrational to accept a belief as justified when none of its good-making 
features are attainable on reflection. Further to the background against which the 
concept of epistemic justification has developed and in response to why do we have 
the concept of being justified in holding a belief and why is it important to us, Alston 
points out:  
 
I suggest that the concept [epistemic justification] was developed, and got its 
hold on us, because of the practice of critical reflection on our beliefs, of 
challenging their credentials and responding to such challenges – in short the 
practice of attempting to justify beliefs. Suppose there were no such practice; 
suppose that no one ever challenges the credentials of anyone’s beliefs; 
suppose that no one ever critically reflects on the grounds or basis of one’s 
own beliefs. In that case would we be interested in determining whether one or 
another belief is justified? I think not. It is only because we participate in such 
activities, only because we are alive to their importance, that the question of 
whether someone is in a state of being justified in holding a belief is of live 
interest to us. I am not suggesting that being justified is a matter of engaging 
in, or successfully engaging in, the activity of justifying. I am not even 
affirming the less obviously false thesis that being justified in believing that p 
is a matter of being able to successfully justify the belief. Many persons are 
justified in many beliefs without possessing the intellectual or verbal skills to 
exhibit what justifies those beliefs. Thus the fact of being justified is not 
dependent on any particular actual or possible activity of justifying. What I am 
suggesting is that those facts of justification would not have the interest and 
importance for us that they do have if we were not party to a social practice of 
demanding justification and responding to such demands. … [but] it seems 
that we must allow cases in which the basis of a belief is blocked from 
consciousness through some special features of that situation. Thus we are free 
to recognize cases of justification in which the complexity of the grounds or 
the rapidity of their appearance and disappearance renders the subject unable 
to store and retrieve them as she would have to in order to cite them in answer 
to a challenge (1989: 236-237).    
 
  
    Moreover, we cannot always in all cases of believing recollect the grounds that give 
rise to a belief in order to be in a position to attain some cognitive access to the 
belief’s justifying premise. This, the problem of forgotten evidence, is a situation 
which seems to be most adequately treated, from an internalist perspective, through 
one’s confidence in one’s memory, as explained in chapter six. Sometimes a believer 
can recollect the original supporting grounds behind a belief, but does not possess 
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what it takes to exhibit or adduce such grounds for the lack of the necessary verbal 
skills or the lack of intellectual capacity to do so. But this can only be an objection to 
the activity conception of internalist justification. This case is, however, still solvable 
on an internalist view. It is, just like the problem of forgotten evidence, most 
adequately treated through one’s confidence in what one recollects to be true. That is, 
if I, on good authority, had acquired a belief about the origin of the universe when I 
was in high school, even if I do not now possess the necessary intellectual capacity to 
adduce what it is that led me to acquire such belief, I can still be internalistically 
justified in holding such belief as long as I have confidence in what I remember to be 
true or reliably acquired. These are the sort of objections levelled against internalism. 
But, though lacking some cognitive access to the justifying condition itself, 
internalism can still account for the epistemic status of such beliefs through 
roundabout routes that imply the indispensability of some internalist access to the 
justifying condition.  
 
8.2. Objections to Externalism 
 
    Though externalism helps resolve the problem of regress caused by the second-
order internalist requirement on justifying conditions, it has much more profound 
drawbacks than internalism. They are of much greater magnitude. The difficulties 
externalism faces are three: first, the problem of accidentally true belief 
(fortuitousness) where a belief-forming process is reliable and its resultant belief true 
but the believer has no reason to assume it to be true (the clairvoyant case); second, 
the problem of indistinguishable worlds where a belief-forming process is unreliable 
and its resultant belief false but justified (the demon world case); third, the problem of 
generality, which is associated with externalism’s lack of specificity as to what 
process type of a given process token shall be chosen to check for its reliability in 
order to establish whether or not a belief is reliably produced. First, the clairvoyant 
case; Norman, a completely reliable clairvoyant, possesses psychic powers in the 
absence of any evidence for or against both the possibility of such cognitive powers 
and whether he has such clairvoyant powers. Norman, one day, happens to truly 
believe that the US president is in New York City in the absence of any evidence or 
reason for or against the belief in question:      
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Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day 
Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he 
has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and 
results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is 
completely reliable (BonJour 1980: 21). 
 
 
Norman’s clairvoyant true belief is justified on the reliabilist view of justification 
by virtue of being the output of a reliable cognitive process. But it is not justified on 
the internalist view for Norman has no cognitive awareness of what it is that makes 
his belief true. That is, he is in possession of no reason to think that his belief is true. 
Given the internalist reasoning that the possession or retention of belief is rational 
only when we have some grasp as to what it is that makes a belief probable, Norman’s 
belief is irrational for he has no reason to so believe. Internalists would, therefore, 
hold that believing that p in the absence of any cognitive access as to what is 
responsible for the truth of p engenders first-person epistemic irrationality or 
epistemic irresponsibility – a problem externalism is plagued with. Furthermore, in 
response to the justifiability of Norman’s clairvoyant true belief and why externalism 
might initially appear plausible, BonJour observes:  
 
I submit, Norman’s acceptance of the belief about the President’s whereabouts 
is epistemically irrational and irresponsible, and thereby unjustified, whether 
or not he believes himself to have clairvoyant power, so long as he has no 
justification for such a belief. Part of one’s epistemic duty is to reflect 
critically upon one’s beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing 
things to which one has, to one’s knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic 
access. We are now face-to-face with the fundamental – and seemingly 
obvious – intuitive problem with externalism: why should the mere fact that 
such an external relation obtains mean that Norman’s belief is epistemically 
justified, when the relation in question is entirely outside his ken? … One 
reason why externalism may seem initially plausible is that if the external 
relation in question genuinely obtains, then Norman will in fact not go wrong 
in accepting the belief, and it is, in a sense, not an accident that this is so. But 
how is this supposed to justify Norman’s belief? From his subjective 
perspective, it is an accident that the belief is true. Of course, it would not be 
an accident from the standpoint of our hypothetical external observer who 
knows all the relevant facts and laws. Such an observer, having constructed 
the justifying argument … would be thereby in a position to justify his own 
acceptance of the belief. … And the suggestion here is that the rationality or 
justifiability of Norman’s belief should be judged from Norman’s own 
perspective, rather than from one that is unavailable to him (Ibid: 22-23).          
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    That is, from Norman’s perspective, it is mere luck that his belief is true. 
Deontologists would argue that Norman had an epistemic duty to reflect properly on 
the given proposition, and had he done so, he would have discovered that he had no 
reason to embrace such belief. From a deontological perspective, Norman should have 
withheld belief in such proposition for such belief was unwarranted from his own 
cognitive perspective. By knowingly coming to acquire such belief in the absence of 
evidence, Norman has culpably violated his epistemic obligations and is therefore 
blameworthy in his belief. He has proceeded irrationally and irresponsibly in his 
doxastic cultivation. Norman’s belief cannot, therefore, be credited with deontological 
justification. It is also unjustified from a non-deontological internalist perspective for 
he lacks access to what is responsible for the truth of his belief. The denial of the 
internalist constraint on justification is to embrace first-person subjective epistemic 
irrationality, epistemic irresponsibility and epistemic fortuity. Further, rejecting the 
first-person cognitive awareness requirement on justification would make sense only 
if we were to evaluate the justifiability of a belief from a perspective inaccessible to a 
given believing subject – from someone else’s viewpoint to whom what confers 
justification is cognitively accessible (as explained earlier by BonJour). But, from an 
externalist perspective, Norman is justified in his belief for he is required to have 
cognitive access to neither the justifying premise behind his belief, nor to the 
reliability of the cognitive process in question, nor to the fact that the belief is reliably 
produced. But, argues BonJour, one is epistemically irresponsible and unjustified in 
accepting an objectively reliable belief without having any cognitive grasp that the 
belief is reliable: 
 
 the fact that a given sort of belief is objectively reliable, and thus that 
 accepting it is in fact conducive to arriving at the truth need not prevent our 
 judging that the epistemic agent who accepts it without any inkling that this is 
 the case violates his epistemic duty and is epistemically irresponsible and 
 unjustified in doing so (Ibid: 24).                   
 
 
    No matter how externally reliable a belief or a belief-forming process is, reliability 
is not sufficient to obviate the necessity to possess some cognitive grasp of a 
justifying condition. Further, BonJour argues that reliability cannot offset subjective 
irrationality or epistemic irresponsibility: 
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external or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality. 
If the acceptance of a belief is seriously unreasonable or unwarranted from the 
believer’s own standpoint, then the mere fact that unbeknownst to the believer 
its existence in those circumstances lawfully guarantees its truth will not 
suffice to render the belief epistemically justified and thereby an instance of 
knowledge (Ibid: 20).  
 
 
   The second objection to externalism is the demon world case – a possible world 
versus the actual world. This is how Alston characterises the case: “Consider a 
possible world that is indistinguishable from the actual world so far as we can tell, but 
in which a Cartesian demon has rigged things so that our perceptual beliefs 
concerning external physical objects are all false, since there are no such objects” 
(1989: 222). The contrast between the two worlds is drawn to show whether reliability 
has any epistemic bearing on conferring justification. Suppose that an agent (s) comes 
to acquire a perceptual belief (p) about an external physical object (x) in the demon 
world. Reliabilists would argue that s is not justified in believing p because p is not 
reliably formed for s’s cognitive processes in the demon world are not reliable. The 
reason why s’s cognitive processes are unreliable in the rigged world is because a 
reliable process is one that has a tendency to produce preponderantly true beliefs. 
Further, all perceptual beliefs in the demon world are false because there are no such 
objects in that world. The cognitive apparatus of the agent in the demon world is, 
therefore, unreliable to produce true perceptual beliefs. Thus, according to 
externalism, p is not justified in the demon world while the object of belief (x) has the 
same shape in both worlds and is, thus, indistinguishable from the x of the actual 
world. That is, both xs are indistinguishable from s’s perspective. In his analysis of 
such propositions that are the same in both worlds, Foley argues that the demon world 
propositions that are indistinguishable from the ones in the actual world are as 
epistemically rational as the ones in the actual world:  
 
If we are willing to grant that in our world some of the propositions S 
perceptually believes are epistemically rational, then these same propositions 
would be epistemically rational for S in w [the demon world] as well. After 
all, world w by hypothesis is one which from S’s viewpoint is 
indistinguishable from this world. So, if given S’s situation in this world, his 
perceptual belief p is rational, his belief p would be rational in w as well. Even 
if, contrary to what we believe, our world is world w, it still can be 
epistemically rational for us to believe many of the propositions we do, since 
the epistemic situation in world w is indistinguishable from the epistemic 
situation in a world which has the characteristics we take our world to have. 
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The point here is a simple one. In effect, I am asking you: aren’t some of the 
propositions you believe epistemically rational for you to believe? And 
wouldn’t whatever it is that make those propositions epistemically rational for 
you also be present in a world where these propositions are regularly false, but 
where a demon hid this from you by making the world from your viewpoint 
indistinguishable from this world (so that what you believed, and what you 
would believe on reflection, and what you seemed to remember, and what you 
experienced were identical to this world)? (in Alston 1989: 222-223).    
 
 
Furthermore, Alston observes that since we cannot distinguish the demon world 
from the actual world “whatever justifies a certain belief in the one world will ipso 
facto justify that same belief in the other world” (Ibid: 223). In other words, if the 
epistemic situations of the two worlds are the same and thus indistinguishable from 
s’s viewpoint, then the same perceptual evidence that justifies s’s belief that p in the 
actual world would also be present in the demon world that could do the same job. 
Thus, due to the indistiguishability of the two worlds from s’s viewpoint, s’s belief 
that p in the demon world is no less justified than s’s belief that p in the actual world 
as they both share the same perceptual evidence and the same epistemic situations, as 
Alston explains:  
 
 Since such a world [the demon world] is indistinguishable by us from our 
 world, we would have just as much justification for our perceptual beliefs 
 there as we actually do. But ex hypothesi those beliefs would not be reliably 
 formed. Hence reliability is not necessary for justification (Ibid: 222).  
 
Moreover, externalists and internalists both recognize that the justification of belief 
is not required to be incorrigible. Thus, s’s belief that p in the demon world should 
count as justified unless we demand infallibility for doxastic justification. 
Furthermore, we already learned on p. 46 that the fundamental role of justification is 
that of a medium or means to truth and that the concept of justification would be of 
little importance had truth somehow been immediately and unproblematically 
accessible to us, and it is due to our lack of immediate and unproblematic access to 
truth that the need for justification arises. That is why justification should be 
understood in terms of one's evidence rather than truth. Thus, as long as s believes on 
adequate evidence in either world, s’s beliefs are justified whether or not they are 
reliably formed. The demon world case demonstrates that reliability is not a necessary 
condition for justification. The absence of reliability does not, therefore, mean the 
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absence of justificatory status. Externalists completely disregard epistemic 
accessibility of justifying conditions in favour of a feature, reliability, whose 
determination or obtaining is neither viable nor necessary to confer justification.  
 
The third problem facing reliabilism is generality. Goldman himself recognizes the 
problem of generality and argues that “A critical problem concerning our [reliabilist] 
analysis is the degree of generality of the process-types in question” (in Pappas 1979: 
12). This is how BonJour outlines the problem:  
 
 What the simple reliabilist says … is that a belief is justified if the general sort 
 of cognitive process from which it results is reliable …But at what level of 
 generality should the relevant process be characterised? Consider my present 
 visually induced belief that there is a white cup sitting on my computer table, 
 and consider some of the different ways in which the cognitive process from 
 which it results might be described (assuming as a part of all of these that my 
 eyes are functioning normally): as the visual perception of a cup under good 
 lighting at close range; as the visual perception of a cup (under unspecified 
 conditions and at an unspecified distance) … as visual perception in general 
 … And this is only a small sampling of a much larger range of possibilities. 
 Which of these descriptions of the cognitive process in question, we must ask, 
 is the relevant one for applying the simple reliabilist’s principle of 
 justification? One reason that this question poses a very serious problem for 
 reliabilists is that the proportion of true beliefs that is produced by the 
 processes specified in these various ways seems to vary extremely widely: I 
 am much less likely to make a mistake about cups that are perceived at close 
 range under good conditions than I am about cups under a wide range of 
 conditions and distances (in Moser 2002: 250-251). 
 
 
    If we were to determine the justifiability of such a visually induced belief from an 
externalist perspective, we would be plagued with unlimited possibilities of cognitive 
process types that could generate the same belief, with each process type involving 
different descriptions and characteristics of the process and situation in which the 
belief is produced. They are all perceptual processes, but they differ in their 
characteristics (as pointed out by BonJour). In the absence of a stipulative rule as to 
which cognitive process type shall be selected to be checked for its reliability in order 
to determine whether or not the belief in question was reliably produced, accurate 
judgement on the justificational status of the belief from an externalist perspective 
will be impossible. Externalism, therefore, generates intuitively unacceptable results. 
There is no safe resolution for externalism. If it drops reliability, it loses its 
fundamental thesis but saves itself from the problem of generality. But even then, it 
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would still suffer from subjective epistemic irresponsibility and epistemic 
irrationality. Externalism is, therefore, not compatible with the intuitions that explain 
the background against which epistemic justification has evolved. Further, the 
generality problem is also outlined by Feldman as follows: 
 
 The specific process token that leads to any belief will always be an instance 
 of many process types. For example, the process token leading to my current 
 belief that it is sunny today is an instance of all the following types: the 
 perceptual process, the visual process, processes that occur on Wednesday, 
 processes that lead to true beliefs, etc. Note that these process types are not 
 equally reliable (in Alston 2005: 116). 
  
 
The problem of generality is an insurmountable problem that originates from 
reliability per se. It arises from the externalists' contention that reliability is a 
necessary condition for justification. That is, in order to determine whether or not a 
belief is justified on an externalist view, we need to determine whether or not the 
given belief-forming process is reliable. And in order to establish whether that 
reliability obtains, we need to assess the process type for its reliability, rather than the 
process token, because only process types are repeatable and thereby possess the 
statistical properties necessary to determine the reliability of a process, as pointed out 
earlier by Goldman. Reliability, thus understood, is a notion, observes Alston, which 
is associated with processes that are repeatable: 
 
 Reliability or the reverse attaches only to what is repeatable, to what has, 
 actually or potentially, a number of instances. At least this is true if we are 
 thinking of events or processes, as reliabilists in epistemology typically are. It 
 is more common in ordinary speech to attribute reliability and unreliability to 
 mechanisms like thermometers … clocks, or to medicines or sources of 
 information. 'Repeatability' or 'instances' does not apply directly to them. 
 Nevertheless, repeatability comes in more indirectly. Though a clock or an 
 encyclopedia or a medicine is not "repeatable", it is something that can be 
 operated, consulted, or used many times, and so there is something like 
 repeatability here, namely, repeated employments. So the general point holds 
 that to be assessable as reliable or the reverse, something must, actually or 
 potentially, provide a range of cases of the appropriate sort. For reliability is 
 always a matter of the incidence of favourable outcomes in a multitude of 
 instances or employments of the item in question. … [That is why] a particular 
 process that takes place at a particular precise time is not the sort of thing that 
 does or does not enjoy a favourable ratio of true beliefs among its products. It 
 occurs just once; the one belief it produces is either true or false, and there's an 
 end to it. Hence, as is regularly said by both friend and foe, it is a type of 
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 cognitive process rather than a particular process (a token) that can be assessed 
 for reliability (2005: 116).  
 
 
Thus, reliability or unreliability is not associated with single employment or single 
instance processes or items. They come into play when there is an actual track record 
of multiple employments or instances or when there is a potential for the process or 
the item to generate such track record upon realisation or consultation. As we have 
noticed earlier, each process output is a token of many different types. In other words, 
each process token outcome could be generated by many different process types. 
Externalism, therefore, suffers from an intractable generality problem whose solution 
is viable only if reliability is dropped as a necessary requirement for justification, in 
which case reliabilism loses its key raison d’être. Thus, the generality problem 
remains unresolved for the following reason. Reliability is a dispositional frequency 
notion associated with things that have a range of instances or employments as 
observed earlier. In order to determine whether or not a belief is reliably produced, we 
shall determine whether or not the belief-forming process type is reliable as reliability 
is assessable only against processes that have a range of manifestations, not only one 
manifestation as is the case with a process token. And since there is no rule as to 
which, among the relevant process types, process type to choose for assessing its 
reliability in order to establish whether or not a given belief is reliably generated, 
reliabilism remains as a general theory of epistemic justification. That is why, though 
suffering from its own intuitive but less severe problems, internalism stands out as the 
only efficient account for justified belief because, argues Alston, there are widely 
shared and strong intuitions in favour of some sort of accessibility requirement for 
justification:  
 
 I find widely shared and strong intuitions in favour of some kind of 
 accessibility requirement for justification. We expect that if there is something 
 that justifies my belief that p, I will be able to determine what it is. We find 
 something incongruous, or conceptually impossible, in the notion of my being 
 justified in believing that p while totally lacking any capacity to determine 
 what is responsible for that justification. Thus when reliability theorists of 
 justification maintain that any reliably formed belief is ipso facto justified, 
 most of us balk. For since it is possible for a belief to be reliably formed 
 without the subject's having any capacity to determine this, and, indeed, 
 without there being anything accessible to the subject on which the belief is 
 based … it seems clear to many of us that reliable belief formation cannot be 
 sufficient for justification (1989: 234-235). 
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Putting externalism into perspective, an externalist would view the justifiability of 
President Bush's alleged belief1 that Saddam Hussein possesses WMD solely from the 
perspective of the reliability of the cognitive process through which the belief was 
apparently acquired. They will count the grounds that gave rise to the belief as 
unnecessary to the conferring of justificational status. To determine the justifiability 
of Bush’s supposed belief, the externalist would face the task of determining the 
belief-forming process token that generated the belief – investigating whether it was a 
visual, memorial, introspective or reasoning process. The most plausible candidate 
seems to be reasoning. But the reasoning process token can be an instance of many 
reasoning process types such as reasoning processes under emotional circumstances, 
reasoning processes under the influence of faith or a given belief-system, reasoning 
processes under the influence of a particular ideology, reasoning processes under the 
influence of a desire, hope, wish, political strategy or objective, reasoning processes 
under tiring conditions, reasoning processes in a desert alone, reasoning processes 
driven by wishful thinking, reasoning processes under informed circumstances, 
reasoning processes in the presence of sufficient counter-evidence, reasoning 
processes under evidential circumstances, reasoning processes under fear, reasoning 
processes in a reflective or critical person, reasoning processes in a credulous person, 
reasoning processes in a reliable person, reasoning processes in an impulsive person, 
reasoning processes in a psychologically abnormal person, reasoning processes in a 
competent person and other relevant reasoning processes.  
 
The supposed belief in question could have been acquired by any of the foregoing 
processes. But the externalist has to choose one of these aforementioned process types 
to assess for its reliability in order to determine whether or not the belief was reliably 
produced and determine its justifiability accordingly. But so far, externalism has 
failed to provide for a rule to choose a process type, among relevant process types, to 
check for its reliability. Thus, reliabilism faces serious insurmountable problems in 
determining whether or not a belief is justified. It is submerged with the generality 
problem in a way that renders reliabilism too general a theory to be competent as an 
account of justified belief. This is despite our intuitive understanding that reliability is 
not required in order for justification to obtain.  
                                                 
1
 Bush (3 December 2002): “we believe [Saddam Hussein] has weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/text/20021203-3.html).  
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    In the philosophical literature, the nature of justification is taken to be either an 
internal or an external matter to a believing subject. Externalists oppose the common-
sensical view of justification represented by internalism. But as we have observed in 
discussions about the theory, externalism leads to the very eventuality, epistemic 
irrationality, which the presence of epistemic justification is supposed to eliminate. 
That is, it is the obtaining of justificatory status that eliminates the possibility of being 
irrational in holding a belief. But externalism generates epistemic irrationality by 
denying the necessity to possess some inkling as to what is responsible for the truth of 
a given belief. From an intuitive perspective, I cannot be said to be rational in holding 
a belief I have no knowledge of its truth-making features. What renders me rational in 
holding a well-grounded belief is my knowledge of what is responsible for the well-
groundedness of the belief. If I have no knowledge of such a factor, then it is unclear 
what constitutes my rationality for holding the belief. The fact that the belief is 
objectively probable has no bearing on my subjective rationality when I have no 
knowledge as to what is responsible for such an objective probability. My rationality 
for holding such a belief is determined by my knowledge of the factor responsible for 
the truth of my belief that p. In the absence of such knowledge, I cannot rightly claim 
to be rational in holding such a belief, no matter how truth-conducive the belief is 
from an objective standpoint. Our intuitions do not go along with the notion of 
accepting a belief as justified in the absence, on the part of a believing subject, of any 
knowledge as to what is responsible for the truth of the belief. Thus, externalism 
conflicts with the very raison d'être behind the conferment of justificatory status on a 
belief by leading to an outcome, epistemic irrationality, whose possibility is supposed 
to be ruled out by the obtaining of justificatory status. This is besides the generality 
problem which renders externalism too general a theory to produce any accurate 
reliability assessment of the process type responsible for the generation of a given 
belief. The failure of externalism to undermine the internalist theory of justification 
further reinforces the intuitive plausibility of our common-sensical convictions of 
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Chapter Nine  
Part One: An Inquiry into the Rationality Status of the Given Beliefs 
 
    This chapter examines the nuclear and terror belief propositions as a paradigm of 
the professed rationale for the war, demonstrating what their rationality status would 
have been if they were genuine beliefs. I will carry out the analysis in light of 
internalism, deontologism and externalism. The first part of the analysis focuses on 
establishing the rationality status of the given supposed beliefs in light of the 
evidential conditions at the time. The findings of the first part of the analysis will 
demonstrate the unprobative nature of the available supporting evidence that p. The 
second part of the analysis investigates the possible attribution of belief, pragmatic 
belief and acceptance in light of the evidence available at the time.  
 
9.1.1. A Background Analysis   
 
The failure of the Iraq Survey Group to uncover any WMD following the invasion 
of Iraq confirms the fact, already confirmed by Ritter1 in June 2000, that the UN 
inspection regime was fundamentally responsible for the destruction of a substantial 
part of the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and the elimination of its 
nuclear weapons program. The rest was unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in the absence 
of the UN inspection personnel in 1991, as pointed out by Ritter2. Thus, by 1998, Iraq 
was fundamentally disarmed from its chemical and biological weapons stockpiles – as 
confirmed by Ritter in June 2000 – with its nuclear weapons program eliminated as 
confirmed by ElBaradei on 9 February 2003: “in ‘98 we eliminated Iraq’s nuclear 
program”, see appendix (p. 17). The containment strategy was, therefore, successful – 
a conclusion corroborated by the former US Defense Secretary Cohen on 11 January 
2001, before the Bush administration assumed office: “We have successfully 
contained Saddam Hussein. …  That containment strategy and policy has worked”, 
see appendix (p. 2). There were only some remaining unresolved disarmament 
questions with regard to some unaccounted for chemical and biological material as 
pointed out by both ElBaradei3 and Ritter4 – questions that were still lingering even 
                                                 
1
 Refer to appendix (p. 15) for Ritter’s statement.  
2
 Refer to appendix (p. 15) for Ritter’s statement. 
3
 ElBaradei (22 November 2002): “It is not true that the operation [the UN inspection process] has been 
open-ended. In the case of the nuclear file, for example … we were able in 1997 to say that we … now 
believe at that time that we have neutralized Iraq's nuclear program. The situation was different in the 
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up to the moment when Secretary Cohen rightly asserts that Iraq has been 
successfully contained. That is, the UNMOVIC’s, the IAEA’s and the Bush 
administration’s learning process to find answers for the unresolved issues 
commenced against such background: a contained Iraq with some unresolved 
disarmament issues. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 along with the subsequent security 
environment, America's demonstrated vulnerability to unprecedented harm, the 
alleged link between Iraq, Al-Qaeda and 9/11, and the absence of the UN inspection 
personnel in Iraq all contributed to dramatically enhance the urgency to resolve the 
outstanding Iraqi disarmament issues. That is, these were all contributing factors 
behind the urgency to discover whether or not the absence of the UN inspection 
personnel in Iraq had changed the status quo there. 
 
The status quo - regardless of the validity of the charges levelled against Iraq - was 
deemed unsustainable with Saddam Hussein still in power (see appendix, pp. 87-88). 
Many high profile influential Bush administration officials were right-wing neo-
conservatives with a long-standing tendency to take out Saddam Hussein regardless of 
the veracity of the stated rationale for the war. That is, some key Bush administration 
officials – such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary 
Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle (the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory 
Committee during the build-up to Iraq war), and John Bolton (the Under Secretary for 
Arms Control and International Security during the build-up to Iraq war) – were 
signatories to the PNAC January 1998 letter urging President Clinton to implement a 
regime-change strategy towards Iraq. The post-9/11 security environment provided 
them with an opportunity to pursue the regime-change strategy they had already 
proposed to President Clinton.  
 
Thus, removing Saddam Hussein from power had long been a key policy objective 
in the US foreign policy. It dates back to the early 1990s. Following the end of the 
Cold War, a classified preventive war policy initiative (Defense Planning Guidance, 
February 1992) with Iraq being one of the primary case studies was drafted by then-
                                                                                                                                            
chemical and biological and missile, where UNSCOM, the predecessor of UNMOVIC, were reporting 
that there were still a number of open questions” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-
dec02/iraq_11-22.html). 
4
 Ritter (15 November 2005): “[by 1998] we had ascertained that we could account verifiably for 90 to 
95% of Iraq's weaponry. We had questions about a certain small percentage of unaccounted-for 
material” (http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/05/11/int05045.html).     
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under Secretary of Defence for Policy Paul Wolfowitz5. Subsequently, the US policy 
objective towards Iraq was officially shifted from containment to regime change by 
the passage of Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998. The Act – calling for regime 
change in Iraq – was a bipartisan congressional legislation unanimously supported by 
the Congress and the Senate, which later on became the statutory policy of the US 
government. The same regime-change policy initiative was subsequently adopted and 
approved by the Bush administration (see appendix, pp. 87-88).  
 
    The bases of the supposed beliefs manifested by the Bush administration were 
controversial satellite photos, phoney defectors, detainees, and conflicting intelligence 
reporting riddled with qualifications and reservations. Further, evidential 
considerations were complicated by a mutual mistrust between the Iraqis and the 
Americans that was driven partly by ideology and partly by experience. But even if 
the Bush administration had some reason to be wary of the evidence provided by the 
Iraqi government, they had good reason to consider the counter-evidence presented by 
the UNMOVIC and the IAEA following their return to Iraq on 25 November 2002. 
Though the return of the UN inspection personnel to Iraq did not offset the prevalent 
mistrust between the two, it provided for the lack of authoritative human sources 
effectively operating on the ground to verify the veracity of the charges levelled 
against Iraq. But neither the increasing progress of the inspection bodies nor the 
empirical evidence they were providing seem to have been considered by the Bush 
administration appropriate enough to accept that not p. The Bush administration's 
reasoning towards threat calculation seems to have been fundamentally influenced 
and guided by the events of 9/11.  
 
That is, the experience of 9/11 was, apparently, the background against which the 
Bush administration officials were examining the appropriateness of evidence and the 
imminence of threats. In a prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on 9 July 2003, Rumsfeld demonstrates that the advent of the new security 
environment changed the way they used to think about the probity of evidence: “The 
coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of 
                                                 
5
 The draft initiative argues: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a 
dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to 
prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated 
control, be sufficient to generate global power” 
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html).  
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Iraq’s pursuit of WMD; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light 
– through the prism of our experience on 9/11” (http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/July/Rumsfeld.pdf). Further, his post-war 
testimony echoes the pre-war testimony he gave on 18 September 2002 to the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committee in which he argued that the new security 
environment along with the high cost of error required that certainty thresholds and 
evidential standards be scaled down:   
 
On September 11th, we were awakened to the fact that America is now 
vulnerable to unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be sufficient 
to change the way we think about our security, how we defend our country – 
and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
 
Thus, the so-called inquiry into the given propositions was launched against the 
background of a security environment shaped by the experience of 9/11, a long-
standing regime-change strategy and a pre-established reasoning marked by 
expectations, historical precedent and the high cost of error. Holding pre-established 
opinions about a given proposition often renders us averse to consider evidence 
contrary to our pre-established reasoning. This is especially the case when the pre-
established reasoning is ideological or doctrinal. It is this that normally leads to 
pragmatic belief. Though the Bush administration exhibited marks of pragmatic belief 
by disregarding doubts and ignoring counter-evidence, this research argues that 
pragmatic belief is not an appropriate attribution of attitude. There was reason to be 
extra cautious of the vulnerabilities exposed by the experience of 9/11, but there was 
little evidence to support the given propositions or the notion that Iraq was a threat to 
the US homeland security. There were, at the time, living doubts against the 
possibility that p along with good contrary evidence presented by the IAEA, 
UNMOVIC, the US DOE, and the US intelligence communities such as the CIA, DIA 
and the INR. 
 
9.1.2. The Nuclear Proposition  
 
The WMD rationale for the war was three-fold: the possession of chemical and 
biological weapons along with a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. As a prime 
example of the Bush administration’s belief-constituted assertions regarding the status 
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of the Iraqi WMD, I have opted to analyse Cheney’s belief-stipulated assertion that 
Saddam Hussein had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program before the war: “we 
believe6 he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons”7 (16 March 
2003). The rhetorical apparatus through which the rationale for the war was 
manifested was two-fold: belief and knowledge-based. The majority of the Bush 
administration charges against Iraq fall within the knowledge and belief category, 
primarily the knowledge category. But the IAEA and the UNMOVIC presented their 
findings regarding the veracity of the WMD rationale with a definitive language. I 
aim to critically analyse, in light of the evidential conditions at the time, the character 
of the supposed nuclear belief proposition and establish whether or not such belief 
would have been justifiably acquired or retained.  
 
Following the departure of the UNSCOM in December 1998, the Iraqi regime 
removed all the UN-mandated monitory cameras at its known and suspect WMD 
sites. Thus, from then on up to the resumption of the UN inspections on 27 November 
2002, there was no authoritative source operating on the ground in Iraq to report on 
the status of its WMD. Consequently, the Bush administration's gathering of evidence 
became highly reliant on controversial Satellite photos, misleading detainees, 
unreliable defectors, historical precedent, out-dated evidence, the previous reports of 
the UNSCOM and the IAEA dating back to the 1990s, and other roundabout routes of 
intelligence gathering such as the dubious intercepted communications presented by 
Powell in his address to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003. In the 
espionage world, such techniques and modalities are, though not always reliable, part 
of the mechanism to gather intelligence or acquire knowledge. But the process of 
gathering evidence did not stay fettered up to the brink of Iraq war. On 25 November 
2002, the UNMOVIC and the IAEA were allowed back to Iraq to verify the Bush 
administration claims of proscribed WMD activities and find out whether Iraq had 
resumed WMD production in the intervening four years.  
 
The inspection regime produced concrete results as to the veracity of the nuclear 
proposition. Based on meticulous and intrusive on-the-ground inspections, 
verification and monitoring, the IAEA categorically denied that there was any 
                                                 
6
 The emphases are mine in statements by the Bush administration as well as the Iraqi government.  
7
 See appendix (p. 106).  
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evidence or plausible indication to support the assertion that Iraq had reconstituted its 
nuclear weapons program, as stressed by ElBaradei on 7 March 2003: “After three 
months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible 
indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq” 
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei-7mar03.pdf). He, even before then, 
demonstrated the IAEA’s knowledge that Iraq had no nuclear capability. On 13 
December 2002, ElBaradei observes: “We know that Iraq … has no [nuclear] 
capability whatsoever to produce either a weapon or weapon-usable material” 
(http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/13/lt.01.html). Furthermore, one month 
following the resumption of the UN inspections in Iraq, on 28 December 2002 
ElBaradei reported that “Iraq have [has] not restarted its nuclear weapons program” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/28/smn.02.html). This is besides 
Saddam Hussein's pre-war categorical denial in an interview on 4 February 2003 with 
the British Labour party politician Tony Benn: 
  
There is only one truth and therefore I tell you as I have said on many 
occasions before that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever. … 
If the purpose was to make sure that Iraq is free of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, then they can do that. These weapons do not come in 
small pills that you can hide in your pocket. These are weapons of mass 
destruction and it is easy to work out if Iraq has them or not. We have said 
many times before and we say it again today that Iraq is free of such weapons 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2726831.stm). 
 
 
Moreover, Naji Sabri8 also emphatically denied the WMD allegations made against 
the Iraqi government. Thus, belief in the nuclear proposition was asserted at a time 
when the evidence adduced in support of such proposition was overridden by the 
IAEA (see appendix, pp. 17-32). In addition to that, on the brink of the transition of 
power from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration, the Secretary of 
Defense Cohen asserted that Saddam Hussein has been successfully contained, that he 
                                                 
8
 On 19 September 2002, Naji Sabri addressed the UN General Assembly and stated “Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I hereby declare before you that Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons. If there are any one amongst you who might still worry that the fabrications announced by 
American officials about Iraq may possibly be true, our country is ready to receive any scientific 
experts accompanied by politicians you choose to represent any one of your countries to tell us which 
places and scientific and industrial installations they would wish to see, particularly those about which 
the American officials have been fabricating false stories, alleging that they contain prohibited 
materials or activities. If such experts and politicians visit Iraq, we shall provide them with all the 
facilities they need to achieve their objective, that is to see the true facts as they are” 
(http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020919iraqE.htm). 
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is not in a position to pose a threat to his neighbours9, and that the containment policy 
and sanctions regime have worked10. Thus, by 11 January 2001, there was an 
authoritative US inner-circle government source testifying to the fact that Iraq was, at 
the time, successfully contained – WMD and threat-free. Following Cohen’s 
statements, no good intelligence reporting or adequate evidence emerged to override 
his assertive testimonies. On the contrary, authoritative evidence emerged from the 
IAEA, corroborating Cohen’s attitude on the given matters.   
 
9.1.3. An Internalist Analysis of the Nuclear Belief Proposition  
 
This section aims to establish whether or not the given nuclear belief would have 
been justifiably acquired in light of the internalist conception of justification. The 
findings of the analysis will, in effect, demonstrate whether or not there was 
justification for the Bush administration officials to believe that Saddam Hussein had 
a reconstituted nuclear weapons program before the war. We have already learned 
that the fundamental raison d'être behind internalism is some sort of actual or 
potential grasp on the part of the believing subject as to what gives rise to a given 
belief or what is responsible for the truth of the belief. The given nuclear belief 
satisfies the internalist access requirement by virtue of the subject's being engaged in 
a public relations campaign to justify the belief. Defending a belief requires cognitive 
access to the belief’s credentials. Further, the given belief satisfies the internalist 
access requirement by virtue of Cheney’s being a normal human being with a 
reasonable degree of cognitive sophistication capable of reflecting on the belief’s 
credentials to know what gave rise to his belief. If Cheney ever held the belief he 
manifests in his interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, it is either that he had already 
acquired the belief before the interview and (re)-manifests it then or it could be that he 
comes to believe the given proposition upon being asked by the moderator about the 
Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In any case, we need to consider Cheney’s broader 
                                                 
9
 Secretary Cohen (11 January 2001): “We have successfully contained Saddam Hussein. He does not 
pose a threat to his neighbors at this point, and I don't believe will be in a position to do so” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=251).  
10
 Secretary Cohen (11 January 2001): “We have contained him in a way that he has not been able to 
rebuild his military and he's not been able to threaten his neighbors. That containment strategy and 
policy has worked. … the sanctions have been responsible for curtailing Saddam's military ambitions” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=251). 
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perspectival context to determine what gave rise to his alleged belief rather than 
solely focusing on the supporting data he presents in the interview. 
 
    Four charges gave rise to the nuclear proposition. First, the allegation that Iraq had 
attained high-strength aluminum tubes believed to be intended to (in the US State 
Department’s terms), that are only really suited to (in Rice’s terms), that are necessary 
to (in Cheney’s terms), that are used to (in Bush’s terms), that can be adapted (in 
Powell’s terms) to be used in, and that could be used in (in the unclassified NIE’s 
terms) its centrifuge program to enrich uranium in an attempt to make a nuclear 
bomb, see appendix (pp. 22-26). Second, the allegation that Iraq had sought to obtain 
yellow cake (pure uranium) from Niger in 2001 and uranium ore from Somalia and 
Congo, see appendix (pp. 29-31). Third, the alleged negotiation for the purchase of a 
magnet production plant in 1999 and 2000 between Iraq and firms in Romania, 
Slovenia, India and Russia as well as Iraq’s alleged attempt to acquire magnets that 
can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium, see appendix (pp. 31-32). 
Fourth, the alleged activities at several suspect nuclear sites as well as satellite 
photographs indicating that Iraq was rebuilding facilities previously associated with 
its nuclear weapons program, see appendix (pp. 19-20).  
 
Establishing Cheney’s cognitive perspective on the given proposition bears on his 
overall reasoning behind the alleged reconstitution of the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program (p). In the immediate context, the interview, he does not adduce any 
substantiating details behind his apparent belief that p. He only appeals to the 
historical precedent of the Iraqi nuclear program such as the program’s dating back to 
the late 1970s when they got their first nuclear reactor from France, the Israelis’ 1981 
preventive strike against Iraq’s first nuclear reactor (Osirak) and Iraq’s continued 
efforts throughout the 1980s to acquire nuclear weapons, see appendix (p. 106). 
Further, prior to the interview where he manifests the given belief, he also, on 26 
August 2002, appeals to the 1995 testimony of Iraq’s minister of industry and military 
industrialization Hussein Kamel: “we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts 
to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other sources, we've gotten this from the 
firsthand testimony of defectors – including Saddam's own son-in-law, who was 
subsequently murdered at Saddam's direction” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html). Following his 
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defection to Jordan in 1995, Kamel was debriefed on 22 August 1995 by the UN 
inspection personnel. During the debriefing, he demonstrated that Iraq had already 
destroyed all its WMD: “I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons 
– biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed” 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/hk.pdf), p. 13.  
 
Thus, Kamel’s testimony was no evidence to support the alleged reconstitution of 
the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, it was evidence that Iraq had 
already dismantled its nuclear weapons program while the UNSCOM and the IAEA 
were still functional in Iraq. But Cheney skews and misrepresents the testimony in a 
bid to reinforce his position on the matter. The way Cheney tries to justify the 
proposition that Iraq had resumed prohibited nuclear activities is analogous to the way 
people try to justify the existence of God in a sense that they both appeal to historical 
evidence or historical precedent11. There was no good current evidence to support the 
nuclear proposition. That is, belief in the nuclear proposition was ruled out by the 
evidence available at the time. Of the four-fold rationale behind the nuclear 
proposition, Cheney makes specific reference only to the pursuit of aluminum tubes in 
his public statements. Stressing Iraq's alleged attempt to acquire centrifuge-usable 
aluminum tubes, he, on 8 September 2002, observes: “Specifically aluminium tubes. 
… he has been seeking to acquire … the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a 
centrifuge” (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). Moreover, in his 
interview with NBC's Meet the Press on 8 September 2002, Cheney also refers to the 
overall intelligence as to what gives rise to belief in the nuclear proposition: we are 
able “to conclude, based on intelligence … that he has reconstituted his nuclear 
                                                 
11
 Similarly, Bush also refers to outdated reporting in his remarks on 7 September 2002: “when the 
inspectors first went into Iraq and were … finally denied access, a report came out of the … IAEA that 
they [the Iraqis] were six months away from developing a weapon. I don't know what more evidence 
we need” (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/text/20020907-2.html). 
 
Furthermore, in his unclassified report to Congress (1 January through 30 June 2001), Tenet also refers 
to Iraq’s historical precedent while judging whether or not Iraq had reconstituted its WMD programs 
following the departure of the UN inspectors in December 1998: “the automated video monitoring 
systems installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are still not operating. 
Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the 
current state of Iraq’s WMD programs. Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has used 
the intervening period [1998-2001] to reconstitute prohibited programs” 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2001.htm).  
 
This further demonstrates how the Bush administration officials were making reference to historical 
precedent or outdated reporting in a bid to substitute it for the lack of current good evidence. 
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program to develop a nuclear weapon” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). By virtue of being the Vice 
President and also his reference to the overall intelligence behind the nuclear 
proposition, Cheney would have been aware of the other three rationales behind the 
given proposition. Thus, we can rightly regard the four-fold rationale as what 
apparently gave rise to the Bush administration's apparent belief in the nuclear 
proposition.   
 
9.1.4. The Adequacy of the Four-fold Rationale 
 
The adequacy of justifying grounds is, from an internalist perspective, understood 
as truth-conducivity or sufficient indication of truth or a reliable indicator of truth. 
Internalists, thus, do not require that a belief be based on incorrigible evidence in 
order for it to be justified. They, rather, speak of justification as a medium or a means 
to truth. That is, though they concur that truth is, ideally, the ultimate goal of our 
cognitive endeavours in any learning or doxastic situation, they do not regard truth as 
a necessary requirement for epistemic justification. There is a general consensus 
among epistemologists that truth is not immediately or unproblematically accessible 
to us in most non-axiomatic learning situations. It is because of this that 
epistemologists of all bents regard the truth of a belief as irrelevant to the belief's 
rationality status. The given rationale was not sufficient to warrant belief in the 
nuclear proposition. There was a perceptible sense of doubt in responses by part of the 
US intelligence community about the probability of the nuclear proposition. In 
addition to that, there was a perceptible lack of confidence in the probity of the 
supporting evidence that p. That is, the discourse of the supporting evidence abounded 
with caveats, reservations and qualifications such as probably, likely, may (be), 
assess, could (be), possibly, and suggest, see appendix (pp. 15-32). By contrast, the 
IAEA’s findings were probative. There was a clear sense of confidence in the 
discourse of the IAEA's empirical evidence that not p, see appendix (pp. 17-32).  
 
The IAEA's findings were the outcome of a thorough field investigation, document 
and equipment analysis on the ground in Iraq. They were conclusions drawn by an 
independent, competent and authoritative panel mandated by the UN Security 
Council. Moreover, the IAEA arrived at some of its conclusions, such as the 
refutation of the alleged uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger, with the 
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concurrence of other independent international experts. There was no good evidence 
to defeat, challenge, or undermine the IAEA’s findings. They were good enough to 
have defeated the four-fold rationale behind the nuclear proposition. But the 
supporting evidence that p was seriously doubted by the state department's 
intelligence and research bureau (INR). On 1 October 2002, the INR expressed grave 
doubts about the probability of the nuclear proposition, counting the available 
corroborating evidence as inadequate and unpersuasive to support the nuclear 
proposition, see appendix (pp. 18-19). The INR further challenged the supporting 
evidence that p, regarding it as unpersuasive the argument that the aluminum tubes 
sought by Iraq were intended to be used as centrifuge rotors. They, therefore, 
concluded that the tubes were not intended for use in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, 
see appendix (p. 22). Moreover, the INR also concurred with the DOE’s judgment 
that the aluminum tubes were poorly suited for use as centrifuge rotors, see appendix 
(p. 22). In addition, the INR also concluded on 1 October 2002 that “the claims of 
Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious”, 
see appendix (p. 29). The unprobativeness and inadequacy of the supporting evidence 
was also recognized by the Bush administration itself. In his remarks on 8 September 
2002, Cheney himself acknowledges the inadequacy of the supporting evidence that 
p:  
 
What we know is just bits and pieces we gather through the intelligence 
system. … So we have to deal with these bits and pieces, and try to put them 
together in a mosaic to understand what’s going on. … We have a tendency – I 
don’t know if it’s part of the … American character – to say, ‘Well, we’ll sit 
down and we’ll evaluate the evidence. We’ll draw a conclusion’. But we 
always think in terms that we’ve got all the evidence. Here, we don’t have all 
the evidence. We have 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent. We don’t know how 
much. We know we have a part of the picture. And that part of the picture tells 
us that he is, in fact, actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear 
weapons (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). 
 
 
9.1.5. A Mentalist Analysis of the Nuclear Belief Proposition 
 
    Mentalism is an internalist conception of justification that restricts justifying 
conditions to factors internal to us in a metaphysical sense whether they be occurrent 
or dispositional states or features of us. Proponents of mentalism support the mentalist 
location of justifying conditions for they contend that only mental states can provide 
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for the kind of access we need in order to possess justificational status for a belief. 
But all internalists, whether or not espousing mentalism, concur that a justifying 
condition must be adequate or truth-conducive aside from being accessible (directly 
or indirectly) to a given believing subject. The truth-conducivity condition of 
justifying factors is often presupposed in discussions about mentalism. Though the 
given subject satisfies the internalist access requirement on justification as already 
observed, the given belief does not satisfy the mentalist constraint on justification. 
 
None of the four-fold rationale behind the given belief was internal to Cheney in a 
metaphysical sense being a state or feature of him. Thus, from a mentalist perspective, 
none of the four-fold rationale qualifies to function as a justifying condition for the 
belief in question. The belief could, therefore, not have been justifiably acquired 
according to mentalism for its grounds fail to meet both the mentalist and the truth-
conducivity condition. We have already observed that mentalism fails to provide for a 
comprehensive account of justification. If the mentalist argument holds, we would be 
justified only in beliefs whose rationale is internal to us in a metaphysical sense being 
a state or feature of us. Mentalism, therefore, detracts from the tenability of the 
(potential) awareness constraint on justifying conditions. It shall, thereby, be ruled out 
as a conception of the accessibility condition on justifying grounds. From a non-
mentalist internalist perspective, the given belief would not have been unjustifiably 
acquired for failing to satisfy the mentalist requirement on justification, but for failing 
to meet the adequacy condition on justifying grounds. Violations of the mentalist 
requirement on justification are no good reason to deny a belief positive epistemic 
status.  
 
9.1.6. A Perspectival Internalist Analysis of the Nuclear Belief Proposition  
 
Perspectival Internalism (PI) is one of the internalist conceptions through which the 
awareness constraint on justification is construed. It is an internalist account whose 
underlying thesis is that what confers justificatory status on a belief falls within our 
cognitive perspective on the world with justified belief being singled out as the typical 
candidate among what falls within our ken. The idea is, if something is within our 
cognitive perspective on the world, then it is the sort of thing that we have already 
taken note of. We are or can, therefore, become conscious of it if it is not forgotten or 
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lost irretrievably. We have already determined Cheney’s perspective on the given 
nuclear proposition as the four-fold rationale which apparently gave rise to belief in 
such proposition. But examining whether or not such belief would have been 
justifiably acquired according to perspectival internalism is complicated by the fact 
that we do not know whether or not he believed the four-fold rationale behind the 
supposed belief in question. The four-fold rationale was too unprobative to have been 
trusted. Its epistemic force was overwhelmingly doubted and Cheney was aware of its 
inadequacy to warrant belief. But even if we assume that he trusted the four-fold 
rationale and therefore came to believe it, such belief could not have been justifiably 
acquired for the four-fold rationale was debunked by the IAEA’s empirical evidence 
that not p.  
 
Belief in the four-fold rationale could not, therefore, have counted as a justified 
belief of Cheney’s cognitive perspective on the nuclear proposition. It is because of 
this that such belief cannot satisfy the perspectival internalism requirement in order 
for it to qualify as a justifying premise for the belief in question. The supposed belief 
in the nuclear proposition could not, thereby, have been justifiably acquired from the 
standpoint of perspectival internalism. In accordance with Alston’s conception of 
perspectival internalism, a belief that does not have as its justifying premise a justified 
belief does not enjoy justificational status for he argues that an unjustified belief 
cannot transfer to another belief a justification it does not itself possess. I, however, 
contend that belief in the nuclear proposition could not have been justifiably acquired 
for its failure to meet the adequacy condition of justification rather than its failure to 
meet the perspectival internalism requirement. We possess justificational status for 
many of our beliefs whose justifying conditions we have no justified belief about. 
Epistemic justification obtains as long as we have some potential awareness to what 
confers such positive epistemic status regardless of the form such awareness takes – 
whether it takes the form of belief, justified belief, knowledge or just plain cognitive 
awareness.  
 
9.1.7. An Access Internalist Analysis of the Nuclear Belief Proposition  
 
    Accessibilism is also one of the internalist avenues through which internalists 
conceive the awareness requirement on justification. The fundamental thesis of access 
internalism is that what bestows justification on a belief shall be, in some way, 
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accessible to the believer. We have already established that the supposed nuclear 
belief does not suffer from accessibilism in the sense of its four-fold rationale being 
accessible to the alleged believing subject. This, however, shall not denote that being 
cognitively accessible renders a ground justification-conferring. The truth-conducivity 
of justifying grounds is often presupposed here. If the doxastic attitude Cheney 
manifests as his position on the given matter was ever a genuine belief, it would not 
have been justifiably acquired for knowingly basing it on defeated evidence. Given 
Iraq’s historical precedent in relation to its WMD, it is logically possible to think that 
the four-fold rationale behind the given belief had, at some point before the 
resumption of the UN inspections, appeared probable to Cheney. But even before the 
inspections resumed, they (the aluminium tubes and the yellow cake claims) were 
undermined by the INR’s assertive counter-evidence and were, all four, eventually 
debunked by the emergence of the IAEA’s authoritative findings. 
 
9.1.8. An Externalist Analysis of the Nuclear Belief Proposition  
 
Unlike internalism, externalism does not require any cognitive access to justifying 
conditions. Instead, externalists argue that a belief’s justifiability status is solely a 
matter of the reliability of the cognitive process that generates the belief. But 
whenever we try to establish whether or not a belief possesses justificatory status, our 
intuitions are satisfied only if we can establish the adequacy of the evidence that gave 
rise to the belief, whether there was sufficient overriding evidence accessible to the 
believing subject at the time of belief, and whether the subject has some cognitive 
grasp as to what it is that is responsible for the truth of the belief. These are the 
foremost considerations that cross our mind whenever the question of the rationality 
of belief arises. But the externalist argument goes against such intuitions. Externalists 
argue in favour of a requirement, reliability, which is not only unnecessary for 
epistemic justification, but impossible to establish given the current form of 
externalism. The cognitive process token that might have generated the nuclear belief 
would have been one of reasoning and that process token could have been an instance 
of each of the process types outlined in the analysis of Bush’ supposed belief attitude 
(see p. 139-40). That is, the belief could have been acquired by any of the outlined 
process types. In the absence of a stipulative rule to make an informed choice as to 
which of the process types to choose to check for its reliability, determining whether 
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or not the given belief would have been reliably acquired cannot be accurately 
established.  
 
9.1.9. A Deontological Analysis of the Nuclear Belief Proposition  
 
Epistemic deontologism implies doxastic voluntarism. Doxastic voluntarists argue 
that we have voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes. That is, they regard the 
permissibility of belief, fulfilment of intellectual obligations, and being blameless in 
holding a belief as the repository of epistemic justification. We have already learned 
that some of our intellectual obligations are to believe only on the basis of good 
evidence, seek evidence pro and con, not stifling doubts, and not ignoring contrary 
evidence when engaged in the resolution of doxastic opinion on an issue. In other 
words, to fulfil epistemic obligations is, as already explained, to pursue the truth and 
avoid the error. That is, to fulfil a relevant epistemic obligation is to attend to 
epistemic considerations that ensure or are conducive of such outcome. Prior to the 
emergence of the IAEA’s findings, there was some flimsy supporting evidence behind 
the given nuclear proposition. That is, there was no sufficient contrary evidence of the 
IAEA’s character to completely rule out belief in the given proposition. Due to the 
lack of sufficient clarity on whether p or not p, an inquiry was initiated by the IAEA 
on the ground in Iraq on 27 November 2002. This is aside from the so-called 
investigation launched by the Bush administration itself. It is this initiation of inquiry 
that comprises one of the core intellectual obligations. We normally feel compelled to 
launch an inquiry into a proposition when it is not clear for us whether p or not p. This 
is, of course, if we wanted to settle opinion on the proposition. Peirce argues that the 
need for inquiry usually arises whenever there is real and living doubt about a 
proposition:  
 
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term 
this struggle inquiry … The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive 
for the struggle to attain belief. … [in order to] stimulate the mind to any 
struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt (1877: 6).  
 
Peirce also argues that the object of inquiry is to settle opinion – acquiring a firm 
belief – sweeping away expectations of proof as the sole end of inquiry:  
 
the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this 
is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true 
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opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as 
a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or 
false. … That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very 
important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague and erroneous 
conceptions of proof (Ibid: 6).  
 
 
We have already observed on p. 136 that the object of our cognitive endeavours is, 
ideally, to acquire the truth in any learning situation. This is also what deontologists 
take to be one of our principal epistemic obligations. But, as pointed out by Peirce, 
often the doubts that motivate inquiry cease whenever we arrive at a firm belief. That 
is, even though we normally initiate an inquiry with truth being our end, we are often 
psychologically satisfied whenever we arrive at a conclusion about which we hold a 
firm belief. Though we aspire to know the truth of the matter and it is to this end that 
we initiate the inquiry, we end up psychologically at ease in our inquiry with the 
arrival of a firm belief about the existence of God, the origin of the universe, or the 
possibility of extraterrestrial life. That is why belief plays an indispensable role in 
settling opinion on matters whose truth is not immediately knowable. Furthermore, 
we tend to hold a belief about the patently true as well; we believe them to be true. 
Peirce argues that apart from truth, belief is the only propositional attitude that renders 
an inquirer to be in “a calm and satisfactory state” (Ibid: 5). But the calm and 
satisfactory state which belief tends to bring about is attainable normally on good 
evidence - evidence that we take to be adequate or satisfactory.  
 
Believing in the absence of good evidence is, from a deontological perspective, a 
violation of our intellectual responsibilities. Epistemic deontologists contend that we 
have an intellectual obligation to refrain from belief in the absence of good evidence. 
The supporting evidence adduced in favour of belief in the nuclear proposition was 
too unprobative to warrant belief. There was sufficient evidence against the possibility 
that p. Thus, from a deontological perspective, the Bush administration was 
intellectually obligated to refrain from belief the nuclear proposition. Clifford argues 
that it is “wrong to believe on insufficient evidence or to nourish belief by suppressing 
doubts and avoiding investigation” (1999: 74). This is the fundamental reasoning 
behind the ethics of belief. If the given belief was ever a genuine belief, the alleged 
believing subject is to blame for violating his most sacred intellectual obligation. The 
alleged belief is, therefore, blameworthy from a deontological standpoint. 
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Deontologists hold that it is a fundamental intellectual responsibility to conduct 
proper inquiry where there is doubt that p and we shall avoid or suspend belief in the 
absence of good evidence. The given nuclear belief would not have been 
epistemically permissible under the evidential conditions at the time. On the 
deontological view, justificational status cannot be attributed to a belief whose causal 
ancestry involves violations of intellectual obligation. The given belief could not, 
therefore, have been justifiably acquired. From a deontological perspective, it is 
epistemically irresponsible to ignore contrary evidence or suppress doubts. In the case 
of the nuclear proposition, the totality of the available evidence was against belief in 
such proposition.  
 
9.1.10. The Terror Proposition  
 
The terror proposition was one of the professed rationales behind the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq. In this section, I aim to outline what gave rise to belief in the proposition that 
Iraq was in league with Al-Qaeda and establish, in light of the evidential conditions at 
the time, whether such belief could have been justifiably acquired. I have chosen to 
take Rice's belief-free assertion as the paradigm of the statements that assert such a 
relationship between the two. She, on 25 September 2002, asserts that “there are 
contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. … there clearly are contacts between al-Qaida 
and Iraq that can be documented. There clearly is testimony that … there's a 
relationship here” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec02/rice_9-
25.html). Unlike Cheney’s belief-stipulated assertion, Rice’s assertion is manifested 
in a belief-free manner. We have already learned that belief propositions manifested 
as belief-free assertions normally imply certainty on the part of the asserter. But we 
will learn below that there was no good evidence available at the time to warrant any 
reasonable degree of certainty that p.  
 
Three reasons were adduced by the Bush administration to support the proposition 
that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. First, the presence of Al-
Qaeda operatives in Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. Most Bush administration 
officials underscored the presence of Al-Qaeda elements in Iraq. On 8 September 
2002, Cheney appeals to perceptual evidence to support the given proposition: “since 
the operations in Afghanistan – we’ve seen al-Qaeda members operating physically in 
Iraq” (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). But he does not provide 
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any photographic evidence – satellite or otherwise – to substantiate his perceptual 
assertion. Similarly, on 18 September 2002, Rumsfeld claims to have knowledge that 
Al-Qaeda is functional in Iraq: “We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). Second, the claim that 
Iraq was aiding and training Al-Qaeda in document forgery, poisons, bomb-making, 
combat operations, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. For 
example, on 28 January 2003, Bush states: “Evidence from intelligence sources, 
secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam 
Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-
19.html). Furthermore, on 31 January 2003, Cheney underlines the same thesis: “His 
regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131-
13.html). In his Cincinnati speech on 7 October 2002, Bush also argues: “We've 
learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and 
deadly gases” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html). Further to Iraq's 
training of Al-Qaeda, Bush states (8 February 2003):  
 
Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with al 
Qaeda. Iraq has also provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons 
training. And an al Qaeda operative was sent to Iraq several times in the late 
1990s for help in acquiring poisons and gases (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030208.html). 
 
 
Third, the claim that Iraq was involved in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001. What gave rise to such a proposition was the allegation that one of the 9/11 
hijackers, Atta, had met up with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague before the 
9/11 attacks, as underscored by Cheney in his appearance on NBC's Meet the Press on 
9 December 2001: It has “been pretty well confirmed, that he [Mohammed Atta] did 
go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in 
Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the [9/11] attack” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20011209.html). 
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9.1.11. The Adequacy of the Corroborating Evidence   
 
The supporting grounds adduced to defend the given terror proposition do not 
constitute sufficient evidence to show current connections between Iraq and Al-Qaeda 
or to warrant belief in such proposition. They are of a variety of hypothetical 
considerations along with evidence of some past contacts between the two. First, they 
consist of a hypothetical, contingent and possible outcome. That is, if Iraq and Al-
Qaeda were to link up. For example, on 22 March 2002, Bush states: “a nightmare 
scenario, of course, would be if a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda were to link 
up with a barbaric regime such as Iraq and, thereby, in essence, possess weapons of 
mass destruction” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-10.html). Similarly, in his 
remarks on 24 March 2002, Cheney also argues: “We're worried about the possible 
marriage, if you will, on the one hand between the terrorist organizations and on the 
other, weapons of mass destruction capability, the kind of devastating materials that 
Saddam used against his own people in '88” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
Second, they consist of likely past contacts between the two sides, as pointed out by 
Rice in her interview with CNN's Late Edition on 8 September 2002: “it's just more of 
a picture that is emerging that there may well have been contacts between al Qaeda 
and Saddam Hussein's regime” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
 
Further to the past contacts between the two, Rumsfeld argues (18 September 
2002): “We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-
Qaeda over the years” (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
Rice again stresses the past contacts between the two and observes (25 September 
2002): “We clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between 
senior Iraqi officials and members of al-Qaida going back for actually quite a long 
time” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec02/rice_9-25.html). 
Third, what incentives Iraq might have had that could have led to making common 
cause and cultivation of a relationship with Al-Qaeda, as emphasized by Rumsfeld on 
18 September 2002: “He has incentives to make common cause with terrorists. He 
shares many common objectives with groups like al-Qaeda, including an antipathy for 
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the Saudi royal family and a desire to drive the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf region” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). Echoing the same 
theme, Cheney states (8 September 2002):  
 
The fact of the matter is, if you look at Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda 
organization, on the one hand, and Saddam Hussein on the other, while they 
come from different perspectives, one’s religiously motivated, the other is 
secular, etc., the fact of the matter is they have the same objective: to drive the 
United States out of the Middle East, to strike the United States, if at all 
possible. So to suggest there’s not a common interest there, I think, would be 
wrong (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). 
 
 
    In addition, the discourse through which the proposition in question was asserted 
abounded with expressions of uncertainty such as maybe, could be, sources of varying 
degrees of reliability, possible training, assumptions, contradictory information, 
second hand details, unspecified training, suggestions, and unconfirmed reports. For 
instance, recognizing the absence of probity in the available corroborating evidence, 
Rumsfeld observes (26 September 2002):  
 
The knowledge that the intelligence community … has of the al Qaeda 
relationship with Iraq is evolving. It's based on a lot of different types of 
sources of varying degrees of reliability. Some of it, admittedly, comes from 
detainees, which has been helpful, and particularly some high-ranking 
detainees [Al-Libi]  
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669). 
 
 
Further, in his testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 17 
September 2002, Tenet also communicates a lack of confidence in the available 
supporting evidence: “As with much of the information on the overall relationship, 
details on training are second-hand or from sources of varying reliability” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFsources_claims_training/2002_02_22_SenatePost
warReport.pdf). This demonstrates the uncertainty which the Bush administration 
officials were feeling about the given terror proposition. That is, it shows that they did 
not believe the available supporting evidence to be adequate in a way to warrant belief 
in the given proposition.  
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9.1.12. The Adequacy of the Counter-Evidence  
 
    Unlike the nuclear proposition, the terror proposition was an emerging issue with 
an openly recognized lack of probity in the available supporting evidence. The 
absence of sufficient evidence pro and con constituted evidential complications in 
settling doxastic opinion on the issue. That is, resolving opinion on the issue was 
hindered by the lack of an authoritative source such as the IAEA to verify the 
possibility of such a relationship between the two. Lacking good evidence to warrant 
a firm doxastic attitude, the approach to understand – both affirmatively and 
negatively – the possibility of such connections was based on understanding the 
political ideologies of the two, their mutual antipathy towards the US government, 
Iraq’s history of supporting terrorist groups, its past contacts with Al-Qaeda, and 
coerced evidence taken from detainees. Therefore, the alleged relationship between 
the two remained elusive until after the war. However, prior to the war, there were 
opposing views as to the possibility of such connections. The US intelligence 
community communicated a clear sense of doubt in the veracity of the available 
corroborating evidence.  
 
    First, with respect to the overall links between the two, the CIA (21 June 2002)12 
asserts that their approach in examining the issue is purposefully aggressive with their 
knowledge of the link containing critical gaps, reporting on the issue limited and the 
reliability of many of their sources questionable. They also demonstrate that their 
assessment of such connections is based on fragmented and conflicting reporting from 
sources of varying reliability. Further, the CIA13 concludes on 29 January 2003 that 
the two are far from being natural partners, submitting that the information on which 
the relationship is based is at times contradictory and is obtained from sources of 
varying degrees of reliability. Second, regarding the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives 
in Iraq, the CIA (21 June 2002)14 recognizes that they lack positive indications to 
show that Iraq is complicit in their presence in the country. They15 again, in 
September 2002, reiterate that they lack certainty as to whether Iraq is actively 
complicit in its territory being used as a safehaven by Al-Qaeda. Moreover, in a 
                                                 
12
 See appendix (pp. 34-5).  
13
 See appendix (pp. 44-5). 
14
 See appendix (p. 35).  
15
 See appendix (p. 36).   
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testimony answering Senator Carl Levin’s questions on 11 February 2003, Tenet16 
himself underscores the lack of knowledge as to whether the terrorists who found 
refuge in Baghdad were under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi government.  
 
    Third, the intelligence community expressed serious doubts about the possibility of 
the alleged Iraqi training of Al-Qaeda. The allegation was primarily based on the 
misleading debriefings of Al-Libi. The DIA, CIA, and NIE all express serious doubts 
about Al-Libi’s claims. The DIA (22 February 2002)17 challenges the veracity of Al-
Libi’s claims, arguing that he lacks specific details regarding the Iraqis involved, the 
type of WMD material involved and the location of the training. They, further, argue 
that it is more likely that he is deliberately misleading the debriefers and that Iraq is 
unlikely to provide assistance to Al-Qaeda. They (28 February 2002)18 also point out 
that all-source intelligence has not confirmed Iraq’s involvement in Al-Qaeda’s WMD 
acquisition efforts in the way of providing knowledge or material. Moreover, the DIA 
(31 July 2002)19 reiterates the position they take on 22 February 2002, adding that 
despite the lack of the specific details already mentioned, Al-Libi’s information is 
second hand and not from his own personal experience. They20, therefore, assert that 
there is no compelling evidence to support the training or direct cooperation between 
the two and also regard the information adduced by the Bush administration to 
support such claims as anecdotal.   
  
    In addition, the CIA (29 January 2003)21 also expresses strong doubts about the 
allegation that Iraq provided WMD training and assistance to Al-Qaeda. Describing it 
as possible cooperation suggested by some reports, the CIA notes that most of the 
reports lack clarity as to whether the training initiatives remained in the planning 
stages or were implemented. They regard reports on training as opaque and of varying 
reliability, touching on future intentions rather than presenting evidence of completed 
training. Further reiterating the lack of clarity and specificity in such reports, the CIA 
asserts that in about half of the reports they (the CIA) could not determine whether the 
Iraqi nationals involved in training Al-Qaeda had any relationship with the Iraqi 
                                                 
16
 See appendix (p. 47). 
17
 See appendix (p. 48). 
18
 See appendix (p. 49).  
19
 See appendix (p. 51).  
20
 See appendix (p. 52).  
21
 See appendix (pp. 53-54). 
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government or were expatriate or freelance engineers or scientists. The CIA also 
recognizes that some of the reports are based on hearsay, and some are just simple 
declarative accusations with no substantiating details. Overall, the CIA is sceptical of 
the source on which a substantial part of the Iraqi-Al-Qaeda training is based.  
 
    Al-Libi claimed that Al-Qaeda sent two of its associates to Iraq in December 2000 
in order to be trained by the Iraqis in chemical and biological weapons acquisition. 
But the CIA (29 January 2003)22 argues that Al-Libi was not in a position to know if 
any training had occurred for the two Al-Qaeda associates departed for Iraq but did 
not return. The classified version of the NIE (1 October 2002)23 also shares the doubts 
and concerns raised by the CIA and DIA about the reports of the Iraqi-Al-Qaeda 
relationship as well as the alleged training. It observes that much of the information 
about the alleged training and the relationship between the two is second-hand and 
from sources of varying reliability. Underlining the pervasive lack of clarity and 
specificity in reports on chemical and biological weapons training, the NIE also points 
out that the intelligence community could not determine whether the Iraqi individuals 
allegedly involved in training the Al-Qaeda were directed by the Iraqi government or 
whether or not the training initiatives were implemented at all.   
 
    Fourth, the intelligence community had grave doubts about the alleged Iraqi role in 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The claim that the Iraqi government had a 
role in 9/11 was based on the alleged meeting of one of the leading 9/11 hijackers, 
Mohammed Atta, with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001. But 
the CIA (21 June 2002)24 regards the reports on their meeting as contradictory, 
arguing that his travels to Prague have not been verified. They also point out that 
some of their analysts agree that intelligence reports provide no conclusive evidence 
to support the idea that the two had cooperated on certain terrorist operations. Further, 
the CIA (29 January 2003)25 asserts that the most reliable reporting at the time casts 
doubt on the possibility of the given meeting in Prague. Considering it complicated 
and sometimes contradictory the information about Atta’s visits to Prague, they point 
out that a CIA and FBI review of intelligence and open-source reporting leads them to 
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 See appendix (p. 55).  
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 See appendix (p. 52).  
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 See appendix (p. 59).  
25
 See appendix (pp. 60-1).  
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doubt the information claiming that such alleged meeting had taken place. Thus, by 
January 2003, the CIA26 concludes that they have no credible information to support 
the thesis that Iraq was complicit in 9/11 or in any other Al-Qaeda operations. 
Moreover, the DIA (31 July 2002) also expresses serious doubts about reports 
claiming that the given meeting had taken place. They assert that “There are 
significant information gaps” in such reports, arguing that “there is no photographic, 
immigration or other documentary evidence indicating Atta was in the Czech 
Republic during the timeframe of the meeting”27.  
 
    Thus, the intelligence community judges the available supporting evidence to be 
inadequate to warrant belief in the given terror proposition. That is, they demonstrate 
a genuine and living sense of doubt about the probity of the evidence corroborating 
the proposition in question. The intelligence community clearly communicates its 
perception of the available supporting evidence as conflicting, contradictory, 
fragmentary, anecdotal, inconclusive, second-hand, opaque, and hearsay. They also 
recognize that the corroborating information is from sources of varying degrees of 
reliability. From their cognitive perspective, belief in the given proposition was not, 
therefore, warranted. We have also already observed a real sense of doubt in the 
discourse of those administration officials asserting the relationship between the two. 
Thus, though the sense of doubt about the available supporting evidence was more 
clearly manifested by the intelligence community, it was also shared by the 
administration officials. Therefore, from the perspective of both the intelligence 
community and the given administration officials, the available supporting evidence 
could not have been regarded as adequate in a way to warrant belief in the given 
proposition.   
 
Thus, given the living sense of doubt they show towards the available supporting 
evidence, it is highly unlikely that the intelligence community (DIA, CIA, and NIE) 
had any belief in favour of the terror proposition. The serious doubts they raise 
against the probability of the given proposition are sufficient to have discouraged 
belief in such proposition. The doubts they manifest show that they had thought of the 
given proposition as unlikely. Yet despite such grave doubts about the probity of the 
                                                 
26
 See appendix (p. 61).  
27
 See appendix (p. 60).   
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supporting evidence, the Bush administration officials kept asserting the alleged 
relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. Evidential conditions of such character 
normally discourage belief. Normally we cannot come to believe a proposition we 
take to be doubted by the available evidence. That is, belief is normally 
psychologically impossible in the presence of a conscious judgment that belief is 
unwarranted by the current evidence. It is unclear how Cheney could have come to 
genuinely believe the nuclear proposition in the face of debunked supporting 
evidence.  
 
It is also equally unclear how Rice could have come to genuinely believe the terror 
proposition in the presence of such unprobative supporting grounds along with the 
serious doubts expressed by the intelligence community. From a deontological 
perspective, neither the nuclear belief nor the terror belief was epistemically licensed 
by the available evidence. Therefore, on the deontological view of epistemic 
justification, both Rice and Cheney are to be held accountable for dereliction of their 
epistemic duties. That is if their manifested attitudes represented their actual state of 
mind on the given matters. The only way Rice could be attributed belief in favour of 
the terror proposition would be if she had forgotten about or disbelieved the doubts 
raised by the intelligence community or if she had believed or judged the available 
supporting evidence to be adequate to warrant such belief. But such belief would have 
been unjustifiably and irrationally acquired for ignoring doubts, avoiding inquiry, and 
basing the belief on inadequate evidence. From a deontological standpoint, she had no 
right to believe the given proposition. That is, she had to either withhold belief in such 
proposition or believe the opposite. She would have been epistemically irresponsible 
to have believed a proposition she had no good evidence in favour of.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 228 
Part Two 
An Inquiry into the Nature of the Given Beliefs  
 
9.2.1. The Attribution of Belief  
 
Following the events of 9/11, the Bush administration officials set out on a 
hortatory public relations campaign asserting, in the absence of decisive evidence, a 
belief that Iraq had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, was in possession of 
chemical and biological weapons and was in league with Al-Qaeda. We have already 
observed on pp. 39-40 that assertions normally imply belief or knowledge of the 
proposition in question, providing that the asserter means what he asserts; we have 
also observed on p. 47 that the simplest form of expressing a belief is just an 
assertion. Thus, the assertion it is cloudy is just one way of expressing the belief that it 
is cloudy. The Bush administration was on the offensive trying to get the public to 
believe the charges they were levelling against Iraq. Normally when we lack what we 
take to be sufficient or good evidence to warrant belief in a proposition, we neither 
hold nor assert belief, at least not when we lack ulterior motives. In the case at hand, 
the Bush administration officials made no secret, as demonstrated in the appendix 
(pp.87-88), that their ultimate goal was, regardless of the veracity of the given 
charges, regime change in Iraq rather than the pursuit of truth. What complicates or 
renders the attribution of belief inappropriate here is not only the public declaration of 
such an overriding non-epistemic goal, but also the lack of what it normally takes to 
hold or arrive at a belief under such conditions. Unlike acceptance or suppositions, 
belief is normally truth-oriented and is, therefore, normally responsive to (epistemic) 
evidence. This, however, shall not imply that any evidence, as long as truth-conducive 
in some way, has the necessary epistemic force to bring about belief. We sometimes 
have evidence conducing to the truth of a proposition and yet hold no such 
corresponding beliefs. Many of us have, at least, some evidence that corroborates the 
truth of the proposition that God exists and yet do not possess any such corresponding 
beliefs. Belief normally arises when we take the available corroborating evidence to 
be good, adequate or satisfactory.  
 
In this section, I aim to establish, in light of the evidence available at the time, 
whether belief in the nuclear and terror propositions can be rightly attributed to the 
Bush administration officials. In situations where we have a hunch or suspect that a 
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particular proposition (p) is or might be true but do not have what we take to be good 
or sufficient evidence to warrant belief in p, we normally, if p is of particular interest 
or importance, launch a dispassionate and impartial inquiry into the possibility 
whether or not that p. This is, of course, if we are epistemically driven and therefore 
have the pursuit of truth as our object. Under such circumstances, we take p as the 
premise of the inquiry. That is, we provisionally accept p for purposes of the inquiry 
in the same way a judge might accept a murder case in a court of law for purposes of 
discovering the truth whether p or not p. If the inquiry culminates in evidence 
adequately supportive of the truth of p, normally we come to believe that p. But 
whether or not we eventually accept the belief that p is up to us. If we take p to be the 
given nuclear proposition here, the inquiry, given the evidential conditions at the time, 
would have naturally culminated in neither belief nor epistemic acceptance that p. 
That is, we normally come to disbelieve p if our inquiry into the possibility whether p 
results in clear evidence that not p. Or, if we were already in possession of a belief 
that p, we will just abandon belief in p upon discovering that not p. But we might still 
go ahead and accept p - what we have eventually come to disbelieve - for practical 
reasons. That is if we perceive the consequences of being mistaken in our belief that 
not p to be grave enough or if we perceive the cost of being wrong in our belief that 
not p to be higher than what follows from our acceptance that p. This is because mere 
propositional acceptance is often driven by the risk asymmetries we associate with the 
eventualities of whether p or not p, as noted on p. 104. 
 
The possibility of mere propositional acceptance as a likely characterisation of the 
given beliefs will be explored in detail on pp. 239-257. There are two perspectives 
from which philosophers normally establish whether or not it is apt to attribute a 
particular belief to a given agent. I will rule out the validity of the first, but uphold the 
plausibility of the second. First, the behaviourist or the functionalist perspective: if we 
look into the alleged belief cases at hand from a functionalist perspective, we can 
notice that there is an appropriate match between the given beliefs and the given 
alleged believing subjects' behavioural dispositional profile which functionalists 
normally associate with a certain belief. Their verbal and actional behaviour was 
consistent with such beliefs. That is, the Bush administration officials continued 
asserting the given beliefs till the war started and they acted appropriately, at least 
from an American perspective, to such beliefs. They apparently believed that Iraq was 
 230 
in league with Al-Qaeda and was a serious and imminent threat to the US national 
security, had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program and was in possession of 
chemical and biological weapons. These seeming beliefs, from the Bush 
administration’s perspective, required that action be taken against Iraq. Thus, there 
was, on the part of the given alleged believing subjects, no shortage of the publicly 
observable behaviour which functionalists associate with belief. If belief were just a 
behavioural disposition, then we could rightly attribute belief to the given agents. But 
belief must be something else. Belief is a feeling disposition which might, but should 
not, be accompanied by behavioural manifestations. This is the second perspective 
from which we shall look into the given beliefs. Establishing whether one feels it true 
that p and false that not p requires empirical evidence which we, as external 
observers, are often not privy to in the analysis of belief. But we can reasonably 
determine whether belief is psychologically possible under certain given conditions 
by looking into the properties that normally cause or give rise to belief or by 
considering the conditions under which belief is normally taken to be likely or 
psychologically possible. The parader's public assertion that the Emperor is wearing 
such and such new beautiful clothes (x) cannot be rightly described as sincere while 
he is aware of the clear present evidence that the Emperor is actually naked. This is, 
of course, providing that the parader's vision is normal. That is, the parader cannot be 
appropriately characterised as believing the Emperor to be wearing x when he clearly 
sees that the Emperor is naked. In other words, we cannot feel it true that p in the face 
of clear evidence that not p. Belief, under such conditions, is psychologically 
impossible.  
 
During the lead-up to Iraq war, the given nuclear proposition was persistently 
asserted even in the face of the majority evidence that not p. The Bush administration 
was well aware that the nuclear proposition was refuted by the IAEA’s findings (see 
appendix, pp. 17-32) which were based on thorough field investigations, document 
and equipment analysis on the ground in Iraq. There was good reason to trust the 
epistemic force of such findings – empirical evidence attained by an investigative 
body characterised by impartiality, competence and authority. We normally come to 
disbelieve p or at least suspend judgment – not construed as belief – on p when we 
take the majority evidence to count against the possibility that p. There is no good 
reason to attribute belief that p in the face of clear evidence that not p. It is likely that 
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one might have a hunch, suspect or just fear that p. But we have already observed in 
chapter three that we cannot come to believe p, nor can we be rightly attributed belief 
that p if we take p to be evidentially unsupported or if we take the available evidence 
for p to be insufficient. Under such circumstances, belief in p is unwarranted from our 
own perspective, and we cannot come to believe a proposition we take to be 
unwarranted from our perspective. This is an apt description of the evidential 
conditions under which belief in the nuclear proposition was asserted by the Bush 
administration officials – Cheney being the paradigm of them. He verbally 
acknowledges (see p. 213) the insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the Bush 
administration to support the nuclear proposition. Belief is a psychological state. I 
recognize that we are neither psychologically nor intellectually all the same. My 
psychological or intellectual constitution might differ from someone else's. Some of 
us are credulous, yet some are critical. But as long as we are dealing with rational 
agency and so long as the agent in question is psychologically normal, we can rightly 
assert that one cannot come to believe a proposition one takes to be unwarranted from 
one's own cognitive perspective. If this is necessarily the case, then we cannot rightly 
attribute belief to Cheney. He takes belief in the nuclear proposition to be 
unwarranted from his own cognitive perspective for he himself takes the available 
supporting evidence for p to be insufficient. My taking the available evidence for p to 
be inadequate or unsatisfactory is just taking belief in p to be unwarranted from my 
cognitive perspective. If the rest of the Bush administration officials took the 
available supporting evidence to be inadequate and thereby perceived belief in p to be 
unwarranted from their own perspective, then our conclusion, the denial of belief, 
stands as an appropriate characterisation of the apparent collective belief in the 
nuclear proposition.  
 
The evidence available prior to the resumption of the UN inspections in Iraq was 
neither good nor sufficient to warrant belief in the nuclear proposition, as openly 
acknowledged by Cheney himself (see p. 213). Even if the Bush administration 
officials had a belief of some strength in p prior to the emergence of the IAEA 
findings, the reasons on which they might have come to believe p were, to their 
consciousness, defeated or at least sufficiently undermined. Thus, they had no good 
reason to retain their apparent belief that p. In situations where we come across or are 
confronted with clear evidence that not p, we normally come to disbelieve p or 
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abandon belief in p if we had already, prior to the discovery of clear evidence that not 
p, held a belief of some strength in p. We have already observed that belief is not 
always formed in response to good or sufficient evidence. There are beliefs based on 
objectively inadequate, but subjectively satisfactory, reasons such as Alston's belief 
case of the culturally isolated agent on p. 181 of the thesis. The evidence supporting 
the nuclear proposition was fed to the Bush administration officials through the CIA, 
DIA, INR and DOE. But all the foregoing sources clearly highlighted, in their reports, 
the unprobative nature or the inadequacies of the available supporting evidence that p 
(see appendix, pp. 16-31). And the Bush administration officials were all aware of 
such inadequacies for they were clearly manifested in the reports they were receiving 
from the foregoing sources. Thus, there is no good reason to support a case of 
ignorance, on the part of the Bush administration officials, of such inadequacies. It is 
unclear how they could have possibly taken the given supporting evidence for p as 
subjectively satisfactory while being aware of the unprobative nature of such 
evidence. Even if we assume that they disbelieved the IAEA's empirical findings that 
not p, belief in p would still have been unwarranted from their own cognitive 
perspective given their awareness or recognition of the insufficiency of the supporting 
evidence that p. Belief in the nuclear proposition (p) cannot, therefore, be rightly 
attributed to the Bush administration officials. 
 
But despite the presence of clear empirical evidence that not p, the Bush 
administration officials persistently asserted the belief that p in the same way the 
parader brazenly commends the Emperor's would-be new clothes in the face of clear 
evidence that the Emperor is actually naked. In the case of the terror proposition (p), 
though there was no such evidence empirically acquired on the ground in Iraq, the 
unprobative nature of the supporting evidence along with the grave doubts raised by 
the CIA, DIA and the NIE (see appendix, pp. 33-61) were sufficient to discourage 
belief in p or at least suspend judgment on the issue. The evidence adduced to support 
the terror proposition was epistemically degenerate. Further, the rationale for belief in 
the terror proposition partly consisted of some hypothetical reasoning, such as what 
would happen if Al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime were to link up, and their apparent 
concern about such a possible marriage between the two. The supporting evidence 
was also partly premised on some likely past contacts between the two along with 
considerations of potential incentives for Iraq to align itself with Al-Qaeda. This is in 
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addition to the evidence coercively taken from detainees such as Al-Libi. Like the 
nuclear proposition, there was no shortage of the sort of publicly observable 
behaviour which behaviourists typically associate with a particular belief. The Bush 
administration officials continued asserting their seeming belief that p whenever the 
question whether p was arising. This is as far as their verbal behaviour was concerned. 
But they also acted appropriately, at least from an American perspective, to p. That is, 
from the Bush administration's standpoint, the belief or acceptance that Iraq was in 
league with Al-Qaeda, training and aiding them, providing them with chemical, 
biological, nuclear and radiological knowledge and material required that action be 
taken against Iraq. Thus, from a behaviourist perspective, belief in the terror 
proposition can be appropriately attributed to the Bush administration officials. But 
belief cannot solely be a disposition to act in a certain way for even mere 
propositional acceptance disposes us to act appropriately to what we accept as true. If 
belief was solely a behavioural disposition, then we could rightly attribute belief even 
to those who merely accept a proposition. Furthermore, if belief was reducible to 
publicly observable behaviour, then we could appropriately attribute belief even to 
those who feign belief or are insincere in their assertions. But belief is more than a 
disposition to act as if p. It is a disposition to feel it true that p regardless of whether 
or not we act, verbally or actionally, appropriately to p.  
 
Normally I cannot feel it true that p in the face of supporting evidence of 
unprobative nature or in the face of serious doubts that p. The intelligence 
community, the CIA, the DIA and the NIE, conveys very serious doubts about the 
possibility that p and considers the available supporting evidence for p to be 
inadequate. Thus, belief in p was unwarranted from their perspective. It is, therefore, 
inappropriate to attribute belief that p to the intelligence community. This very 
evidence - characterised by the intelligence community as contradictory, conflicting, 
fragmentary, anecdotal, inconclusive, and hearsay - was the basis on which the Bush 
administration officials asserted their apparent belief that p. The kind of evidence 
adduced to support the terror proposition, though not unthinkable, lacks the necessary 
epistemic force that normally renders us feeling it true that p. It is not clear how any 
rational or psychologically normal human agent can feel it true that p in the face of 
degenerate evidence of uprobative nature or in the face of grave doubts against the 
possibility that p. No doubt one might still fear, suspect or have a hunch that p. 
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Fearing that p might be a sufficient reason to accept p. But belief does not, normally, 
obtain in the presence of supporting evidence of such nature or in the face of such 
living doubts that p. But, as already observed, evidence shall not necessarily be 
objectively good or adequate to render belief likely or psychologically possible. 
However, evidence shall necessarily be objectively good or adequate to render a 
belief justified or rational. But we can come to believe p as long as we, from our own 
cognitive perspective, take the evidence for p to be good or satisfactory. In this way, 
we can attribute belief in p to the Bush administration officials only if they had taken 
the available evidence for p to be good or satisfactory for belief in p. But I find it 
highly unlikely that rational or psychologically normal agents can ordinarily come to 
take evidence of such nature to be good or satisfactory for belief. By the same token, I 
find it highly unlikely that rational or psychologically normal agents can normally 
come to feel it true that p in the face of bad evidence for p or in the face of grave 
doubts against the possibility that p. It is because of this that I, given the evidential 
conditions at the time, find it inappropriate and unreasonable to attribute belief in the 
terror proposition to the Bush administration officials.  
 
9.2.2. The Attribution of Pragmatic Belief  
 
This section aims to establish whether the Bush administration’s asserted belief in 
the nuclear and terror propositions can be rightly described as a case of pragmatic 
belief. We have already learned that we are not always epistemically driven in our 
doxastic cultivations, see chapters three (pp. 79-80) and four (pp.115-123). Unlike 
epistemic beliefs, pragmatic beliefs are not acquired with a concern for truth. They 
are, rather, acquired on the basis of pragmatic considerations. In other words, they are 
brought about to satisfy some pragmatic end, as illustrated on pp. 115-123. We have 
also learned that in order to bring about a pragmatic belief, focus shall be solely or 
primarily directed to evidence conducing to the desired belief (see p. 68). That is, we 
normally tend to disregard disconfirming evidence when we set out to bring about a 
desired belief. Under such situations, we will be emotionally biased in favour of the 
belief we aim to bring about. Being a pleasant thought and given my growing 
psychological need for the desired belief that p, I might, through primary focus on the 
evidence corroborating p, just come to believe that my ex-lover still loves me. That is, 
I somehow in such an indirect way might just convince myself that p. My endeavour 
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to bring about such a desired belief might either succeed or fail. It is likely that I 
might still be longing for such a belief without possessing the actual belief itself. But 
if I pass into the desired belief state, I, upon being asked whether p or upon 
considering whether p, necessarily feel it true that p. The disposition to feel it true that 
p is a necessary condition of belief in p, as pointed out by Cohen on pp. 62-63 of the 
thesis. Following the successful acquisition of a desired belief, we must, as observed 
in chapter three, forget how we came about such a belief. That is, we must forget that 
we came about such a belief on the basis of evidentially irrelevant considerations or 
on the basis of evidence that we ourselves took to be unprobative otherwise we cannot 
feel it true that p and false that not p upon considering whether p. This is, of course, if 
after the acquisition of the desired belief, the epistemic position of the proposition in 
question stayed the same - as evidentially unsupported as it was before. And if I do 
not possess any such dispositional feelings, it is normally unlikely that I would feel 
surprised, disappointed or shocked upon discovering that not p. That is, of course, if I 
were to pass into the desired belief state and at some point considered whether p. I 
cannot be rightly described as believing that p when I am fully conscious or in full 
recognition that p is not supported by the available evidence. If this is how a supposed 
pragmatic belief is perceived from my own cognitive perspective, then my reasoning 
and acting as if p is nothing other than mere propositional acceptance driven by some 
practical reason.  
 
Pragmatic beliefs are, as explained on pp. 115-123, either wishful or unwelcome by 
nature. Wishful beliefs are driven by pragmatic desires, whereas unwelcome beliefs 
are driven by fears or worries. I do not currently believe in Paradise (p) for I take the 
available evidence to be inadequate to support such a belief. But by virtue of being a 
pleasant thought and a comforting premise for reasoning about life, I want to believe 
it. The acquisition of such a desired belief might bring about some happiness or some 
peace of mind. If I succeed in getting myself to believe that p, then I will genuinely 
feel it true that p upon considering or being asked whether p. But I think that merely 
fearing a potential eventuality (p) in the absence of good evidence that p normally 
promotes or leads to mere propositional acceptance rather than unwelcome belief. I 
concur with Bratman that practical pressures or risk asymmetries normally determine 
what we accept rather than what we believe in a given context (see p.104). If the 
supposed beliefs in question were cases of pragmatic belief at all, they would be most 
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appropriately construed as unwelcome beliefs. It is not apt to characterise as wishful a 
belief that generates or heightens fear, tension or anxiety. But I do not think that they 
can be rightly characterised as unwelcome beliefs either. In situations where I have no 
good evidence whether p or not p but where p is of major concern to me, it is more 
appropriate to characterise the propositional attitude that prompts me to act as if p as 
one of mere acceptance rather than belief that p. I have no good evidence for or 
against the proposition that I have left my car unlocked in the car park (p). But I, in 
the middle of watching a film, am suddenly struck with a fear that I might have left 
my car unlocked. Fearing the potential implications of p, I rush back to the car park 
only to discover that not p. My acting as if p does not mean that I acted because I 
believed that p. Taking action to prevent a feared eventuality is not solely driven by 
doxastic attitudes. Mere propositional acceptance disposes us to act appropriately to p 
as well. That is, belief is not the only propositional attitude that motivates action 
appropriate to a given belief. In the case at hand, I weigh up the risks of the 
eventualities of the two possibilities: whether p or not p. Being driven by the risk 
asymmetries I associate with accepting or rejecting that p, I come to accept that p. In 
other words, given the high cost of error, I just do not take it for granted that not p. 
Instead, I will proceed cautiously in my considerations whether p or not p. I will just 
accept that p, taking it as a premise in my practical reasoning about the given matter 
and act accordingly. Just like Bratman's case of the ladder, it is one thing to 
experience the inconvenience of a trip back to the car park, another to have your car 
stolen. It would be inappropriate to characterise the propositional attitude I am driven 
by in my acting and reasoning as if p as one of belief that p while I have no good 
evidence to consider either possibility, whether p or not p, more likely than the other. 
The motivation or ulterior end behind unwelcome believing is, as observed in chapter 
four, a supposed prevention or avoidance of a feared danger. But wanting to prevent a 
feared eventuality (p) when there is no good evidence whether p normally promotes 
or leads to mere acceptance rather than belief that p. That is if an attitude had to be 
taken on the given proposition under the current evidential conditions or if the agent 
had to act on some basis in light of the evidential conditions at the time. This research, 
therefore, concludes that the given Bush administration beliefs cannot be rightly 
characterised as pragmatic beliefs.  
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    It is likely that the Bush administration officials, due to his ruthless oppression of 
his own people and his brutal aggressions against his neighbouring countries in the 
past, had long believed Saddam Hussein to be a danger of some sort to the 
international community. This belief might have had an overarching influence on their 
reasoning about the alleged Iraqi threat to the US homeland security. It could be that 
they had taken his homicidal nature as a reason to fear him or believe him to be a 
danger to the international security, or it could be that they had taken the sanctions 
they imposed on Iraq as a reason to fear retaliation from his regime. No doubt Saddam 
Hussein was an existential threat to his own people, but there was no good evidence to 
indicate that he was a threat to the US homeland security. Though there was reason to 
fear his regime, there was no good evidence to believe that the Iraqi regime was an 
imminent threat to the US national security, as stressed by the Bush administration on 
numerous occasions. It is logically possible to think that they, due to their distrust of 
him along with his past possession of such weapons, suspected or feared that he might 
have retained at least some of his WMD stockpiles or produced some more or had his 
nuclear weapons program resumed following the departure of the UN inspectors in 
December 1998. If we cannot trust one that not p, it is highly unlikely that we can be 
certain of one's relevant intentions or testimonies that not p. This could be thought of 
as a fear factor, but I doubt that such fear factors are sufficient on their own to cause 
intellectual belief. Feared propositions of no evidentiary basis normally promote or 
lead to mere propositional acceptance rather than intellectual belief. That is if, due to 
the nature of the situation, the agent were or had to take an attitude on the basis of the 
degenerate epistemic conditions at the time or if the agent had to act at the time on 
some basis. There is no consensus among philosophers as to whether fear entails 
belief or whether fear is caused by belief. Walton holds that "It seems a principle of 
common sense ... that fear must be accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one 
is in danger" (1978: 6-7). Morreall counters Walton's conception of fear and argues 
that his "account of fear is a standard application of the cognitive theory of emotions, 
according to which emotions involve or are caused by beliefs" (1993: 359). He rightly 
observes that in order for one to fear an object, "one need not believe that the object is 
dangerous to him [or that one is endangered by that object]" (Ibid: 360). He further 
argues that fear "does not require us ... to recognize danger" (Ibid: 361). Morreall 
provides some strong counter-examples to the thesis that fear entails or requires 
belief. He draws our attention to "the fear of public speaking" (Ibid: 363). Many 
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people experience the fear of public speaking without believing that they are 
endangered by the object of their fear or that the object of their fear poses a threat to 
them. That is, they do not believe that the audiences are a danger to them, yet they 
still exhibit the kind of behaviour and experience the kind of feelings that we 
normally associate with fear. Further instantiating his argument, Morreall observes: 
  
 When young children are put to bed in an unfamiliar house, for example, they 
 may feel fear without judging the bed, the chair, or anything else to be 
 dangerous. Adults can experience this kind of fear when beginning a new  job 
 or moving to an unfamiliar place. ... What the child is afraid of, for instance, is 
 said to be the bedroom or the whole house; the object of the adult's fear is the 
 new workplace or new life. ... If [however] asked whether  the bedroom or 
 house, or the workplace or new life, is dangerous, the child or the adult are just 
 as likely to say no as they are when asked whether specific things in those 
 situations are dangerous (Ibid: 362).  
 
 
Morreall takes such a fear to be "caused by excessive novelty" (Ibid: 362). He argues 
that belief is not the only mental state that can engender emotions in us. Rather, mere 
thoughts, imaginations, or entertainment can also bring about emotions: 
 
 The ... problem with the claim that to fear something known to be dangerous I 
 have to believe it is dangerous to me, lies in the word 'believe'. The cognitive 
 theory of emotions requires beliefs, but there are emotions that are easily 
 caused by mental states less epistemically committed than beliefs. Sexual 
 arousal, for example, is easily caused by fantasies - that is how pornography 
 works. Disgust can be caused by imagining fictional scenes of torture or 
 cannibalism. The fact that what I am  imagining in such cases is not real and I 
 know that, does not prevent the emotion (Ibid: 364).  
 
 
Moreover, Hume argues that though fear is usually caused by a probable evil, 
passions such as fear can be caused by evils that are perceived by the person feeling 
the fear as improbable or even impossible:  
 
 It is a probable good or evil, that commonly produces hope or fear ... [but] the 
 passions of fear and hope will arise, even though there be no probability ... We 
 find that an evil, barely conceived as possible, does sometimes produce fear; 
 especially if the evil be very great. ... But they are not only possible evils, that 
 cause fear, but even some allowed to be impossible; as when we tremble on 
 the brink of a precipice, though we know ourselves to be in perfect security ... 
 This proceeds from the immediate presence of the evil, which influences the 
 imagination in the same manner as the certainty of it [the evil] would do ... 
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 Evils, that are certain, have sometimes the  same effect in producing fear, as 
 the possible or impossible (2010: 243-244). 
 
 
    Thus, merely imagining a WMD-9/11, a transfer of WMD to Al-Qaeda, or a 
nuclear-armed Iraq (p) would have been sufficient to cause, in the Bush 
administration officials, a feeling of fear that p. Merely imagining a shipwreck, while 
on board a ship, might frighten me. Further, merely imagining being attacked by a 
piranha, a crocodile or a shark while on board a fishing boat might terrify me. Merely 
imagining a nuclear-armed Iran (p) can cause a feeling of fear that p. It is likely that 
the Bush administration merely feared that p due to the lack of the kind of certainty 
deemed appropriate to accept or act upon in a post-9-11 security environment. 
Though there was good empirical negative evidence in the case of the nuclear 
proposition, they might have distrusted such evidence or its source. There are 
situations where feelings of uncertainty cause fear. That is, sometimes we come to 
fear that p because of our uncertainty whether or not that p. Hume argues that "all 
kinds of uncertainty have a strong connection with fear" (Ibid: 244). In short, my 
fearing that p neither entails nor requires my believing that p. Morreall, therefore, 
argues that "fear is not as epistemically fussy as the cognitive theory would have us 
believe. ... Beliefs are not required [to fear a proposition]" (1993: 366). That is, 
fearing that p neither requires nor entails any epistemic commitment to p. Thus, the 
Bush administration's fearing that p, if they ever feared that p, cannot be taken to 
entail the belief that p.   
 
9.2.3. The Attribution of Propositional Acceptance  
 
Under epistemically outlandish conditions where there is a palpable presence of 
unprobative supporting evidence that p along with serious living doubts against the 
possibility whether p, we feel compelled to question the sincerity of a p-belief 
asserted by an agent fundamentally driven by pragmatic ends and potential risk 
asymmetries. In situations like this, one would normally have grave qualms in 
attributing belief to a given agent. We have already observed that belief does not 
normally arise in the face of clear evidence that not p or in the face of grave doubts 
that p. This section aims to establish whether the Bush administration’s asserted belief 
in the nuclear and terror propositions can be rightly characterised as a case of mere 
propositional acceptance. We have learned in chapter four that we can accept a 
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proposition for practical reasons independently of its truth or belief in it. That is, we 
can accept a proposition we have no belief about. But we can also accept a 
proposition we believe or even disbelieve. That is, doxastic attitudes of belief or 
disbelief are no constraining factors to mere propositional acceptance. We have 
already observed three clear-cut cases of mere propositional acceptance such as 
Alston’s field commander (p. 98), Bratman’s construction project (pp. 103-104) and 
ladder cases (p. 105). We have also observed Foley’s remark (p. 108) that acceptance 
can have unwelcome consequences and Bratman’s contention (p. 104) that mere 
acceptance is often driven by risk asymmetries. It is because of this that we 
sometimes accept what we disbelieve or refuse to accept what we believe to be the 
case. Under conditions where I perceive danger to be increasingly looming or where 
there is a present danger to my safety, I, for practical purposes like an escape route, 
might accept a faulty boat whose safety conditions I disbelieve. That is, despite my 
belief to the contrary, I might just accept that the boat is in good working conditions 
and might therefore reason as well as act accordingly. Here I consider the cost of 
rejecting the safety conditions of the boat to be considerably higher than the cost of 
accepting it to be safe. For practical reasons, I might eventually come to accept what I 
disbelieve to be the case. Now suppose that there was neither a looming nor a present 
danger to me and I believed the boat to be in good working conditions (p). But, like 
Bratman’s case of the ladder, when I think about using the boat for a sailing mission 
to cross the Atlantic Ocean, I do not just take it for granted that (p). That is, though I 
believe that p, due to the high cost of error, I do not accord it acceptance solely on the 
basis of my belief that p. Understanding what is at stake and given my knowledge of 
how tempestuous the Atlantic Ocean can get, I might require a greater reassurance or 
a propositional attitude epistemically superior to mere belief in order to accept the 
boat as safe for use. I might need knowledge or certainty. That is why before 
accepting the boat as safe for sea, I will most probably be driven to verify my belief 
that it is. 
 
Belief is, as explained in chapter two, a feeling disposition to undergo certain 
internal experiences such as feeling it true that p and false that not p, feeling pleased 
upon realising that a belief we have been holding is actually true or, conversely, 
feeling disappointed, shocked or surprised upon discovering that not p. If the Bush 
administration officials ever believed the nuclear proposition (p), they would have felt 
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surprised to learn about the IAEA's empirical evidence that not p or they would have 
felt disappointed or shocked at how misguided they have been regarding p. If they had 
a nuclear-free Iraq as their desired end, they would have even felt delighted to learn 
that not p. There are two possible answers as to why the Bush administration went 
along with the nuclear proposition despite the presence of clear evidence that not p. I 
aim to establish that it was either a matter of mere propositional acceptance or mere 
public display (lying or pretence). Part of the reason that might give rise to mere 
public display is that the Bush administration made it known that their objective in 
this whole Iraqi conflict was regime change regardless of whether p, but still based 
their case for war on p rather than regime change. It looks similar to the assailant who 
stabs his victim for robbery, but states being threatening or dangerously armed (p) as 
a reason for stabbing him. It could well be the case that the victim is in fact 
dangerously armed and that the assailant truly believes him to be so. We can assume 
that the assailant admits, in his private conversations with his wife, that he acted for 
reasons other than his belief that p. That is, the assailant stabs the victim not out of 
putative self-defence, but, rather, to rob the gun he is carrying. If that is the case, then 
the assailant is lying about the reason behind stabbing the victim. But it does not 
follow that he is lying about his being dangerously armed. That is, we can still 
attribute him belief that the victim was dangerously armed when stabbed, though he 
was not motivated in his action by such a belief. But in his advancement to stab him, 
he might take extra precautions due to his belief that p. That is, he might advance 
appropriately to such a belief in the way of fighting or stabbing techniques such as 
how to stab or fight someone who is carrying a gun (I do not mean acting 
appropriately to p in the way of being motivated, in his stabbing him, by p).  
 
In the case at hand, the question is whether the Bush administration officials 
accepted the nuclear proposition (p) or were just being insincere in their assertions 
that p. The fact that they made it clear that they would still go ahead with regime 
change as their ultimate end regardless of whether or not that p calls into question 
whether they were sincere in stating p as their rationale behind invading Iraq. This is 
good reason to argue that the Bush administration was being insincere in stating p as 
their rationale for the war while they would have gone ahead with the war regardless 
of whether or not that p. But this alone cannot be good reason to argue that they were 
just lying about p. It could be the case that they accepted p and the action such a 
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propositional acceptance required or favoured coincided, from their perspective, with 
the action they have long wanted to pursue in the way of regime change. Further, Iran 
is perceived as a hostile regime in the eyes of many Western countries. There are 
many states that want to take out the Iranian regime for its riches or its being a 
hindrance to their economic interests. But it might not be preferable to invade it on the 
basis of economic interests. It is, rather, more preferable or doable to do it on the basis 
of a rationale that is acceptable to your fellow citizens and the international 
community as well. In making a case for war or in going ahead with the invasion, the 
invading force might state the Iranian nuclear issue as the sole reason behind the 
invasion, genuinely believing, for good reasons, that Iran is weaponising its uranium 
(p), while having oil as the true reason behind the invasion. We can assume that the 
invader does not care whether or not Iran goes nuclear. It, rather, is interested in 
conquering the Iranian oilfields. Here, the invading state lies about the true rationale 
for the invasion, but it does not follow that they did not believe that p. It just means 
that their action was not motivated by p.  
 
That is, though they lie about the true reason for the war, it does not follow that 
they also lie about p itself. In other words, though their reference to p as the sole 
reason for the war is insincere, it does not follow that they do not believe that p. Thus, 
their being insincere in their reference to p as the sole reason for the war does not 
preclude them from having the belief that p. We can still rightly attribute them the 
belief that p. Moreover, though they are driven in their action by factors other than p, 
since they have a belief that p, in mobilising and equipping their forces, they might 
plan, proceed and act appropriately to p. They might even equip their forces with the 
equipment necessary to evade radiation or embed within their armed forces special 
medical teams designed to provide medical treatment to those who might be exposed 
to radiation. That is, just like the assailant, they might act appropriately to p in the 
way of combating needs and techniques, though they are not motivated by p in their 
decision to take out the Iranian regime. In the case at hand, it could well be that the 
Bush administration's rationale for the war was two-fold: regime change (oil) and the 
acceptance that p. But even if the true reason for the war was regime change, it still 
does not follow that they did not accept that p. They might have still accepted p, but 
their reference to p as the sole reason for the war would have been insincere. That is, 
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their being insincere in their reference to p as the sole reason for the war would not 
have precluded them from accepting p.  
 
Furthermore, even if the true rationale for the war was regime change rather than 
the professed rationale (p), it still does not follow that they rejected p. Due to the 
potential risk asymmetries associated with the eventualities of the two possibilities of 
p or not p, it is very unlikely that the Bush administration officials, at least at the time 
of planning the war or while considering what equipment would be most apt for the 
safety of their troops and the success of their mission, would have just taken it for 
granted that Iraq was free of all the chemical and biological weapons, deadly 
radiological material or enriched uranium (p). In fact the Bush administration acted as 
if there were such materials in Iraq, equipping their troops with protective clothing 
and gas masks. That is, they acted appropriately to p. But, of course, their acting as if 
p cannot be taken as a good reason for attributing them belief in p. Their acting as if p 
just implies that they, at best, might have accepted p for practical purposes. Moreover, 
we often act on the side of caution or prudence in situations where the risk 
asymmetries between rejecting and accepting p are unacceptably high. Though the 
Kennedy administration had no adequate evidence as to the imminent use of the 
nuclear missiles that were being installed on the Cuban soil by the Soviet Union, they 
still accepted that the presence of such offensive enemy nuclear missiles in the 
Western hemisphere constituted an imminent threat to the US national security (p). 
Taking it for granted that p, they contemplated all possible actions including an all-out 
nuclear response to the threat, but eventually chose to launch a naval blockade against 
Cuba. That is, they acted as if p or appropriately to p, though they had no adequate 
evidence that p. Given the fact that the risk asymmetries between rejecting and 
accepting p were unacceptably high, it would have been irrational for the Kennedy 
administration to reject p.  
 
The unacceptably high risk asymmetries involved in situations like this constitute 
prudential justification for the agent to act. From the Kennedy’s perspective, rejecting 
p might have resulted in a sudden and massive nuclear attack on the US homeland or 
even in the US being wiped out by the force of such offensive nuclear weapons. Or it 
could, at least, have resulted in a nuclear-armed Cuba that could have bullied or 
rivalled the US supremacy in the Western hemisphere and contributed to the 
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intolerable expansion of Communism in the region. By contrast, accepting that p had 
these potential dangers eliminated. Furthermore, my acceptance that the person I take 
to be dangerously armed is a present threat to my safety is also driven by the 
unacceptably high risk asymmetries associated with the relevant two possibilities. 
Even though I have no good evidence to believe that he is a present threat to me and I 
do not hold any such beliefs, due to practical reasons like self-defence, I might still 
accept that he is. Thus, if I were to act, my action would still be prudentially justified, 
though not epistemically. After all, it is, as noted on p. 105, safer to err on the side of 
prudence or caution and this is how our reasoning is driven under such conditions. 
Thus, it is, just like Bratman's case of the ladder, one thing to mistake a nuclear threat 
to be imminent, another to suffer a sudden nuclear annihilation. It is one thing to have 
a few of your cities or even half of your country nuked in a nuclear war, another to 
suffer a sudden and massive nuclear annihilation of the entire country. It is one thing 
to lose some of your armed forces countering a threat mistaken for being imminent, 
another to have a nuclear-armed Cuba at your door step bullying, rivalling, 
blackmailing you, or spreading Communism in the Western hemisphere. It is one 
thing to suffer the inconvenience of mobilising your armed forces to blockade a 
country taken to be the platform of an imminent threat, another to have the threat fully 
materialise on your soil. In the case of the Bush administration’s likely acceptance 
that p, it is one thing to mistake Iraq for possessing chemical and biological weapons, 
lethal radiological material, enriched uranium or a reconstituted nuclear weapons 
program, another to have your armed forces suffer from radiation or a chemical or 
biological attack in the battlefield. It is one thing to experience the inconvenience of 
overloading your armed forces with all these gas masks and protective clothing, 
another to suffer from a lack of them in the battlefield. In my case, it is one thing to 
mistake a dangerously armed stranger for being an aggressor, another to suffer the 
consequences of not defending myself when I had to.  
 
In the attribution of belief, we noticed that belief in the nuclear (n) and terror (t) 
propositions would have been unwarranted from their own cognitive perspective 
given their taking of the available supporting evidence to be inadequate, their 
knowledge of the presence of clear empirical evidence that not p (n), their knowledge 
of the unprobative nature of the available supporting evidence, and their knowledge 
that p was overwhelmingly doubted by the majority evidence (t). I cannot, normally, 
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be rightly attributed belief in p when I take belief in p to be unwarranted from my 
own perspective, when I take the available evidence for p to be inadequate, 
unprobative or degenerate, when I know of the presence of clear evidence that not p, 
when I know that the majority evidence casts sufficient doubt on the possibility that p, 
or when I take p to be evidentially unsupported. No doubt we sometimes hold belief 
in the presence of some degree of doubt against the possibility that p, notably belief in 
God. After all, belief, as observed on p. 48, does not necessarily preclude some degree 
of doubt on the part of the believing subject. Many people come to believe in God or 
retain such a belief in the presence of some doubt against the possibility whether p. 
Many retain their belief in God despite their knowledge of the contrary evidence 
presented by the evolutionists. But people who come to believe p or retain such a 
belief in the presence of some degree of doubt normally take the supporting evidence 
for p to be good or at least satisfactory, no matter how unprobative such evidence is 
from an objective perspective. That is, they take the available supporting evidence to 
be more convincing, satisfactory or probative than the doubts raised against the 
possibility that p. That is why they take belief to be warranted from their cognitive 
perspective. It is because of this that belief is psychologically possible under 
conditions where there is some degree of doubt on the part of the potential believing 
subject. But, of course, belief is normally unwarranted from our own cognitive 
perspective and is, thereby, psychologically impossible if we take p to be 
overwhelmingly doubted by the available evidence or if we take the majority evidence 
to cast doubt or to count against the possibility that p.  
 
In the case of the nuclear proposition, Cheney takes the available supporting 
evidence to be inadequate. Belief in the nuclear proposition would have, therefore, 
been unwarranted from his cognitive perspective. This is despite his knowledge of the 
presence of clear empirical evidence that not p. That is why belief cannot be rightly 
attributed to Cheney. In the case of the terror proposition, the intelligence community 
takes p to be overwhelmingly doubted by the available evidence. That is, they take the 
majority evidence to count against the possibility that p. It is not clear how the White 
House officials could have taken as satisfactory the so-called supporting evidence 
characterised by the US intelligence community as unprobative. That is why I find no 
good reason to attribute to the Bush administration officials belief in the terror 
proposition. We normally take belief in p to be unwarranted from our own cognitive 
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perspective whenever we take the evidence for p to be inadequate, unprobative or 
unsatisfactory. An agent’s taking belief in p to be unwarranted from his own 
perspective or his taking p to be doubted by the majority evidence is good reason to 
deny him belief in p. Unlike mere acceptance, belief, as noted in chapter three, is 
constrained by rationality and psychological restraints that originate from belief's 
intimate connection with reason. Denying or granting the attribution of mere 
acceptance that p solely supervenes on whether the accepting subject reasons as if p 
regardless of whether or not he goes along with acting as if p. That is, acting as if p is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the attribution of mere propositional acceptance. I 
can pretend to be a statute (p), acting as if I am a statute. But from my acting as if p it 
does not follow that I accept that I am a statute for I do not reason as if I am a statute. 
My acting as if I am a statute is a matter of mere pretence or public display for I am 
not intellectually committed to my being a statute. In other words, I do not reason as if 
I am a statute. There is no intellectual commitment on my part to the truth of my 
being a statute. The acceptance of a proposition might, but should not, involve acting 
as if p. But it entails reasoning as if p or being intellectually committed to the truth of 
p. Furthermore, propositional acceptance should not necessarily be manifested as a 
speech act of assertion like I accept that the boat is in good working order. 
Acceptance, as observed on pp. 107-108, is a mental act or an internal act of assent 
that might, but should not, be manifested in language or action. My acceptance of the 
boat as safe for use did not involve any act of assertion in either occasion.  
 
But acceptance can also be an inner speech act, as argued by Clarke: "Acceptance 
(and also rejection) need not be publicly expressed by assent or assertion (dissent or 
denial). … [Rather, it can be] "inner speech" … [or] an internal assent to or assertion 
of mental analogues of sentences" (1989:32). Thus, during my acceptance of the boat 
as safe, I might have made an inner assertion to myself when I perceived the danger to 
be looming: it is safe, come on, use it. We have already observed that belief is a 
disposition to feel it true that p and that acceptance is a policy for reasoning as if p 
regardless of, in both cases, whether or not we assert that p or act appropriately to p. 
Though, in both cases of belief and acceptance, we normally are disposed to assert 
that p and act appropriately to p if suitable situations arise, it is a necessary condition 
of neither belief nor acceptance that such disposition be manifested or activated. It 
could well be the case that in his meeting with the sub-contractors, Bratman accepts 
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the top of the estimated range as the total cost of the construction project (p) and 
therefore reasons accordingly. But no suitable situations might subsequently arise in 
order for him to assert that p or act as if p in the way of, for example, ordering 
construction materials in line with his acceptance that p. Following his acceptance 
that p, he may go broke as a result of a robbery or an unfortunate gambling or, simply, 
he might die in a car accident following his meeting with the sub-contractors. In his 
practical reasoning, Bratman might accept his chair to be safe, but soon after giving it 
mental acceptance, his house might, as a result of an earthquake, collapse with the 
chair crushed to the ground. Thus, no appropriate occasions might arise in order for 
him to act as if p. That is if he himself was lucky enough to escape the earthquake 
unharmed. Furthermore, I might suffer a stroke soon after coming to believe or accept 
the boat to be safe for use in the ocean. Thus, our failure to act – verbally or actionally 
– as if p or appropriately to p cannot be taken as a reason to deny us belief or 
acceptance that p. Nor can our acting as if p be taken as a reason for attributing us 
belief or acceptance that p. I might act appropriately to p, yet hold no such 
corresponding beliefs. Instead, I might just be feigning belief in p or I might act as if I 
am a statute, though I do not accept that I am a statute. I am just pretending to be a 
statute. That is, neither the attribution of belief nor that of acceptance supervenes on 
publicly observable behaviour. The Bush administration officials acted as if p, but 
their acting as if p cannot be ipso facto taken as a reason for attributing them 
propositional acceptance.  
 
Denying them mere acceptance that p would leave us with the possibility that they 
just lied about the nuclear and the terror propositions for we have already established 
that neither belief nor pragmatic belief can be rightly attributed to them. But it is 
important to differentiate between lying about why they wanted to invade Iraq and 
lying about p. We have already noticed that even if they were insincere in their 
reference to p as the real rationale for the war, it still does not follow that they did not 
accept p in their practical reasoning. That is, it still does not follow that they rejected 
p in their considerations such as how to go about confronting the Iraqi forces or what 
military equipment would be necessary to pursue such a confrontation with minimal 
casualties. I can accept p as a premise in my practical reasoning and subsequently 
refer to p insincerely as a reason for doing something driven by considerations other 
than my acceptance that p. Suppose that Osama Bin Laden was still at large and that 
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the search for him was still underway. Though the Bush administration lacks what 
they take to be good evidence to believe that he is hiding in Pakistan, given the 
inherent mistrust between the two countries, the Bush administration does not just 
take it for granted that he is not there. Though Pakistan repeatedly denies the presence 
of the elusive Bin Laden there, considering the risk asymmetries associated with 
accepting and rejecting the good-faith of Pakistan, the Bush administration might just 
accept that Bin Laden is either hiding or is harboured by Pakistan (p). That is, they, 
for practical purposes, might come to accept that p and therefore reason as if p. In 
fact, they might even launch a covert reconnaissance mission following their 
acceptance that p, tasking their drones, satellites and even clandestine ground civilian 
forces with verifying whether p. Thus, they act and reason appropriately to p, but hold 
no such corresponding beliefs. Suppose that the Bush administration has, for reasons 
other than p, long wanted to take out the Pakistani regime and now deems p an 
appropriate reason to make the case for war. Taking out the Pakistani regime is what 
the Bush administration is driven by in its waging war against Pakistan. That is, this is 
what their goal is in waging the war. But for purposes of convenience like rallying 
public support and ensuring international acceptance for the war, they just present p as 
the rationale for the war. Here, though they lie about why they want to invade the 
country, it does not follow that they do not accept that p. In war planning 
preparations, they might well task a special search team with tracking Bin Laden. 
That is, though they are insincere in presenting p as the reason for the war, it does not 
follow that they reject p or do not take the truth of p for granted. They might still 
accept p as a premise in their practical reasoning and might even act appropriately to 
p by, among other things, tasking a special battalion with searching the locations 
identified by their imagery specialists as possible hideouts of Bin Laden.  
 
In the case at hand, given the Bush administration's public declaration that they 
would still go ahead with regime change in Iraq whether or not that p, we can 
reasonably argue that they were being insincere in presenting p to be the rationale for 
the war while they would have gone ahead with the war regardless of whether or not 
that p. But it still does not follow that they did not accept that p. In light of the Bush 
administration's post-9/11 security discourse, we can rightly argue that propositions of 
such nature were deemed more rational to accept than to reject. Though preventive 
war as a policy vision is hardly a new concept in the US foreign policy, it was 
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flagrantly adopted as the centrepiece of the US foreign policy by the Bush 
administration. They brazenly embraced preventive war as a policy objective 
following the events of 9/11, and their apparent reason for that was the new security 
environment brought about by their experience of 9/11. Taking preventive action as a 
response to contemporary threats of the twenty first century is at the heart of the 
September 2002 US National Security Strategy, known as the Bush Doctrine. Though 
presented to the public as a preemptive security strategy, the doctrine is 
fundamentally preventive in essence. As observed on pp. 13-14, preemptive war is 
driven solely by the imminence of an attack, whereas preventive war normally by the 
inevitability of a potential conflict or by perceived future power relationships. The 
central underlying premise of the Bush Doctrine is the contention that the concept of 
imminence must be understood in relation to the new security environment at play 
rather than the kind of certainty or good evidence that is normally responsible for our 
justifiably believing a threat to be imminent: "We must adapt the concept of imminent 
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries" 
(http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf), p. 15. The doctrine further argues: 
"To forestall or prevent ... hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively", "even if uncertainty remains as to the time ... of the 
enemy's attack" (p. 15). Thus, the doctrine concludes that the US military "must be 
transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than ... when a war 
might occur" (p. 29). That is, the obtaining of temporal imminence as a necessary 
condition for self-defense or a preemptive response is seen by the Bush administration 
as unviable in a post-9/11 security environment. That is why the given doctrine argues 
that "America will act against ... emerging threats before they are fully formed"28. 
That is, the Bush administration's conception or definition of a preemptive response 
relies on the intentions and capabilities of a potential adversary rather than on the 
temporal imminence of a threat or an attack. Thus, their model of preemption is fully 
scrapped from the conventional property, the imminence of an attack, which underlies 
the very essence of preemption. Furthermore, in his testimony to the House and 
Senate Armed Services Committee on 18 September 2002, Rumsfeld stresses that 
even the kind of evidence or certainty required to act upon shall be understood in 
relation to the post-9/11 security environment:  
                                                 
28
 This is stated on the second page of the introduction to the given doctrine. The introduction pages are 
not numbered. 
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 "[Regarding] the kind of evidence we consider to be appropriate to act in the 
 21st century. In our country, it has been customary to seek evidence that would 
 prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in a court of law. That approach is 
 appropriate when the  objective is to protect the rights of the accused. But in 
 the age of WMD, the objective is not to protect the "rights" of dictators  like 
 Saddam Hussein - it is to protect the lives of our citizens. And when there is 
 that risk, and we are trying to defend against the closed societies and shadowy 
 networks that threaten us in the 21st century, expecting to find that standard of 
 evidence, from thousands of miles away, and to do so before such a weapon 
 has been used, is not realistic. And, after such weapons have been used  it is 
 too late. I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th 
 century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms. On September 11th, we were 
 awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented 
 destruction. That awareness  ought to be sufficient to change the way we 
 think about our security, how we defend our country - and the type of 
 certainty and evidence we consider appropriate. In the 20th century, when we 
 were dealing largely with conventional weapons, we could wait for perfect 
 evidence. If we miscalculated, we could absorb an attack, recover, take a 
 breath, mobilize, and go out and defeat our attackers. In the 21st century, that 
 is no longer the case, unless we are willing and comfortable accepting the loss 
 not of thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives - a high 
 price indeed. We have not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going 
 on in the world. Over the years, even our best efforts, intelligence has 
 repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities of a variety of countries of 
 major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six or eight 
 years between the time a country of concern first developed a WMD capability 
 and the time we finally learned about it" 
 (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283).  
 
 
In situations where we lack the kind of certainty or good evidence that is normally 
responsible for our being devoid of some reasonable doubt that p, our reasoning on p 
is normally driven by the relevant risk asymmetries associated with accepting or 
rejecting that p. That is, of course, if we had to take a stance on p under the evidential 
conditions at the time or if we had to act at the time on some basis whether it be 
acceptance or rejection of the given proposition. We have observed in chapter four 
that mere propositional acceptance requires neither certainty nor epistemic evidence 
for acceptance, unlike belief, is not constrained by rationality or psychological factors. 
Rather, it is practical purposes that promote or shape mere propositional acceptance 
and it is the associated risk asymmetries that underlie our choice of accepting p rather 
than not p or vice versa. This, of course, excludes situations where, due to the high 
cost of error, our acceptance of a particular proposition requires or is driven by 
knowledge, certainty or justified belief, such as a physician's acceptance that a certain 
medicine aggravates or cures an illness, a surgeon's acceptance that a certain 
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anaesthetic is local rather than general, or a nuclear scientist's acceptance that a 
certain level of radiation is harmless to humans. But these are normally doxastic 
acceptances. Thus, due to the unacceptable cost of error, in certain situations where 
we lack knowledge, certainty or justified belief that p, normally we do not just take it 
for granted that p. The mere acceptance driven by the associated risk asymmetries 
concerns situations where, due to the very nature of the situation, we cannot or are 
unlikely to obtain, in a timely manner, good evidence whether or not p. In the case of 
the Bush administration, there was no adequate evidence to support the nuclear or the 
terror proposition, and this was recognized by them, as demonstrated in the case of 
Cheney's nuclear assertion (see p. 213). But, of course, there was, at the time, 
adequate evidence that not p in the case of the nuclear proposition. The presence of 
adequate contrary evidence that p would, however, been no constraining factor on 
mere acceptance that p for mere acceptance is governed by neither epistemic evidence 
nor doxastic attitudes whether it be belief or disbelief.  
 
The greater the risk of error, the more cautious we become in our choice whether or 
not to take something for granted. Rumsfeld stresses that the appropriateness of 
evidence and certainty shall be assessed against the background of what is at stake 
along with the nature of the threat in question. He warns against expectations of high 
evidential standards, arguing that the principle of evidence beyond reasonable doubt is 
no longer viable in a world where unconventional threats arise from "closed societies 
and shadowy networks" far beyond national borders. That is, from Rumsfeld's 
perspective, given the high cost of miscalculation in a security environment 
characterised by the threat of unconventional weapons, evidence and certainty shall be 
looked at in relation to the new security environment. He, therefore, argues that it is 
the experience of 9/11 that they should take as the touchstone for assessing the 
appropriateness of the kind of evidence and certainty required to act upon in the 
twenty first century. Moreover, Rumsfeld's argument that evidential standards and 
certainty thresholds shall be reduced in a security environment shaped by the 
experience of 9/11 is apparently driven by his contention that nowadays their "margin 
of error is notably different"29 due to the new security environment where the threat of 
unconventional weapons arises from rogue states and shadowy terrorist networks. Part 
seven of the appendix (pp. 81-86) illustrates the risk asymmetries the Bush 
                                                 
29
 See appendix (pp. 82-83). 
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administration officials seem to have weighed up in their considerations of the Iraqi 
issue. The majority of their statements concern the risk of accepting that Saddam 
Hussein would neither use WMD against the US homeland nor would he transfer 
them to terrorist organizations. This is the risk that they vehemently warn of even in 
the absence of good evidence that Saddam Hussein had any of those alleged WMD 
stockpiles or any connections to terrorist networks at all. It is likely that the Bush 
administration officials neither believed the IAEA's empirical evidence that not p nor 
did they believe the inspection process to be some sort of a reassurance or a guarantee 
that Saddam Hussein did not possess or was not producing weapons of mass 
destruction. This is clearly demonstrated by the White House's press secretary 
Fleischer on 3 September 2002: “inspections in and of themselves, inspectors in and 
of themselves, are not a guarantee that Saddam Hussein is not developing weapons of 
mass destruction” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020903-1.html). Moreover, on 26 
September 2002, Rumsfeld echoes this very same line of reasoning: “the idea that if 
you had an appropriate inspection regime, that they'd come back and say you were 
wrong is - is so far beyond anyone's imagination that it's not something I think about” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669). Further, in 
his interview with Meet the Press on 16 March 2003, Cheney expresses a lack of trust 
in the competence of the inspection regime as well as a lack of reason to believe their 
findings (see appendix, p. 106). That is, the Bush administration officials seem to 
have rejected the reliability and competence of the UN inspectors to produce the kind 
of evidence or certainty deemed appropriate to act upon in a post-9/11 security 
environment.  
 
Propositional acceptance can be either doxastic or mere acceptance. In the case of 
doxastic acceptance, we accept a proposition we either merely believe, know it or are 
certain of. This is because belief can amount to knowledge if it is true and justified, 
and that our believing a proposition might involve certainty. In situations where the 
cost of error is deemed unacceptably high as in the case of a physician's potential 
acceptance that a certain medication is harmless (p), we normally feel compelled to 
accept p as a premise in our practical reasoning only if we have good evidence that p, 
know or are certain that p. If the situation was one of the former but where we lack 
knowledge, certainty, or good evidence whether p or not p but where p is of major 
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concern to us, we normally do not just take it for granted that not p even if we had to 
act on some basis. Instead, we would proceed cautiously if we had to act on some 
basis. The basis on which we would be acting will normally be fundamentally driven 
by the risk asymmetries associated with our choice whether p or not p. Given the high 
price at stake, we might just accept the proposition we fear most, reason and proceed 
accordingly. After all, it, as already pointed out by Engel on p. 105 of the thesis, is 
"safer to err on the side of prudence". I might well accept the stranger looming out of 
the dark shadows to be a present danger to me (p) when I take him to be dangerously 
armed, and I might well act on my acceptance that p. Though the cost of error is 
unacceptably high either way, and I have no good epistemic reasons to accept p rather 
than not p nor do I have any good epistemic reason to consider either more likely, 
given the risk asymmetries associated with my choice of whether p or not p, I might 
well accept that p. There are potential risks in accepting either proposition. I might be 
causing harm to someone who had no intention to inflict harm upon me. But for me, 
the risks of taking it for granted that not p when he turns out to be a present danger 
outweigh the risks of taking it for granted that p when he turns out to be harmless to 
me. It is one thing to suffer harm, another to cause it. Under such poor epistemic 
conditions, I cannot, without a supposed unacceptable cost, be reasonably expected to 
obtain, in a timely manner, good epistemic evidence before deciding whether p or not 
p, and since my acceptance that p is not based on good epistemic evidence, I cannot 
be said to be epistemically justified in my accepting that p. Nevertheless, my 
acceptance that p is prudentially justified. I have a good practical reason to accept that 
p: defending myself against an accepted present danger.  
 
It is likely that the Bush administration just took it for granted that p due to the lack 
of knowledge, certainty or good evidence that not p - the kind of certainty or evidence 
deemed appropriate to accept in a post-9/11 era. Though the IAEA's empirical 
evidence that not p was sufficiently probative, it is likely that the Bush administration 
had low confidence in the competence and reliability of the inspection regime as 
implied by Fleischer and Rumsfeld earlier or it is likely that they, as stated by Cheney 
on p. 106 of the appendix, did not trust the inspection regime at all, let alone believe 
its findings. It is, therefore, likely that they, given the new security environment along 
with their acute awareness of the power and willingness of hostile regimes to inflict 
unprecedented sudden damage, deemed it irrational to put their faith and the security 
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of the American people in the words of the IAEA or anyone else. That is, given the 
new security environment - characterised by the apparent threat of unconventional 
weapons in the hands of rogue states in league with terrorist networks - they might 
have thought that it was safer to err on the side of prudence or caution and might 
have, therefore, opted for accepting that p rather than not p. In fact, on 7 October 2002 
Bush argues that given the nature of today's threats along with the deceptive character 
of the Iraqi regime, they have every reason to accept the worst of all possibilities: 
"Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the 
Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty 
to prevent the worst from occurring" (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html). Just like 
Bratman's case of the ladder, it is one thing to have a war reproached for its false 
premises, another to have Iraq turning out to be in possession of WMD and in league 
with Al-Qaeda, another to suffer a WMD attack, another to have the Dark Winter 
exercise30 materialise at home, another to have a WMD-armed Iraq rivalling your 
supremacy in the region, or another to confront a WMD-armed Iraq in the future. 
Furthermore, it is one thing to suffer harm yourself, another to cause it under a false 
premise.  
 
Moreover, it is logically possible to think that the Bush administration feared that 
the situations at the time were such that they could not, without unacceptable cost, 
obtain, in a timely manner, the kind of appropriate evidence necessary to decide 
whether p or not p. In fact, Bush asserts, though in the absence of good evidence, that 
they could not, without unacceptable cost, wait for the final proof to see whether the 
Iraqi regime has WMD: "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final 
proof - the smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud"31. That 
is, Bush warns of the dangers of waiting for better evidence while ElBaradei (see 
appendix, pp. 19 and 20) and Blix (see appendix, p. 72) both demonstrate that they 
have found no smoking gun during their inspections (2002-2003) on the ground in 
Iraq. Furthermore, the classified version of the NIE (1 October 2002) also shows that 
the intelligence community has "no specific intelligence information that Saddam's 
regime has directed attacks against US territory" (see appendix, p. 73). It further 
                                                 
30
 See appendix (pp. 67, 68, and 85).  
31
 See appendix (p. 72). 
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states: "We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use 
WMD" (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf). Moreover, the 
classified NIE also demonstrates "Low Confidence" as to "Whether Saddam would 
engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland" or "Whether in desperation 
Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida" (Ibid). 
Mushroom cloud is certainly a highly unacceptable cost if materialised. Fearing that a 
situation might well culminate in a mushroom cloud on your soil should you fail to 
ward off a feared danger (p) is a good practical reason to accept that p and act 
accordingly. Though Bush's claim of a potential mushroom cloud from Iraq (p) was 
unsupported by the evidence available at the time, he would still have had good 
practical reasons to accept that p if he was genuinely worried that p. Talk of a possible 
attribution of doxastic acceptance would be inappropriate here for we have already 
concluded that belief in the given propositions could not be rightly attributed to the 
Bush administration officials.  
 
Mere propositional acceptance can be rightly attributed to them only if their acting 
as if p was driven by their reasoning as if p. Propositional acceptance is necessarily 
reasoning as if p. That is, to accept that p is just to think about a given matter as if p 
regardless of whether or not we subsequently take some action appropriate to p. No 
doubt we often act appropriately to what we accept as true in our practical reasoning. 
But our acceptance that p shall not necessarily be accompanied by behavior 
appropriate to p, as explicated in our discussions on propositional acceptance in 
chapter four. Further, I might act as if p, but might not necessarily reason as if p, as 
the case of pretending to be a statue demonstrates (see pp. 106, 246 and 247). Thus, 
merely acting as if p cannot amount to accepting that p. There are situations where 
one’s acting as if p is a matter of mere public display or sheer pretence. That is why 
reasoning as if p is a necessary condition of accepting that p. This research concludes 
that given the Bush administration's explicit declaration that they would still proceed 
with regime change in Iraq regardless of whether or not the inspectors were allowed 
back in Iraq, in other words regardless of whether or not that p, it is likely that they 
were being insincere in presenting p as their rationale for the war. But it still does not 
follow that they did not accept that p. There are situations where we might be 
insincere in presenting p - a proposition we already accept as true in our reasoning 
about p - as a rationale for doing something x, but where we might still accept that p 
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at least at the planning phases of executing x, as demonstrated in earlier examples. 
That is, even if the Bush administration did not initially accept that p, it is unlikely 
that they would have just taken it for granted that not p during the planning phases of 
prosecuting the war. Though the Bush administration expressed knowledge that p (see 
appendix, pp. 115-141), the evidential conditions at the time were not even sufficient 
for belief that p, let alone knowledge that p.  
 
They could not have possibly known that p for p was a false proposition anyway. If 
they were ever genuine in their assertions that p, then it is more likely that by 
knowledge that p, they were referring to some other cognitive attitude rather than the 
philosophical notion of knowledge as justified true belief. But given their explicit 
persistent endeavor to rally public and international support for a cause unsupported 
by the available evidence, it is more likely that they, for practical purposes, just 
exaggerated their thoughts about p. In light of their emphasis on their demonstrated 
vulnerability, their argument of the new security environment where the cost of error 
or miscalculation was seemingly deemed intolerable due to the nature of the 
contemporary threats and the willingness of hostile regimes to inflict sudden harm on 
a massive scale, their national security strategy to bring any conceivable or potential 
threats to a head, their alleged fear that Iraq might, at some point, transfer some of its 
alleged WMD to terrorists, their argument that the principle of evidence beyond 
reasonable doubt is no longer viable in a security environment marked by the threat of 
unconventional weapons and shadowy terrorist networks, their apparent doubts about 
the competence and reliability of the inspection regime to ensure knowledge or 
certainty that not p, their recognition of the insufficiency of the available supporting 
evidence that p, their distrust of the Iraqi regime to come clean on the given issues, 
this research concludes that the Bush administration's asserted belief that p is better 
construed as mere acceptance that p. This is, of course, if their asserted belief that p 
was anything other than mere pretence. Due to the factors outlined above, especially 
their apparent understanding that their margin of error in the twenty first century was 
fundamentally different due to the nature of the new security environment, 
propositions of such nature under such epistemic conditions would have been deemed 
more prudent to accept than to reject. Moreover, the risk asymmetries associated with 
accepting or rejecting such propositions along with the new security environment 
where the cost of error was apparently deemed to be unacceptably high would further 
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explain why they might have deemed it more rational to accept than to reject that p. 
Further, the rationality or the necessity of accepting p is reflected in their public 
discourse. In an interview with NBC's Meet the Press on 8 September 2002, Cheney 
explicitly stated: "we have to assume there's more there than we know" (see appendix, 
p. 129). Bush echoes this very same line of reasoning as well (see p. 254 of the thesis 
for his statement on this). Thus, due to the given security environment where they 
apparently perceived themselves to be too vulnerable to attack, the potentially higher 
risks of rejecting p, the nature of the given alleged threat along with the deceptive 
character of the Iraqi regime, the Bush administration officials seem to have 
considered it more rational to accept than to reject that p. 
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Chapter Ten  
Conclusion  
 
Driven by a conviction that belief and justification are the core fundamentals of 
epistemology that make a practical difference in human life, this research has 
undertaken to examine the build-up to Iraq war from that perspective. Beliefs make a 
practical difference in our life in the way of motivating or guiding our actions. 
Lacking easy and immediate access to truth, we often come to conclude or act when 
we arrive at a firm belief. Beliefs play a fundamental role in settling opinion. Had it 
not been for our capacity to believe, most of our conduct would be guided by our 
instincts. It is for the lack of immediate access to truth that the need for justification 
arises. In epistemic deontology, our inability to have immediate access to truth is 
superseded by our epistemic responsibility to base our beliefs on adequate evidence. 
That is, on the deontological view, the immediate inaccessibility of truth is superseded 
by an epistemic duty to seek both confirming and disconfirming evidence and ensure 
that we do not stifle doubts or suppress evidence when it proves disconfirming or 
discomforting. These are the essence of epistemic duties which deontologists take to 
be the repository of epistemic justification.  
 
Though internalists and externalists both concur that a belief can be false but 
justified and that the truth of a belief does not, therefore, count in favour of its being 
justified, the externalists’ conception of justification permits otherwise. Externalists, 
however, do not explicitly endorse such reasoning. In addition, there is no agreement 
among legal philosophers as to what actually confers justification or whether 
justification is associated with actions or actors. Some, such as Fletcher (1985) and 
Hurd (1999), tie justification to truth (true belief), whereas some, such as Baron 
(2005a, b) and Stewart (2003), tether it to reasonable belief. That is, the reasonable 
belief view permits reasonably mistaken defensive force to count as justified (putative 
justification), whereas the truth view only recognizes the defensive force motivated by 
true belief. The truth view has some intuitive appeal due to the undeserved or unjust 
harm inflicted upon a putative aggressor who has no intention to cause harm against 
the person who uses putative defensive force on the basis of a reasonable belief that 
justifying conditions obtain. But adherents of the reasonable belief conception submit 
that we cannot be reasonably expected to base our conduct on something (truth) we 
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cannot be reasonably expected to have immediate access to. It is our capacity for 
belief that makes it possible we have an involuntary attitude of belief's character in 
situations where we have no immediate access to truth, and it is the presence of 
justification along with our being motivated by such justification that ensures the 
rationality of conduct where truth is not immediately knowable.   
 
    Rational belief, reasonable belief and justified belief are all used interchangeably in 
the philosophical literature with the pre-modifiers being epistemic appraisals of the 
belief in question. Epistemologists are driven by the form the justificational status of a 
belief takes, whether it is internalist or externalist in nature. They all concur that 
basing beliefs on good evidence is epistemically desirable. But they diverge on what it 
is that endows belief with positive epistemic status. Internalists associate such status 
with a belief’s being based on adequate evidence accessible, in some way, to the 
believing subject. They contend that a belief possesses justificational status only when 
the believer has some potential access to what confers such status. Externalists tether 
justification with the reliability of the cognitive process that generates the belief. 
Deontologists tie it with one’s being blameless in holding a belief.  
 
    They all face problems in their attempt to provide a tenably comprehensive answer 
to what it is for a belief to possess justificatory status. In its trial against the supposed 
beliefs in question, mentalism fails to account for a plausible explanation behind a 
belief’s unjustifiability status. Due to its implausible argument that justifying 
conditions must be metaphysically internal to a believer, mentalism dooms its cause 
for a general account of justification. As an extreme brand of internalism, mentalism 
can only account for the justification of beliefs whose justifying conditions comprise 
an occurrent or dispositional state or a feature of the believer. The motivation behind 
such a restrictive account is that only what is internal to a believer in a metaphysical 
sense can satisfy the internalist access to justifying conditions. But we can attain such 
access through reflection or recollection without the justifying condition’s being 
internal to us in a metaphysical sense.  
 
If internalism is to function as a leading epistemological theory accounting for the 
justificatory status of the majority of our beliefs, then it shall restrict the internalist 
condition to indirect awareness. It needs to avoid conditions, such as direct awareness 
or the metaphysical location of justifying conditions, which detract from its intuitive 
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force or its commonsensical appeal. Even if the supposed nuclear belief were to meet 
the mentalist condition, it would still not have been justifiably acquired for its failure 
to satisfy the truth-conducivity condition required by internalists. Further, the alleged 
nuclear belief also fails to satisfy the perspectival internalism’s requirement for the 
rationale that gave rise to such alleged belief – though within the believing subject's 
ken – fails to count as a justified belief. Given the IAEA's empirical evidence that not 
p, the rationale behind the nuclear belief could not have counted as a justified belief of 
Cheney’s. That is, if Cheney ever came to believe the rationale behind his supposed 
nuclear belief, then his rationale belief would have lacked epistemic justification for 
the epistemic force of the four-fold rationale was impugned by the living doubts 
raised by the US intelligence community and later overridden by the IAEA’s findings. 
Thus, he had no good evidence to believe them.   
 
    The fundamental reasoning behind perspectival internalism is that for a condition to 
be justification-conferring, it should be within our perspective on the world in the way 
of justified belief. But a justifying condition can be within our perspective on the 
world without its being a justified belief itself (without our justifiably believing that it 
possesses adequacy for the belief in question). Any adequate evidence could be 
justification-conferring as long as we have some cognitive awareness of its existence 
whether that awareness takes the form of a belief, a justified belief, knowledge or just 
simple awareness. The fundamental thesis of internalism is that a belief possesses 
justificatory status only if it is based on adequate evidence – directly or indirectly 
accessible to the believer whether in the way of belief, justified belief, knowledge or 
other cognitive states – with no sufficient contrary evidence available at the time of 
belief. Requiring that a justifying condition itself be a justified belief is, therefore, 
superfluous.  
 
    There are two core theses underlying the argument by perspectival internalists. 
First, they argue that if a justifying condition obtains, we should justifiably believe 
that it does in the way (efficacious) that it does if it were to be justification-conferring. 
That is, they contend that we should justifiably believe that the justifying condition 
provides adequate support for the belief in question (having a justified belief about the 
adequacy of the justifying condition). But this is not the only legitimate way through 
which we come to be aware of justifying conditions. There are situations where we 
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become aware of a justifying condition through other cognitive states such as 
intuitions and immediate apprehensions, as argued by BonJour (1980). Subjecting the 
psychological medium between a believer and a justifying condition to justified belief 
creates a superfluous requirement for positive epistemic status. It complicates the 
epistemic assessment of belief by leading it to regress – an outcome which strong 
internalism is plagued with. Second, they contend that only justified beliefs could 
confer justification, arguing that an unjustified belief cannot be in the role of 
bestowing an epistemic status it does not itself possess. But this conception cannot 
account for the epistemic status of all beliefs. We have already observed that we 
possess justificatory status for many beliefs whose justifying conditions we have no 
justified belief about.  
 
Being examined against all accounts of internalism, the fundamental internalist 
violation responsible for rendering the supposed nuclear belief unjustifiably acquired 
would have been the subject's disregard to the available living doubts, ignoring 
contrary evidence and basing the belief on defeated evidence. That is, of course, if the 
given propositional attitude were to be a genuine belief. But this research has, in light 
of the evidential conditions at the time, concluded that the attribution of belief to the 
given subject is inappropriate. However, if challenged, Cheney could defend the 
possession of his alleged nuclear belief by arguing that he took such belief to be 
warranted by the evidence available at the time. That is, he could argue that belief in 
the nuclear proposition was warranted from his own cognitive perspective on the 
matter. But there was no reasonable or adequate ground to warrant such belief. The 
IAEA findings clearly demonstrated that there was no evidence to show that Iraq had 
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In addition, the US intelligence 
community expressed serious doubts about the probability of the nuclear proposition. 
That is, the available supporting grounds were not sufficient to constitute evidence of 
any probity to show that Iraq had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program before the 
war. If what Cheney manifests as his belief represents his real state of mind on the 
given matter, then such belief would have been unjustifiably acquired.  
 
Enmeshed with an intractable generality problem and a counter-intuitive contention 
that justificational status obtains regardless of a believing subject's cognitive 
awareness of what it is that confers such status, externalism fails to explain what the 
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rationality status of the alleged nuclear belief would have been if it were to be a 
genuine belief. Embracing belief in the absence of some cognitive grasp of what is 
responsible for the rationality of the belief leads to epistemic irrationality. In addition 
to that, the generality problem leaves externalism as a general theory of epistemic 
justification, rendering us unable to accurately choose the relevant process type to 
examine its reliability in a bid to establish whether or not a belief is reliably produced. 
It is due to this generality problem that we cannot, from an externalist standpoint, 
accurately establish whether or not a given belief is reliably formed. And it is because 
of our inability to accurately establish the reliability of the process type responsible 
for the generation of a belief that we cannot accurately establish the epistemic status 
of the belief from an externalist perspective. In order to determine the justifiability of 
a belief from an externalist perspective, we have to establish whether or not the 
cognitive process responsible for the generation of the belief was reliable. As already 
observed, reliability is a dispositional frequency notion attributable to items that have 
a range of employments or realisations. It is, therefore, associated with types rather 
than tokens.  But since each token can be a member of an infinite number of types, 
determining the exact type to check for its reliability will end up undeterminable in 
the absence of a rule. A given belief could be generated by scores of process types.  
 
So long as externalism continues to have reliability as its raison d’être, it will 
continue to be a general account of justification incapable of providing an accurate 
epistemic assessment of belief. For externalists, a belief is justified as long as it is the 
outcome of a reliable cognitive process. But epistemic justifiability is just epistemic 
rationality, and we are epistemically rational in believing something only when we 
have some cognitive access to what is responsible for the rationality of the belief. This 
is, of course, providing that the basis of the belief provides adequate support for the 
truth of the belief. Even if the supposed nuclear belief were to be generated by a 
highly reliable cognitive process type, it would still have been epistemically irrational 
for the given subject to knowingly embrace belief on the basis of defeated evidence. 
He would have been epistemically irresponsible, from a deontological perspective, to 
embrace belief in the presence of living doubts and such overwhelming contrary 
evidence. 
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Furthermore, even if Cheney had impeccable evidence to trust the reliability of his 
reasoning, the alleged nuclear belief would still have been unjustifiably acquired due 
to its being knowingly based on debunked evidence. There is no way that Cheney 
could not have known that, at the time of manifesting such belief, the four-fold 
rationale behind the nuclear proposition was overridden or at least fundamentally 
undermined by the IAEA’s probative findings. The subjective or objective presence of 
reliability can neither supersede nor offset the need for adequate evidence. In addition 
to the basing relation and the lack of sufficient contrary evidence, the presence of 
adequate supporting evidence – accessible in some way – is the most fundamental 
reason behind the obtaining of epistemic justification and the most plausible reason, 
after truth, for holding a belief. We, once epistemically motivated, tend to hold our 
beliefs because we have good reason for thinking them to be true.  
 
The alleged nuclear belief would still have been unjustifiably acquired even if the 
alleged believing subject were to believe or trust the four-fold rationale behind the 
nuclear proposition for such rationale was no good evidence to warrant belief in the 
nuclear proposition. Belief and reason are, as already observed, intimately connected. 
That is why it is psychologically impossible to believe something we take to be 
unwarranted by the current evidence. The available contrary evidence along with the 
living doubts were sufficient to disbelieve or discourage belief in the nuclear 
proposition. That is, they were sufficient to reject belief in favour of the given 
proposition. Belief in the nuclear proposition was neither favoured nor warranted by 
the available evidence. The available supporting evidence was defeated. Thus, the 
totality of the available evidence was against belief in the nuclear proposition. 
However, we can attribute belief to Cheney, but neither epistemic nor deontological 
justification to possess the belief, only if he had trusted or believed the available 
supporting evidence.  
 
That is, only if he took the available supporting evidence to be sufficient or 
satisfactory to warrant such belief. But Cheney himself was aware that there were 
serious doubts1 about the probity of the supporting evidence prior to the resumption of 
the UN inspections. He was also aware of the IAEA’s probative findings which 
                                                 
1
 For the intake of INR on aluminium tubes, refer to appendix (pp. 22, 23 and 25), on uranium (p. 29), 
and on the general nature of the available nuclear-related evidence (pp. 18-19). For the intake of DOE 
on aluminium tubes, refer to appendix (pp. 23 and 30). 
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assertively demonstrated the absence of any evidence to support the proposition that 
there were proscribed nuclear activities in Iraq. Moreover, Cheney himself recognizes 
the uncertainty of intelligence evidence. Addressing the Iraqi nuclear proposition on 
29 August 2002, he argues that “Intelligence is at best an uncertain business, even 
under the best circumstances” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020829-5.html). Most importantly, 
he takes the available supporting evidence to be insufficient to warrant belief in the 
nuclear proposition. The following is what he takes to be the case with the 
corroborating evidence gathered through the intelligence community prior to the 
resumption of the UN inspections in Iraq:  
 
We have a tendency … to say, “Well, we’ll sit down and we’ll evaluate the 
evidence. We’ll draw a conclusion”. But we always think in terms that we’ve 
got all the evidence. Here, we don’t have all the evidence. … What we know 
is just bits and pieces we gather through the intelligence system2 (8 September 
2002).  
 
 
The four-fold rationale behind the nuclear proposition came to the attention of the 
intelligence community well before Cheney’s recognition that the available 
supporting evidence was inadequate. The aluminium tube and the magnet (along with 
the high-speed balancing machines) allegations emerged prior to April 20013, the 
Niger uranium yellow cake on 15 October 20014, and the satellite photographs in May 
20025. That is, by the bits and pieces of evidence, Cheney is referring to the four-fold 
rationale behind his manifested belief that Iraq had a reconstituted nuclear weapons 
program before the invasion. He takes the source of the available supporting evidence 
(the intelligence community) to be uncertain and the available supporting evidence 
insufficient. Thus, Cheney takes belief in the nuclear proposition to be unwarranted by 
the current evidence. In other words, belief in the nuclear proposition was 
unwarranted from his cognitive perspective on the given issue.  
 
                                                 
2
 See appendix (p. 18).  
3
 Further details to be found at: http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf (pp. 88 and 
126, respectively).  
4
 Ibid (p. 36).  
5
 Further details to be found at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html.  
 265 
The only thing that would have rendered the four-fold rationale adequate or 
satisfactory from the perspective of Cheney would have been a subsequent emergence 
of evidence corroborating the given rationale. But as we have already learned, the 
subsequent emergence of evidence was the IAEA’s sufficient contrary evidence. 
Following his statement acknowledging the inadequacy of the available supporting 
evidence, no evidence emerged to corroborate the four-fold rationale. Thus, the four-
fold rationale would have still remained inadequate from his perspective on the 
nuclear issue. It is psychologically impossible to believe something we take to be 
unwarranted by the current evidence. Thus, belief in the nuclear proposition as well as 
its rationale would have been psychologically impossible from Cheney’s perspective 
on the given matter. The only way we can attribute belief to Cheney is if he had 
successfully engaged in a self-serving endeavour re-examining the four-fold rationale, 
employing different assessment criteria in a bid to convince himself of the adequacy 
of the given rationale and, in effect, of the probability of the nuclear proposition. But 
we normally do not convince ourselves of the probability of an evidentially 
unsupported proposition that generates or heightens anxiety. This is diagnostic of 
wishful believing rather than fear-driven propositional attitudes such as pragmatic 
acceptance. Under epistemic conditions where we merely fear that p but take belief in 
p to be unwarranted by the current evidence, we, for practical reasons, normally come 
to accept rather than believe that p. That is if we had to act or proceed on some basis 
at the time; or if we had to take an attitude on p, whether it be belief, disbelief, 
acceptance or rejection, on the basis of the evidential conditions at the time. 
 
Though there was a glaring focus on corroborating evidence and a flagrant 
disregard to dissenting evidence on the part of the Bush administration officials, this 
cannot be taken as evidence that they wanted to believe the given propositions. 
Normally we do not desire belief in p under conditions where we lack good evidence 
whether p or not p but where we perceive the feared eventuality of p to be too costly. 
That is, we normally do not prefer to believe an epistemically ill-founded proposition 
that produces or heightens fear, tension or anxiety. The desire to ward off a feared 
danger cannot be equated with the desire to believe. The latter normally obtains when 
the given proposition is desired. The desire to believe can only be satisfied by 
bringing about the desired belief. But fulfilling the desire to ward off a feared danger 
is not contingent on possessing any doxastic attitudes. We do not have to necessarily 
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believe that a perceived danger is imminent or present in order to be prompted to 
engage in self-defense. Like belief, mere acceptance that p normally disposes us to act 
appropriately to p as well. That is, accepting that my safety is in danger normally 
prompts me to reason and act accordingly. Poor epistemic conditions where we 
merely fear that p, but lack good evidence whether p, normally promote mere 
practical acceptance that p rather than belief that p. Faced with the feared eventuality 
of p, but where we lack good evidence whether or not that p, we can only be more 
likely to, for practical reasons, accept than to reject that p. This is especially the case 
when the cost of error is too high. The risk asymmetries we associate with accepting 
or rejecting that p, where p is of major concern to us, normally promote pragmatic 
acceptance that p. In light of the considerations outlined on p. 256, this research has 
concluded that neither belief nor pragmatic belief can be rightly attributed to the Bush 
administration officials. It, rather, has concluded that the given supposed beliefs are 
more apt to be characterised as mere propositional acceptances. That is if they were 
ever genuine propositional attitudes, rather than mere pretence.   
 
To sum up, the research has undertaken a three-fold inquiry into the nature of the 
given alleged beliefs. The first part of the inquiry looked into the possibility of 
attributing belief, the second part that of pragmatic belief, and the third part that of 
mere propositional acceptance to the given alleged believing subjects. The inquiry 
demonstrated that neither belief nor pragmatic belief would be an appropriate 
characterisation of the given alleged beliefs, given the evidential conditions at the 
time along with the unwelcome nature of the given propositions. In the philosophical 
literature, pragmatic belief is described as either welcome or unwelcome. In other 
words, the essence of pragmatic belief is said to originate from either a) pragmatic 
ends or wishful thoughts, or, b) fears, anxieties or worries. There are situations where 
wishful thinking or pragmatic goals can cause or lead to a desired belief state, though 
only indirectly. Though I do not currently believe in God or that x has any feelings of 
affection to me (p), my hunger for such a belief state might cause in me the belief that 
p. I might be able to bring about such a desired belief through indirect routes such as 
bringing about conditions which, from my perspective, constitute evidence for p or by 
focusing on the available supporting evidence and ignoring the evidence that casts 
doubt on the possibility that p. My endeavour to bring about this belief will succeed 
only if I succeed in getting myself convinced that p or only if I can pass from the 
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cognitive purview where I take p to be evidentially unsupported to a cognitive 
purview where I take the available evidence for p to be satisfactory from my own 
subjective perspective. But it will fail if I eventually fail to take the available evidence 
for p to be satisfactory.  
 
It is normal for human agents to desire belief in propositions they do not currently 
believe. There are many things we want to believe in, though without currently 
possessing the corresponding beliefs. I want to believe in Paradise, though I am not 
holding any such corresponding beliefs at the moment. In situations where our 
cognition is driven by pragmatic desires or practical interests, we normally want to 
believe propositions that can bring about positive thinking, psychological comfort, 
mental ease, or peace of mind. That is, we do not normally want to believe a 
proposition that generates or heightens anxiety or fear. In situations where we merely 
fear that p in the absence of good evidence whether or not that p, but where the feared 
eventuality of p is of utmost concern to us just like the feared eventuality of leaving 
the gas stove on is to Barbara (see pp. 118-119 of the thesis), we normally tend to 
accept p if we had to take an attitude on p under such epistemically degenerate 
conditions or if we had to act on some basis at the time. That is, it is not the case that 
we are more willing to believe than to disbelieve p under such poor epistemic 
conditions where we want to prevent or avoid a feared eventuality that is 
epistemically unsupported by the available evidence. Fearing p neither requires nor 
entails the belief that p. Improbable or even impossible evils can cause in us the 
feeling of fear, as argued by Hume (see pp. 238-239 of the thesis). Further, merely 
imagining or considering a frightening scene can cause fear in us, as argued by 
Morreall (see p. 238 of the thesis). Thus, merely imagining what it would be like if 
the plane my sister is flying on crashes can cause in me the fear that the plane she is 
flying on might crash (see Radford and Weston 1975: 72-73).  
 
Though I have a fear of some sort that I might miss my flight or that I might not get 
through a job interview, a driving test or a life-changing operation, it is not 
necessarily the case that I am holding the corresponding beliefs. It is logically and 
psychologically possible to fear a proposition without holding the corresponding 
belief. It is likely that the Bush administration officials merely feared or suspected 
that p. But from this, it does not follow that they also held the corresponding belief. 
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Belief differs from other mental states such as fear or suspicion. The latter can obtain 
in the absence of the former. Moreover, it is likely that they just accepted p due to the 
lack of what they, in a post-9/11 security environment, would have accepted as 
certainty or good epistemic evidence whether or not that p or due to the fear that 
maybe p. Mere propositional acceptance is, after all, a cognitive attitude that does not 
require good epistemic evidence. It is, instead, a propositional attitude that could be 
driven by purely practical reasons. By contrast, by virtue of its constitutional aim at 
getting the truth, belief is normally committed to epistemic evidence, though we also 
have beliefs motivated by practical reasons (non-paradigmatic cases of belief). I 
concur with Bratman (1992) that the practical pressures, the pressures of risks, or the 
risk asymmetries that arise from epistemically unprobative conditions normally shape 
what we accept rather than what we believe under such conditions. In other words, 
they normally promote or shape mere propositional acceptance rather than belief. 
After all, mere acceptance that p, just like the belief that p, disposes us to reason and 
act as if p. The difference between them is that our believing that p entails our feeling 
it true that p, whereas our acceptance that p does not entail such a feeling. This is 
besides the voluntariness of propositional acceptance and the involuntariness of 
belief.  
 
The given Bush administration beliefs cannot be appropriately characterised as 
pragmatic beliefs, that is as beliefs driven or motivated by a pragmatic desire that p be 
the case for the propositions they manifested a belief in favour of were not wishful or 
welcome propositions to be desired. They were unwelcome propositions. We 
normally do not want to believe a proposition that is unwelcome. That is why an 
alleged pragmatic belief in an unwelcome proposition cannot be rightly characterised 
as a belief motivated by a pragmatic desire that p be the case. It will be conceptually 
incoherent to characterise a supposed unwelcome belief as a belief driven by a 
pragmatic desire that p be the case. If the supposed pragmatic belief is ever a genuine 
belief, it would be an unwelcome belief motivated by fears or worries. The evidential 
conditions under which the given alleged beliefs were manifested were unprobative. 
There was sufficient contrary evidence in the case of the nuclear proposition along 
with sufficient living doubts in the case of the terror proposition. That is, neither 
proposition was supported by good epistemic evidence at the time. Though the Bush 
administration officials made it clear that their policy objective was regime change, it 
 269 
is still logically possible to think that they were worried that p or had a fear that p. In 
light of regime change as their declared policy objective, it can be argued that they 
were being insincere in presenting p as the real rationale behind the war. But even if 
they were insincere in presenting p as the real reason for the war, it still does not 
follow that they did not fear that p. Furthermore, it still does not follow that they did 
not accept p at least in their war plans or in their practical reasoning on how best to go 
about prosecuting the war itself. But even if they feared that p, it still does not follow 
that they had a fear-driven belief that p. Fearing that p neither requires nor entails the 
belief that p, as noted on pp. 237-239 of the thesis. In light of the evidential conditions 
at the time along with the new security environment where the margin of error was, 
apparently, perceived by the Bush administration to be dramatically different6, this 
research concludes that the given alleged beliefs, if they were ever genuine 
propositional attitudes, are better understood as mere propositional acceptances rather 
than paradigmatic cases of belief or pragmatic beliefs. Though the Bush 
administration's declared policy objective, regime change, might have favoured a 
collective manifestation of belief in the professed rationale for the war, such a 
pragmatic end would not have required genuine belief in the given rationale.  
 
    The research has also undertaken an inquiry into the justificational status of the 
given supposed beliefs, taking into account the internalist, the deontological, and the 
externalist theories of justification. The inquiry into the foregoing justification 
theories demonstrated that the theory most consistent with our intuitions about 
justified belief is the internalist theory of justification (the weak non-deontological 
account of internalism). In the philosophical literature, the primary dispute over what 
justification theory best accounts for our intuitions about the concept of epistemic 
justification is between internalists and externalists. I have employed the 
deontological theory of justification in order to show that internalism is motivated by 
our intuitions about the rationality of belief rather than by deontological 
considerations, as claimed by externalists. Moreover, I have employed externalism in 
order to demonstrate the counter-intuitive nature of justification theories, such as that 
of externalism, that do not recognize the necessity of internalist constraints on 
justification. The appeal for a particular justification theory rather than another is, as 
already observed in articulating the research question, determined by the respective 
                                                 
6
 See appendix (pp. 82-83) for Rumsfeld's statement on this.  
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theory's capacity to account for our intuitions about justified belief. Both internalists 
and externalists take epistemic justification to be an ordinary concept and, thereby, 
base their arguments for the alleged plausibility of their theories on the respective 
theory's capacity to appropriately account for our intuitions about justifiable 
believing. Further reiterating what was articulated in addressing the research question 
vis-à-vis the reason behind the appeal for a particular justification theory rather than 
another, Stewart Cohen observes:  
 
 While numerous considerations play a role in the assessment of a 
 philosophical theory  of ordinary concepts [such as epistemic justification], a 
 major consideration is how  well the theory accords with our intuitions. … 
 We are interested in the concept of  justified belief because it plays a central 
 role in the way we view ourselves and our relation to the world. We want to 
 know what we are saying when we describe ourselves as having justified 
 beliefs (or as being justified in believing). So, an important test for a particular 
 theory is how well it fares in accounting for our intuitions about justified 
 belief. Indeed, this is how many philosophers who work on developing these 
 theories have proceeded. … [Thus] the [justificatory] methodology involves, 
 to a large extent, assessing how well the theories accord with our intuitive 
 judgments about when beliefs are justified (or, equivalently, when it is true to 
 say that beliefs are justified) (1995: 114-115).  
 
 
That is, according with our intuitions about justified belief is widely recognized by 
justification theorists as the touchstone for the assessment of a justification theory's 
commonsensical appeal. It is this harmony with our intuitions of justifiable believing 
that provides a justification theory with a tenable position or an impervious posture. 
Thus, in constructing their theories, most justification theorists give us the impression 
that they are just formulating our commonsensical convictions of justified belief in an 
orderly manner. But as the inquiry into the leading justification theories demonstrated, 
the justification theory that best corresponds with our intuitions of justifiable 
believing is the internalist theory of justification. It is the internalist theory that is 
committed to our commonsensical judgments on justified belief. So when 
investigative journalists set out on an inquiry into the truth values or the justifiability 
of a claim, they would be doing the same thing as what an internalist would be doing 
when determining the justificational status of a belief proposition. They both would 
be working within the parameters of the evidence that settles the question of the truth 
and falsity of the proposition in question. In other words, they both would be pursuing 
evidence for and against the probability of the given proposition. From both 
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perspectives, the inquiry into the justifiability status of the given proposition is settled 
on the basis of two determining factors. First, whether the proposition is supported by 
the available evidence, if there is any. Second, whether the available supporting 
evidence is adequate or probative.  
 
Furthermore, any commonsensical view would, of course, take it as essential that a 
belief is based on the evidence that justifies the belief. I might, as observed on p. 54, 
be in possession of good evidence that warrants belief in a proposition, but might 
come to believe it for reasons other than the good evidence at my disposal. Thus, I 
might have good reasons within my cognitive purview to believe in God, but might 
come to believe such a proposition on the basis of evidentially irrelevant 
considerations such as a hunger for such a belief state, a practical end, a practical 
need, or just because my family, my friends or my tribe members believe it. It is 
because of such cases that the obtaining of the basing relation between a belief 
proposition and its justifying premise is a necessary condition for the conferment of 
epistemic justification on a belief. Any justification theory that takes our 
commonsensical convictions of justification seriously would recognize the 
indispensability of the aforementioned factors as a necessary condition for the 
conferment of justificational status on a belief. Flouting such intuitively compelling 
considerations, the externalist theory's necessary condition for justificational status 
supervenes on the reliability of the cognitive process that generates a given belief. In 
addition to its being unnecessary for the conferment of such a status, the externalists' 
reliability condition is rendered undeterminable by the generality problem which 
externalism is plagued with. This is besides the widely shared doubt among 
epistemologists that commonsense has any such externalist conceptions of 
justification.  
 
    I suggest that future research focus on analysing the Bush administration’s 
knowledge-constituted propositions7 in light of the different theories of knowledge. 
Further study can draw upon the findings of this research along with its 
comprehensive appendix to examine the belief condition of knowledge in the given 
context as well as the broader political context, determining the nature of the given 
                                                 
7
 Refer to appendix (pp. 115-141) for a comprehensive account of the Bush administration officials 
professing to know the charges levelled against Iraq to be true.  
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knowledge claims, and also establishing how political knowledge connects to the 
theory of knowledge.  
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Appendix (the emphases are mine) 
Part One 
 
Character List 
 
• Al-Libi – a captured Al-Qaeda element. Under the influence of waterboarding, 
he was coerced to give details about the alleged connections between Iraq and 
Al-Qaeda. He, consequently, provided his American debriefers with false 
information. 
• Ari Fleischer – then White House’s Press Secretary. 
• Brent Scowcroft – the National Security Adviser under President Gerald Ford 
and George H.W. Bush. 
• Colin Powell – then US Secretary of State. 
• Condoleezza Rice – President Bush’s National Security Advisor during the 
build up to Iraq war.  
• Dick Cheney – then US Vice President. 
• Donald Rumsfeld – then US Secretary of Defense. 
• Gregory Thielmann – then director of Intelligence Bureau at the US State 
Department.  
• Hussein Kamel – the Iraqi Minister for Military Industrialisation in the 1990s. 
• Mohamed Atta – the leading 9/11 hijacker.    
• Naji Sabri – then Iraqi Foreign Minister.  
• Paul Wolfowitz – then Deputy Defense Secretary. 
• Robert Baer – a 21-year CIA veteran who spent ninety percent of his time in 
the Middle East.  
• Scott McClellan – then Deputy Press Secretary. 
• Scott Ritter – the chief UN weapons inspector (1991-1998). 
• Tariq Aziz – then Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister.       
• Tyler Drumheller – the 26-year top CIA veteran who was the chief of 
clandestine operations in Europe during the lead up to Iraq war.   
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
• CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
• DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency 
• DOE – Department of Energy  
• IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency 
• INR – the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
• Iff – if and only if  
• NIE – National Intelligence Estimate 
• P - proposition  
• PNAC – Project for the New American Century  
• UN – United Nations 
• UNMOVIC – United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 
Commission  
• UNSCOM – United Nations Special Commission  
• WMD – weapons of mass destruction  
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Part Two 
The Iraq War Rationale: Possession of Chemical Weapons 
 
The Key Belief Statement 
 
Powell (5 February 2003): “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
 
Corroborating Assertions  Counter Assertions   
Tenet (1 January through 30 June 2001):  
• “We assess that since the suspension of 
UN inspections in December of 1998, 
Baghdad has had the capability to 
reinitiate its CW programs within a few 
weeks to months”. 
• “Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key 
portions of its chemical production 
infrastructure for industrial and 
commercial use, as well as its missile 
production facilities. Iraq has attempted to 
purchase numerous dual-use items for, or 
under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. 
This equipment – in principle subject to 
UN scrutiny – also could be diverted for 
WMD purposes. Since the suspension of 
UN inspections in December 1998, the risk 
of diversion has increased”. 
• “After Desert Fox [the 1998 bombing 
campaign], Baghdad again instituted a 
reconstruction effort on those facilities 
destroyed by the US bombing, including 
several critical missile production 
complexes and former dual-use CW 
Cohen (11 January 2001): “We have 
successfully contained Saddam Hussein ... That 
containment strategy and policy has worked” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?sp
eechid=251). 
 
Powell (24 February 2001): “and frankly they 
[the sanctions] have worked. He [Saddam 
Hussein] has not developed any significant 
capability with respect to weapons of mass 
destruction. He is unable to project conventional 
power against his neighbors” 
(http://www.usembassy-
israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/february/
me0224b.html). 
 
Rice (29 July 2001): “We are able to keep arms 
from him [Saddam Hussein]. His military forces 
have not been rebuilt” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0107/
29/le.00.html). 
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production facilities. In addition, Iraq 
appears to be installing or repairing dual-
use equipment at CW-related facilities. 
Some of these facilities could be converted 
fairly quickly for production of CW 
agents” 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archiv
ed-reports-1/jan_jun2001.htm).  
Tenet (6 February 2002): “Baghdad is expanding 
its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be 
diverted quickly to CW production” 
(https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-
testimony/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192002.
html). 
 
 
 
US State Department (12 September 2002): “At 
Fallujah and three other plants, Iraq now has 
chlorine production capacity far higher than any 
civilian need for water treatment, and the evidence 
indicates that some of its chlorine imports are 
being diverted for military purposes”  
(http://www.c-
span.org/Content/PDF/iraqdecade.pdf). 
 
 
DIA (September 2002):  
 
• “A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical 
warfare agents, precursors, munitions, and 
production equipment were destroyed 
between 1991 and 1998 as a result of 
Operation Desert Storm1 and UNSCOM 
DIA (September 2002): “There is no reliable 
information on whether Iraq is producing and 
stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has – 
or will – establish its chemical warfare agent 
production facilities” 
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/dod/
2003/dia0603.pdf). 
                                                 
1
 The first Iraq war is referred to as either the first Gulf war or Operation Desert Storm.  
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actions. Nevertheless, we believe Iraq 
retained production equipment, expertise 
and chemical precursors and can 
reconstitute a chemical warfare program in 
the absence of an international inspection 
regime. Iraq's successful use of chemical 
weapons in the past against Iranian troops 
and Kurdish civilians increases the 
likelihood of a chemical warfare 
reconstitution. Iraq has not signed the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)”. 
• “Although we lack any direction 
information, Iraq probably possesses CW 
agent in chemical munitions, possibly 
including artillery rockets, artillery shells, 
aerial bombs, and ballistic missile 
warheads. Baghdad also probably 
possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, 
primarily containing precursors, but that 
also could consist of some mustard agent 
or stabilized VX”  
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_do
cs/dod/2003/dia0603.pdf). 
  
 
NIE – classified version (1 October 2002):  
 
• “We judge that Iraq has continued its 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs in defiance of UN resolutions 
and restrictions”. 
• “Iraq … has expanded its chemical … 
infrastructure under the cover of civilian 
production”. 
• “An array of clandestine reporting reveals 
NIE – classified version (1 October 2002): “We 
judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's 
WMD efforts … We lack specific information on 
many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-
nie.pdf). 
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that Baghdad has procured covertly the 
types and quantities of chemicals and 
equipment sufficient to allow limited CW 
agent production hidden within Iraq's 
legitimate chemical industry”. 
• “Although we have little specific 
information on Iraq's CW stockpile, 
Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 
metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 
500 MT of CW agents – much of it added 
in the last year”. 
• “The Iraqis have experience in 
manufacturing CW bombs, artillery 
rockets, and projectiles. We assess that 
they possess CW bulk fills for SRBM 
warheads, including for a limited number 
of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few 
with extended ranges”. 
• “We assess that Baghdad has begun 
renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF 
(cyclosarin), and VX; its capability 
probably is more limited now than it was at 
the time of the Gulf war, although VX 
production and agent storage life probably 
have been improved” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
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Powell (5 February 2003): 
 
• “We also have satellite photos that indicate 
that banned materials have recently been 
moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction facilities. … Let's look at 
one. This one is about a weapons munition 
facility, a facility that holds ammunition at 
a place called Taji (ph). This is one of 
about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know 
that this one has housed chemical 
munitions. … Here, you see 15 munitions 
bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The 
four that are in red squares represent active 
chemical munitions bunkers. How do I 
know that? How can I say that? Let me 
give you a closer look. Look at the image 
on the left. On the left is a close-up of one 
of the four chemical bunkers. The two 
arrows indicate the presence of sure signs 
that the bunkers are storing chemical 
munitions”. 
• “In May 2002, our satellites photographed 
the unusual activity in this picture. Here 
we see cargo vehicles are again at this 
transshipment point, and we can see that 
they are accompanied by a 
decontamination vehicle associated with 
biological or chemical weapons activity. 
What makes this picture significant is that 
we have a human source who has 
corroborated that movement of chemical 
weapons occurred at this site at that time. 
Blix (7 March 2003): “There have been reports, 
denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed 
activities are conducted underground. … During 
inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, 
inspection teams have examined building 
structures for any possible underground facilities. 
In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment 
was used in several specific locations. No 
underground facilities for chemical or biological 
production or storage were found so far” 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivere
d.htm). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blix (14 February 2003): “The presentation of 
intelligence information by the US Secretary of 
State [on 5 February 2003] suggested that Iraq had 
prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and 
removing evidence of proscribed weapons 
programmes. I would like to comment only on one 
case, which we are familiar with, namely, the 
trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical 
decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a 
declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites 
Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have 
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So it's not just the photo, and it's not an 
individual seeing the photo. It's the photo 
and then the knowledge of an individual 
being brought together to make the case”. 
• “Our conservative estimate is that Iraq 
today has a stockpile of between 100 and 
500 tons of chemical weapons agent”. 
• “We know that Iraq has embedded key 
portions of its illicit chemical weapons 
infrastructure within its legitimate civilian 
industry”.  
• “Under the guise of dual-use 
infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an 
effort to reconstitute facilities that were 
closely associated with its past program to 
develop and produce chemical weapons. 
For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions 
of the Tariq (ph) state establishment. Tariq 
(ph) includes facilities designed 
specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons 
program and employs key figures from 
past programs” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/20
03/02/20030205-1.html).  
noted that the two satellite images of the site were 
taken several weeks apart. The reported movement 
of munitions at the site could just as easily have 
been a routine activity as a movement of 
proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent 
inspection” 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/sec
urity_council_briefings.asp#6). 
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Part Three 
The Iraq War Rationale: Possession of Biological Weapons 
 
The Key Belief Statement 
 
Rumsfeld (20 January 2003): “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=165). 
 
Corroborating Assertions  Counter Assertions   
Tenet (1 January through 30 June 2001): 
• “Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate 
Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure 
(FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, 
coupled with its extensive 
concealment efforts suggest that the 
BW program has continued. Without 
an inspection-monitoring program, 
however, it is more difficult to 
determine the current status of these 
programs”. 
• “Iraq also has continued dual-use 
research that could improve BW agent 
R&D [Research and Development] 
capabilities. With the absence of a 
monitoring regime and Iraq’s growing 
industrial self-sufficiency, we remain 
concerned that Iraq may again be 
producing biological warfare agents” 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/ar
chived-reports-1/jan_jun2001.htm). 
 
Cohen (11 January 2001): “We have successfully 
contained Saddam Hussein. … That containment 
strategy and policy has worked” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speech
id=251). 
 
 
Powell (24 February 2001): “and frankly they [the 
sanctions] have worked. He [Saddam Hussein] has not 
developed any significant capability with respect to 
weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project 
conventional power against his neighbors” 
(http://www.usembassy-
israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/february/me0
224b.html). 
 
Rice (29 July 2001): “We are able to keep arms from 
him [Saddam Hussein]. His military forces have not 
been rebuilt” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0107/29/le
.00.html). 
 
 9 
Tenet (6 February 2002): “We believe it 
[Iraq] also maintains an active and capable 
BW program; Iraq told UNSCOM it had 
worked with several BW agents” 
(https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-
testimony/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192
002.html).  
 
Spratt1 (18 September 2002): “we don't know for 
sure what they have in the way of biological agents, 
and we aren't sure how robust their VX … might be” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speech
id=284).  
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “Many of 
his [Saddam Hussein’s] WMD capabilities 
are mobile and can be hidden to evade 
inspectors” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=283).  
 
 
                                                 
1
 John Spratt is a US Congressman representing South Carolina’s fifth district  
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NIE – classified version (1 October 2002): 
• “We judge that Iraq has continued its 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs in defiance of UN 
resolutions and restrictions”. 
• “We judge that all key aspects – R&D, 
production, and weaponization – of 
Iraq's offensive BW program are 
active and that most elements are 
larger and more advanced than they 
were before the Gulf war”. 
• “Iraq has largely rebuilt … biological 
weapons facilities damaged during 
Operation Desert Fox and has 
expanded its chemical and biological 
infrastructure under the cover of 
civilian production”. 
• “We judge Iraq has some lethal and 
incapacitating BW agents and is 
capable of quickly producing and 
weaponizing a variety of such agents, 
including anthrax, for delivery by 
bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and 
covert operatives”. 
• “Chances are even that smallpox is 
part of Iraq's offensive BW program”. 
• “Baghdad probably has developed 
genetically engineered BW agents”. 
• “Baghdad has mobile facilities for 
producing bacterial and toxin BW 
agents” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ira
q-wmd-nie.pdf). 
NIE – classified version (1 October 2002): “We 
judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD 
efforts ... We lack specific information on many key 
aspects of Iraq's WMD programs” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf). 
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Wolfowitz (23 January 2003):  
 
• “We know about that capability [Iraq’s 
mobile biological weapons production 
facilities] from defectors and other 
sources”. 
• “there is every reason to believe that 
things are being moved constantly and 
hidden” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=171). 
 
Bush (28 January 2003): “From three Iraqi 
defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, 
had several mobile biological weapons labs. 
These are designed to produce germ warfare 
agents, and can be moved from place to a 
place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein 
has not disclosed these facilities. He's given 
no evidence that he has destroyed them” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030128-19.html). 
 
 
Cheney (31 January 2003): “We know that 
he had … several mobile biological weapons 
laboratories designed to produce germ 
warfare agents on the move”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030131-13.html). 
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Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “Saddam Hussein has not verifiably 
accounted for even one teaspoon-full 
of this deadly material [anthrax]. … 
The Iraqis have never accounted for 
all of the biological weapons they 
admitted they had and we know they 
had. They have never accounted for 
all the organic material used to make 
them [biological weapons]. … they 
have not accounted for many of the 
weapons filled with these agents 
[biological] such as there are 400 
bombs. This is evidence, not 
conjecture. This is true. This is all 
well-documented”. 
• “We have firsthand descriptions of 
biological weapons factories on 
wheels and on rails. … an Iraqi civil 
engineer [Curveball] in a position to 
know the details of the program, 
confirmed the existence of 
transportable facilities moving on 
trailers. … A third source, also in a 
position to know, reported in summer 
2002 that Iraq had manufactured 
mobile production systems mounted 
on road trailer units and on rail cars. 
… Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi 
major, who defected, confirmed that 
Iraq has mobile biological research 
laboratories, in addition to the 
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production facilities I mentioned 
earlier. … We know that Iraq has at 
lest seven of these mobile biological 
agent factories”. 
• “There can be no doubt that Saddam 
Hussein has biological weapons and 
the capability to rapidly produce more, 
many more. And he has the ability to 
dispense these lethal poisons and 
diseases in ways that can cause 
massive death and destruction” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
Powell: (7 March 2003): there are “[WMD] 
underground facilities that we know exist” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
03/20030307-10.html).  
 
 
Blix (7 March 2003): 
 
• “As I noted on 14 February [2003], intelligence 
authorities have claimed that weapons of mass 
destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks 
and, in particular, that there are mobile 
production units for biological weapons.  The 
Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. 
Several inspections have taken place at 
declared and undeclared sites in relation to 
mobile production facilities. Food testing 
mobile laboratories and mobile workshops 
have been seen, as well as large containers with 
seed processing equipment. No evidence of 
proscribed activities have so far been found”. 
• “There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi 
side, that proscribed activities are conducted 
underground. ... During inspections of declared 
or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have 
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examined building structures for any possible 
underground facilities. In addition, ground 
penetrating radar equipment was used in 
several specific locations. No underground 
facilities for chemical or biological production 
or storage were found so far” 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdeliv
ered.htm). 
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Part Four 
The Iraq War Rationale: The Reconstitution of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The Key Belief Statement  
 
Cheney (16 March 2003): “we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 
weapons”1. 
Cheney in 2002: 
• 17 March 2002 – “we also have reason to believe they're pursing the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons” (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020317.html).  
• 24 March 2002 – “now, of course, for the last three years there've been no inspectors and 
there's good reason to believe that he continues to aggressively pursue the development of a 
nuclear weapon” (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
 
The Undesirable Truth: The Inspections Worked  
 
Ritter (June 2000): “Verifying Iraq's complete disarmament was complicated by the fact that in the 
summer of 1991 Iraq, disregarding its obligation to submit a complete declaration of its WMD 
programs, undertook a systematic program of “unilateral destruction”, disposing of munitions, 
components, and production equipment related to all categories of WMD. When Iraq admitted this 
to UNSCOM, it claimed it had no documentation to prove its professed destruction. While 
UNSCOM was able to verify that Iraq had in fact destroyed significant quantities of WMD-related 
material, without any documents or other hard evidence, it was impossible to confirm Iraq's 
assertions that it had disposed of all its weapons. UNSCOM's quantitative mandate had become a 
trap. However, through its extensive investigations, UNSCOM was able to ensure that the vast 
majority of Iraq's WMD arsenal, along with the means to produce such weaponry, was eliminated. 
Through monitoring, UNSCOM was able to guarantee that Iraq was not reconstituting that capability 
in any meaningful way” (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/iraqjun.asp). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See appendix, part ten (p. 106).    
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Tenet (1 January through 30 June 2001):  
 
• “We believe that Iraq has probably 
continued at least low-level 
theoretical R&D [research and 
development] associated with its 
nuclear program”. 
• “the automated video monitoring 
systems installed by the UN at 
known and suspect WMD facilities 
in Iraq are still not operating. Having 
lost this on-the-ground access, it is 
more difficult for the UN or the US 
to accurately assess the current state 
of Iraq’s WMD programs. Given 
Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that 
Baghdad has used the intervening 
period [1998-2001] to reconstitute 
prohibited programs”. 
• “The Intelligence Community 
remains concerned that Baghdad may 
be attempting to acquire materials 
that could aid in reconstituting its 
nuclear weapons program” 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/
archived-reports-
1/jan_jun2001.htm).  
 
Tenet (1 January through 30 June 
2000): “We do not have any direct 
evidence that Iraq has used the period since 
Desert Fox [December 1998] to 
reconstitute its WMD programs, although 
given its past behavior, this type of activity 
must be regarded as likely. We assess that 
since the suspension of UN inspections in 
December of 1998, Baghdad has had the 
capability to reinitiate both its CW and 
BW programs within a few weeks to 
months. Without an inspection monitoring 
program, however, it is more difficult to 
determine if Iraq has done so” 
(http://ftp.fas.org/irp/threat/bian_feb_2001.
htm).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
Tenet (1 July Through 31 December 
2001): “Iraq has … probably used the 
period [1998-2001] since it refused 
inspections to attempt to reconstitute 
prohibited programs. Without UN-mandated 
inspectors in Iraq, assessing the current state 
of Iraq's WMD and missile programs is 
difficult” 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archive
d-reports-1/july_dec2001.htm). 
 
Tenet (6 February 2002): “We believe 
Saddam never abandoned his nuclear 
weapons program” 
(https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-
testimony/2002/senate_select_hearing_0319
2002.html). 
 
ElBaradei (8 October 2002): “when we 
left in 1998, we believe that we neutralized 
the nuclear program” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPT
S/0210/08/se.06.html). 
 
ElBaradei (9 February 2003): “in ‘98 we 
eliminated Iraq’s nuclear program” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Ia
eaIraq/pressconf_09022003.pdf). 
Cheney (26 August 2002): “we now know 
that Saddam has resumed his efforts to 
acquire nuclear weapons. Among other 
sources, we've gotten this from the firsthand 
testimony of defectors – including Saddam's 
own son-in-law, who was subsequently 
murdered at Saddam's direction. Many of us 
are convinced that Saddam will acquire 
nuclear weapons fairly soon” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002
/08/20020826.html). 
* Reference to out-dated reporting. 
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Bush (7 September 2002): “when the 
inspectors first went into Iraq and were … 
finally denied access, a report came out of 
the … IAEA that they [the Iraqis] were six 
months away from developing a weapon. I 
don't know what more evidence we need” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002
/09/text/20020907-2.html). 
* Reference to out-dated reporting. 
 
 
 
ElBaradei (7 March 2003): “After three 
months of intrusive inspections, we have to 
date found no evidence or plausible 
indication of the revival of a nuclear 
weapons programme in Iraq” 
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei
-7mar03.pdf). 
 
Cheney (8 September 2002): “We have a 
tendency … to say, “Well, we’ll sit down 
and we’ll evaluate the evidence. We’ll 
draw a conclusion”. But we always think 
in terms that we’ve got all the evidence. 
Here, we don’t have all the evidence. … 
What we know is just bits and pieces we 
gather through the intelligence system” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bus
h/meet.htm). 
 
 
INR, cited in the classified version of the 
NIE (1 October 2002): “The Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research (INR) believes that Saddam 
continues to want nuclear weapons and 
that available evidence indicates that 
Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited 
effort to maintain and acquire nuclear 
weapons-related capabilities. The activities 
we have detected do not, however, add up 
to a compelling case that Iraq is currently 
pursuing what INR would consider to be 
an integrated and comprehensive 
approach to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers 
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the available evidence inadequate to 
support such a judgment. Lacking 
persuasive evidence that Baghdad has 
launched a coherent effort to reconstitute 
its nuclear weapons program, INR is 
unwilling to speculate that such an effort 
began soon after the departure of UN 
inspectors or to project a timeline for the 
completion of activities it does not now see 
happening. As a result, INR is unable to 
predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear 
device or weapon”  
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
 
NIE – classified version (1 October 2002): 
  
• “if left unchecked, it [Iraq] probably 
will have a nuclear weapon during 
this decade”. 
• “in the view of most agencies, 
Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear 
weapons program”. 
• “Although we assess that Saddam 
does not yet have nuclear weapons 
or sufficient material to make any, he 
remains intent on acquiring them. 
Most agencies assess that Baghdad 
started reconstituting its nuclear 
program about the time that 
UNSCOM inspectors departed – 
December 1998”. 
• “Iraq's efforts to re-establish and 
enhance its cadre of weapons 
ElBaradei (13 December 2002): “We 
know that Iraq … has no [nuclear] 
capability whatsoever to produce either a 
weapon or weapon-usable material” 
(http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/02
12/13/lt.01.html). 
 
ElBaradei (28 December 2002):  
 
• “No, I don't think we have any 
smoking gun [in Iraq]”. 
• “Iraq have [has] not restarted its 
nuclear weapons program”  
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANS
CRIPTS/0212/28/smn.02.html). 
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personnel as well as activities at 
several suspect nuclear sites further 
indicate that reconstitution is 
underway” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ir
aq-wmd-nie.pdf). 
Bush (7 October 2002): “Satellite 
photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding 
facilities at sites that have been part of its 
nuclear program in the past”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002
/10/20021007-8.html). 
 
ElBaradei (7 March 2003): “there is no 
indication of resumed nuclear activities in 
those buildings that were identified 
through the use of satellite imagery as 
being reconstructed or newly erected since 
1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related 
prohibited activities at any inspected sites” 
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei
-7mar03.pdf). 
ElBaradei (7 January 2003): “I believe 
… that we haven't seen anything to show 
that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons 
program. … so far, we haven't seen a 
smoking gun” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPT
S/0301/07/ltm.05.html). 
 Powell (5 February 2003) : 
• “We have no indication that Saddam 
Hussein has ever abandoned his 
nuclear weapons program. On the 
contrary, we have more than a 
decade of proof that he remains 
determined to acquire nuclear 
weapons”. 
• “Since 1998, his efforts to 
reconstitute his nuclear program 
have been focused on acquiring the 
third and last component, sufficient 
fissile material to produce a nuclear 
explosion” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releas
es/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
Blix (27 January 2003): “The large 
nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and 
the fissionable material was removed from 
Iraq by the IAEA”  
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.h
tm). 
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 ElBaradei (14 February 2003): 
 
• “As I have reported on numerous 
occasions, the IAEA concluded, by 
December 1998, that it had 
neutralized Iraq's past nuclear 
programme and that, therefore, 
there were no unresolved 
disarmament issues left at that 
time”. 
• “We have to date found no 
evidence of ongoing prohibited 
nuclear or nuclear related 
activities in Iraq. However, as I 
have just indicated, a number of 
issues are still under investigation 
and we are not yet in a position to 
reach a conclusion about them, 
although we are moving forward 
with regard to some of them”. 
• “The IAEA's experience in nuclear 
verification shows that it is 
possible, particularly with an 
intrusive verification system, to 
assess the presence or absence of a 
nuclear weapons programme in a 
State even without the full co-
operation of the inspected state” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/
Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.sh
tml). 
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Rice (8 September 2002): “We do know 
that there have been shipments going into 
Iran, for instance – into Iraq, for instance, of 
aluminum tubes that really are only suited to 
– high-quality aluminum tools that are only 
really suited for nuclear weapons programs, 
centrifuge programs” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0209/08/le.00.html). 
 
 
Cheney (8 September 2002): “Specifically 
aluminium tubes. … he has been seeking to 
acquire … the kinds of tubes that are 
necessary to build a centrifuge. … we know 
about a particular shipment. We’ve 
intercepted that” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush
/meet.htm). 
 
 
INR, cited in the classified version of the 
NIE (1 October 2002): “In INR's view 
Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is 
central to the argument that Baghdad is 
reconstituting its nuclear weapons 
program, but INR is not persuaded that the 
tubes in question are intended for use as 
centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the 
judgment of technical experts at the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) who have 
concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to 
acquire are poorly suited for use in gas 
centrifuges to be used for uranium 
enrichment and finds unpersuasive the 
arguments advanced by others to make the 
case that they are intended for that 
purpose. INR considers it far more likely 
that the tubes are intended for another 
purpose, most likely the production of 
artillery rockets. The very large quantities 
being sought, the way the tubes were tested 
by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of 
attention to operational security in the 
procurement efforts are among the factors, 
in addition to the DOE assessment, that 
lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not 
intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon 
program” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
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US State Department (12 September 
2002): “Iraq has stepped up its quest for 
nuclear weapons and has embarked on a 
worldwide hunt for materials to make an 
atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has 
sought to buy thousands of specially 
designed aluminum tubes which officials 
believe were intended as components of 
centrifuges to enrich uranium” 
(http://www.c-
span.org/Content/PDF/iraqdecade.pdf). 
 
ElBaradei (9 January 2003): “we believe, 
at this stage, that these aluminium tubes 
were intended for the manufacturing of 
rockets” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Ia
eaIraq/un_briefing_9jan.html). 
 
 
Bush (12 September 2002): “Iraq has made 
several attempts to buy high-strength 
aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a 
nuclear weapon” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002
/09/20020912-1.html#). 
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NIE – unclassified version (October 
2002): “Iraq’s efforts to procure tens of 
thousands of proscribed high-strength 
aluminum tubes are of significant concern. 
All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is 
seeking nuclear weapons and that these 
tubes could be used in a centrifuge 
enrichment program. Most intelligence 
specialists assess this to be the intended use, 
but some [INR and DOE] believe that these 
tubes are probably intended for conventional 
weapons programs” 
(http://ftp.fas.org/irp/cia/product/Iraq_Oct_2
002.pdf). 
 
ElBaradei (14 February 2003): “The 
IAEA is continuing to follow up on 
acknowledged efforts by Iraq to import 
high strength aluminium tubes. As you will 
know, Iraq has declared these efforts to 
have been in connection with a programme 
to reverse engineer conventional rockets. 
The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed 
been manufacturing such rockets. 
However, we are still exploring whether 
the tubes were intended rather for the 
manufacture of centrifuges for uranium 
enrichment. In connection with this 
investigation, Iraq has been asked to 
explain the reasons for the tight tolerance 
specifications that it had requested from 
various suppliers. Iraq has provided 
documentation related to the project for 
reverse engineering and has committed 
itself to providing samples of tubes 
received from prospective suppliers” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Stateme
nts/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml). 
 
Bush (7 October 2002): “Iraq has 
attempted to purchase high-strength 
aluminum tubes and other equipment needed 
for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich 
uranium for nuclear weapons”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002
/10/20021007-8.html). 
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Bush (28 January 2003): “Our intelligence 
sources tell us that he [Saddam Hussein] has 
attempted to purchase high-strength 
aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear 
weapons production” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003
/01/20030128-19.html). 
 
 
Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “Intercepted communications from 
mid-2000 through last summer show 
that Iraq front companies sought to 
buy machines that can be used to 
balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of 
these companies also had been 
involved in a failed effort in 2001 to 
smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq”. 
• “Saddam Hussein ... has made 
repeated covert attempts to acquire 
high-specification aluminum tubes 
from 11 different countries, even 
after inspections resumed 
[inspections resumed on 27 
November 2002]. … Most U.S. 
experts think they [the aluminum 
tubes] are intended to serve as rotors 
in centrifuges used to enrich 
uranium. Other experts [from the 
INR and the DOE], and the Iraqis 
themselves, argue that they are really 
to produce the rocket bodies for a 
conventional weapon, a multiple 
INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts 
to Acquire Aluminum Tubes, cited in 
the classified version of the NIE (1 
October 2002): “Some of the specialized 
but dual-use items being sought are, by all 
indications, bound for Iraq's missile 
program. Other cases are ambiguous, such 
as that of a planned magnet-production line 
whose suitability for centrifuge operations 
remains unknown. Some efforts involve 
non-controlled industrial material and 
equipment – including a variety of 
machine tools – and are troubling because 
they would help establish the infrastructure 
for a renewed nuclear program. But such 
efforts (which began well before the 
inspectors departed) are not clearly linked 
to a nuclear end-use”  
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
 
ElBaradei (14 February 2003): “In the 
course of an inspection conducted in 
connection with the aluminium tube 
investigation, IAEA inspectors found a 
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rocket launcher. Let me tell you what 
is not controversial about these 
tubes. First, all the experts who have 
analyzed the tubes in our possession 
agree that they can be adapted for 
centrifuge use” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releas
es/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
number of documents relevant to 
transactions aimed at the procurement of 
carbon fibre, a dual-use material used by 
Iraq in its past clandestine uranium 
enrichment programme for the 
manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our 
review of these documents suggests that 
the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not 
intended for enrichment purposes, as the 
specifications of the material appear not to 
be consistent with those needed for 
manufacturing rotor tubes. In addition, we 
have carried out follow-up inspections, 
during which we have been able to observe 
the use of such carbon fibre in non-
nuclear-related applications and to take 
samples”  
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Stateme
nts/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml). 
 
 ElBaradei (7 March 2003):  
 
• “With regard to aluminium tubes, 
the IAEA has conducted a thorough 
investigation of Iraq’s attempts to 
purchase large quantities of high-
strength aluminium tubes. As 
previously reported, Iraq has 
maintained that these aluminium 
tubes were sought for rocket 
production. Extensive field 
investigation and document 
analysis have failed to uncover any 
evidence that Iraq intended to use 
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these 81mm tubes for any project 
other than the reverse engineering 
of rockets”.  
• “The Iraqi decision-making process 
with regard to the design of these 
rockets was well documented. Iraq 
has provided copies of design 
documents, procurement records, 
minutes of committee meetings and 
supporting data and samples. A 
thorough analysis of this 
information, together with 
information gathered from 
interviews with Iraqi personnel, has 
allowed the IAEA to develop a 
coherent picture of attempted 
purchases and intended usage of 
the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well 
as the rationale behind the changes 
in the tolerances”. 
• “Drawing on this information, the 
IAEA has learned that the original 
tolerances for the 81mm tubes were 
set prior to 1987, and were based 
on physical measurements taken 
from a small number of imported 
rockets in Iraq’s possession. Initial 
attempts to reverse engineer the 
rockets met with little success. 
Tolerances were adjusted during 
the following years as part of 
ongoing efforts to revitalize the 
project and improve operational 
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efficiency. The project languished 
for long periods during this time 
and became the subject of several 
committees, which resulted in 
specification and tolerance 
changes on each occasion”. 
• “Based on available evidence, the 
IAEA team has concluded that 
Iraq’s efforts to import these 
aluminium tubes were not likely to 
have been related to the 
manufacture of centrifuges and, 
moreover, that it was highly 
unlikely that Iraq could have 
achieved the considerable re-
design needed to use them in a 
revived centrifuge programme”. 
• “there is no indication that Iraq has 
attempted to import aluminium 
tubes for use in centrifuge 
enrichment. Moreover, even had 
Iraq pursued such a plan, it would 
have encountered practical 
difficulties in manufacturing 
centrifuges out of the aluminium 
tubes in question”  
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/el
baradei-7mar03.pdf). 
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Cheney (20 September 2002): “We now 
have irrefutable evidence that he [Saddam 
Hussein] has once again set up and 
reconstituted his program to take uranium, 
to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that 
it will function as the base material as a 
nuclear weapon” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/claims_facts
_noweapons.php). 
 
 
 
 
NIE – classified version (1 October 2002): 
“Uranium Acquisition. Iraq retains 
approximately two-and-a-half tons of 2.5 
percent enriched uranium oxide, which the 
IAEA permits. This low-enriched material 
could be used as feed material to produce 
enough HEU [highly enriched uranium] for 
about two nuclear weapons. The use of 
enriched feed material also would reduce the 
initial number of centrifuges that Baghdad 
would need by about half. Iraq could divert 
this material – the IAEA inspects it only 
once a year – and enrich it to weapons grade 
before a subsequent inspection discovered it 
was missing. The IAEA last inspected this 
material in late January 2002” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
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NIE – classified version (1 October 2002):  
• “A foreign government service 
reported that as of early 2001, Niger 
INR, cited in the classified version of the 
NIE (1 October 2002): “the claims of 
Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa 
are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious” 
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planned to send several tons of “pure 
uranium” (probably yellowcake [A 
refined form of natural uranium]) to 
Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and 
Iraq reportedly were still working 
out arrangements for this deal, which 
could be for up to 500 tons of 
yellowcake. We do not know the 
status of this arrangement”. 
• “Reports indicate Iraq also has 
sought uranium ore from Somalia 
and possibly the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo” 
• “We cannot confirm whether Iraq 
succeeded in acquiring uranium ore 
and/or yellowcake from these 
sources [Niger, Somalia and Congo]. 
Reports suggest Iraq is shifting from 
domestic mining and milling of 
uranium to foreign acquisition. Iraq 
possesses significant phosphate 
deposits, from which uranium had 
been chemically extracted before 
Operation Desert Storm. Intelligence 
information on whether nuclear-
related phosphate mining and/or 
processing has been reestablished is 
inconclusive, however”. 
• “Most agencies believe that 
Saddam's personal interest in and 
Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain 
high-strength aluminum tubes for 
centrifuge rotors – as well as Iraq's 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
 
ElBaradei (7 March 2003):  
 
• “With regard to Uranium 
Acquisition, the IAEA has made 
progress in its investigation into 
reports that Iraq sought to buy 
uranium from Niger in recent years. 
The investigation was centred on 
documents provided by a number 
of States that pointed to an 
agreement between Niger and Iraq 
for the sale of uranium between 
1999 and 2001”. 
• “The IAEA has discussed these 
reports with the Governments of 
Iraq and Niger, both of which have 
denied that any such activity took 
place. For its part, Iraq has 
provided the IAEA with a 
comprehensive explanation of its 
relations with Niger, and has 
described a visit by an Iraqi official 
to a number of African countries, 
including Niger, in February 1999, 
which Iraq thought might have 
given rise to the reports. The IAEA 
was also able to review 
correspondence coming from 
various bodies of the Government 
of Niger, and to compare the form, 
format, contents and signatures of 
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attempts to acquire magnets, high-
speed balancing machines, and 
machine tools – provide compelling 
evidence that Saddam is 
reconstituting a uranium enrichment 
effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons 
program (DOE agrees that 
reconstitution of the nuclear 
program is underway but assesses 
that the tubes probably are not part 
of the program)”  
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ir
aq-wmd.html). 
 
that correspondence with those of 
the alleged procurement-related 
documentation”. 
• “Based on thorough analysis, the 
IAEA has concluded, with the 
concurrence of outside experts, that 
these documents – which formed 
the basis for the reports of recent 
uranium transactions between Iraq 
and Niger – are in fact not 
authentic. We have therefore 
concluded that these specific 
allegations are unfounded”  
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/el
baradei-7mar03.pdf). 
 
Rumsfeld (29 January 2003): “His 
[Saddam Hussein’s] regime has the design 
for a nuclear weapon; it was working on 
several different methods of enriching 
uranium, and recently was discovered 
seeking significant quantities of uranium 
from Africa” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transc
ript.aspx?TranscriptID=1349). 
 
ElBaradei (7 March 2003): “there is no 
indication that Iraq has attempted to import 
uranium since 1990”  
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei
-7mar03.pdf). 
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Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials 
negotiated with firms in Romania, 
India, Russia and Slovenia for the 
purchase of a magnet production 
plant. Iraq wanted the plant to 
produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 
grams. That's the same weight as the 
magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge 
program before the Gulf War. This 
incident linked with the tubes is 
another indicator of Iraq's attempt to 
reconstitute its nuclear weapons 
program”. 
• “We also have intelligence from 
multiple sources that Iraq is 
attempting to acquire magnets and 
high-speed balancing machines; both 
items can be used in a gas centrifuge 
program to enrich uranium” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releas
es/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
ElBaradei (7 March 2003):  
 
• “With respect to reports about 
Iraq’s efforts to import high-
strength permanent magnets – or to 
achieve the capability for 
producing such magnets – for use 
in a centrifuge enrichment 
programme, I should note that, 
since 1998, Iraq has purchased 
high-strength magnets for various 
uses. Iraq has declared inventories 
of magnets of twelve different 
designs. The IAEA has verified that 
previously acquired magnets have 
been used for missile guidance 
systems, industrial machinery, 
electricity meters and field 
telephones. Through visits to 
research and production sites, 
reviews of engineering drawings 
and analyses of sample magnets, 
IAEA experts familiar with the use 
of such magnets in centrifuge 
enrichment have verified that none 
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Part Five 
The Iraq War Rationale: Terrorism Connections  
 
The Key Belief Statement  
Rice (25 September 2002): “there are contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. … there clearly are 
contacts between al-Qaida and Iraq that can be documented. There clearly is testimony that … 
there's a relationship here” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec02/rice_9-
25.html). 
File 
Type 
Corroborating Assertions  
 
Counter Assertions   
Bush (22 March 2002): “a nightmare 
scenario, of course, would be if a terrorist 
organization, such as al Qaeda were to link up 
with a barbaric regime such as Iraq and, 
thereby, in essence, possess weapons of mass 
destruction”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
03/20020322-10.html). 
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Cheney (24 March 2002): “We're worried 
about the possible marriage, if you will, on 
the one hand between the terrorist 
organizations and on the other, weapons of 
mass destruction capability, the kind of 
devastating materials that Saddam used 
against his own people in '88”. So this whole 
subject is at a higher level of concern … than 
it was previously” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
Cheney (24 March 2002): “With 
respect to the connections to al-Qaida 
[with Iraq], we haven't been able to 
pin down any connection there” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident
/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
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Rice (8 September 2002):  
 
• “There is certainly evidence that al 
Qaeda people have been in Iraq. There 
is certainly evidence that Saddam 
Hussein cavorts with terrorists”. 
• “it's just more of a picture that is 
emerging that there may well have 
been contacts between al Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein's regime”  
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCR
IPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
CIA (21 June 2002): 
 
• “This Intelligence Assessment 
responds to senior policymaker 
interest in a comprehensive 
assessment of Iraqi regime 
links to al-Qa’ida. Our 
approach is purposefully 
aggressive in seeking to draw 
connections, on the assumption 
that any indication of a 
relationship between these two 
hostile elements could carry 
great dangers to the United 
States”. 
• “Our knowledge of Iraqi links 
to al-Qa’ida still contains 
many critical gaps because of 
limited reporting and the 
questionable reliability of 
many of our sources”. 
• “Some analysts … believe that 
the available signs support a 
conclusion that Iraq has had 
sporadic, wary contacts with 
al-Qa’ida since the mid-1990s, 
rather than a relationship with 
al-Qa’ida that developed over 
time. These analysts would 
contend that mistrust and 
conflicting ideologies and 
goals probably tempered these 
contacts” 
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(http://www.fas.org/irp/congre
ss/2005_cr/CIAreport.062102.
pdf). 
Cheney (8 September 2002):  
 
• “since the operations in Afghanistan – 
we’ve seen al-Qaeda members 
operating physically in Iraq”.    
• “The fact of the matter is, if you look 
at Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda 
organization, on the one hand, and 
Saddam Hussein on the other, while 
they come from different perspectives, 
one’s religiously motivated, the other 
is secular, etc., the fact of the matter is 
they have the same objective: to drive 
the United States out of the Middle 
East, to strike the United States, if at 
all possible. So to suggest there’s not a 
common interest there, I think, would 
be wrong” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel
/bush/meet.htm). 
CIA: Iraq and al-Qa’ida: 
Interpreting a Murky Relationship 
(21 June 2002):  
 
• “our assessment of al-Qa’ida’s 
ties to Iraq rests on a body of 
fragmented, conflicting 
reporting from sources of 
varying reliability”, p. 64. 
• “Reporting shows that 
unknown numbers of al-Qa’ida 
associates fleeing Afghanistan 
since December have used Iraq 
– including the Kurdish areas 
of northern Iraq, Baghdad, and 
other regions – as a safehaven 
and transit area. We lack 
positive indications that 
Baghdad is complicit in this 
activity” 
(http://www.intelligence.senate
.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf), p. 
86.  
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CIA: Iraqi Support for Terrorism 
(September 2002): “The presence of 
al-Qa’ida militants on Iraqi soil poses 
many questions. We are uncertain to 
what extent Baghdad is actively 
complicit in this use of its territory by 
al-Qa’ida operatives for safehaven and 
transit” 
(http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiia
ccuracy.pdf), p. 89. 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): 
 
• “We know that al-Qaeda is operating 
in Iraq today … We also know that 
there have been a number of contacts 
between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the 
years”.  
• “He has incentives to make common 
cause with terrorists. He shares many 
common objectives with groups like 
al-Qaeda, including an antipathy for 
the Saudi royal family and a desire to 
drive the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf 
region. Moreover, if he decided it was 
in his interest to conceal his 
responsibility for an attack on the 
U.S., providing WMD to terrorists 
would be an effective way of doing so” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
 
Brent Scowcroft (15 August 2002): 
“Saddam's strategic objective appears 
to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to 
control oil from the region, or both. 
That clearly poses a real threat to key 
U.S. interests. But there is scant 
evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist 
organizations, and even less to the 
Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's 
goals have little in common with the 
terrorists who threaten us, and there is 
little incentive for him to make 
common cause with them” 
(http://www.opinionjournal.com/edito
rial/feature.html?id=110002133). 
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Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): 
• “They [the Iraqi government] also 
have Al Qaida currently in the 
country”. 
• “There are currently Al Qaida in Iraq” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=284). 
 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): “there is no 
question but that there are al Qaeda in Iraq in 
more than one location. There have been for a 
good long period”  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=287). 
 
Sabri (19 September 2002)1: “Iraq 
has no past, current, or anticipated 
future contact with Osama bin Laden 
and al Qaeda” 
 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR200
6091401545.html).  
 
* The statement comes from a 
clandestine questioning of Sabri by a 
senior CIA officer.  
 
Rice (25 September 2002): “We clearly 
know that there were in the past and have 
been contacts between senior Iraqi officials 
and members of al-Qaida going back for 
actually quite a long time” 
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/internationa
l/july-dec02/rice_9-25.html). 
 
                                                 
1
 “Regarding Iraq’s connections to Al-Qa’ida, the high-level Iraqi official [Naji Sabri] allegedly said 
that Iraq has no past, current, or anticipated future contact with Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida. He 
[Naji Sabri] added that bin Laden was in fact a longtime enemy of Iraq. In contrast to the information 
about WMD, this information was never disseminated at all. It was not used in intelligence reporting 
provided to policymakers and was not disseminated as intelligence reporting for analysts. When asked 
why this information was not disseminated, CIA told the Committee [Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence] that the report did not add anything because it did not provide anything new”, Additional 
Views of Senators Roberts, Hatch, and Chambliss, in Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on 
Post-war Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with 
Pre-war Assessments together with Additional Views (8 September 2006), 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Senate (http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf), p. 143.       
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Bush (25 September 2002): “you can't 
distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam 
when you talk about the war on terror. And so 
it's a comparison that is – I can't make 
because I can't distinguish between the two” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/20020925-1.html). 
 
Bush (26 September 2002): 
• “Each passing day could be the one on 
which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax 
or VX – nerve gas – or some day a 
nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally”.  
• “The regime [Iraqi regime] has long-
standing and continuing ties to 
terrorist organizations. And there are 
al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/09/text/20020926-7.html). 
Brent Scowcroft (15 August 2002): 
“He [Saddam Hussein] is unlikely to 
risk his investment in weapons of 
mass destruction, much less his 
country, by handing such weapons to 
terrorists who would use them for 
their own purposes and leave Baghdad 
as the return address. Threatening to 
use these weapons for blackmail – 
much less their actual use – would 
open him and his entire regime to a 
devastating response by the U.S. 
While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is 
above all a power-hungry survivor” 
(http://www.opinionjournal.com/edito
rial/feature.html?id=110002133). 
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Rumsfeld (26 September 2002):  
• “The knowledge that the intelligence 
community, the shared intelligence 
information among the coalition 
members, has of the al Qaeda 
relationship with Iraq is evolving. It's 
based on a lot of different types of 
sources of varying degrees of 
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reliability. Some of it, admittedly, 
comes from detainees, which has been 
helpful, and particularly some high-
ranking detainees [Al-Libi]”. 
• “Since we began after September 11th, 
we do have solid evidence of the 
presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, 
including some that have been in 
Baghdad. We have what we consider 
to be very reliable reporting of senior 
level contacts going back a decade, 
and of possible chemical and 
biological agent training. And when I 
say contacts, I mean between Iraq and 
al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts 
have been increasing since 1998”. 
• Question: “Are there any indications 
that senior al Qaeda are in Baghdad or 
Iraq”?  
• Rumsfeld: “the problem with it is that 
when intelligence is gathered, it's 
gathered at a moment, and then that 
moment passes, and then there's the 
next moment and the moment after 
that. We certainly have evidence of 
senior al Qaeda who have been in 
Baghdad in recent periods. Whether 
they're currently there or not one 
never knows, because they're moving 
targets”. 
• Rumsfeld: “although we know there 
are al Qaeda in the country, and we 
know they've discussed with Iraq safe 
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haven. Now whether the ones that are 
in the country are there under some 
sort of grant of safe haven or not is – 
happens to be a piece of intelligence 
that either we don't have or we don't 
want to talk about”. 
• Question: “you said, I think, that you 
have solid evidence of the presence of 
al Qaeda in Iraq, including some in 
Baghdad. And when you said that, I 
wasn't clear what time frame you were 
referring to, whether or not that is 
current. Do you currently believe 
they're in Baghdad, or are you only 
talking about al Qaeda in the North in 
Kurdish-controlled areas”?  
• Rumsfeld: “Specifically not, with 
respect to the last part of your 
question. We're not only talking about 
al Qaeda in the northern part”. 
• Question: “So you currently believe 
there are al Qaeda in Saddam Hussein-
controlled areas”.   
• Rumsfeld: “I thought I said it 
precisely the way I wanted to. I can't 
know whether, as we sit here talking, 
the information that was accurate 
when we got it is still accurate today” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/T
ranscript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669). 
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Rumsfeld (27 September 2002): “we ended 
up with five or six sentences that were bullet-
proof. … they're factual, they're exactly 
accurate. They [the thoughts or intelligence 
information] demonstrate that there are in fact 
al Qaeda in Iraq. But they're not 
photographs, they are not beyond a 
reasonable doubt, they in some cases are 
assessments from a limited number of 
sources. They're in some cases hard 
information that were we to release it would 
reveal a method of gathering it. And it seems 
to me that if our quest is for proof positive we 
probably will be left somewhat unfulfilled” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=289). 
 
  
Bush (28 September 2002):  
• “The regime has long-standing and 
continuing ties to terrorist groups, and 
there are al Qaeda terrorists inside 
Iraq”. 
• “each passing day could be the one on 
which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax 
or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear 
weapon to a terrorist group” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/09/20020928.html). 
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Bush (2 October 2002): “Countering Iraq's 
threat is also a central commitment on the war 
on terror”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021002-7.html). 
 
Bush (7 October 2002):  
 
• “We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda 
terrorist network share a common 
enemy – the United States of 
America”. 
• “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have 
had high-level contacts that go back a 
decade”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/10/20021007-8.html).    
 
Tenet (7 October 2002): “We have solid 
reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq 
and al-Qa'ida going back a decade” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/10/dci100
702.html). 
Tenet (7 October 2002): “Our 
understanding of the relationship 
between Iraq and al- Qa'ida is 
evolving and is based on sources of 
varying reliability. Some of the 
information we have received comes 
from detainees, including some of 
high rank” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/10/
dci100702.html). 
 
Bush (14 October 2002): “This is a man 
[Saddam Hussein] that we know has had 
connections with al Qaeda. This is a man 
who, in my judgment, would like to use al 
Qaeda as a forward army. And this is a man 
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that we must deal with for the sake of peace, 
for the sake of our children's peace” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021014-3.html). 
Wolfowitz (16 October 2002): “We are still 
assembling the picture, which we know is 
incomplete, of the Iraqi relationship with al 
Qaeda. If that is true about the past, think how 
much more true it is about the future” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=295). 
 
 
Bush (7 November 2002): “he [Saddam 
Hussein] is dealing with al Qaeda” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
11/text/20021107-2.html). 
 
 
Rumsfeld (14 November 2002): “our 
understanding of the relationship between Iraq 
and al Qaeda is still developing. That there is 
no question but that there have been 
interactions between the Iraqi government, 
Iraqi officials, and al Qaeda operatives. They 
have occurred over a span of some eight or 
ten years to our knowledge. There are 
currently al Qaeda in Iraq” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcri
pt.aspx?TranscriptID=3283). 
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Cheney (2 December 2002): “His regime has 
had high-level contacts with al Qaeda going 
back a decade and has provided training to al 
Qaeda terrorists” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
12/20021202-4.html). 
 
Powell (27 January 2003): “we have seen 
contacts and connections between the Iraqi 
regime and terrorist organizations, to include 
al-Qaida. As we have been able to focus on 
this more and look back in time, I think we're 
more confident of that assessment and we see 
no reason not to believe that such contacts 
and the presence of al-Qaida elements or 
individuals in Iraq is a reasonable 
assumption, and we have some basis for that 
assumption”  
(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NS
AEBB80/new/doc%2021/Briefing%20on%20
the%20Iraq%20Weapons%20Inspectors'%20
Report.htm).   
 
Bush (28 January 2003): “Evidence from 
intelligence sources, secret communications, 
and statements by people now in custody 
reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects 
terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. 
Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could 
provide one of his hidden weapons to 
terrorists, or help them develop their own” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030128-19.html). 
 
CIA: Iraqi Support for Terrorism (29 
January 2003): “Saddam Husayn and 
Usama bin Ladin are far from being 
natural partners” 
(http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ph
aseiiaccuracy.pdf), p. 64.   
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CIA (29 January 2003): “This 
paper's conclusions – especially 
regarding the difficult and elusive 
question of the exact nature of Iraq's 
relations with al-Qaida – are based on 
currently available information that is 
at times contradictory and derived 
from sources of varying degrees of 
reliability” 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cr
eports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf). 
Cheney (30 January 2003): “His regime aids 
and protects terrorists, including members of 
al Qaeda” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030130-16.html).   
 
Cheney (31 January 2003): “His regime aids 
and protects terrorists, including members of 
al Qaeda” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030131-13.html). 
 
 
Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “We know members of both 
organizations [Al-Qaeda and Iraqi 
Intelligence Services] met repeatedly 
and have met at least eight times at 
very senior levels since the early 
1990s. In 1996, a foreign security 
service tells us, that bin Laden met 
with a senior Iraqi intelligence official 
in Khartoum, and later met the director 
of the Iraqi intelligence service”. 
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• “Baghdad has an agent in the most 
senior levels of the radical 
organization, Ansar al-Islam, that 
controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 
this agent offered Al Qaida safe haven 
in the region. After we swept Al Qaida 
from Afghanistan, some of its 
members accepted this safe haven. 
They remain their [there] today”. 
• “Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist 
network headed by Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi, an associated in collaborator 
of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida 
lieutenants”. 
• “Zarqawi's activities are not confined 
to this small corner of north east Iraq. 
He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 
for medical treatment, staying in the 
capital of Iraq for two months while he 
recuperated to fight another day. 
During this stay, nearly two dozen 
extremists converged on Baghdad and 
established a base of operations there. 
These Al Qaida affiliates, based in 
Baghdad, now coordinate the 
movement of people, money and 
supplies into and throughout Iraq for 
his network, and they've now been 
operating freely in the capital for more 
than eight months”. 
• “From the late 1990s until 2001, the 
Iraqi embassy in Pakistan played the 
role of liaison to the Al Qaida 
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organization” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
Tenet (11 February 2003): “I don't know 
that [whether the Zarqawi terrorist network is 
under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi 
government], sir, but I know that there's a 
safe haven that's been provided to this 
network in Baghdad. … what we've said is 
Zarqawi and this large number of operatives 
are in Baghdad” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/
09/20060915-4.html). 
 
 
Cheney (16 March 2003):  
 
• “we know that he has a long-standing 
relationship with various terrorist 
groups, including the al-Qaeda 
organization”. 
• “But we also have to address the 
question of where might these 
terrorists acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, chemical weapons, 
biological weapons, nuclear weapons? 
And Saddam Hussein becomes a 
prime suspect in that regard” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel
/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm). 
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Tenet (17 September 2002): “There is 
evidence that Iraq provided al-Qa’ida with 
various kinds of training – combat, bomb-
making, and chemical, biological radiological 
and nuclear. Although Saddam did not 
endorse al-Qa’ida’s overall agenda and was 
suspicious of Islamist movements in general, 
he was apparently not averse, under certain 
circumstances, to enhancing Bin Ladin’s 
operational capabilities. As with much of the 
information on the overall relationship, 
details on training are second-hand or from 
sources of varying reliability” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFsources_c
laims_training/2002_02_22_SenatePostwarRe
port.pdf). 
 
* Tenet is referring to the so-called evidence 
taken coercively from Al-Libi. 
DIA (22 February 2002):  
• “This is the first report from 
Ibn al-Shaykh [al-Libi, a senior 
Al-Qaeda operational planner] 
in which he claims Iraq 
assisted al-Qaida’s CBRN 
[chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear] 
efforts. However, he lacks 
specific details on the Iraqis 
involved, the CBRN materials 
associated with the assistance, 
and the location where 
training occurred. It is 
possible he does not know any 
further details; it is more likely 
this individual is intentionally 
misleading the debriefers. Ibn 
al-Shaykh has been undergoing 
debriefs for several weeks and 
may be describing scenarios to 
the debriefers that he knows 
will retain their interest”. 
• “Saddam’s regime is intensely 
secular and is wary of Islamic 
revolutionary movements. 
Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely 
to provide assistance to a 
group it cannot control” 
(http://levin.senate.gov/newsro
om/supporting/2005/DIAletter.
102605.pdf). 
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 * The Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (8 September 2006): 
“The Committee [SSCI] noted that 
after the war, a key detainee (al-Libi) 
had recanted his claim that al-Qa’ida 
members travelled to Iraq for chemical 
and biological weapons training. The 
Committee noted that no other 
reporting found in Iraq after that war 
began had corroborated the CBW 
[chemical and biological weapons] 
training reports” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFso
urces_claims_training/2002_02_22_S
enatePostwarReport.pdf), p. 79. 
Further information is available from 
page 79 thereafter. 
 
Rice (25 September 2002): “We know too 
that several of the detainees, in particular 
some high ranking detainees [Al-Libi], have 
said that Iraq provided some training to al-
Qaida in chemical weapons development” 
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/internationa
l/july-dec02/rice_9-25.html). 
 
 
DIA (28 February 2002): “Iraq has 
been repeatedly accused of aiding al-
Qa’ida’s chemical and biological 
acquisition efforts. Despite recent 
information from a senior al-Qa’ida 
trainer [Al-Libi] currently in custody, 
all-source intelligence has not 
confirmed Iraq’s involvement. Iraq is 
unlikely to have provided bin Ladin 
any useful CB [chemical or biological] 
knowledge or assistance” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFso
urces_claims_training/2002_02_22_S
enatePostwarReport.pdf).   
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Rumsfeld (26 September 2002):  
• “We have what we believe to be 
credible information that Iraq and al 
Qaeda have discussed safe haven 
opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal 
nonaggression discussions. We have 
what we consider to be credible 
evidence that al Qaeda leaders have 
sought contacts in Iraq who could help 
them acquire weapon of – weapons of 
mass destruction capabilities. We do 
have – I believe it's one report 
indicating that Iraq provided 
unspecified training relating to 
chemical and/or biological matters for 
al Qaeda members. There is, I'm told, 
also some other information of varying 
degrees of reliability that supports that 
conclusion of their cooperation”. 
• Question: “Do you know what the 
specific kind of training is without 
telling us”? 
• Rumsfeld: “That I'm not – I don't 
have high confidence in” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/T
ranscript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669). 
CIA (21 June 2002): 
 
• “Some analysts … believe that 
the available signs support a 
conclusion that Iraq has had 
sporadic, wary contacts with 
al-Qa’ida since the mid-1990s, 
rather than a relationship with 
al-Qa’ida that developed over 
time. These analysts would 
contend that mistrust and 
conflicting ideologies and 
goals probably tempered these 
contacts and severely limited 
the opportunities for 
cooperation. These analysts 
also do not rule out that 
Baghdad sought and obtained a 
nonaggression agreement or 
made limited offers of 
cooperation, training, or 
safehaven (ultimately 
uncorroborated or withdrawn) 
in an effort to manipulate, 
penetrate, or otherwise keep 
tabs on al-Qa’ida or selected 
operatives”. 
• “The most ominous indications 
of Iraqi-al-Qa’ida cooperation 
involve Bin Ladin’s chemical, 
biological, radiological, and 
nuclear (CBRN) ambitions. 
Although Iraq historically has 
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tended to hold closely its 
strategic weapons experts and 
resources, Baghdad could have 
offered training or other 
support that fell well short of 
its most closely”  
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congre
ss/2005_cr/CIAreport.062102.
pdf). 
 
Bush (7 October 2002): "We've learned that 
Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-
making and poisons and deadly gases" 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021007-8.html).    
 
DIA (31 July 2002): “It is plausible 
al-Qa’ida attempted to obtain CB 
[chemical or biological] assistance 
from Iraq and Ibn al-Shaykh [al-Libi] 
is sufficiently senior to have access to 
such sensitive information. However, 
Ibn al-Shaykh’s information lacks 
details concerning the individual 
Iraqis involved, the specific CB 
materials associated with the 
assistance and the location where the 
alleged training occurred. The 
information is also second hand, and 
not derived from Ibn al-Shaykh’s 
personal experience” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFso
urces_claims_training/2002_02_22_S
enatePostwarReport.pdf). 
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NIE (November 2002): “We have credible 
reporting that al-Qa’ida leaders sought help 
from Baghdad in acquiring WMD capabilities 
and that Iraq provided training in bomb-
making and according to one detainee [Al-
Libi], in the area of chemical and biological 
agents” 
(http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFsources_c
laims_training/2002_02_22_SenatePostwarRe
port.pdf). 
DIA: Special Analysis (31 July 
2002): “compelling evidence 
demonstrating direct cooperation 
between the government of Iraq and 
al-Qa’ida has not been established, 
despite a large body of anecdotal 
information” 
(http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ph
aseiiaccuracy.pdf), p. 66.   
 
NIE – classified version (1 October 
2002): 
• “As with much of the 
information on the overall 
relationship [between Iraq and 
Al-Qaeda], details on training 
and support are second-hand 
or from sources of varying 
reliability”. 
• “… suggest the involvement of 
Iraq or Iraqi nationals in al-
Qa’ida’s CBW [chemical and 
biological weapons] efforts. 
We [the intelligence 
community] cannot determine, 
however, how many of these 
Iraqi nationals were directed 
by Baghdad or how many of 
the reported plans for CBW 
training or support were 
actually realized”  
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congre
ss/2005_cr/NIE.100202.pdf). 
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CIA (29 January 2003):  
 
• “Iraq … agreed to provide unspecified 
chemical or biological weapons 
training for two al-Qa’ida associates 
beginning in December 2000”. 
 
*This is according to what Al-Libi told his 
interrogators. 
• “Regarding the Iraq-al-Qaida 
relationship, reporting from sources of 
varying reliability points to a number 
of contacts, incidents of training, and 
discussions of Iraqi safehaven for 
Usama bin Ladin and his organization 
dating from the early 1990s” 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cr
eports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf). 
 
 
CIA (29 January 2003): 
 
• “Some of the most ominous 
suggestions of possible Iraqi-
al-Qa’ida cooperation involve 
Bin Ladin’s CBW [Chemical 
and Biological Warfare] 
ambitions. Although Iraq 
historically has guarded 
closely its strategic weapons 
information, experts, and 
resources, Baghdad could have 
offered training or other 
support to al-Qa’ida”. 
• “Most of the reports do not 
make clear whether training 
initiatives offered by Iraqis or 
discussed by the two sides 
[Iraqi and Al-Qaeda sides] 
remained in the planning 
stages or were actually 
implemented”. 
• “In about half of the reports, 
we cannot determine if the 
Iraqi nationals mentioned had 
any relationship with the 
Baghdad government or were 
expatriate or free-lance 
scientists or engineers”. 
• “[The] reporting touches most 
frequently on the topic of Iraqi 
training of al-Qa’ida. Details 
on training range from good 
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reports … [of] varying 
reliability, often the result of 
long and opaque reporting 
chains or discussions of future 
intentions rather than evidence 
of completed training. The 
general pattern that emerges is 
of al-Qa’ida’s enduring 
interest in acquiring CBW 
[Chemical and Biological 
Weapons] expertise from 
Iraq”. 
• “At least … [some] of the 
reports [about Iraq-Al-Qaeda 
relationship] appear based on 
hearsay”. 
• “[some] of the reports are 
simple declarative accusations 
of Iraqi-al-Qa’ida complicity 
with no substantiating detail or 
other information that might 
help us corroborate them” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congre
ss/2005_cr/CIAreport.012903.
pdf). 
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Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “Iraqis continued to visit bin Laden in 
his new home in Afghanistan. A senior 
defector, one of Saddam's former 
intelligence chiefs in Europe, says 
Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan 
sometime in the mid-1990s to provide 
training to Al Qaida members on 
document forgery”. 
• “I can trace the story of a senior 
terrorist operative [Al-Libi] telling 
how Iraq provided training in these 
weapons [WMD] to Al Qaida. 
Fortunately, this operative is now 
detained, and he has told his story. 
This senior Al Qaida terrorist was 
responsible for one of Al Qaida's 
training camps in Afghanistan. His 
information comes first-hand from his 
personal involvement at senior levels 
of Al Qaida. He says bin Laden and 
his top deputy in Afghanistan, 
deceased Al Qaida leader Muhammad 
Atif (ph), did not believe that Al Qaida 
labs in Afghanistan were capable 
enough to manufacture these chemical 
or biological agents. They needed to 
go somewhere else. They had to look 
outside of Afghanistan for help. Where 
did they go? Where did they look? 
They went to Iraq. The support that 
(inaudible) describes included Iraq 
CIA  (29 January 2003): “Iraq – 
acting on the request of al-Qa’ida 
militant Abu Abdullah, who was 
Muhammad Atif’s emissary – agreed 
to provide unspecified chemical or 
biological weapons training for two al-
Qa’ida associates beginning in 
December 2000. These two 
individuals departed for Iraq but did 
not return, so al-Libi was not in a 
position to know if any training had 
taken place” 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cr
eports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf). 
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offering chemical or biological 
weapons training for two Al Qaida 
associates beginning in December 
2000. He says that a militant known as 
Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had been 
sent to Iraq several times between 
1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring 
poisons and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi 
(ph) characterized the relationship he 
forged with Iraqi officials as 
successful” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
Bush (6 February 2003): “Saddam Hussein 
has longstanding, direct and continuing ties 
to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi 
intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least 
eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent 
bomb-making and document forgery experts 
to work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided 
al Qaeda with chemical and biological 
weapons training” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
02/text/20030206-17.html).  
 
Bush (8 February 2003): “Saddam Hussein 
has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to 
terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi 
intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least 
eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent 
bomb-making and document forgery experts 
to work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided 
al Qaeda with chemical and biological 
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weapons training. And an al Qaeda operative 
was sent to Iraq several times in the late 1990s 
for help in acquiring poisons and gases” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
02/20030208.html). 
Tenet (11 February 2003): “Iraq has in the 
past provided training in document forgery 
and bomb-making to al-Qa'ida. It also 
provided training in poisons and gasses to two 
al-Qa'ida associates; one of these associates 
characterized the relationship he forged with 
Iraqi officials as successful” 
(https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-
testimony/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html). 
 
Bush (6 March 2003):  
• “He [Saddam Hussein] has trained and 
financed al Qaeda-type organizations 
before, al Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations”. 
• “He provides funding and training and 
safe haven to terrorists – terrorists who 
would willingly use weapons of mass 
destruction against America and other 
peace-loving countries”. 
• “It's a country [Iraq] that trains 
terrorists, a country that could arm 
terrorists” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/03/20030306-8.html). 
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Rice (9 March 2003): “The strongest link of 
– of Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda … there are 
a lot of tantalizing meetings that – with people 
who were involved in 9/11. But the strongest 
links to al Qaeda are really two. First of all, a 
poisons master named Al Zakawi who has his 
own network in Baghdad – or in – in Iraq, not 
in the north of Iraq where Saddam Hussein is 
arguably not in control but in central Iraq … a 
man who is spreading poisons throughout 
Europe. And secondly, a very strong link to 
training al Qaeda in chemical and biological 
weapons techniques. We know from a 
detainee [Al-Libi] that – the head of training 
for al Qaeda, that they sought help in 
developing chemical and biological weapons 
because they weren't doing very well on their 
own. They sought it in Iraq. They received the 
help” 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/10/
ftn/main543382.shtml?tag=contentMain;conte
ntBody). 
 
 
Bush (17 March 2003): “it [Iraqi regime] has 
aided, trained and harbored terrorists, 
including operatives of al Qaeda” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
03/20030317-7.html). 
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Cheney (9 December 2001): It has “been 
pretty well confirmed, that he [Mohammed 
Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a 
senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service 
in Czechoslovakia last April, several months 
before the attack [9/11]” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20011209.html). 
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Cheney (24 March 2002): “We discovered, 
and it's since been public, the allegation that 
one of the lead hijackers, Mohamed Atta, had, 
in fact, met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague, 
but we've not been able yet from our 
perspective to nail down a close tie between 
the al-Qaida organization and Saddam 
Hussein. We'll continue to look for it”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
CIA (21 June 2002): 
 
• “Reporting is contradictory on 
hijacker Mohammad Atta’s 
alleged trip to Prague and 
meeting with an Iraqi 
intelligence officer, and we 
have not verified his travels”.   
• “Some analysts concur with 
the assessment that intelligence 
reporting provides ‘no 
conclusive evidence of 
cooperation [between Iraq and 
Al-Qaeda] on specific terrorist 
operations’” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congre
ss/2005_cr/CIAreport.062102.
pdf). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIA: Special Analysis (31 July 
2002): “There are significant 
information gaps in this reporting that 
render the issue impossible to prove or 
disprove with available information. It 
is unclear why the source did not 
report on the meeting in April or May. 
Atta was unknown at the time but he 
would have been significant as a 
contact of al-Ani [the Iraqi 
intelligence chief in Prague], who was 
under Czech scrutiny at the time. 
Also, there is no photographic, 
immigration or other documentary 
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Cheney (8 September 2002): “there has been 
reporting that suggests that there have been a 
number of contacts over the years. We’ve 
seen in connection with the hijackers, of 
course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead 
hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a 
number of occasions. And on at least one 
occasion, we have reporting that places him 
in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence 
official a few months before the attack on the 
World Trade Center. … It’s credible. But, you 
know, I think a way to put it would be it’s 
unconfirmed at this point”  
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/
meet.htm). 
 
 
CIA (29 January 2003): 
 
•  “Some information asserts 
that [Muhammad] Atta met 
with Prague IIS [Iraqi 
Intelligence Service] chief 
Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir 
al-Ani; but the most reliable 
reporting to date casts doubt 
on this possibility”.  
• “The other two alleged visits 
[of Muhammad Atta] occurred 
on 26 October 1999 and on 9 
April 2001. The data 
surrounding these visits is 
complicated and sometimes 
contradictory. A CIA and FBI 
review of intelligence and 
open-source reporting leads us 
to question the information … 
[which] claimed that Atta met 
al-Ani” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congre
ss/2005_cr/CIAreport.012903.
pdf). 
 
CIA: Iraqi Support for Terrorism 
(January 2003): “We have no 
credible information that Baghdad was 
complicit in the attacks on the 
Pentagon or the World Trade Center 
on 11 September or any other al-
Qa’ida strike” 
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(http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiia
ccuracy.pdf), p. 94. 
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Part Six 
The Iraqi Threat  
 
Corroborating Assertions   Counter Assertions   
Cheney (11 December 2001):  
• “he [Saddam Hussein] is clearly a 
threat to his neighbors”. 
• “The policy towards Iraq clearly is 
going to evolve over time. But they 
[the Iraqi government] remain very 
much an area of concern for us 
because of the threat that Saddam 
Hussein has represented in the past 
and does in the future” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident
/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20011211.html). 
Cohen (10 January 2001):  
 
• “Saddam Hussein's forces are in a 
state where he cannot pose a threat to 
his neighbors at this point. We have 
been successful, through the 
sanctions regime, to really shut off 
most of the revenue that will be going 
to build his – rebuild his military”. 
• "Now he can cheat and smuggle on 
the margins, and apply that [the oil-
for-food program revenue] to his 
military. But I will tell you his 
military is not in a position – thanks 
to what we've been doing with our 
British friends, and thanks to the 
sanctions, he's not in a position to 
threaten his neighbors at this point" 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/sp
eech.aspx?speechid=1093). 
 
Cheney (15 February 2002): “Iraq is clearly 
… very much of concern” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020215.html). 
Cohen (11 January 2001):  
 
• “We have successfully contained 
Saddam Hussein. He does not pose a 
threat to his neighbors at this point, 
and I don't believe will be in a 
position to do so”. 
• “We have contained him in a way 
that he has not been able to rebuild 
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his military and he's not been able to 
threaten his neighbors. That 
containment strategy and policy has 
worked” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/sp
eech.aspx?speechid=251). 
Cheney (17 March 2002): “it's important 
that we find a way to deal with that emerging 
threat”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020317.html). 
Tenet (7 February 2001): 
• “There are still constraints on 
Saddam’s power. His economic 
infrastructure is in long-term decline, 
and his ability to project power 
outside Iraq’s borders is severely 
limited”. 
• “His military is roughly half the size 
it was during the Gulf War and 
remains under a tight arms embargo. 
He has trouble efficiently moving 
forces and supplies – a direct result 
of sanctions. These difficulties were 
demonstrated most recently by his 
deployment of troops to western Iraq 
last fall, which were hindered by a 
shortage of spare parts and transport 
capability” 
(https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-
testimony/2001/UNCLASWWT_020
72001.html). 
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Cheney (29 August 2002): “What we must 
not do in the face of a mortal threat [the Iraqi 
threat] is give in to wishful thinking or to 
willful blindness” 
 (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
08/20020829-5.html). 
 
Rice (29 July 2001): “We are able to keep 
arms from him [Saddam Hussein]. His 
military forces have not been rebuilt” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0
107/29/le.00.html). 
 
Cheney (8 September 2002): “we believe 
that he [Saddam Hussein] is a danger, a 
fundamental danger, not only for the region 
but potentially the United States, as well” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/
meet.htm). 
 
Bush (4 September 2002): Saddam Hussein 
is “a serious threat to the United States, a 
serious threat to the world” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/20020904-1.html). 
Brent Scowcroft (15 August 2002): “There 
is little evidence to indicate that the United 
States itself is an object of his [Saddam 
Hussein’s] aggression” 
(http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/fea
ture.html?id=110002133). 
 
Rice (8 September 2002): “he poses a clear 
threat to the United States. He poses a threat 
because he is trying to acquire the most 
terrible weapons, because he is not a status-
quo actor” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0
209/08/le.00.html). 
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Bush (12 September 2002): “the logic and 
the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam 
Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering 
danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope 
against the evidence” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/20020912-1.html#). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002):  
• “The question facing us is this: what 
is the responsible course of action for 
our country? Do you believe it is our 
responsibility to wait for a nuclear, 
chemical or biological 9/11? Or is it 
the responsibility of free people to do 
something now – to take steps to deal 
with the threat before we are 
attacked”? 
• “I suspect, that in retrospect, most of 
those investigating 9/11 would have 
supported preventive action to pre-
empt that threat, if it had been 
possible to see it coming. Well, if one 
were to compare the scraps of 
information the government had 
before September 11th to the volumes 
of information the government has 
today about Iraq’s pursuit of WMD, 
his use of those weapons, his record of 
aggression and his consistent hostility 
toward the United States – and then 
factor in our country’s demonstrated 
vulnerability after September 11th – 
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the case the President made should be 
clear”.  
• “no terrorist state poses a greater and 
more immediate threat to the security 
of our people, and the stability of the 
world, than the regime of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq” 
• “He [Saddam Hussein] has repeatedly 
threatened the U.S. and its allies with 
terror – once declaring that ‘every 
Iraqi become a missile’”. 
• “He [Saddam Hussein] has said, in no 
uncertain terms, that he would use 
weapons of mass destruction against 
the United States”. 
• “But those who raise questions about 
the [Iraqi] nuclear threat need to focus 
on the immediate threat from 
biological weapons”. 
• “The case against Iraq does not 
depend on an Iraqi link to 9/11. The 
issue for the U.S. is not vengeance, 
retribution or retaliation – it is 
whether the Iraqi regime poses a 
growing danger to the safety and 
security of our people, and of the 
world. There is no question but that it 
does”. 
• “If, in 1998, Saddam Hussein posed 
the grave threat that President Clinton 
correctly described, then he most 
certainly poses a vastly greater 
danger today”. 
  69 
• “Every month that goes by, his 
[Saddam Hussein’s] WMD programs 
are progressing and he moves closer 
to his goal of possessing the capability 
to strike our population, and our allies, 
and hold them hostage to blackmail” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): 
• “Saddam Hussein regime is a grave 
and gathering danger. It's a danger we 
do not have the option to ignore”.  
• “But we should be just as concerned 
about the immediate threat from 
biological weapons. Iraq has these 
weapons. They're simpler to deliver 
and even more readily transferred to 
terrorist networks, who could allow 
Iraq to deliver them without Iraq's 
fingerprints”. 
• “If you want an idea of the 
devastation Iraq could wreck on our 
country with a biological attack, 
consider the recent unclassified Dark 
Winter exercise conducted by Johns 
Hopkins University. It simulated a 
biological WMD attack in which 
terrorists released smallpox in three 
separate locations in the U.S. Within 
two months, the worst case estimate 
indicated up to 1 million people could 
be dead and another 2 million 
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infected. Cut it in half, cut it into a 
quarter, it is not a nice picture” 
• “He [Saddam Hussein] threatens the 
regimes of his neighboring countries 
frequently”. 
• “Post-9/11, we view Saddam Hussein 
as a threat to this country” 
• “he has said in no uncertain terms that 
he would use weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=284). 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): 
• “If you want an idea of the 
devastation Iraq could wreak on our 
country with a biological attack, 
consider the recent Dark Winter 
exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins 
University. It simulated a biological 
weapon attack in which terrorists 
release smallpox in three separate 
locations in the United States. Within 
two months, the worst-case estimate 
indicated that 1 million Americans 
could be dead and another 2 million 
infected. It's not a pretty picture. Cut it 
in half. Cut it by three-quarters. It's 
still a disaster”.  
• “There are a number of terrorist states 
pursuing weapons of mass destruction 
– Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, just 
to name a few – but no terrorist state 
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poses a greater or more immediate 
threat to the security of our people 
than the regime of Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq”. 
• “his [Saddam Hussein’s] regime is a 
grave and gathering danger. It's a 
danger that we do not have the option 
to ignore”  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=287). 
Senator Hutchinson (19 September 2002): 
“I believe that Saddam Hussein, in fact, does 
present a clear and present danger not only to 
the security of the United States but to his 
region and to the security of other nations in 
that part of the world”  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=287). 
Nancy Pelosi: (3 October 2002): “As the 
ranking Democrat on the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I have seen no 
evidence or intelligence that suggests that 
Iraq indeed poses an imminent threat to our 
nation. If the Administration has that 
information, they have not shared it with the 
Congress” 
(http://www.house.gov/pelosi/prIraqResoluti
on100302.htm).   
Senator John Warner (19 September 
2002): “Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit 
of weapons of mass destruction and the 
means to deliver these weapons represents a 
present threat and an immediate challenge to 
the international community” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=287). 
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Bush (26 September 2002):  
 
• Iraq poses “a true threat to freedom. A 
true threat to the United States. A 
threat to Israel; a threat to peace in the 
region”. 
• “This is a man who is a threat to 
peace”. 
• “this man [Saddam Hussein] poses a 
much graver threat than anybody 
could have possibly imagined” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/09/20020926-17.html). 
 
Bush (26 September 2002): “The danger 
[from Iraq] to our country is grave. The 
danger to our country is growing”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/text/20020926-7.html). 
 
Rumsfeld (27 September 2002): “no 
terrorist state poses a greater or more 
immediate threat to our security than that of 
Iraq” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.asp
x?speechid=289). 
 
Bush (28 September 2002): “The danger 
[from Iraq] to our country is grave and it is 
growing”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/20020928.html). 
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Representative Gephardt (2 October 
2002): “In our view, Iraq's use and continuing 
development of weapons of mass destruction, 
combined with efforts of terrorists to acquire 
such weapons, pose a unique and dangerous 
threat to our national security” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021002-7.html). 
 
 
Bush (2 October 2002): “On its present 
course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique 
urgency” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021002-7.html). 
 
Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of 
United States Armed Forces Against Iraq 
(2 October 2002):  
 
• “Iraq both poses a continuing threat to 
the national security of the United 
States and international peace and 
security in the Persian Gulf region”. 
• There is a “risk that the current Iraqi 
regime will either employ those 
weapons [WMD] to launch a surprise 
attack against the United States or its 
Armed Forces or provide them to 
international terrorists who would do 
so” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/10/20021002-2.html).   
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Bush (5 October 2002): “The danger to 
America from the Iraqi regime is grave and 
growing”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021005.html). 
 
ElBaradei (7 January 2003): “I believe … 
that we haven't seen anything to show that 
Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons 
program. … so far, we haven't seen a 
smoking gun” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0
301/07/ltm.05.html). 
Bush (7 October 2002):  
• “Facing clear evidence of peril, we 
cannot wait for the final proof – the 
smoking gun – that could come in the 
form of a mushroom cloud”. 
• Iraq poses “a grave threat to peace”. 
• “While there are many dangers in the 
world, the threat from Iraq stands 
alone – because it gathers the most 
serious dangers of our age in one 
place”. 
• The Iraqi regime “threatens us [the 
USA]”. 
• “The attacks of September the 11th 
showed our country that vast oceans 
no longer protect us from danger. 
Before that tragic date, we had only 
hints of al Qaeda's plans and designs. 
Today in Iraq, we see a threat whose 
outlines are far more clearly defined, 
and whose consequences could be far 
more deadly. Saddam Hussein's 
actions have put us on notice, and 
there is no refuge from our 
responsibilities”. 
• “Some ask how urgent this danger is 
Blix (9 January 2003): “we still get prompt 
access from the Iraqi side; … the inspections 
are covering ever-wider areas, and ever more 
sites in Iraq; … in the course of these 
inspections we have not found any smoking 
gun” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Iaea
Iraq/un_briefing_9jan.html). 
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to America and the world. The danger 
is already significant, and it only 
grows worse with time”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/10/20021007-8.html). 
Bush (7 October 2002): “We've also 
discovered through intelligence that Iraq has 
a growing fleet of manned and unmanned 
aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse 
chemical or biological weapons across broad 
areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring 
ways of using these UAVS for missions 
targeting the United States” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021007-8.html). 
 
Bush (12 October 2002): “Confronting Iraq 
is an urgent matter of national security” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/20021012.html). 
NIE – classified version (1 October 2002): 
“The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) 
probably has been directed to conduct 
clandestine attacks against US and Allied 
interests in the Middle East in the event the 
United States takes action against Iraq. The 
IIS probably would be the primary means by 
which Iraq would attempt to conduct any 
CBW attacks on the US Homeland, although 
we have no specific intelligence information 
that Saddam's regime has directed attacks 
against US territory” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-
wmd-nie.pdf). 
 
Bush (16 October 2002): “The Iraqi regime 
is a serious and growing threat to peace” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
10/text/20021016-1.html). 
 
Bush (3 November 2002): “he's [Saddam 
Hussein] a threat”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
11/20021103-3.html). 
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Bush (7 November 2002):  
• “we believe the Iraqi dictator is a 
threat to peace”  
• “The man [Saddam Hussein] is a 
threat. ... He's a threat because he is 
dealing with al Qaeda”. 
• “He's [Saddam Hussein] a threat. He's 
a threat to the country, he's a threat to 
people in his neighborhood. He's a 
real threat” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/11/text/20021107-2.html). 
 
Bush (20 November 2002): Iraq poses a 
“unique and urgent threat”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
11/20021120-4.html).   
 
Bush (3 December 2002):  
• “He's [Saddam Hussein] a threat and 
he's a danger”. 
• “this man's [Saddam Hussein] a 
threat; he's a threat to us, he's a threat 
to you [NATO Allies]”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2002/12/text/20021203-3.html). 
 
Bush (31 December 2002): “a Saddam 
Hussein with weapons of mass destruction is 
a threat to the security of the American 
people” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/
12/text/20021231-1.html). 
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Bush (2 January 2003): “He's a danger to 
the American people, he's a danger to our 
friends and allies” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030102.html). 
 
Bush (3 January 2003):  
• “The Iraqi regime is a grave threat to 
the United States. The Iraqi regime is 
a threat to any American”. 
• “The Iraqi regime has used weapons 
of mass destruction. They not only 
had weapons of mass destruction, they 
used weapons of mass destruction. 
They used weapons of mass 
destruction on people in other 
countries, they have used weapons of 
mass destruction on their own people. 
That's why I say Iraq is a threat, a 
real threat” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/01/20030103.html). 
 
Rumsfeld (20 January 2003):  
• “Iraq poses a threat to the security of 
our people, and to the stability of the 
world, that is distinct from any other”. 
• “It [Saddam Hussein’s regime] is a 
danger to its neighbors, to the United 
States, to the Middle East, and to the 
international peace and stability. It's a 
danger we cannot ignore”. 
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• “In both word and deed, Iraq has 
demonstrated that it is seeking the 
means to strike the United States, and 
our friends and allies with weapons of 
mass destruction”  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spe
ech.aspx?speechid=165). 
Bush (28 January 2003): Iraq poses “a 
serious and mounting threat to our country, 
and our friends and our allies” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030128-19.html). 
 
Rumsfeld (29 January 2003): “This is a 
country [Iraq] … that's threatened the United 
States of America” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcri
pt.aspx?TranscriptID=1349). 
 
Cheney (30 January 2003): 
• “Saddam Hussein's pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction poses a 
grave danger – not only to his 
neighbors, but also to the United 
States”.  
• Iraq poses “a serious threat to our 
country, to our friends, and to our 
allies”. 
• Iraq poses “terrible threats to the 
civilized world”. 
• The Iraqi regime poses a “grave 
danger” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
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s/2003/01/20030130-16.html).  
Cheney (31 January 2003):  
• The Iraqi regime poses a “very serious 
danger”. 
• “Saddam Hussein's pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction poses a 
grave danger – not only to his 
neighbors, but also to the United 
States”.  
• Iraq poses “a serious threat to our 
country, to our friends, and to our 
allies”. 
• Iraq poses “terrible threats to the 
civilized world” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/01/20030131-13.html). 
 
Bush (31 January 2003): “He [Saddam 
Hussein] is a danger to the world” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030131-23.html). 
 
Powell (5 February 2003): The Iraqi deadly 
weapons programs “are real and present 
dangers to the region and to the world” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
02/20030205-1.html). 
 
Bush (10 February 2003):  
• “I believe that Saddam Hussein is a 
threat to the American people”.  
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• “I believe that Saddam Hussein is a 
threat to the American people. I also 
know he's a threat to our friends and 
allies” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/02/text/20030210-10.html).   
Scott McClellan (10 February 2003): “This 
is about an imminent threat [from Iraq]” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
02/20030210-7.html). 
 
Bush (26 February 2003):  
• “The safety of the American people 
depends on ending this direct and 
growing threat. Acting against the 
danger will also contribute greatly to 
the long-term safety and stability of 
our world”. 
• Iraq poses a “direct and growing 
threat” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/02/text/20030226-11.html). 
 
Bush (26 February 2003):  
 
• “There's also a threat gathering in 
Iraq. It's been gathering for a long 
period of time”. 
• “The danger with Iraq is that he can 
strike in the neighborhood” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
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s/2003/02/text/20030226-3.html). 
Bush (6 March 2003):  
 
• “I believe the [Iraqi] threat is real”. 
• “I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat 
– is a threat to the American people. 
He’s a threat to people in his 
neighborhood. He's also a threat to the 
Iraqi people”. 
• “I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat 
to the American people. I believe he's 
a threat to the neighborhood in which 
he lives. And I've got a good evidence 
to believe that”.  
• “Saddam Hussein is a threat to our 
nation”. 
• “There's a lot of facts which make it 
clear to me and many others that 
Saddam is a threat”. 
• “Saddam Hussein and his weapons are 
a direct threat to this country, to our 
people, and to all free people”.  
• “I see a gathering threat [from Iraq]. I 
mean, this is a true, real threat to 
America”. 
• “If I thought we were safe from 
attack, I would be thinking differently. 
But I see a gathering threat. I mean, 
this is a true, real threat to America. 
And, therefore, we will deal with it” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
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s/2003/03/20030306-8.html). 
Bush (16 March 2003): “The dictator of Iraq 
and his weapons of mass destruction are a 
threat to the security of free nations. He is a 
danger to his neighbors”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
03/text/20030316-3.html). 
 
Cheney (16 March 2003): “he [Saddam 
Hussein] does constitute a threat” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/c
heneymeetthepress.htm). 
 
Bush (19 March 2003):  
• “The people of the United States and 
our friends and allies will not live at 
the mercy of an outlaw regime that 
threatens the peace with weapons of 
mass murder. We will meet that threat 
now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, 
Coast Guard and Marines, so that we 
do not have to meet it later with 
armies of fire fighters and police and 
doctors on the streets of our cities”. 
• The Iraqi regime “threatens the peace 
with weapons of mass murder” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release
s/2003/03/text/20030319-17.html). 
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Part Seven 
The Associated Risk Asymmetries 
  
 
Bush: 
• 29 January 2002: “States like these [Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.  They could provide these 
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.  They could attack our 
allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.  In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic"  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-
11.html).   
• 12 September 2002: “To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions 
and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-
1.html#). 
• 28 September 2002: “each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime 
gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020928.html). 
• 7 November 2002: “a true threat facing our country is that an al Qaeda-type network 
trained and armed by Saddam could attack America and leave not one fingerprint. That 
is a threat”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/text/20021107-
2.html). 
• 6 February 2003: “One of the greatest dangers we face is that weapons of mass 
destruction might be passed to terrorists, who would not hesitate to use those weapons. 
Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/text/20030206-
17.html).   
• 25 February 2003: “I worry about the future. I worry about a future in which Saddam 
Hussein gets to blackmail and/or attack. I worry about a future in which terrorist 
organizations are fuelled and funded by a Saddam Hussein. And that's why we're 
bringing this issue to a head”  
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(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/text/20030225-
6.html). 
• 6 March 2003: “September the 11th changed the strategic thinking, at least, as far as I 
was concerned, for how to protect our country. It used to be that we could think that 
you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his 
type of terror. September the 11th should say to the American people that we're now a 
battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization 
could be deployed here at home”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-
8.html). 
Cheney:  
• 24 March 2002: “We're worried about the possible marriage, if you will, on the one 
hand between the terrorist organizations and on the other, weapons of mass destruction 
capability, the kind of devastating materials that Saddam used against his own people 
in '88”. So this whole subject is at a higher level of concern … than it was previously”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html). 
• 2 December 2002: “There is also a grave danger that al Qaeda or other terrorists will 
join with outlaw regimes that have these weapons to attack their common enemy, the 
United States of America. That is why confronting the threat posed by Iraq is not a 
distraction from the war on terror. It is absolutely crucial to winning the war on terror”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021202-
4.html). 
• 16 March 2003: “the cost [of invading Iraq] is far less than it will be if we get hit, for 
example, with a weapon that Saddam Hussein might provide to al-Qaeda ... And the 
cost will be much greater in a future attack if the terrorists have access to the kinds of 
capabilities that Saddam Hussein has developed”  
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm). 
 
Rumsfeld:  
• 18 September 2002: "We have entered a new security environment, one that is 
dramatically different than the one we grew accustomed to over the past half-century. 
We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and terrorists states are 
developing the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction. Today, our margin of 
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error is notably different. In the 20th century, we were dealing, for the most part, with 
conventional weapons - weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands of people, 
generally combatants. In the 21st century, we are dealing with weapons of mass 
destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of people - innocent men, women 
and children. Further, because of the nature of these new threats, we are in an age of 
little or no warning, when threats can emerge suddenly - at any place or time - to 
surprise us. Terrorist states have enormous appetite for these powerful weapons - and 
active programs to develop them. They are finding ways to gain access to these 
capabilities. ... In word and deed, they have demonstrated a willingness to use those 
capabilities. Moreover, after September 11th, they have discovered a new means of 
delivering these weapons - terrorist networks. To the extent that they might transfer 
WMD to terrorist groups, they could conceal their responsibility for attacks. And if 
they believe they can conceal their responsibility for an attack, then they would likely 
not be deterred. ... Iraq has these weapons. They are much simpler to deliver than 
nuclear weapons, and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could 
allow Iraq to deliver them without fingerprints. ... Some have argued that even if Iraq 
has these weapons, Saddam Hussein does not intend to use WMD against the U.S. 
because he is a survivor, not a suicide bomber - that he would be unlikely to take 
actions that could lead to his own destruction. ... it is far from clear that he would not 
necessarily restrain from taking actions that could result in his destruction. For 
example, that logic did not stop the Taliban from supporting and harboring al-Qaeda as 
they planned and executed repeated attacks on the U.S. And their miscalculation 
resulted in the destruction of their regime. Regimes without checks and balances are 
prone to grave miscalculations. Saddam Hussein has no checks whatsoever on his 
decision-making authority. Who among us really believes it would be wise or prudent 
for us to base our security on the hope that Saddam Hussein, or his sons who might 
succeed him, could not make the same fatal miscalculations as Mullah Omar and the 
Taliban? It is my view that we would be ill advised to stake our people’s lives on 
Saddam Hussein’s supposed "survival instinct""  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
 
  86 
• 18 September 2002: "Some have argued Iraq is unlikely to use WMD against us 
because, unlike terrorist networks, Saddam has a "return address". ...  there is no reason 
for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. it would necessarily 
have an obvious "return address". There are ways Iraq could easily conceal 
responsibility for a WMD attack. They could deploy "sleeper cells" armed with 
biological weapons to attack us from within - and then deny any knowledge or 
connection to the attacks. Or they could put a WMD-tipped missile on a "commercial" 
shipping vessel, sail it within range of our coast, fire it, and then melt back into the 
commercial shipping traffic before we knew what hit us. Finding that ship would be 
like searching for a needle in a haystack - a bit like locating a single terrorist. Or they 
could recruit and utilize a terrorist network with similar views and objectives, and pass 
on weapons of mass destruction to them. It is this nexus between a terrorist state like 
Iraq with WMD and terrorist networks that has so significantly changed the U.S. 
security environment. We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 
bombing the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia—an attack that killed 19 American 
service members. We still do not know who is responsible for last year’s anthrax 
attacks. The nature of terrorist attacks is that it is often very difficult to identify who is 
ultimately responsible. Indeed, our consistent failure over the past two decades to trace 
terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that using 
terrorist networks as proxies is an effective way of attacking the U.S. with impunity" 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283).   
• 18 September 2002: "Just as there are risks in acting, so too there are risks in not 
acting. ... we must not forget that the costs of a nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons attack would be far worse [than the costs of acting against Iraq]. ... Those are 
the costs that also must be weighed carefully. And this is not [to] mention the cost to 
one’s conscience of being wrong [in accepting that not p]. ... Long before the Second 
World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf indicating what he intended to do. But the 
hope was that maybe he would not do what he said. Between 35 and 60 million people 
died because of a series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early - at 
a minimal cost of lives - had the vast majority of the world’s leaders not decided at the 
time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting. Today, we must 
decide whether the risks of acting are greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam 
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Hussein has made his intentions clear. He has used weapons of mass destruction 
against his own people and his neighbors. .... He is hostile to the United States. ... He 
has said, in no uncertain terms, that he would use weapons of mass destruction against 
the United States. He has, at this moment, stockpiles chemical and biological weapons, 
and is pursuing nuclear weapons. If he demonstrates the capability to deliver them to 
our shores, the world would be changed. Our people would be at great risk. Our 
willingness to be engaged in the world, our willingness to project power to stop 
aggression, our ability to forge coalitions for multilateral action, could all be under 
question. And many lives could be lost. We need to decide as a people how we feel 
about that. Do the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh these risks of 
living in the world we see? Or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of 
acting? That is the question President Bush has posed to the Congress, to the American 
people and to the world community"  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283).   
• 18 September 2002: “If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreak on our 
country with a biological attack, consider the recent ‘Dark Winter’ exercise conducted 
by Johns Hopkins University. It simulated a biological WMD attack in which terrorists 
released smallpox in three separate locations in the U.S. Within 22 days, it is estimated 
it would have spread to 26 states, with an estimated 6000 new infections occurring 
daily. Within two months, the worst-case estimate indicated one million people could 
be dead and another 2 million infected. Not a nice picture” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
Powell (5 February 2003): “Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we 
know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his 
determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will 
not some day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a 
time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
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John Spratt1 (18 September 2002): “And in particular - this concerns me - we don't know for 
sure what they have in the way of biological agents, and we aren't sure how robust their VX, 
that dusty (ph) VX, persistent VX might be” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
General Richard Myers2 (8 September 2002): “I think ... the evidence is ... we don't think so 
[that Iraq has an atomic weapon], but let me just say that our intelligence is always imperfect, 
and we usually find out that what we don't know is the most troublesome, and in this case, so 
we don't know. But our estimate is that at this point he does not have a nuclear weapon, but he 
wants one”, in Hershey (2008). 
Fleischer (3 September 2002): “the history of the inspections, when they took place, did lead 
to a lot of question marks. That’s why I said that inspections in and of themselves, inspectors 
in and of themselves, are not a guarantee that Saddam Hussein is not developing weapons of 
mass destruction”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020903-1.html). 
 
Wolfowitz (16 October 2002): “the risk of the Iraqi regime using those terrible weapons 
[WMD] or giving them to terrorists is unacceptably high. ... The most dangerous assumption 
of all ... is the assumption that Saddam would not use terrorists as an instrument of revenge. 
That is the very danger that Secretary Powell warned of … The use of terrorists as an 
undeterrable instrument for delivering weapons of mass destruction. ... he cannot be trusted. 
The risk is simply too great that he will use them or provide them to a terror network”  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=295). 
The US Congress: Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Iraq (2 October 2002): "the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ 
those weapons [WMD] to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed 
Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude 
of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to 
justify action by the United States to defend itself"  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 John Spratt was a US Congressman representing South Carolina’s fifth district at the time of the lead-
up to Iraq war.  
2
 Richard Myers is a US Military General who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 
Bush administration’s first term and the build-up to Iraq war.  
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Part Eight 
Regime Change 
 
Bush (22 March 2002): “yes, we'd like to see a regime change in Iraq. That's been the 
longstanding policy of the U.S. government. Nothing is new there. That's precisely what has 
been said since I became President of the United States” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-10.html). 
Fleischer, Press Secretary (3 September 2002): 
• Fleischer: “regime change is the bipartisan policy of the United States government, 
enacted by – enacted by a previous President, enacted as a result of a Democrat President 
and a Republican Congress agreeing that the world would be safer, the region would be 
safer if Saddam Hussein was not in control”.  
• Fleischer: “The policy of the United States is regime change, with or without inspectors 
[being allowed by Saddam Hussein back to Iraq]”. 
• Question: “But if those inspectors go back in, have the unfettered access they seek and 
certify to us that he's honoring those agreements, does he still – does he avoid regime 
change?  
• Fleischer: “the policy of this government has been that regime change will make the 
world a safer, more peaceful place” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020903-1.html). 
Cheney (8 September 2002): 
• Mr Russert: “If Saddam did let the inspectors in and they did have unfettered access, 
could you have disarmament without a regime change”? 
• Cheney: “Boy, that’s a tough one. I don’t know. We’d have to see. I mean, that gets to 
be speculative, in terms of what kind of inspection regime and so forth”.  
• Mr Russert: “But what’s your goal? Disarmament or regime change”? 
• Cheney: “The president’s made it clear that the goal of the United States is regime 
change. He said that on many occasions”.  
• Mr Russert: “So you don’t think you can get disarmament without a regime change”? 
• Cheney: “I didn’t say that. I said the president’s objective for the United States is still 
regime change” (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). 
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Rumsfeld (18 September 2002):  
• “It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime 
change by the passage of the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. The president is now asking 
Congress to support that policy”. 
• “The Congress, of course, has adopted a policy for the United States of America for 
regime change” (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002):  
• “It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime 
change by passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 by, as I recall, something like a ten 
to one margin in both houses. The president is now asking Congress to support that 
policy”. 
• “the policy of the United States government, including the Congress, is [Iraqi] regime 
change. But I think the reason the Congress came to that conclusion and the president 
talks of regime change as a policy of the United States is because it's at this stage so 
difficult to imagine disarmament without regime change”.  
• “the connection between disarming the [Iraqi] weapons of mass destruction and regime 
change is to me awfully tight. It's very difficult to accomplish it without it” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
Rumsfeld (26 September 2002): “the fact is it's [regime change] been the statutory policy of the 
United States government since 1998, in the prior administration, the prior Congress – three 
congresses ago. And the prior administration adopted that as the policy. This president has 
accepted that” (http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669). 
Bush (7 October 2002): “two administrations – mine and President Clinton's – have stated that 
regime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removing a great danger to our nation” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html). 
Bush (6 March 2003): “We will be changing the regime of Iraq, for the good of the Iraqi 
people” (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html). 
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Part Nine  
The Iraqi Cooperation and the UN Inspections’ Progress 
 
The Iraqi Non-cooperation Claims   Counter Evidence  
 
 
Sabri (16 September 2002):  
 
• “I am pleased to inform you [Secretary-
General Kofi Annan] of the decision of 
the Government of the Republic of Iraq 
to allow the return of the United Nations 
weapons inspectors to Iraq without 
conditions”. 
• “The Government of the Republic of 
Iraq has based its decision concerning 
the return of inspectors on its desire to 
complete the implementation of the 
relevant Security Council resolutions 
and to remove any doubts that Iraq still 
possesses weapons of mass destruction. 
… the Government of the Republic of 
Iraq is ready to discuss the practical 
arrangements necessary for the 
immediate resumption of inspections” 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/
documents/s-2002-1034.pdf). 
 
 
ElBaradei (28 December 2002): “We are 
doing no-notice inspection”  
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/021
2/28/smn.02.html). 
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ElBaradei (6 January 2003): “Iraq is 
cooperating at least in terms of process, in terms 
of opening doors to us, in terms of allowing us 
to do what we want to do” 
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/
jan-june03/elbaradei_1-6.html). 
Powell (27 January 2003): 
 
• “The inspectors have also told us that 
they have evidence that Iraq has moved 
or hidden items at sites just prior to 
inspection visits. That's what the 
inspectors say, not what Americans say, 
not what American intelligence says, but 
we certainly corroborate all of that. But 
this is information from the inspectors”. 
• “Iraq continues to conceal quantities, 
vast quantities, of highly lethal material 
and weapons to delivery it. They could 
kill thousands upon thousands of men, 
women and children if Saddam Hussein 
decides to use these against those men, 
women and children, or, just as 
frightening, to provide them to others 
who might use such weapons”.   
• “Today, we heard that the inspectors 
have not been able to interview any 
Iraqi in private. We heard that the 
inspectors have not been allowed to 
Blix (9 January 2003): “we still get prompt 
access from the Iraqi side; … the inspections 
are covering ever-wider areas, and ever more 
sites in Iraq; … in the course of these 
inspections we have not found any smoking 
gun” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIra
q/un_briefing_9jan.html). 
 
Blix (27 January 2003):  
 
• “It would appear from our experience so 
far that Iraq has decided in principle to 
provide cooperation on process, notably 
access”.   
• “Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather 
well so far with UNMOVIC in this field 
[inspection process1]. The most 
important point to make is that access 
has been provided to all sites we have 
wanted to inspect and with one 
exception it has been prompt. We have 
further had great help in building up the 
                                                 
1
 Cooperation on process “has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical 
arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on 
the premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must nevertheless be a 
measure of mutual confidence from the very beginning in running the operation of inspection” whereas 
“The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all 
programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or 
else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains” (27 January 2003).  
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employ aerial surveillance”.   
• “If Iraq no longer has weapons of mass 
destruction, they should willingly give 
the names of all who were involved in 
their previous programs to the 
inspectors for examination and 
interview”.   
• “The inspectors told us that their efforts 
have been impeded by a swarm of Iraqi 
minders” 
(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEB
B/NSAEBB80/new/doc%2021/Briefing
%20on%20the%20Iraq%20Weapons%2
0Inspectors'%20Report.htm). 
infrastructure of our office in Baghdad 
and the field office in Mosul. 
Arrangements and services for our plane 
and our helicopters have been good. The 
environment has been workable” 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx2
7.htm). 
 
Bush (31 January 2003): “Saddam Hussein is 
not disarming”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01
/20030131-23.html). 
ElBaradei (28 January 2003): “I think in the 
nuclear area we are making progress” 
(http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/
28/cnna.access.elbaradei/index.html). 
Cheney (31 January 2003): “Saddam Hussein 
is continuing his decade-old game of defiance, 
delay and deception. He's blocking unrestricted 
aerial reconnaissance – as called for in the U.N. 
resolutions. His security agents are hiding 
documents and materials from U.N. inspectors. 
His intelligence agents are posing as scientists. 
And Saddam Hussein has decreed that real 
scientists who cooperate with U.N. inspectors 
will be killed, along with their families” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01
/20030131-13.html). 
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Powell (5 February 2003): “Saddam Hussein 
and his regime are not just trying to conceal 
weapons, they're also trying to hide people. You 
know the basic facts. Iraq has not complied 
with its obligation to allow immediate, 
unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to 
all officials and other persons as required by 
Resolution 1441” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02
/20030205-1.html). 
 
Bush (8 February 2003): “the regime is 
pursuing an elaborate campaign to conceal its 
weapons materials and to hide or intimidate key 
experts and scientists. This effort of deception 
is directed from the highest levels of the Iraqi 
regime, including Saddam Hussein, his son, 
Iraq's vice president and the very official 
responsible for cooperating with inspectors” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02
/20030208.html). 
 
ElBaradei (9 February 2003): 
 
• “I am seeing a beginning of a change of 
heart on the part of Iraq. We have seen 
eagerness by them to move on these 
issues [the remaining disarmament 
issues]”. 
• “I think we are moving on these issues 
[Iraqi nuclear remaining disarmament 
issues: alleged importation of aluminum 
tubes, magnets, uranium and the alleged 
use of high explosives] and hope we will 
continue to move forward on these 
issues”. 
• “The final question is the enactment of a 
law (prohibiting weapons of mass 
destruction). They [the Iraqis] assured us 
this is moving. The two important 
remaining issues for us are the 
interviews and the surveillance. We are 
moving on one, the interviews, and we 
hope by Friday to move on the question 
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of surveillance planes”.  
• “I see a beginning of a change of heart 
and a beginning of a different attitude 
[on the Iraqi part] … Change of heart is 
a process”. 
• “They [the Iraqis] showed cooperation 
on documents” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus
/IaeaIraq/pressconf_09022003.pdf). 
 
 Blix (9 February 2003):  
• “Iraq has been helpful on process. We 
distinguish between cooperation on 
process and cooperation on substance. 
We have noted repeatedly that access 
has been given to all sites we’ve wanted 
to see and this has been prompt in all 
cases. Not only not just opening doors 
but also answering, a lot of explaining 
etc at sites. The general statement would 
be that cooperation on process has been 
good”. 
• “There are some good developments 
which I’d like to note from these two 
days: we have been given, I’m talking 
for my group (UNMOVIC), a number of 
papers on specific high profile 
unresolved issues in response to points 
that were made at our last visit here that 
Iraq was ready to amplify and to explain 
further what they stated in their 
declaration of December. These papers 
relate to anthrax issues, missile issues, 
notably to the al-Fatah and to the al-
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Samoud”. 
• “Smoking gun is different from drastic 
change. We have seen positive signs [in 
relation to inspections in Iraq]. We are 
not asserting that there are weapons of 
mass destruction. We are also not 
excluding that there are not such 
weapons” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus
/IaeaIraq/pressconf_09022003.pdf). 
 
 
ElBaradei (14 February 2003): 
 
• “Since our 27 January [2003] report, the 
IAEA has conducted an additional 38 
inspections at 19 locations, for a total of 
177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq 
has continued to provide immediate 
access to all locations”. 
• “The IAEA has continued to interview 
key Iraqi personnel. We have recently 
been able to conduct four interviews in 
private – that is, without the presence of 
an Iraqi observer. The interviewees, 
however, have tape recorded their 
interviews. In addition, discussions have 
continued to be conducted with Iraqi 
technicians and officials as part of 
inspection activities and technical 
meetings. I should note that, during our 
recent meeting in Baghdad, Iraq 
reconfirmed its commitment to 
encourage its citizens to accept 
interviews in private, both inside and 
outside of Iraq”. 
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• “In response to a request by the IAEA, 
Iraq has expanded the list of relevant 
Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with 
their current work locations. The list 
includes the higher-level key scientists 
known to the IAEA in the nuclear and 
nuclear related areas”.  
• “I was informed this morning by the 
Director General of Iraq's National 
Monitoring Directorate that national 
legislation prohibiting proscribed 
activities was adopted today. The 
resolution of this long-standing legal 
matter was a step in the right direction 
for Iraq to demonstrate its commitment 
to fulfilling its obligations under the 
Security Council’s resolutions”. 
• “Iraq has accepted the use of all of the 
platforms for aerial surveillance 
proposed by supporting States to 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA, including 
U2s, Mirage IVs, Antonovs and drones”. 
• “The Government of Iraq reiterated last 
week its commitment to comply with its 
Security Council obligations and to 
provide full and active co-operation 
with the inspecting organizations”. 
• “It is my hope that the commitments 
made recently in Baghdad will continue 
to translate into concrete and sustained 
action” 
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/State
ments/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml). 
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Bush (20 February 2003):  
• “he is not complying with the United 
Nations demands to destroy them 
[WMD]”.  
• “He is actively deceiving the 
inspectors”. 
• “He is actively hiding the weapons” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2003/02/text/20030220-2.html). 
 
Bush (6 March 2003): 
• “He has no intention of disarming”.  
• “Saddam Hussein is not disarming. This 
is a fact. It cannot be denied” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2003/03/20030306-8.html). 
 
ElBaradei (7 March 2003):  
 
• “I should note that, in the past three 
weeks, possibly as a result of ever-
increasing pressure by the international 
community, Iraq has been forthcoming 
in its co-operation, particularly with 
regard to the conduct of private 
interviews and in making available 
evidence that could contribute to the 
resolution of matters of IAEA concern”. 
• “As you may recall, when we first began 
to request private, unescorted 
interviews, the Iraqi interviewees 
insisted on taping the interviews and 
keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, 
upon our insistence, individuals have 
been consenting to being interviewed 
without escort and without a taped 
record. The IAEA has conducted two 
such private interviews in the last 10 
days, and hopes that its ability to 
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conduct private interviews will continue 
unhindered, including possibly 
interviews outside Iraq”. 
• “In the last few weeks, Iraq has 
provided a considerable volume of 
documentation relevant to the issues I 
reported earlier as being of particular 
concern, including Iraq’s efforts to 
procure aluminium tubes, its attempted 
procurement of magnets and magnet 
production capabilities, and its reported 
attempt to import uranium”. 
• “In conclusion, I am able to report today 
that, in the area of nuclear weapons – 
the most lethal weapons of mass 
destruction – inspections in Iraq are 
moving forward. Since the resumption 
of inspections a little over three months 
ago – and particularly during the three 
weeks since my last oral report to the 
Council – the IAEA has made important 
progress in identifying what nuclear-
related capabilities remain in Iraq, and 
in its assessment of whether Iraq has 
made any efforts to revive its past 
nuclear programme during the 
intervening four years since inspections 
were brought to a halt” 
(http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbara
dei-7mar03.pdf). 
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 Blix (7 March 2003): 
 
• “Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 
November 2002.  In matters relating to 
process, notably prompt access to sites, 
we have faced relatively few difficulties 
and certainly much less than those that 
were faced by UNSCOM in the period 
1991 to 1998”.   
• “In the last month, Iraq has provided us 
with the names of many persons, who 
may be relevant sources of information, 
in particular, persons who took part in 
various phases of the unilateral 
destruction of biological and chemical 
weapons, and proscribed missiles in 
1991”.  
• “More papers on anthrax, VX and 
missiles have recently been provided”.  
• “There is a significant Iraqi effort 
underway to clarify a major source of 
uncertainty as to the quantities of 
biological and chemical weapons, which 
were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A 
part of this effort concerns a disposal 
site, which was deemed too dangerous 
for full investigation in the past.  It is 
now being re-excavated.  To date, Iraq 
has unearthed eight complete bombs 
comprising two liquid-filled intact R-
400 bombs and six other complete 
bombs.  Bomb fragments were also 
found.  Samples have been taken. The 
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investigation of the destruction site 
could, in the best case, allow the 
determination of the number of bombs 
destroyed at that site.  It should be 
followed by a serious and credible effort 
to determine the separate issue of how 
many R-400 type bombs were produced.  
In this, as in other matters, inspection 
work is moving on and may yield 
results”. 
• “Iraq has also recently informed us that, 
following the adoption of the 
presidential decree prohibiting private 
individuals and mixed companies from 
engaging in work related to WMD, 
further legislation on the subject is to be 
enacted. This appears to be in response 
to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting 
clarification of the issue. What are we to 
make of these activities? One can hardly 
avoid the impression that, after a period 
of somewhat reluctant cooperation, 
there has been an acceleration of 
initiatives from the Iraqi side since the 
end of January”.  
• “the question is now asked whether Iraq 
has cooperated ‘immediately, 
unconditionally and actively’ with 
UNMOVIC, as required under 
paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002).  
The answers can be seen from the 
factual descriptions I have provided.  
However, if more direct answers are 
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desired, I would say the following: The 
Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach 
conditions, as it did regarding 
helicopters and U-2 planes.  Iraq has 
not, however, so far persisted in these or 
other conditions for the exercise of any 
of our inspection rights.  If it did, we 
would report it. It is obvious that, while 
the numerous initiatives, which are now 
taken by the Iraqi side with a view to 
resolving some long-standing open 
disarmament issues, can be seen as 
“active”, or even “proactive”, these 
initiatives 3-4 months into the new 
resolution cannot be said to constitute 
“immediate” cooperation.  Nor do they 
necessarily cover all areas of relevance.  
They are nevertheless welcome”. 
• “we are able to perform professional no-
notice inspections all over Iraq and to 
increase aerial surveillance”. 
• “While during our meetings in Baghdad, 
the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that 
the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have 
declared fall within the permissible 
range set by the Security Council, the 
calculations of an international panel of 
experts led us to the opposite 
conclusion.  Iraq has since accepted that 
these missiles and associated items be 
destroyed and has started the process of 
destruction under our supervision. The 
destruction undertaken constitutes a 
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substantial measure of disarmament – 
indeed, the first since the middle of the 
1990s.  We are not watching the 
breaking of toothpicks.  Lethal weapons 
are being destroyed”.   
• “To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, 
including 4 training missiles, 2 combat 
warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have 
been destroyed under UNMOVIC 
supervision. Work is continuing to 
identify and inventory the parts and 
equipment associated with the Al 
Samoud 2 programme”  
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7
asdelivered.htm). 
 
Rumsfeld (11 March 2003): “we know he 
continues to hide biological and chemical 
weapons, moving them to different locations as 
often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them 
in residential neighborhoods” 
(http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.a
spx?transcriptid=2027). 
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Part Eleven  
Suggested Future Research 
 
File 
Type 
Knowledge-Constituted Statements 
Rice (8 September 2002): “We know that he is acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction” (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
 
Bush (12 September 2002): “We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons 
of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that 
he stopped when they left?”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-
1.html#). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “We have not, will not, and cannot know 
everything that is going on in the world. Over the years, even our best efforts, 
intelligence has repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities of a variety 
of countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six 
or eight years between the time a country of concern first developed a WMD 
capability and the time we finally learned about it” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “we do not know where all of Iraq’s WMD 
facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “knowing what we know about Iraq’s history, 
no conclusion is possible except that they have and are accelerating their WMD 
programs” (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
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Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): “we simply do not know where all or even a 
large portion of Iraq's WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them 
are” (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
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Rumsfeld (26 September 2002): “We know they [the Iraqis] have weapons of 
mass destruction. We know they have active programs. There isn't any debate 
about it”  
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669). 
 
Bush (26 September 2002): “We know he's [Saddam Hussein] actively seeking 
the destructive technologies to match is hatred” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/text/20020926-7.html). 
Bush (7 October 2002): “If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons 
today – and we do – does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him 
as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-
8.html). 
 
Rumsfeld (3 December 2002): “The United States knows that Iraq has weapons 
of mass destruction. The U.K. knows that they have weapons of mass destruction. 
Any country on the face of the earth with an active intelligence program knows 
that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2803). 
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Powell (5 February 2003):  
 
• “I cannot tell you everything that we know. ... What you will see is an 
accumulation of facts. … My colleagues, every statement I make today is 
backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're 
giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence”. 
• “My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, 
to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism”. 
• “We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all 
prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We 
know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party 
and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files 
from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that 
are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to 
avoid detection”. 
• “As it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using 
its considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities”. 
• “We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of 
mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam 
Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose 
plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his 
determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take 
the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the 
place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a 
much weaker position to respond?”.  
• “Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons, 
they're also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not 
complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted 
and private access to all officials and other persons as required by 
Resolution 1441”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html). 
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Hans Blix (9 February 2003): “Our starting point is that the Security Council to 
which we report would want to be reassured that no WMD or long-range missiles 
are in Iraq. Much was destroyed up to '98, but the Security Council noted in 99 
that there are unresolved disarmament issues and asked Iraq and us UNMOVIC 
and the IAEA to resolve them. These unresolved issues do not necessarily mean 
that there are weapons; it means we don’t know, we'd like to know that they 
don’t now exist”  
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIraq/pressconf_09022003.pdf). 
  
Bush (20 February 2003): “the world knows that Saddam Hussein has weapons 
of mass destruction”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/text/20030220-2.html). 
Bush (6 March 2003): “the American people know that Saddam Hussein has 
weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-
8.html). 
Cheney (29 November 2001): “We know he [Saddam Hussein] has developed 
… chemical agents” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20011129.html). 
Cheney (17 March 2002): “We know they [the Iraqis] have … chemical 
weapons” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020317.html). 
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Cheney (19 March 2002): “We know that they [the Iraqis] have chemical 
weapons. Of course they've used them in the past against the Iranians and the 
Curds” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020319.html). 
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Senator Richard Durbin (3 September 2002): “We know he has chemical and 
biological weapons. Maybe he has more” 
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress/july-dec02/congress_9-3.html). 
 
Fleischer (3 September 2002): “We do know that Saddam Hussein possesses 
chemical weapons” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020903-
1.html). 
General Richard Myers (8 September 2002): “We've known for, for quite 
some time that he's got chemical and biological weapons and a, and an interest in 
nuclear weapons, and this is very consistent with what we've known all along, 
and I think represents the facts as they are”, in Hershey (2008). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “We do know that the Iraqi regime currently 
has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction”  
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): 
 
• “We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons 
of mass destruction”. 
• “we know Iraq possesses … chemical weapons, and is expanding and 
improving their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit 
as much concern as Iraq’s potential nuclear capability” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): “We do know that the Iraqi regime has 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
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General Richard Myers (19 September 2002): “we know he's continuing to 
produce the chemical and biological weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
 
Bush (7 October 2002): “We know that the regime has produced thousands of 
tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-
8.html). 
 
Rumsfeld (14 November 2002): “we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical 
and biological weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3283). 
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Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq 
procures needed items from around the world using an extensive 
clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted 
communications and human sources who are in a position to know the 
facts”. 
• “We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have 
recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
facilities. … Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munition 
facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji (ph). This 
is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has 
housed chemical munitions. … Here, you see 15 munitions bunkers in 
yellow and red outlines. The four that are in red squares represent active 
chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know that? How can I say that? 
Let me give you a closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is 
a close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate 
the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical 
munitions”. 
• “We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical 
weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry”. 
• “In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this 
picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, 
and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle 
associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this 
picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated 
that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So 
it's not just the photo, and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the 
photo and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to 
make the case”.  
• “we know that they [the Iraqi government] do [have nerve agents]” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html).   
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Rumsfeld (11 March 2003): “we know he continues to hide biological and 
chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 
hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods”  
(http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2027). 
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Cheney (16 March 2003): “we know he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, 
developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons. … . We 
know he’s reconstituted these programs since the Gulf War” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm). 
 
Cheney (29 November 2001): “We know he [Saddam Hussein] has developed 
biological … agents” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20011129.html). 
 
Cheney (17 March 2002): “We know they [the Iraqis] have biological … 
weapons” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020317.html). 
 
Cheney (19 March 2002): “We know they [the Iraqis] have biological weapons” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020319.html). 
 
Senator Richard Durbin (3 September 2002): “We know he has chemical and 
biological weapons. Maybe he has more” 
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress/july-dec02/congress_9-3.html). 
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General Richard Myers (8 September 2002): “We've known for, for quite 
some time that he's got chemical and biological weapons and a, and an interest in 
nuclear weapons, and this is very consistent with what we've known all along, 
and I think represents the facts as they are”, in Hershey (2008). 
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Rice (8 September 2002): “we know that he has stored the biological weapons” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
 
Congressman John Spratt1 (18 September 2002): “And in particular – this 
concerns me – we don't know for sure what they have in the way of biological 
agents, and we aren't sure how robust their VX, that dusty (ph) VX, persistent 
VX might be” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “We do know that the Iraqi regime currently 
has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “We do know that the Iraqi regime has 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283).   
 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): “We do know that the Iraqi regime has 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
 
General Richard Myers (19 September 2002): “we know he's continuing to 
produce the chemical and biological weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
Rumsfeld (14 November 2002): “we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical 
and biological weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3283). 
                                                 
1
 John Spratt is a US Congressman representing South Carolina’s fifth district.  
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Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq 
procures needed items from around the world using an extensive 
clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted 
communications and human sources who are in a position to know the 
facts”. 
• “While we were here in this council chamber debating Resolution 1441 
last fall, we know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside 
Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing 
biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to 
various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads 
have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved 
every one to four weeks to escape detection”. 
• “Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full 
of this deadly material [anthrax]. … The Iraqis have never accounted for 
all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they 
had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make 
them [biological weapons]. … they have not accounted for many of the 
weapons filled with these agents [biological] such as there are 400 
bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well-
documented”  
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html).   
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 Rumsfeld (11 March 2003): “we know he continues to hide biological and 
chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 
hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods” 
(http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2027). 
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Bush (28 January 2003): “From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the 
late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to 
produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade 
inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He's given no 
evidence that he has destroyed them”   
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-
19.html). 
 
Cheney (30 January 2003): “We know he had … several mobile biological 
weapons laboratories designed to produce germ warfare agents on the move”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030130-
16.html). 
 
Cheney (31 January 2003): “We know that he had … several mobile biological 
weapons laboratories designed to produce germ warfare agents on the move” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131-
13.html). 
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Wolfowitz (23 January 2003): “We know about that capability [Iraq’s mobile 
biological weapons production facilities] from defectors and other sources” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=171). 
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Powell (5 February 2003): “We have firsthand descriptions of biological 
weapons factories on wheels and on rails. … an Iraqi civil engineer in a position 
to know the details of the program, confirmed the existence of transportable 
facilities moving on trailers. … A third source, also in a position to know, 
reported in summer 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems 
mounted on road trailer units and on rail cars. … Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi 
major, who defected, confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research 
laboratories, in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier. … We 
know that Iraq has at lest seven of these mobile biological agent factories” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-
1.html).   
 
Cheney (19 March 2002): “we know they [the Iraqis] are pursuing nuclear 
weapons” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20020319.html). 
 
Cheney (26 August 2002): “we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts 
to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other sources, we've gotten this from the 
firsthand testimony of defectors – including Saddam's own son-in-law, who was 
subsequently murdered at Saddam's direction. Many of us are convinced that 
Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html). 
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General Richard Myers (8 September 2002): “I think the, the evidence is we 
don't, we don't think so [that Iraq has an atomic weapon], but let me just say that 
our intelligence is always imperfect, and we usually find out that what we don't 
know is the most troublesome, and in this case, so we don't know. But our 
estimate is that at this point he does not have a nuclear weapon, but he wants 
one”, in Hershey (2008). 
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Cheney (8 September 2002): “I can say that I know for sure that he [Saddam 
Hussein] is trying to acquire the capability [nuclear capability]” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). 
 
Rice (8 September 2002): “We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear 
weapon” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
 
General Richard Myers (8 September 2002): “We've known for, for quite 
some time that he's got chemical and biological weapons and a, and an interest in 
nuclear weapons, and this is very consistent with what we've known all along, 
and I think represents the facts as they are”, in Hershey (2008). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “Now, do we have perfect evidence that can 
tell us precisely the date Iraq will have a deliverable nuclear device, or when and 
where he might try to use it? That is not knowable” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002):  
 
• “We do know that the Iraqi regime … is pursuing nuclear weapons”. 
• “We do not know today precisely how close he is to having a deliverable 
nuclear weapon. What we do know is that he has a sizable appetite for 
them, that he has been actively and persistently pursuing them for more 
than 20 years, and that we allow him to get them at our peril. Moreover, 
let’s say he is 5-7 years from a deliverable nuclear weapon. That raises 
the question: 5-7 years from when? From today? From 1998, when he 
kicked out the inspectors? Or from earlier, when inspectors were still in 
country? There is no way of knowing except from the ground, unless one 
believes what Saddam Hussein says” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
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Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): 
• “we do know they're currently pursuing nuclear weapons”. 
• “Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent, that 
Saddam Hussein is at least five to seven years away from having nuclear 
weapons. I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 
1991, the best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was about five to 
seven years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat 
wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, they found that the Iraqis were 
probably six months to a year to 18 months from having a nuclear 
weapon, not five to seven years. We do know that he has been actively 
and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for more than 20 years” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): “We do know that … they're [the Iraqis] 
pursuing nuclear weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
 
Rumsfeld (14 November 2002): “we know he has an active program for the 
development of nuclear weapons” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3283). 
 
ElBaradei (13 December 2002): “We know that Iraq, at least when we left in 
1998, has no [nuclear] capability whatsoever to produce either a weapon or 
weapon-usable material” 
(http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/13/lt.01.html). 
 
Bush (31 December 2002): “I think it's important to remember that Saddam 
Hussein was close to having a nuclear weapon. We don't know whether or not he 
has a nuclear weapon” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/text/20021231-1.html). 
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Rice (9 March 2003): 
 
• “What we've said is that we believe the weakness in Saddam Hussein's 
program [nuclear program] is the absence of fissile material, and we do 
not know whether he has acquired fissile material. This was a particular 
report that had to be investigated and run down, but we've always said 
that his strength is that he has the infrastructure in place, he has a 
procurement network that is out buying pieces of a nuclear 
infrastructure”. 
• “He has the scientists [nuclear scientists] in place, but what we don't think 
he has or know whether he has is the [nuclear] fissile material”. 
• “But I want to be very clear. We've always said that we do not know 
whether he's acquired [nuclear] fissile material” 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/10/ftn/main543382.shtml?tag=
contentMain;contentBody). 
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Cheney (16 March 2003): “We know he’s out trying once again to produce 
nuclear weapons” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm). 
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Cheney (8 September 2002): “we have to assume there’s more there than we 
know. What we know is just bits and pieces we gather through the intelligence 
system. But we-you never-nobody ever mails you the entire plan or that rarely 
happens. It certainly has not happened in this case. So we have to deal with these 
bits and pieces, and try to put them together in a mosaic to understand what’s 
going on. But we do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his 
procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich 
uranium to build a nuclear weapon” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). 
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NIE – Classified (1 October 2002): “A foreign government service reported 
that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of “pure uranium” 
(probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were 
still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of 
yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf). 
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Rice (8 September 2002): “We do know that there have been shipments going 
into Iran, for instance – into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are 
only suited to – high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for 
nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
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NIE – Classified (1 October 2002): INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to 
Acquire Aluminum Tubes: “Some of the specialized but dual-use items being 
sought are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program. Other cases are 
ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-production line whose suitability 
for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts involve non-controlled 
industrial material and equipment – including a variety of machine tools – and 
are troubling because they would help establish the infrastructure for a renewed 
nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors 
departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi 
pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf). 
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 Rice (8 September 2002): “We know that there are unaccounted-for Scud and 
other ballistic missiles in Iraq” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
  133 
Powell (5 February 2003):  
• “We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged 
permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samud II (ph) and the al-Fatah (ph), 
violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this council in Resolution 
687. These are prohibited systems”. 
• “What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are 
intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One 
program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more 
than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, 
who will be in danger of these missiles” (http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html).   
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Rumsfeld (25 February 2003): “We know that Iraq has a number of so-called 
UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, of different types; that they train with them and 
exercise them” (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=346). 
Cheney (30 January 2003): “We know he had about 30,000 munitions capable 
of delivering chemical weapons”  
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030130-
16.html). 
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Cheney (31 January 2003): “We know that he had some 30,000 munitions 
capable of delivering chemical agents” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131-
13.html). 
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CIA (21 June 2002): “Our knowledge of Iraqi links to al-Qa’ida still contains 
many critical gaps because of limited reporting and the questionable reliability 
of many of our sources” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/CIAreport.062102.pdf). 
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Cheney (8 September 2002): “There is – again, I want to separate out 9/11, 
from the other relationships between Iraq and the al-Qaeda organization. But 
there is a pattern of relationships going back many years. And in terms of 
exchanges and in terms of people, we’ve had recently since the operations in 
Afghanistan – we’ve seen al-Qaeda members operating physically in Iraq and off 
the territory of Iraq. We know that Saddam Hussein has, over the years, been one 
of the top state sponsors of terrorism for nearly 20 years. We’ve had this recent 
weird incident where the head of the Abu Nidal organization, one of the world’s 
most noted terrorists, was killed in Baghdad. The announcement was made by 
the head of Iraqi intelligence. The initial announcement said he’d shot himself. 
When they dug into that, though, he’d shot himself four times in the head. And 
speculation has been, that, in fact, somehow, the Iraqi government or Saddam 
Hussein had him eliminated to avoid potential embarrassment by virtue of the 
fact that he was in Baghdad and operated in Baghdad. So it’s a very complex 
picture to try to sort out” 
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm). 
Rice (8 September 2002): “There is certainly evidence that al Qaeda people 
have been in Iraq. There is certainly evidence that Saddam Hussein cavorts with 
terrorists. I think that if you asked, do we know that he had a role in 9/11, no, we 
do not know that he had a role in 9/11. But I think that this is the test that sets a 
bar that is far too high. We know a great deal about his terrorist activity. We 
know that he, as I said before, tried to assassinate President George H. W. Bush. 
We know that he pays Hamas terrorists $25,000 for suicide bombings that led to 
suicide bombings against American citizens with five American deaths at 
Hebrew University” 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html). 
 
Bush (12 September 2002): “al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan … 
are known to be in Iraq” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-
1.html#). 
 
  135 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002):  
• “We do know that the Iraqi regime has … proven support for and 
cooperation with terrorist networks”. 
• “We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little 
happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. 
We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and 
al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror 
himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=283). 
 
Rumsfeld (18 September 2002): “We do know that …. they've … proven 
support for and cooperation with terrorist networks” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=284). 
 
Rumsfeld (19 September 2002): “We do know … that they [the Iraqis] 
cooperate with terrorist networks” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=287). 
 
Rice (25 September 2002):  
• “We clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts 
between senior Iraqi officials and members of al-Qaida going back for 
actually quite a long time”. 
• “yes there are contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. We know that Saddam 
Hussein has a long history with terrorism in general. And there are some 
al-Qaida personnel who found refuge in Baghdad”.  
• “We know too that several of the detainees, in particular some high 
ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al-Qaida 
in chemical weapons development”  
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec02/rice_9-
25.html). 
 
  136 
Rumsfeld (26 September 2002): 
 
• “The knowledge that the intelligence community, the shared intelligence 
information among the coalition members, has of the al Qaeda 
relationship with Iraq is evolving. It's based on a lot of different types of 
sources of varying degrees of reliability. Some of it, admittedly, comes 
from detainees, which has been helpful, and particularly some high-
ranking detainees”.  
• “Since we began after September 11th, we do have solid evidence of the 
presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in 
Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of 
senior level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical and 
biological agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean between Iraq 
and al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 
1998”. 
• “We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al 
Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal 
nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible 
evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could 
help them acquire weapon of – weapons of mass destruction capabilities. 
We do have – I believe it's one report indicating that Iraq provided 
unspecified training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al 
Qaeda members. There is, I'm told, also some other information of 
varying degrees of reliability that supports that conclusion of their 
cooperation”. 
• Question: Do you know what the specific kind of training is without 
telling us?  
• Rumsfeld: That I'm not – I don't have high confidence in, because –  
• Question: Are there any indications that senior al Qaeda are in Baghdad 
or Iraq?  
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• Rumsfeld: “the problem with it is that when intelligence is gathered, it's 
gathered at a moment, and then that moment passes, and then there's the 
next moment and the moment after that. We certainly have evidence of 
senior al Qaeda who have been in Baghdad in recent periods. Whether 
they're currently there or not one never knows, because they're moving 
targets”. 
• Rumsfeld: “although we know there are al Qaeda in the country, and we 
know they've discussed with Iraq safe haven. Now whether the ones that 
are in the country are there under some sort of grant of safe haven or not 
is – happens to be a piece of intelligence that either we don't have or we 
don't want to talk about”. 
• Question: “you said, I think, that you have solid evidence of the presence 
of al Qaeda in Iraq, including some in Baghdad. And when you said that, 
I wasn't clear what time frame you were referring to, whether or not that 
is current. Do you currently believe they're in Baghdad, or are you only 
talking about al Qaeda in the North in Kurdish-controlled areas”?  
• Rumsfeld: “Specifically not, with respect to the last part of your question. 
We're not only talking about al Qaeda in the northern part”. 
• Question: So you currently believe there are al Qaeda in Saddam 
Hussein-controlled areas.  
• Rumsfeld: “I thought I said it precisely the way I wanted to. I can't know 
whether, as we sit here talking, the information that was accurate when 
we got it is still accurate today” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3669
). 
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Rumsfeld (14 November 2002): “our understanding of the relationship between 
Iraq and al Qaeda is still developing. That there is no question but that there have 
been interactions between the Iraqi government, Iraqi officials, and al Qaeda 
operatives. They have occurred over a span of some eight or ten years to our 
knowledge. There are currently al Qaeda in Iraq” 
(http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3283). 
 
Bush (2 October 2002): “We know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and 
ongoing ties to international terrorists” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-
7.html). 
 
Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Iraq (2 October 2002): “members of al Qaida, an organization bearing 
responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, 
including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in 
Iraq” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-
2.html). 
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Bush (7 October 2002):  
 
• “we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to 
groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace”. 
• “We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy – the United States of America”. 
• “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go 
back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. 
These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical 
treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with 
planning for chemical and biological attacks”.  
• “we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime 
gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html). 
 
Bush (14 October 2002): “This is a man [Saddam Hussein] that we know has 
had connections with al Qaeda. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to 
use al Qaeda as a forward army. And this is a man that we must deal with for the 
sake of peace, for the sake of our children's peace” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021014-
3.html). 
 
Wolfowitz (16 October 2002): “We are still assembling the picture, which we 
know is incomplete, of the Iraqi relationship with al Qaeda. If that is true about 
the past, think how much more true it is about the future” 
(http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=295). 
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CIA (29 January 2003): “Iraq – acting on the request of al-Qa’ida militant Abu 
Abdullah, who was Muhammad Atif’s emissary – agreed to provide unspecified 
chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qa’ida associates beginning 
in December 2000. These two individuals departed for Iraq but did not return, so 
al-Libi was not in a position to know if any training had taken place” 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf). 
 
Powell (5 February 2003): 
• “We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of 
mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam 
Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose 
plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his 
determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take 
the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the 
place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a 
much weaker position to respond?”. 
• “We know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. … The [Zarqawi] network 
remains in Baghdad”.  
• “We know members of both organizations [Al-Qaeda and Iraqi 
Intelligence Services] met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at 
very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security 
service tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official 
in Khartoum, and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html).   
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Bush (6 February 2003): “We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist 
network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. The network runs a 
poison and explosive training center in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are 
known to be in Baghdad. The head of this network traveled to Baghdad for 
medical treatment and stayed for months. Nearly two dozen associates joined 
him there and have been operating in Baghdad for more than eight months. The 
same terrorist network operating out of Iraq is responsible for the murder, the 
recent murder, of an American citizen, an American diplomat, Laurence Foley. 
The same network has plotted terrorism against France, Spain, Italy, Germany, 
the Republic of Georgia, and Russia, and was caught producing poisons in 
London. The danger Saddam Hussein poses reaches across the world” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/text/20030206-17.html). 
 
Bush (8 February 2003): “We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist 
network headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. This network runs a 
poison and explosive training camp in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are 
known to be in Baghdad” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030208.html). 
 
Tenet (11 February 2003): “I don't know that [whether the Zarqawi terrorist 
network is under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi government], sir, but I 
know that there's a safe haven that's been provided to this network in Baghdad. 
… what we've said is Zarqawi and this large number of operatives are in 
Baghdad” 
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060915-
4.html). 
 
  142 
Rice (9 March 2003): “The strongest link of – of Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda 
… there are a lot of tantalizing meetings that – with people who were involved in 
9/11. But the strongest links to al Qaeda are really two. First of all, a poisons 
master named Al Zakawi who has his own network in Baghdad – or in – in Iraq, 
not in the north of Iraq where Saddam Hussein is arguably not in control but in 
central Iraq … a man who is spreading poisons throughout Europe. And 
secondly, a very strong link to training al Qaeda in chemical and biological 
weapons techniques. We know from a detainee that – the head of training for al 
Qaeda, that they sought help in developing chemical and biological weapons 
because they weren't doing very well on their own. They sought it in Iraq. They 
received the help” 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/10/ftn/main543382.shtml?tag=content
Main;contentBody). 
 
Bush (15 March 2003): “We know the Iraqi regime finances and sponsors 
terror” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html). 
 
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
 
Cheney (16 March 2003): “we know that he has a long-standing relationship 
with various terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization”  
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm). 
 
Ir
a
qi
 
Th
re
a
t Bush (10 February 2003): “I believe that Saddam Hussein is a threat to the 
American people. I also know he's a threat to our friends and allies” 
(http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/text/20030210-10.html). 
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NIE – Classified (1 October 2002): “He probably would use CBW when he 
perceived he irretrievably had lost control of the military and security situation, 
but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that point” 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf). 
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